


Security, Conflict and Cooperation
in the Contemporary World



The Balkans in the Cold War

Edited by

SVETOZAR RAJAK,
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Security, Conflict and Cooperation in the Contemporary World

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This volume is the product of three years of planning, discussions and communications among the editors and the authors on the research questions we should address. This trip has been full of interesting debates, individual challenges and teamwork that have made us all wiser and more confident in the significance of regional outlooks for understanding international phenomena.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BCP	Bulgarian Communist Party
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy [EEC]
CC	Central Committee
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON	See CMEA
CMC	Cuban Missile Crisis
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—COMECON
CMFA	Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs [Warsaw Pact]
CoE	Council of Europe
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union [See Also VKP(b)]
CPY	Communist Party of Yugoslavia [Until 1952]
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
DP	Democrat Party [Turkey]
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
ELAS	Greek People's Liberation Army
EPC	European Political Cooperation [EEC]
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FNRJ	Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR	German Democratic Republic

ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
JAF	Joint Armed Forces [Warsaw Pact]
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff [USA]
JP	Justice Party [Turkey]
KKE	Greek Communist Party
LCC	League of Communists of Croatia
LCY/SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia [after 1952]
MEC	Middle East Command
MEDO	Middle East Defence Organisation
MGCM	Multilateral Group for Current Mutual Information [Warsaw Pact]
MLF	Multilateral Force [NATO]
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NAP	National Action Party [Turkey]
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration [USA]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NOF	People's Liberation Front [Greek Civil War]
NSC	National Security Council [USA]
NSP	Islamic National Salvation Party [Turkey]
NSWP	Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement [Greece]
PCC	Political Consultative Committee [Warsaw Pact]
PHP	Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRM	People's Republic of Macedonia [Yugoslavia; See Also SRM]
RPP	Republican People's Party [Turkey]
RWP	Romanian Workers' Party
SFRJ	See SFRY
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SMIP	Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Archives
SNOF	Slav-Macedonian Liberation Front [Greece, 1944]
SRM	Socialist Republic of Macedonia [Yugoslavia]
SU	Soviet Union
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TNA	The National Archives [UK]
UAR	United Arab Republic

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
URVSJ	Association of Reserve Military Officers of Yugoslavia
US	United States
USAREUR	United States Army, European Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VKP(b)	Soviet Communist Party [Until October 1952; See Also CPSU]
VOA	Voice of America
WP	Warsaw Pact [See Also WTO]
WPT	Worker's Party of Turkey
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

INTRODUCTION

The Balkans, occupying a strategic position from Central Europe to its southern and south-eastern borderlands, became a breeding ground for the impending Cold War confrontation before the Second World War ended, together with its historic and multi-layered political, economic and cultural bequest. Although the new international system brought new challenges, such as ideological dilemmas, the fact remains that many of region's problems predated the Cold War and in many cases survived it. Contrary to stereotypes, these problems were not limited to nationalism, the residue of the processes the rest of Europe completed in the second half of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries. Significantly, they encompassed a search for civic identities beyond nationalism, but also strategic dilemmas, the economy and the burning issue of modernization, a major aspiration of the Balkan peoples and states since the nineteenth century. In fact, the choices undertaken by the Balkan states to subscribe to the Cold War alliances, or pursue non-alignment in the case of Yugoslavia, were concomitant with their ambition to follow existing patterns of modernization through industrialization, in an effort to overcome perennial problems of poverty, instability and insecurity.

Positioned on the fault line between two competing prospects of modernity and equally blessed and burdened with ingrained cultural and religious diversity, the Balkans posed a challenge to the post-Second World War global system. Unsurprisingly, this would be true particularly during the nascent and the final phase of the Cold War when the system was most vulnerable. Inevitably, this brings us to the question about the factors that shaped the Balkans during the Cold War. Was it the systemic element of the Cold War

itself, or perhaps the inherent regional realities and pressures? This volume argues that both factors played a role and aims to underline their interdependence. No one would question the fact that superpower supremacy, Cold War strategic dilemmas or ideological cleavages were of critical importance. Yet, even in the era of regional transnationalism and then globalization, the regional pressures proved equally decisive. Their relevance and uncontrollability derived from the character of the regional actors—small states, which were highly vulnerable to alterations in the regional balance of power, usually as a consequence of global power shifts. These regional characteristics and ambitions provide for an element of continuity between the Cold War and the periods that preceded and followed it.

In the past few decades, the international scholarship of the Cold War has broadened our understanding beyond interpretations that view it merely as a contest between the two dominant superpowers. Historiography has justly turned its focus to numerous factors that contributed to the complexity of international structures and the dynamics of global developments through interdependence, thus ‘de-centering’ the Cold War. One of the most intriguing among the many perspectives advanced is the effort to comprehend the interrelation between the local, regional and global. This volume addresses the relationship between the global Cold War and its regional manifestations, namely those in the Balkans. To achieve the above goal, this volume represents an international history of the Balkans, our second contextual framework. It aspires to combine many levels of analysis—local, national, regional, European, international and transnational, using comparative studies, regional interactions and their wider impact on the Cold War.

The last, but certainly not least, contextual framework of this volume was to address the history of the Balkans in the Cold War beyond the traditional focus on diplomatic history. In tune with an ever expanding and pluralistic interpretation of the Cold War concept, research on the Balkans has also moved beyond the political and military focus to address culture and identity as well. Our aim was to bring into the discussion these diverse aspects that reflected the region’s complexities. The volume is structured around five big themes: (I) The Balkans and the Creation of the Cold War Order; (II) Military Alliances and the Balkans; (III) Uneasy Relations with the Superpowers; (IV) Balkan Dilemmas in the 1970s and 1980s and the ‘Significant Other’: The EEC; and (V) Identity, Culture, Ideology. This volume does not and cannot represent a *definitive* history of the Balkans in the Cold War. It would be futile and impossible, not least because it would

imply an end to future research. On the contrary, our ambition is to encourage further research and scholarship of the subject area, as well as to inspire scholarly discussions and debates that are a precondition for that healthy inquisitiveness, which leads to new knowledge and historical insights.

This volume comprises fifteen chapters grouped within the above five themes, plus the concluding observations. Our contributors are prominent scholars, authorities in their respective fields, as well as young historians who have distinguished themselves by addressing topics that fill an existing void in the scholarship of the Balkans in the Cold War. They represent an international body of scholars from a number of countries in the region, as well as from outside the Balkans. In this collection we wished to examine the state of the existing historiography of the Balkans, to provide the platform for presenting new research and innovative interpretations, as well as to identify new areas that deserve further research and attention in the future. The editors have made every effort to ensure that this volume reflects varying interpretations of the contentious issues of the history of the Balkans during the Cold War. Of particular importance is that the chapters presented here are based on multi-archival research and in particular on research of the regional archives that have become accessible after the end of the Cold War. In this respect, it is noteworthy that archives of the ex-socialist countries have provided an abundance of new insight. Of particular merit is the fact that these archives are freely accessible to researchers. Archival accessibility is somewhat different in the case of Greece and Turkey. Access to Turkish archives remains restricted. In the case of Greece, rapid and promising progress has been recorded lately in the opening of both personal and official archives, and it is hoped that more will be done in the future.

John O. Iatrides discusses the impact of Balkan affairs, mainly the Greek civil war and its international complications, on US containment policy during the crucial period of the onset of the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine became the first American large-scale, medium-term intervention in the Eastern hemisphere in peacetime. Iatrides points to a mixture of international, regional and Greek developments that caused the change in American policy from relative indifference towards the region to active intervention. This change involved a slow and long process, and was not merely a hasty response to the British ultimatum, early in 1947, warning Washington about the imminent British withdrawal from Greece.

Drawing on exceptional research of published and archival sources from former Communist countries and from the West, Mark Kramer examines

Stalin's efforts to bring Tito and Yugoslavia to heel after the 1948 rift. He provides insight into the enormity of the Soviet and satellite rearmament after January 1951 and posits that it was, to a large extent, a consequence of Moscow's inability to remove Tito with non-military means. Stalin was set to create a clear military superiority of the Soviet bloc countries bordering Yugoslavia. The chapter further implies that perhaps only Stalin's death in March 1953 prevented the Soviet bloc's all-out attack on Yugoslavia.

Svetozar Rajak argues that the Yugoslav–Soviet break-up in 1948 contributed to paradigm shifts in the early Cold War. It destroyed the uniformity within the Soviet bloc and instigated changes in the nascent Cold War structures. For several years in the early 1950s, Yugoslavia, a communist country, associated itself with the Western defence system. Moreover, by seeking to carve for itself a position between the two global ideological alliances, Yugoslavia became one of the leaders of the Third World Non-aligned Movement that challenged Cold War bipolarity. In doing so, it was the only Balkan country whose international activism transcended regional boundaries demonstrating Belgrade's ambition to play a global role.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou argues that the NATO experts' analysis on Yugoslavia left much to be desired, mostly because they attempted to discuss a heretical communist country using 'orthodox' perceptions of the Cold War. After the 1955 Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement, the experts feared that Belgrade might return to the Soviet fold, and ultimately failed to comprehend Tito's need to be, and be seen to be, independent from the West. They also viewed Yugoslavia in a regional Eastern European context, and rather ignored its roles in the Non-aligned Movement. It was only after the mid-1960s, when Yugoslav economic reforms pointed to a visible distance from the Soviet system, that the NATO analysts were satisfied that Belgrade represented a real communist 'heresy'.

Ayşegül Sever discusses the peculiarities of Turkey's position in the Cold War. Turkey held a crucial place in the Western defensive perimeter around the Soviet Union. However, its accession to NATO in 1952 did not fully provide for security. Contrary to other NATO members, Turkey was also a neighbour to 'out-of-area' regions, mostly the Middle East, in which it was expected by the West to play a role. During the 1950s, Ankara actively participated in regional alliances, the Balkan and the Baghdad Pacts. This posed additional security challenges, which NATO, focusing on its treaty area and the European Cold War, could not always address. Turkey remained one of the most exposed frontline members of the Western alliance.

Jordan Baev studies the position of Bulgaria within the Warsaw Pact. He emphasizes the labour division in nuclear armaments, as well as the Pact's perceptions of NATO war plans. He argues that, despite its loyalty to Moscow, Bulgarian proposals regarding the reform of the Pact and the revision of nuclear strategy found little support. Generally, the Balkan perspective was marginally considered in the final strategic planning. The extremely centralized operation of the decision-making acted as a major force of unity, but also as serious impediment to change. The Warsaw Pact collapsed essentially unreformed together with the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s.

Pointing to the differing priorities of other regional actors, Laurien Crump traces the development of true multilateralism within the Warsaw Pact from the perspective of the dynamics of the Albanian and Romanian dissent during the early 1960s. Under the pressure of the Sino-Soviet split, the Balkan challenge slowly transformed the Warsaw Pact from a Soviet 'transmission belt' into an instrument for its smaller allies to use to their own benefit. Most significantly, Crump convincingly shows how in the first half of the 1960s the alliance turned into a platform for genuine discussion.

Ivo Banac charts a 'precipitous' decline in Yugoslav-Soviet relations following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow accused Belgrade of contributing to the anti-Soviet character of the 'Prague Spring'. Once again, the ferocity of Soviet animosity placed serious security dilemmas before Tito's regime. These concerns were exacerbated by the ongoing struggle between reformists and conservatives within the Yugoslav ruling elite, compounded by the buoyed political influence of Yugoslavia's political émigré circles from abroad. Faced with dire challenges, Tito's regime sought and received support from the US, in particular President Nixon. At the same time, without compromising its non-aligned standing, Belgrade adopted greater caution in dealings with the Soviets, particularly evident during Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971.

Effie G. H. Pedaliu argues that the application of the American policy of 'differentiation' during 'proto-détente', the under-researched interregnum between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the launch of superpower détente by the Nixon administration, affected the Balkans and had important repercussions for each state of the peninsula across the Cold War divide. Within this framework, she looks at how the US viewed the process of 'Balkan détente' and to what degree American involvement with the region was circumscribed by its Mediterranean policy and its attempts to stifle change in Southern Europe.

Eirini Karamouzi assesses the role of the European Economic Community in dealing with the Southern European crisis of 1974–5. With a special focus on the Greek transition to democracy, Karamouzi sheds light on the growing importance of the Community's enlargement policy as a stabilizing civilian force. Based on a desire to promote political stability, the EEC discovered the joint instruments of trade concessions, financial assistance, and the ultimate carrot of membership to exert influence in the region in a complementary way within the Atlantic world.

Adopting a similar Community-centred approach, Benedetto Zaccharia analyses the relationship between the EEC and Yugoslavia and challenges the orthodox view that speaks of a policy of neglect during the Cold War. Despite the constraints imposed by Yugoslavia's non-alignment status, the 1970s witnessed a flurry of economic activity that involved commercial and cooperation agreements grounded in a shared political rationale of Balkan and Mediterranean stability.

Konstantina E. Botsiou examines the erosion of communism as a project of modernization in the Balkans during the two final decades of the Cold War. She argues that, ironically, both détente and the 1973 energy crisis led the Soviet Union to invest in a long-term strategic antagonism with the US. The subsequent relaxation of the Soviet grip on the economic and social planning of Eastern Europe strengthened the hybrid of national communism. In the Balkan states where socialist transformation was incomplete, anti-reformist personal dictatorships made economic growth dependent on Western credit. Even though a special case, Yugoslavia followed the same route of economic development with Tito maintaining the precarious domestic political balance until his physical eclipse. The combination of centrally planned economies with selective financial and political openings to the West proved a difficult and risky compromise. The unavailability of Western credit after the second energy crisis of 1979 caused a major debt crisis, soon to evolve into a major political crisis, linked as it was to US advances in the nuclear arms race.

Miroslav Perišić provides insight into a less known episode of the Cold War—the transformation of the rigid, Stalinist ideological mindset of Yugoslav communists through cultural liberalization. Ousted from the Soviet bloc in 1948, the Yugoslav regime had to normalize relations with


the West. In order to succeed, Belgrade understood that it had to change Western public stereotypes about Yugoslavia as a backward Balkan country, and demonstrate that Yugoslavia's new road to socialism was an antidote to the Stalinist model. To do so, it was necessary to discard rigid Stalinist interpretations of culture and arts. Almost overnight, from 1950, Yugoslavia lifted all existing restrictions on free global cultural exchanges and embarked upon educating its new intellectual elites in the West. Of particular interest, as Perišić argues, was that this unique cultural revolution was initiated from the top.

In his chapter, Spyridon Sfetas refers to the multidimensional character of the regional Cold War. He discusses the impact of an older dispute, the Macedonian question, on relations in the Belgrade–Sofia–Athens triangle—especially the Bulgarian–Yugoslav dispute—during the era of détente. Sfetas shows that older nationalist problems tended to be ‘hidden’ in the wider tensions of the Cold War; in turn, these regional problems could always be used either by regional states or the major powers (the US, the Soviet Union, but also China) to further national or Cold War aims. Thus, a regional dispute could involve a series of problems involving security, identity, perceptions and regional balances, as well as wider Cold War considerations.

Mehmet Döşemeci explores the modernization debates that took place in the Turkish Second Republic (1961–80). By taking off the Cold War lens, he studies Turkey on its own domestic terms to better understand its recent past. The great Westernization debate, as he calls the discussions over Turkey's turbulent relationship with EEC, influenced the Turkish social imaginary and its political culture to a much greater degree than the Cold War itself.

This volume shows how the interpretative framework of the Balkans during the Cold War is changing. We expect it to stimulate further exchanges both on regional experiences of the Cold War as well as on the impact of bipolarity on Balkan politics and societies.

The Editors



PART I

The Balkans and the Creation of the
Cold War Order

Greece and the Birth of Containment: An American Perspective

John O. Iatrides

THE ROOSEVELT YEARS

Until the closing days of the Second World War Washington policymakers considered the Balkans to be of little importance to the United States (US). This assessment reflected the lack of significant economic and political interests in that region as well as President Franklin Roosevelt's preoccupation with the war and his determination to avoid American entanglements in Southeastern Europe where no major military operations were contemplated and where he expected traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry to re-emerge. Accordingly, he gave Prime Minister Winston Churchill a free hand in the Balkans and, in particular, Greek affairs.¹

This is not to suggest that the State Department remained indifferent to events in the region. Objecting to Britain's dominant role in the Balkans an American diplomat warned: 'Bitterness as regards the British, resentfulness of their lack of tact toward smaller peoples, distrust of their capacity to devote sufficient means to any project, and suspicion of their political intentions, are so wide-spread as to be practically universal among the Balkan peoples today ...'.² American officials were particularly concerned about Greece and felt strongly that after the war its people should

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be allowed to decide their political system, including the future of the unpopular monarchy, without foreign interference. But without support from their superiors they had to acquiesce to London's handling of Greece's wartime and postliberation problems.

For its part, the British government regarded King George II as the legitimate head of a valiant Allied nation whose restoration would ensure that Greece would escape Moscow's orbit and remain safely on Britain's side. As Churchill noted in May 1944, 'Our long term political and military objects [*sic*] are to retain Greece as a British sphere of influence and to prevent Russian domination of Greece, which would gravely prejudice our strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean.'³ Weeks later, a distraught Churchill exclaimed to a confidant: 'Good God, can't you see that the Russians are spreading across Europe like a tide; they have invaded Poland, and there is nothing to prevent them marching into Turkey and Greece!'⁴ He instructed the Foreign Office to prepare a paper on the 'brute issues between us and the Soviet Government', regarding Italy and the Balkans, 'and above all in Greece'.⁵ The memorandum, presented to the cabinet on 7 June 1944, concluded: 'As regards Greece, we should have to set about now building up a regime which after the war would definitely look to Britain for support against Russian influence.'⁶ In September, fearing a communist move to seize the Greek capital at the moment of liberation, the principal resistance organizations were placed under a British officer and the communist-controlled resistance army ELAS (Greek People's Liberation Army) was ordered to remain outside the Athens area.⁷ Later that month London informed Moscow of its plans to send troops into Greek territory and requested that no Soviet forces enter that country. The Soviet authorities agreed.⁸ Thus the Churchill–Stalin 'spheres of influence' agreement, under discussion since May and concluded in Moscow on 9 October 1944, validated an understanding already in place. It provided for the division of influence over Greece (90 percent for Britain), Rumania (90 percent for Russia), Bulgaria (75 percent for Russia), and a 50–50 percent split for Yugoslavia and Hungary.⁹ In a forerunner of the Americans' strategy of 'containment', Churchill had sought to secure Greece as an outpost of British influence.

Washington saw matters differently. Informed that an Anglo-Soviet deal on Greece and Rumania was in the making, Roosevelt sought to derail it.¹⁰ He complained to Churchill that the Americans had not been consulted and predicted that the proposed arrangement 'would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets and

in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence ...'.¹¹ In his response, Churchill claimed that the proposal was limited to 'war conditions', denied any intention to 'carve up the Balkans into spheres of influence', and promised to keep Roosevelt fully informed of developments.¹² In the end, without consulting the State Department, Roosevelt consented to the Anglo-Soviet agreement, ostensibly for a three-month duration, and added: 'I hope matters of this importance can be prevented from developing in such a manner in the future.'¹³

In late November 1944, weeks after the country's liberation, Prime Minister George Papandreou, with strong British backing, ordered the disbanding of the wartime resistance groups. When the communists refused to have ELAS disarmed and the leftist ministers resigned, the coalition government collapsed and fighting erupted in the capital. American officials blamed the crisis largely on highhanded British intervention. Ambassador MacVeagh wrote to Roosevelt that 'at bottom, the handling of this fanatically freedom-loving country ... as if it were composed of natives under the British Raj, is what is the trouble', and characterized the insurgents as 'democrats without possessions but hungry, homeless and armed'.¹⁴ MacVeagh regarded the fighting as a clash between the British and ELAS, a view shared widely in the Department.¹⁵

Significantly, the Churchill-Stalin agreement on the Balkans held. Soviet troops in Bulgaria ignored the urgent appeals of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) to occupy Greek territory.¹⁶ In Moscow, Stalin told the Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov that in staging their revolt 'The Greeks have acted foolishly ...',¹⁷ and that Britain and the United States 'would never tolerate a "red" Greece threatening their vital communications to the Middle East'.¹⁸ Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that Stalin would have welcomed a communist victory in postwar Greece so long as it did not bring him into direct confrontation with London and Washington.¹⁹

In March 1945, following the defeat and disarming of the ELAS in Athens largely by British troops, Roosevelt proposed to Churchill the dispatch of an American, British and Soviet 'special mission' to develop 'the productive power of Greece rapidly, by concerted, non-political action'. When Churchill rejected Soviet participation and counter-proposed an Anglo-American undertaking, the president dismissed the idea as 'a mistake' because it might be seen as contrary to the Yalta agreement on 'tri-partite action in liberated areas ...'. Roosevelt wished to avoid 'anything that would weaken the effectiveness of our efforts to honor these decisions on their [Soviet] side'.²⁰ If, as has been argued, the president anticipated

open friction with the Soviet Union, he was determined to avoid it at least until Japan had been defeated.²¹

THE TRUMAN YEARS

Following Roosevelt's death and Japan's surrender, and as the problems of the postwar era began to emerge, America's foreign policy establishment resembled briefly a formidable battleship without a seasoned captain at the helm. Having been kept in the dark regarding wartime agreements, President Harry Truman was unprepared to assert himself in world affairs—this at the very moment when the collapse of the pre-war balance of power and America's vital interests required that Washington preside over the shaping of a new world order. Particularly alarming was Stalin's apparent determination to consolidate his wartime gains in East-Central Europe, the Middle East and Asia and challenge the West on a wide front. With its European allies devastated by the war, the Truman administration felt compelled to respond firmly and decisively.²²

The president's principal foreign policy adviser and the architect of American diplomacy in the early postwar years was Dean Acheson, a prominent international lawyer with a forceful personality and a veteran of Washington's establishment under Roosevelt.²³ Acheson revitalized the State Department and sought to awaken Congress and the nation to the challenges of international realities by at times engaging in hyperbole and 'crisis diplomacy', particularly in dealing with the Soviet Union.²⁴

While preoccupied by much larger issues the administration continued to monitor developments in Greece where, after the defeat of the communist-led uprising in Athens, right-wing extremists took to harassing ELAS veterans and leftist sympathizers. In April 1945, reporting on recurring incidents of political violence, MacVeagh conceded that the authorities had shown themselves incapable of maintaining order. On the other hand, the communists had hidden away or smuggled to neighboring countries large quantities of weapons 'with a view to their further use ...'.²⁵ In June, following a conversation with KKE leader Nikos Zahariades, MacVeagh wrote that his visitor's 'sweet reasonableness' revealed a shift in the party's orientation away from violent confrontation and toward a

long-term policy of lulling its opponents to sleep by overtly confining itself to politics, with emphasis on 'anti-fascism' and 'democracy' while never ceasing to bore from within in the labor movement, the public services, the

armed forces and even among the peasants, with a view to the best possible exploitation of such opportunities as may develop as times goes on²⁶

In a separate report, admitting that Moscow's influence on the KKE could not be determined, he concluded: 'Possibly the Russians ... do not feel it necessary, in order to keep the leftist pot here boiling merrily, to do more than fan the flames with a sympathetic press and radio and keep the local communists in a constant state of hopeful expectation of more definite assistance to come.'²⁷

While American officials in Greece were content to remain passive observers, British authorities were becoming increasingly alarmed about the burdens they had assumed in that troubled country. In late 1945, Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial Staff, and Lt. Gen. William D. Morgan, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, visited Greece to review Britain's role in that country. Afterward, Gen. Morgan told an American diplomat that Greece's security situation had become 'more desperate than ever', and in his view, 'it would be impossible for the British to cope with it alone'. Emphasizing threats from Greece's communist neighbors, Morgan concluded that 'unless the United States decided to play a more active role in Greece the British should get out of Greece completely and take their losses ... If the United States could not put troops in Greece perhaps it could station substantial air forces there'. Morgan intended to urge Prime Minister Clement Attlee to discuss Greece with Truman during his upcoming visit to Washington.²⁸

General Morgan's analysis of the Greek situation contained little that was not already known in Washington. Anticipating Attlee's visit, the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, sought to block any American military involvement in Greece. Patterson conceded that 'only the presence of British troops ... has prevented the renewal of civil war'. However, he believed that 'the problem in Greece is more likely to be internal than external', and that 'the present British forces in Greece are adequate to carry out the present mission [of] maintaining internal order in conjunction with the establishment of a stable government'. Therefore, in view of America's military commitments elsewhere and pressures to demobilize, Patterson recommended that 'the United States not assume any military obligations in Greece'.²⁹ Agreeing with Patterson's assessment Secretary of State James Byrnes advised the president that America's military cooperation 'would contribute nothing to the solution of present problems in that country'. Admitting that 'a chaotic Greece is a constant temptation

to aggressive actions by its northern neighbors ... and constitutes a serious menace to international peace and security', Byrnes recommended that, instead of military assistance, the United States and Britain provide loans and technical advisers 'to start Greece on the path toward economic recovery'. Truman approved the proposal without comment.³⁰

Although in principle American and British officials agreed to cooperate in addressing Greece's economic problems, in practice their priorities and preferred solutions remained far apart. The Americans believed that the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), to whose resources they contributed the lion's share—but whose Balkan mission was under British direction—should provide relief assistance and serve as the Greek government's main foreign adviser. Moreover, they expected the Greeks to implement major reforms, including currency and price stabilization, improve taxation and reduce government spending. The British, whose efforts to promote stability and effective government in Athens were undermined at every turn by the rising level of political violence, were prepared to resort to more drastic measures. In mid-November 1945, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hector McNeil proposed sending to Athens a mission—to which American participation was invited—to oversee economic recovery and reconstruction provided that the Greek government agreed to 'assume any powers necessary [to] implement [and] operate program devised by Mission'. To MacVeagh, McNeil's proposal indicated that the 'British contemplate control of Greek economic life to an even greater extent than the Germans attempted during occupation ...'. Prime Minister Panayiotis Kanellopoulos confided to MacVeagh 'in considerable embarrassment' that the McNeil plan was a 'very sensitive' issue for Greeks who 'fear disastrous political effect placing foreigners in Greek Ministries with such powers as the British envisage'. While he found McNeil's proposal unacceptable, the prime minister preferred an Anglo-US team of experts to advise Greek authorities. Kanellopoulos stressed that, 'as an interim regime', his cabinet had 'no right ... to commit a future Greek Government constituted on the basis of [the anticipated] elections'.³¹

On 11 January 1946, in an attempt to sound the alarm about the Greek crisis, the American and British ambassadors in Athens sent a joint telegram to their governments warning that

If we fail to deal with the Greek problem with imagination and understanding at this moment it is our view that the present democratic government

will certainly fall and probably be succeeded by a regime of the extreme right which in turn could scarcely fail to produce in due course a Communist dictatorship

The two diplomats urged the adoption of 'a broad [,] generous and statesmanlike approach, by wiping out debts which cannot and will not be paid and by giving a definite guarantee that whatever material or financial assistance is in fact found to be necessary will be made available'. They summed up: 'What Greece needs is a plan (1) which gives her the reassurance of continued economic existence after the present year; and (2) which prevents the Greek vices of extravagance and incompetence from wrecking the plan'. They concluded with a dire prediction: '... we feel that it is our duty to warn you that Greece will not only be a source of grave political trouble for some time to come, but will also in all probability be condemned to bloodshed and famine'.³²

While discussions of Greece's domestic problems continued, an unexpected development appeared to accentuate their international dimension. On 1 February 1946, the Soviet representative at the United Nations, Andrei Vyshinsky, charged that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted foreign interference in internal affairs and threatened the region's peace and security. Vyshinsky urged the Security Council to demand that Britain withdraw its forces from Greece immediately. In a sharp exchange, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin defended Britain's role in Greece and countercharged that Soviet propaganda emboldened the Greek communists to resort to violence. As the Council could not come to any agreement on the matter, Vyshinsky proposed sending a commission 'to investigate the situation and whatever the commission says we will abide by, and we will even withdraw our letter' of protest. When Bevin rejected the idea, Vyshinsky backed down: 'We want to stay friendly with you and we must find a way.' In the end, with American delegates working behind the scenes, the Council considered the matter closed.³³

The Greek elections of 31 March 1946, which Western observers pronounced 'on the whole free and fair',³⁴ provided a measure of legitimacy for the new government. Yet the outcome was deeply flawed. The KKE-led leftists had abstained, ensuring a clear victory of the rightist Populist Party whose head, Constantine Tsaldaris, was regarded in Washington as one of Greece's most inept and uninspiring politicians. His government's harsh measures against the left and tolerance for right-wing extremists inflamed further polarization and violence. Greek demands for border

adjustments at the expense of the country's northern neighbors irritated American and British officials who, wishing to avoid aggravating their already prickly relations with Moscow, warned Tsaldaris against pursuing 'grandiose plans'. In June, when Tsaldaris expressed a strong desire to present his policies personally to officials in Washington, the American *chargé d'affaires* in Athens quipped that the prime minister was anxious to convince Americans that he had 'no horns and tails'.³⁵

Fears of escalating violence were well founded. On election night an armed band overpowered the police station of Litochoro, a village in the foothills of Mt. Olympus, in effect signaling the start of civil war. In early July, Markos Vafiades, a veteran communist leader of the wartime ELAS, took command of existing guerrilla bands, creating the nucleus of what would be called the Democratic Army of Greece.³⁶ Support from neighboring regimes for the insurgents was an open secret. By August MacVeagh was reporting that the communists' armed strength in the Olympus region numbered about four thousand, that serious fighting was underway, and that the government's policy was to declare the KKE illegal and root out communism in Greece. In the ambassador's view, the Tsaldaris government 'may be making as many enemies as friends'.³⁷

The Truman administration's essentially passive attitude toward the escalating crisis in Greece was gradually abandoned largely in response to deteriorating US-Soviet relations. The president and his advisers opted to confront Moscow, whose brutal treatment of Eastern European countries and obstinacy on other issues they found unacceptable and alarming.³⁸ In April 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov, received a tongue-lashing from Truman who demanded that the Soviets honor the Yalta accords on Poland. Afterward the president characterized his own words as a 'one-two right to the jaw' while his visitor complained that he had never been spoken to that way before.³⁹ 'Power', Truman exclaimed, 'is the only thing the Russians understand'.⁴⁰ In early May, Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union for the war in Europe (but not for the Far East) were stopped, signaling Washington's growing impatience with Moscow.⁴¹ When the Soviet Union refused to end its wartime occupation of northern Iran, strong Anglo-American protests and a major diplomatic crisis in the United Nations compelled Moscow to withdraw its troops. Five months later, in August 1946, Soviet attempts to impose on Turkey a new regime for the Straits raised fears in London and Washington that Moscow was intent on gaining direct access to, and possibly a permanent presence in, the Eastern Mediterranean. With strong British and American

support Ankara resisted Soviet pressures, which were eased by year's end.⁴² In May 1946, American authorities in Germany stopped reparations from their zone of occupation to the Soviet zone and blamed Moscow—and Paris—for the Allies' failure to reach agreement on Germany.

Confrontational exchanges and diplomatic clashes were accentuated by bellicose public rhetoric from both sides. In early February 1946 Stalin announced a new five-year plan of massive industrial and military expansion intended to 'guarantee our country against any eventuality'. The Soviet dictator declared that peace was 'impossible under the present capitalist development of world economy', and that wars between socialism and capitalism were inevitable. For some in Washington Stalin's speech amounted to 'The Declaration of World War III'.⁴³ In an apparent reaction to Stalin's speech, Secretary Byrnes spoke publicly about the growing mistrust and tension between major powers, declared that the American government was prepared to prevent aggression and stressed the importance of military power in the pursuit of national goals.⁴⁴ A week later, at Fulton, Missouri, in Truman's presence, Churchill spoke ominously of an 'iron curtain' that had descended on Eastern Europe, separating it from the West, and called for an Anglo-American alliance to confront Soviet expansionism.

A year earlier, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study of America's military requirements in the new world order, had argued that since future cooperation among America, Britain and Russia could not be guaranteed, America had to possess the power to ensure its own security 'without immediate or substantial assistance from other nations'. Moreover, 'When it becomes evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by a potential enemy', the government 'should press the issue to a prompt political decision, while making all preparations to strike the first blow if necessary'.⁴⁵ In its comments, presented more than a year later, the State Department expressed concern that in the JCS study, 'a breakdown of peaceful relations among Britain, Russia and the United States receives undue emphasis ...'.⁴⁶

Despite the Department's professed sanguine views on continued cooperation among the victors, some officials in Washington did in fact interpret Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946, as a statement of hostile intentions toward the West. That interpretation soon received weighty confirmation from George F. Kennan, a career diplomat and respected Soviet specialist serving as *chargé d'affaires* at the American embassy in Moscow. Kennan analyzed Stalin's bellicosity in his now-famous 'long

telegram' of 22 February to the department, which has been characterized as 'the single most influential explanation of postwar Soviet behavior and one which powerfully reinforced the growing tendency within the United States to interpret Moscow's actions in a sinister light'.⁴⁷ Kennan elaborated his views in his article 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', published in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947, and recommended that America engage in the 'patient but firm and vigilant *containment* of Russian expansionist tendencies ... and the adroit application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy ...'.⁴⁸

Kennan's analysis, which blamed tensions in US–Soviet relations entirely on Moscow, was not without its prominent critics in and out of government.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it was broadly accepted as the logical and durable foundation upon which decision-makers could base specific policies as circumstances required. A new study on relations with Moscow, to which Kennan contributed substantially, concluded that Washington should make clear to Moscow that 'our strength will be sufficient to repel any attack and sufficient to defeat the USSR decisively if a war should start ...'. Truman, who had commissioned the report, found it 'very valuable', but considered it too sensitive to circulate outside his office: 'If it leaked it would blow the roof off the White House, it would blow the roof off the Kremlin.'⁵⁰

Containment's principal architect did not have Greece or, indeed, the Balkans and East-Central Europe in mind. At the time of the Yalta conference, Kennan had argued that Europe should be divided 'into spheres of influence—keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours ...', thus abandoning the continent's eastern regions to Moscow's control.⁵¹ Two years later, Kennan disapproved of the Truman Doctrine, which he found too bellicose.⁵² In principle, he supported assistance to Greece but not to Turkey. He once jokingly suggested sending 'about three ships all painted white with 'Aid to Greece' on the sides, and ... have the first bags of wheat driven up to Athens in an American jeep with a Hollywood blonde on the radiator'.⁵³ In 1948, at the height of the civil war, Kennan strongly opposed sending combat troops to Greece as others in the department had advocated. In the end, Secretary Marshall sided with Kennan.⁵⁴

As originally conceived, containment was intended to block Soviet encroachment on Western Europe and the Middle East. Yet for Acheson and his advisers, in the aftermath of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe

and pressures on Iran and Turkey, the Greek civil war appeared to fit well with what Kennan had called the ‘nooks and crannies’ of power that Moscow would try to fill. As one prominent historian put it, Acheson ‘connected the dots’.⁵⁵

GREECE: ROTTING APPLE IN A BARREL

Washington’s barely concealed disdain for the Greek government’s ineffective and undemocratic practices underwent abrupt change in September 1946, following a Ukrainian complaint to the UN Security Council that actions of the Greek authorities, backed by British troops, threatened the peace and security of the Balkan region. There were also charges of violent incidents along Greece’s borders with Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Although in the end the Council once again decided to drop the matter,⁵⁶ the acrimony prompted the American War Department to commission a paper on ‘US Security Interests in Greece’.

Asserting that Greece was under attack by ‘an apparently well organized and armed Communist minority supported by the USSR and Soviet satellites’, the study stressed the conflict’s importance for American interests:

The strategic significance of Greece to US security lies in the fact that Greece stands alone in the Balkans as a barrier between the USSR and the Mediterranean, in a position similar to that of Turkey farther to the east ... If Greece were to fall into the Soviet orbit, there could not fail to be most unfavorable repercussions in all those areas where political sympathies are balanced precariously in favor of the West and against Soviet Communism.

The paper stressed the importance of ‘not allowing the ideological struggle now going on in the world to become one between the USSR and the US, or one between the USSR and the US and Britain; it must remain one between the USSR and the non-Soviet world’. According to the military analysts,

the US is at a disadvantage in rendering direct support to its friends on the Soviet perimeter. It is not for consideration whether the US can support the Greek Government with military force; yet there can be no question that the USSR is giving direct military assistance to elements seeking to cause the fall of the government.

Although the external threat to Greece diminished the effectiveness of American economic and political support, it was imperative that ‘assistance be offered and given now, lest the future become even less propitious than the present’. Finally, ‘The United States should make it clear to the world that our desire to see Greece remain independent and in charge of her own affairs is no less firm than our position on Turkey’.⁵⁷ In short, depicted as the instrument of the Soviet bloc, the Greek communist insurgency constituted a threat to America’s security interests which required urgent and strong countermeasures. Significantly, the Pentagon paper all but ignored Britain’s role in bolstering Greece’s defense against the forces of domestic and foreign communism.

This time Washington’s diplomats did not resent being preempted by military planners in initiating recommendations on issues of strategic importance. On 25 September, top State Department officials agreed that ‘it is desirable to draw up, in written form, new outlines of policy on Turkey, Greece and Iran, the three Near and Middle Eastern nations we consider most seriously affected by present developments’. The proposed policy was to include ‘political and economic considerations as well as those related primarily to military assistance’.⁵⁸ Thus the linking of the Greek communist insurgency to direct Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey transformed Washington’s understanding of the Greek crisis. No longer viewed as a domestic or strictly regional affair, the Greek civil war was seen as an element of Soviet expansionism. The new perception was reinforced by persistent alarmist speculation about the region. In early January 1947, the American ambassador in Moscow warned that Turkey and Iran would again become targets of Soviet pressures intended ‘to gain independent access to the Mediterranean and Arab world ...’.⁵⁹ A few days later the US embassy in Ankara urged that military assistance to Turkey be provided directly rather than through the British, as in the past.⁶⁰

In Athens, abandoning his earlier attribution of turmoil in Greece to domestic squabbles, MacVeagh reported that the KKE was under Moscow’s secret control, and that ‘overwhelming’ hostile forces across the Balkans were ‘facing the Greek frontier’. Accordingly, the ‘conclusion seems inevitable that the Soviet Government in the final analysis must be “assigned responsibility for continued strife” in Greece’.⁶¹ Encouraged by his superiors’ sudden show of concern over Greek affairs, the ambassador missed no opportunity to advise Greek officials on how to improve their country’s image abroad. Thus, asked by the king’s political adviser if it was proper to retain as defense minister a notoriously right-wing politician,

MacVeagh retorted that 'curbing Mr. Mavromichalis' actions is not so important as eliminating what he stands for and that he should be left out of new Cabinet entirely if Greek Govt wishes to appear democratic in American eyes'.⁶²

American officials now feared that the ineptness and repressive tactics of the Tsaldaris government might hinder their efforts to persuade Congress to approve significant assistance to Greece. MacVeagh was therefore instructed to make it clear in Athens that 'American public opinion will not for any protracted period look with favor upon extension by the US of support to a Greek Govt which does not enjoy popular support of Greeks themselves'. Washington was concerned that '... political strength seems to have been passing from center and liberal groups into hands of totalitarian rightists or leftists'. The desired broadly based political 'center' could be created

if responsible Greek leaders would have vision, restraint, and patriotism to form political coalition which would include those leftist, liberal and center groups sufficiently enlightened and loyal to refuse to have any further dealings or associations with communists and those rightist groups which would be willing loyally to cooperate with all anti-Communist center and leftist groups. Rightist groups unwilling to cooperate with Greek leftist anti-Communist groups should be considered as reactionaries unworthy of membership in such coalition and groups prepared to cooperate with communists should be regarded as disloyal, contaminated, or politically immature elements the presence of which would be almost certain to create distrust within ranks of such coalition

The department suggested that Archbishop and former regent Damaskinos might serve as the temporary head of such a progressive and broadly based 'loyal coalition'.⁶³ Thus, months before its formal decision to intervene, Washington missed no opportunity to influence the composition and agenda of the Greek government.

On the other hand, despite growing worries about Greece's vulnerability, American officials were reluctant to appear overly assertive. As Acheson explained to MacVeagh on 8 November, '... we have concern lest in case we supply arms and military equipment to Greece the impression be obtained that we are carrying on a provocative policy with regard to the Soviet Union and its Balkan puppets and are encouraging the outbreak of open warfare in the Balkans'. To resolve Washington's dilemma

MacVeagh was instructed to explain in Athens that ‘since British troops are in Greece and since in the past Great Britain has been supplying Greece with arms and military equipment, it would be preferable for the Greeks to continue to obtain such supplies from Great Britain rather than from the United States’.⁶⁴

This cautious and otherwise practical arrangement failed to address the realities on the ground and, in particular, the apparent ineffectiveness of British assistance to Greece’s security forces. On 30 November 1946, British authorities in Athens described the situation as ‘deteriorating daily’ and speculated that ‘Communist uprisings in capital are possible early December (anniversary of 1944 events)’.⁶⁵ A few days later, Field Marshal Montgomery told MacVeagh that he had urged the Greek government to convert its entire army into anti-guerrilla forces and, in a spring offensive, ‘totally eradicate banditry in Greece’. He added: ‘It can be done, and if it isn’t done Greece is lost ...’.⁶⁶ On 16 December MacVeagh reported: ‘I feel impossible exaggerate importance of adequately equipping Greek army at earliest possible date.’ Afraid that British efforts in Greece might be ‘too little and too late’, he urged the Department to ascertain as soon as possible whether Britain could ‘supply Greece with arms considered necessary for maintenance Greek independence and territorial integrity’. Separately, he reported that ‘Position Greek finances reaching catastrophic stage’.⁶⁷

In Washington, the wheels of government were turning, however slowly. An economic mission prepared to leave for Athens although its task reflected no urgency: it was merely to ‘consider the extent to which the Greek Government can carry out reconstruction and development through effective use of Greek resources, and the extent to which foreign assistance may be required’. Symbolically more significant, the prompt delivery to the Greek Air Force of eight American C-47 transport planes, a type the British could not provide, was quickly authorized.⁶⁸ In February 1947 MacVeagh forwarded to Washington a Greek General Staff report detailing extensive guerrilla activity across northern Greece supported by neighboring communist regimes. The goal of the insurgents’ campaign was said to be to create conditions in the country that would ‘call for Russian military and political intervention’. While characterizing the Greek report as ‘thoroughly objective’ the ambassador expressed doubts that ‘communist engineered anarchy in Greece would necessarily call for “direct Russian intervention” as long as the Russian-controlled forces of the neighboring states are available for such a purpose’.⁶⁹

The embassy's drum-beat of alarmist reports was echoed by other Americans in Greece. The representative on the UN Balkan Commission of Investigation, Mark Ethridge, reported on 17 February that the insurgents were expanding their operations, that the Greek army's morale was the 'lowest possible' and that the government was 'steadily losing popular confidence through ineffectuality'. His French counterpart believed that Paris 'could not withstand pressure if Greece through inadequate support by Britain and America fell into Soviet orbit'. Other colleagues claimed that 'having been rebuffed in Azerbaijan and Turkey [the] Soviets are finding Greece surprisingly soft and ... [the] matter has gone beyond probing [the] state and is now an all-out offensive for the kill'.⁷⁰ The head of the newly arrived economic mission, Paul A. Porter, reported his preliminary impressions in the bleakest terms:

There is really no State here in the Western concept. Rather we have a loose hierarchy of individualistic politicians, some worse than others, who are so preoccupied with their own struggle for power that they have no time, even assuming capacity, to develop economic policy ... The civil service is a depressing farce. I am skeptical of the capacity of this Government, which ... represents only a coalition of the Rightist and Conservative elements ... to administer effectively the extensive reforms needed ... I believe that day to day guidance by American personnel in Greece is going to be necessary

Porter made no mention of Britain's role in Athens.⁷¹ On 18 February, reacting to the stream of dire warnings from Athens, the State Department instructed MacVeagh to consult with Porter and Ethridge and report immediately on the 'seriousness of situation and, if collapse seems probable and immediate, how much time remains for any remedial action which US and UK might take'.⁷²

MacVeagh's prompt response was unequivocal:

We feel situation here so critical that no time should be lost in applying any remedial measures, even if only of a temporary character, within possibilities of US and UK. Impossible to say how soon collapse may be anticipated, but we believe that to regard it as anything but imminent would be highly unsafe.

He added:

If nothing but economic and financial factors were to be considered, full collapse from Greece's present position might take several months. However,

deteriorating morale [of] both civil servants and armed forces, as well as of general public, owing to inadequate incomes, fear of growing banditry, lack of confidence in Govt., and exploitation by international Communists, creates possibility of much more rapid denouement.

MacVeagh and his associates recommended, as the ‘best way [to] combat [an] explosive situation’, the taking of action to alleviate ‘... growing fear of inflation, and consequently of increased misery ...’. Also, to make clear to all, ‘including [the] Soviet Union, our determination not to permit foreign encroachment, either from without or within, on [the] independence and integrity of Greece’.⁷³

On receiving MacVeagh’s telegram, the department finally shifted into high gear. Senior officials Loy W. Henderson and John D. Hickerson prepared a memorandum on the ‘Crisis and Imminent Possibility of Collapse in Greece’, and delivered it to Acheson who, with Secretary Marshall out of town, instructed Henderson to draft a briefing paper for the president and the cabinet. The sense of urgency was intensified by a call from the British embassy requesting an immediate appointment to deliver two formal notes announcing that British assistance to Greece and Turkey would end on 31 March. In view of Britain’s sudden but not entirely unexpected decision, Acheson instructed Henderson to update his briefing paper and called Truman and Marshall to apprise them of the latest development.⁷⁴ The under-secretary then informed the Secretaries of War and Navy and requested that they prepare to discuss urgently proposals for action in Greece. According to Acheson’s account, asked by Henderson whether ‘we were still working on papers bearing on the making of a decision or the execution of one, I said the latter; under the circumstances there could be only one decision. At that we drank a martini or two toward the confusion of our enemies.’⁷⁵

The top-level meetings that followed, involving Truman, Marshall, the cabinet and congressional leaders, were crucial in moving matters forward. However, once the president had approved Acheson’s memorandum and recommendations (on 25 February), the administration was committed to act. On 27 February, at a White House meeting with Truman and top congressional leaders, the normally taciturn Marshall resorted to hyperbolic language: ‘the world has arrived at a point in its history that has not been paralleled since ancient history ...’.⁷⁶ Acheson was no less apocalyptic: Moscow’s pressures on Turkey, Iran, and Greece, he declared,

had brought the Balkans to the point where a highly possible breakthrough might open three continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost ... We and we alone were in a position to break up the play

With Truman looking on, no one asked questions or raised objections.⁷⁷

On 12 March 1947 Truman presented to Congress a bland but forceful version of his administration's bold policy initiative. After describing the world as divided into two distinct ideological camps, one based on freedom and democracy and the other on tyranny and oppression, he declared America's determination to support 'free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures' and help them 'to work out their own destinies in their own way'. Addressing the specific purpose of his message, he warned: 'Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.' To launch his policy Truman asked Congress to appropriate four hundred million dollars for assistance to Greece and Turkey, to be administered under direct American supervision.⁷⁸

CONTAINMENT AND GREECE: A RETROSPECTIVE

The strategy of containment had profound ramifications for Greece, Turkey and the Balkan region. Massive American aid of every kind, delivered under the watchful eyes of hundreds of civilian and military advisers, ensured the defeat of the communist insurgency in Greece and placed the country on the road to recovery. American interventionist pressure compelled Tsaldaris' right-wing People's Party to share power with the centrist Liberals whose head, Themistocles Sofoulis, assumed the premiership. Assistance to Turkey improved its military capabilities, strengthened its resolve to resist Moscow's expansionist pressures and made it Washington's favorite ally in the area. Following the Stalin-Tito split in 1948, communist Yugoslavia received Washington's support while Belgrade agreed to end its involvement in the Greek civil war.⁷⁹ The United States ensured the entry of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) thereby improving their bilateral relations, strengthening their

defenses and extending the frontiers of the Western alliance to the Black Sea, the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Anglo-American mediation promoted rapprochement between Athens and Belgrade and, with Ankara's participation, paved the way for the 'Balkan Pact'. Although the regional alliance proved virtually stillborn and Greco-Turkish feuding soon paralyzed NATO's Balkan flank, containment brought to the region a measure of stability and security.⁸⁰

Initially designed to benefit specifically Greece and Turkey, the strategy of containment was soon broadened through the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan), whose pragmatically defined goal was to rebuild Western Europe's devastated economies thus inoculating them against social unrest and the virus of communism. It was followed by the North Atlantic Treaty, a collective defense shield promising protection against Soviet aggression. Success in Greece, Western Europe and the Middle East appeared to offer proof that the new strategy worked. In time, military conflicts in Korea and Indochina saw the policy's implementation against communist forces in Asia, with American combat troops in ever-increasing numbers doing most of the fighting. Until the Soviet Union's collapse, containment remained the cornerstone of American foreign policy and military strategy.

In retrospect, Moscow's involvement in the Greek civil war had been indirect, ambivalent and, in the end, ineffective.⁸¹ As argued in these pages, Washington's decision to intervene in that conflict was largely motivated by growing alarm over tensions elsewhere in the region, where the Soviet Union had been the instigator. Nevertheless, American policy-makers were genuinely convinced that the Greek communist insurgency had Stalin's blessing and that its defeat would blunt the projection of Soviet power in a strategic region. To achieve their goal they espoused an early version of 'domino theory', in the process overstating the likely impact of a communist victory in Greece on Western Europe, the Near East and Africa. Particularly misguided was their professed fear that, to safeguard its waning influence in Greece, Britain might strike a deal with Moscow which could include a military alliance.⁸²

The Americans' feverish preoccupation with Greece was short-lived. In the mid-1950s, with Greece a member of the Atlantic alliance, the Eisenhower administration curtailed direct economic assistance and refused to side with Athens in its festering disputes with Ankara, giving rise to a strong anti-American sentiment which was to prove lasting. The Balkans no longer occupied center stage in the East-West conflict.

Greece may not have been the ideal springboard for launching America's containment strategy.⁸³ Nevertheless, American action played a crucial role in defeating an insurgency whose victory would surely have enhanced Soviet influence and opportunities in the region. It kept Greece in the Western camp, secured Turkey's position as the guardian of the Straits, enabled Tito to survive Moscow's wrath and blocked the establishment of a Soviet presence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. In the end, for all its flaws, in Greece containment proved to be a sound investment.

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Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet– East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948–53

Mark Kramer

The June 1948 Cominform summit was a landmark event for the Soviet bloc. Yugoslavia, which had been one of the staunchest postwar allies of the Soviet Union, was publicly denounced and expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), the body that had been created at Moscow's initiative in September 1947 to bind together the East European Communist parties (as well as the French and Italian Communist parties) under the exclusive leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. Tension between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had been developing behind the scenes for several months and had finally reached breaking point in March 1948. The rift stemmed from substantive disagreements, domestic political maneuvering, and a clash of personalities pitting the Soviet dictator, Iosif Stalin, against the leader of the Yugoslav Communists, Josip Broz Tito. Crucial documents released since 1990 from the former Soviet bloc archives indicate that the level of animosity between the two countries by mid-1948 was even greater than Western analysts had previously thought.

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The archival evidence also shows that Stalin's determination to reassert control over Yugoslavia never slackened up to the time he died in 1953.

This chapter draws on a large quantity of published and archival sources from former Communist countries and from the West to offer a reassessment of the Soviet–Yugoslav split, focusing in particular on Stalin's efforts to bring Yugoslavia back under Soviet domination.¹ The chapter first briefly reviews the main reasons for the schism between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and then examines how Stalin attempted to bring Tito to heel. For more than two years the Soviet leader tried to regain control over Yugoslavia through non-military means, but in the final two years of his life he moved steadily toward a military solution. The chapter traces the evolution of Stalin's policy from 1948 to 1953, showing not only the various tactics he used in dealing with Yugoslavia but also how he sought to forestall any wider adverse repercussions in the Soviet bloc.

SOURCES OF THE SPLIT

The most serious differences between Moscow and Belgrade in the early postwar era had arisen over policy in the Balkans, especially Yugoslavia's ties with neighboring Communist states.² Stalin was increasingly wary of Tito's efforts to seek unification with Albania and to set up a Yugoslav-dominated federation with Bulgaria—an issue that figured prominently in the final face-to-face meetings between Stalin and Tito, in May–June 1946.³ Stalin himself had initially pushed for a Yugoslav–Bulgarian federation, but when neither the Yugoslavs nor the Bulgarians pursued the matter decisively, the Soviet leader shifted to supporting only a Bulgarian–Yugoslav treaty of mutual assistance, which would eventually facilitate Yugoslavia's incorporation of the whole of Pirin Macedonia (Blagoevgrad Province in southwestern Bulgaria).⁴ After Bulgarian leaders wanted to move gradually on that specific issue and Tito fiercely criticized the lack of progress, Stalin evidently became even more apprehensive about Tito's ambitions throughout the Balkans.

Although the relationship between Stalin and Tito during their meetings in the late spring of 1946 was not yet acrimonious, it deteriorated steadily over the next year. Stalin was especially irritated by Tito's failure to consult with Moscow and to wait for the Soviet Union's explicit approval before taking any further steps vis-à-vis Bulgaria and Albania. After Yugoslavia signed a bilateral treaty with Bulgaria in August 1947 without seeking to obtain Stalin's consent, the Soviet leader sent a secret cable to

Tito denouncing the treaty as ‘mistaken’ and ‘premature’ and demanding that it be repudiated.⁵ (The failure to gain Moscow’s approval before signing the treaty was due at least as much to the Bulgarian Communist leader, Georgi Dimitrov, as to Tito, but Stalin placed the main burden of responsibility on the Yugoslavs.) Other Soviet officials warned Stalin and his senior advisers that Tito’s ‘proposal for a federation of Balkan countries is deeply misguided’.⁶

Tensions increased still further in the first few months of 1948 as Yugoslavia continued to pursue unification with Albania, despite Moscow’s objections.⁷ Under pressure from Stalin, Tito promised in January 1948 not to send a Yugoslav army division to Albania (as Yugoslavia had tentatively arranged to do after deploying an air force regiment and military advisers in Albania the previous summer to prepare the country to ‘rebuff Greek monarcho-fascists’). This concession, however, failed to alleviate Stalin’s annoyance. Tito’s continuing efforts to assert greater control over the Albanian Communist Party, as evidenced by a plenum of the Party’s Central Committee in early 1948 that resulted in the takeover of the party by pro-Yugoslav officials ‘under instructions from Yugoslavia’, provoked consternation in Moscow.⁸ In February 1948, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov warned Tito that ‘serious differences of opinion’ about ‘relations between our countries’ would persist unless Yugoslavia adhered to the ‘normal procedures’ of clearing all actions with Moscow beforehand.⁹ Concerns about following ‘normal procedures’ were at least as salient as any substantive disputes in the bilateral exchanges over the Balkans.

A few other serious points of contention had also emerged between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early postwar years. In particular, Tito was far more willing than Stalin to provide military and financial assistance to Communist guerrillas in ‘gray-area’ countries, notably in Greece, where an intense civil war raged in the 1940s.¹⁰ Even before the Soviet–Yugoslav split became public, high-ranking Soviet officials had privately conveyed warnings to Yugoslav leaders that a militant position vis-à-vis Greece might ‘cause an increase in Anglo-American military intervention’.¹¹ On other issues, too, Tito had occasionally harbored misgivings about what he regarded as the USSR’s excessively conciliatory policies toward the West—an ironic position in view of subsequent developments. In private conversations with Soviet officials in May 1948, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders expressed alarm about what they depicted as Tito’s

increasingly ‘anti-Soviet views and sentiments’ and accused the Yugoslav leader of ‘hostility’ and ‘outright Trotskyism’.¹²

Nonetheless, the disagreements between the two sides, important though they may have been, were hardly sufficient in themselves to provoke such a bitter and costly schism. For the most part, the Yugoslav Communists until early 1948 had been unstinting in their support for Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party (known by the acronym VKP(b) until October 1952 and then renamed the KPSS or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Indeed, the steadfast loyalty of Yugoslavia on almost all issues—loyalty that was spontaneous and not simply coerced—was evidently one of the major factors behind Stalin’s decision to seek an abject capitulation from Belgrade as an example to the other East European countries of the unwavering obedience to Moscow that was expected on every issue.¹³

INITIAL SOVIET EFFORTS TO REASSERT CONTROL

Far from demonstrating Soviet strength, Stalin’s decision to provoke a split with Yugoslavia revealed the limits of Soviet coercive power—economic, political, and military. The Soviet Union and its East European allies imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and adopted a wide array of political measures to destabilize and precipitate the collapse of Tito’s regime. The economic pressure was both bilateral and multilateral. When Stalin decided in late 1948 to proceed with the formation of a multilateral agency that would firmly bind the Soviet and East European economies, one of his main aims was to ensure stricter ‘coordination of [punitive] economic actions’ against Yugoslavia.¹⁴ The new Soviet–East European economic organization, formally established as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) at a secret conclave in Moscow on 5–7 January 1949, was designed in part to help individual member-states cope with the adverse economic effects they might suffer as they ‘drastically curtailed their trade with ... Yugoslavia’—a concern that had been raised by Bulgarian delegates at the CMEA’s founding conference.¹⁵

The Eastern bloc delegations at the January 1949 meeting also agreed to devise other ‘joint measures’ that would place an ever greater strain on the Yugoslav economy.¹⁶ Over the next few years, the CMEA countries (especially those contiguous with Yugoslavia) steadily escalated their economic warfare against Yugoslavia and tightened their bilateral sanctions. The Soviet Union halted supplies of crucial raw materials, machinery, and

spare parts for Yugoslav industry and clamped down on nearly all agricultural trade with Yugoslavia, effectively imposing an embargo.¹⁷ This mounting economic pressure, however, ultimately proved of no avail and in many respects was counterproductive. Yugoslavia turned to the West and to Third World countries for economic assistance and trade (including supplies of energy, raw materials, and spare parts), and Tito successfully rebuffed Moscow's attempts to force Yugoslavia to pay in full for hundreds of millions of rubles' worth of aid supposedly provided by the USSR during the first few years after the war.¹⁸

Soviet efforts to encourage pro-Moscow elements in the Yugoslav government, Communist party, and army to launch a coup against Tito proved equally ineffective when the Yugoslav leader liquidated the pro-Moscow factions in these bodies before they could move against him.¹⁹ The Soviet and East European governments broke diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, annulled the bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance they had signed with Belgrade over the previous few years, and inundated Yugoslavia with radio broadcasts condemning Tito as a 'fascist', a 'criminal', and a 'betrayers of the socialist cause'. Former Yugoslav partisan commanders who had sided with the Soviet Union in 1948 and had taken refuge in the USSR (or another Soviet bloc country) were enlisted to broadcast reports attacking Tito's role in the partisan movement and depicting him as a 'traitor' who had secretly been working on behalf of 'fascist armies occupying our homeland'.²⁰ The aim was to undermine the primary element of Tito's postwar legitimacy. Other radio broadcasts, from Albania and Hungary as well as the Soviet Union, exhorted the Macedonians and other minority ethnic groups in Yugoslavia to 'rise up against the oppressive regime'; the reports claimed (falsely) that widespread violent turmoil had broken out in Yugoslavia and within the Yugoslav army.²¹ The broadcasts were intended to demoralize the Yugoslav population and to fuel social disorder among ethnic groups, but they actually had the opposite effect of unifying the country more solidly behind Tito.

Nor was Stalin any more successful when he attempted to rely on covert operations to undermine the Yugoslav government and get rid of Tito. The Soviet state security and foreign intelligence organs devised a multitude of secret plots to assassinate Tito, including several as late as 1953 that involved a notorious special agent and assassin, Josif Grigulevich, who had been posing under aliases as a senior Costa Rican diplomat in both Rome and Belgrade. The idea was for Grigulevich (codenamed 'Max') either to

release deadly bacteria during a private meeting with the Yugoslav leader or to fire a concealed, noiseless gun at Tito during an embassy reception.²² No suitable opportunities for Grigulevich arose, however, in part because of precautions Tito had taken at the outset against such schemes. Other assassination plots, including some devised as early as the summer of 1948, envisaged the use of Bulgarian, Romanian, Hungarian, and Albanian intelligence agents acting at the behest of the Soviet Union, but these plots, too, ultimately came to naught.

In addition to covert operations directed against Tito himself, the Soviet and East European intelligence agencies spirited a large number of saboteurs and subversives into Yugoslavia to foment social chaos, disrupt economic activity, and incite a popular uprising against Tito's government.²³ Soviet bloc officials also smuggled in huge quantities of newspapers and leaflets in the various national languages of Yugoslavia urging 'all true Communists' to 'expose and remove the Tito-Ranković clique'.²⁴ In the end, however, all of these clandestine schemes proved infeasible or were thwarted by the Yugoslav state security forces, which remained firmly beholden to Tito.

SOVIET MILITARY OPTIONS VIS-À-VIS YUGOSLAVIA

The ineffectiveness of political and economic pressure and covert operations against Yugoslavia left Stalin with the unattractive option of using large-scale military force, an option he never ultimately pursued. Stalin's hesitation about launching an invasion of Yugoslavia evidently stemmed from many factors, including the prospect that Soviet troops would encounter staunch Yugoslav resistance, the burden of deploying large numbers of soldiers at a time when the Soviet armed forces were already overstretched, the transport and logistical problems of crossing Bulgaria's mountainous terrain into Yugoslavia, the possibility of provoking a war with the West (a concern that became more acute after the United States and its European allies began forging closer political, economic, and even military ties with Yugoslavia), and a belief that Tito could eventually be ousted by non-military means.²⁵ If Yugoslavia had been adjacent to the Soviet Union or had been located in the center of Eastern Europe rather than on the periphery, Stalin might have been quicker to rely on armed force. Nikita Khrushchev, who took part in all the high-level Soviet deliberations regarding options vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, later said he was 'absolutely

sure that if the Soviet Union had bordered on Yugoslavia, Stalin would have resorted to military intervention'.²⁶

Initial Configuration of Forces

It is indeed conceivable, as Khrushchev implied, that if Stalin had lived longer, he would eventually have ordered Soviet troops to occupy Yugoslavia. There is considerable evidence that in the final two years of his life the Soviet leader was seeking the capability for a decisive military move in Europe, possibly against Yugoslavia. Initially, from 1948 through mid-1950, the Soviet Union and its East European allies made only limited preparations for military contingencies involving Yugoslavia.²⁷ Declassified US intelligence documents reveal that, as of January 1950, the combined armed forces of the four Soviet bloc countries adjoining Yugoslavia (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) numbered only 346,000 troops organized in 28 divisions, or roughly the same size as Yugoslavia's army of 325,000 soldiers in 32 divisions.²⁸ Even though Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania had been receiving substantial inflows of Soviet-made weaponry and equipment, none of the 28 East European divisions had yet attained a high level of combat readiness. The documents also indicate that the Soviet Union at that point had only a token number of troops still deployed in Bulgaria and Albania and only four to six ground divisions (numbering 60,000–90,000 troops) in Romania and Hungary, equipped with roughly 1000 battle tanks.²⁹ Moreover, only one of the Soviet units, the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, which had been relocated from Romania to Hungary in mid-1949, was actually deployed near the Yugoslav border.³⁰

The Eastern bloc divisions arrayed against Yugoslavia as of early 1950 would have been sufficient for relatively limited contingencies (e.g. border incursions), but they fell well short of the quantity and quality of forces needed to achieve decisive military results in the face of stiff Yugoslav resistance. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded in May 1950 that the East European armies at their existing force levels would be 'incapable of waging offensive war' unless they received much greater Soviet backing. An invasion of Yugoslavia, the CIA estimated, would require 'a minimum of 25–30 Soviet divisions plus overwhelming air and armored support'. Anything short of that, the agency surmised, 'would probably result in a prolonged stalemate'.³¹

The Secret January 1951 Eastern Bloc Meeting

Nonetheless, even though Soviet and East European military preparations for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia were initially modest, the mobilization of Eastern bloc forces that could have been used against Yugoslavia increased drastically during the final two years of Stalin's life. This shift, which began in late 1950, reached a feverish pace after Stalin summoned the East European Communist party leaders and defense ministers to Moscow for a meeting on 9–12 January 1951. The meeting was not announced in advance and was held in complete secrecy, and nothing about it was disclosed in public afterward. Stalin and his chief political and military aides (Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, Lavrentii Beria, the Military Minister, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii, and the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Army-General Sergei Shtemenko) took part in the deliberations, as did the principal Soviet military advisers assigned as 'representatives' to the countries around Yugoslavia.

The full stenographic transcript of this four-day conclave has not yet been released from the Russian archives, but detailed notes taken by some of the East European participants, which only recently came to light, reveal that Stalin used the sessions to call for a huge expansion of all the Eastern bloc armed forces, including those in countries that would be involved in any conflict with Yugoslavia.³² Soviet leaders had been emphasizing the need for sharply increased military deployments since early 1950 in their discussions with senior Bulgarian and Romanian officials, and at the January 1951 conference Stalin extended this demand to the whole Soviet bloc and laid out a much more compressed timetable for a huge buildup—a timetable suitable for a crash war effort.³³

Stalin opened the meeting on 9 January by declaring that it was 'abnormal for [the East European countries] to have weak armies'. He already knew from Soviet military and intelligence personnel that the East European armed forces were in woeful shape. This assessment was vividly corroborated on 9 January when each of the East European defense ministers presented a status report indicating that his country's military forces were 'currently unable to meet the requirements of a war'.³⁴ Stalin warned his guests that 'this situation must be turned around' as quickly as possible. 'Within two to three years at most', he proclaimed, the East European countries must 'build modern, powerful armies' consisting of a total of at least three million soldiers. More than 1.2 million of these troops were to be deployed in peacetime in fully 'combat-ready' condition, 'poised to go

to war' at very short notice.³⁵ Another 1.85 million to 2 million military reserve forces in Eastern Europe were to be trained and equipped for rapid mobilization in the event of an emergency.³⁶

Stalin's blunt remarks at the conference clearly indicate that he believed a large-scale military confrontation in Europe was coming in the near future, and that he wanted to make sure the Soviet and East European armed forces would win it decisively. To achieve that goal, he could leave nothing to chance. He expressed great satisfaction that the United States had 'failed to cope with even a small war in Korea' and that US troops would 'be bogged down in Asia for the next two to three years'. 'This extremely favorable circumstance', he told the other participants, would give the Eastern bloc countries just enough time to complete a massive buildup of their armed forces.³⁷

Although Stalin's comments about an impending war in Europe may have been connected with the increase in US troop deployments begun in Europe after the outbreak of the Korean War (deployments stemming from US officials' concern that Stalin might be using the war in Korea as a diversion to undertake a thrust against Western Europe), this could not have been the main reason for his dire warnings. For one thing, the US military buildup in Europe was barely under way by the time of the January 1951 meeting. Much larger increases in US force levels in Europe did not come until considerably later in 1951 and especially 1952.³⁸ Furthermore, the notes from the meeting indicate that Stalin was pleased that the United States had gotten bogged down in Korea, and he did not seem at all fearful of US military prowess. Hence, even though a war with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states was undoubtedly a key part of Stalin's calculus at this time, he seems also to have had other military contingencies in mind, including a large-scale operation to overthrow Tito's regime and bring Yugoslavia back into the fold.

Initially, most of the East European officials were caught off-guard by the onerous task Stalin was assigning to them. The Polish national defense minister, Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski, insisted that the force levels set for Poland could not be achieved 'before the end of 1956'. Poland, he said, would find it 'enormously difficult' to complete such a large buildup in the short amount of time Stalin was proposing.³⁹ The Bulgarian Communist Party leader, Vulko Chervenkov, expressed similar reservations about his own country's ability to achieve the projected force levels. Stalin replied that 'if Rokossowski [and Chervenkov] can guarantee that there will be no war by the end of 1956, then [a scaled-back program]

might be adopted, but if no such guarantee can be offered, then it would be more sensible to proceed' with a crash buildup. This rebuke made clear to the East European leaders that Stalin was not there to bargain with them over the terms of the expansion and modernization of their armed forces. Although many of the East Europeans remained uneasy about the strain their countries would endure from the pace and magnitude of the envisaged buildup, they knew they had no choice but to comply with Stalin's wishes.⁴⁰

The Resulting Soviet–East European Military Buildup

No sooner had the conference ended than the East European governments embarked on programs to fulfill the inordinately ambitious numerical goals established for them by the Soviet High Command. The Soviet General Staff simultaneously undertook a crash buildup of the USSR's (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) own armed forces. The troop strength of the Soviet military had been cut precipitously after World War II, declining to only 2.9 million soldiers by 1948 from a wartime peak of nearly 12 million. During the final two years of Stalin's life, the size of the Soviet armed forces nearly doubled, reaching 5.6 million troops as of March 1953—a remarkable rate of peacetime growth.⁴¹ These new forces, many of which were equipped with the latest weaponry, were almost entirely located in the westernmost portion of the Soviet Union, including hundreds of thousands of combat troops who could have been assigned to any possible contingencies against Yugoslavia. The number of Soviet reserves ready for operations also sharply increased at this time, giving the Soviet General Staff the capacity to deploy more than ten million combat troops within thirty days of mobilization for war.⁴²

This immense buildup of the Soviet Armed Forces was accompanied by an abrupt increase in the level of their combat readiness. The Soviet Military Ministry (as the Defense Ministry was then known) issued new guidelines in late April 1951 requiring commanders at all levels to enforce strict discipline or risk incurring severe punishment.⁴³ In accordance with a directive of the VKP(b) Secretariat, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army, which oversaw the discipline and political preparation of Soviet combat troops, was thoroughly reorganized in the spring and summer of 1951 to rectify 'enormous shortcomings and breaches of discipline' within the senior officer corps and to move toward 'maximum combat readiness'.⁴⁴ Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii and

the head of the Soviet Army's Main Political Directorate, Colonel-General Fedor Kuznetsov, issued new guidelines in early September 1951 that drastically tightened disciplinary procedures, including changes suitable for wartime.⁴⁵ The sheer scale and rapidity of the peacetime buildup of the Soviet Armed Forces were unprecedented, especially in a country that had not yet fully recovered from the devastation of World War II. The vast expansion of the Soviet ground and air forces in 1951–3 allowed for military deployments against Yugoslavia (as well as for other contingencies) that would have been infeasible in 1948–50.

In Eastern Europe, too, the results of the crash military buildup were evident almost immediately. By January 1952 the combined armed forces of the four Eastern bloc countries bordering on Yugoslavia had expanded to 590,000 troops in 38 divisions, or nearly double the size of the Yugoslav army, which had not increased at all since 1950.⁴⁶ The East European armies continued to grow at a breakneck pace during the final year of Stalin's life, reaching the target goal of roughly 1.2 million soldiers. Furthermore, the quality of the weapons deployed by the Bulgarian and Romanian armed forces (and to a lesser extent by the Hungarian and Albanian armies) improved a great deal, as the countries received new combat aircraft, main battle tanks, short-range missiles, and heavy artillery not only from their dominant supplier, the Soviet Union, but also from Czechoslovakia, where the highly advanced armaments manufacturing base was placed on a war footing from 1951 to 1953 on Stalin's direct orders. During the final two years of Stalin's life, as the Czech military historian Jindřich Madry has pointed out, 'the Czechoslovak weapons industry was brought up to maximum capacity for what was seen as an "inevitable war"'.⁴⁷

The precipitous increases in the quantity and quality of weapons deployed by the armies of the four Communist states surrounding Yugoslavia were not matched by a comparable Yugoslav buildup. On the contrary, Yugoslavia's military forces were no longer receiving any new armaments, spare parts, munitions, or support equipment from their erstwhile supplier (the Soviet Union) and were facing a dire situation as their existing weaponry broke down and could not be repaired or replaced. Although Yugoslavia had begun receiving small amounts of light weapons and military-related equipment from the United States and a few other Western countries by mid-1951, these items were hardly enough to make up for the debilitating loss of Soviet-made armaments, communications gear, and spare parts.⁴⁸ In early 1952, US intelligence analysts reported

that the Yugoslav armed forces were plagued by grave weaknesses, including the ‘insufficient quantity and obsolescence of much of [their] equipment’, a ‘lack of spare parts and of proper ammunition’, a ‘severe shortage of heavy weapons, particularly of antitank artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and armor’, and the ‘lack of experience of the [Yugoslav] general staff in the tactical and technical utilization of combined arms’.⁴⁹ Thus, even as the Soviet and East European armed forces were rapidly expanding and gearing up for an all-out military confrontation in both Central Europe and the Balkans, the Yugoslav army was declining and was increasingly unfit for combat.

Yugoslavia and NATO in Soviet Military Planning

The military buildup in the Soviet bloc was ostensibly intended to deter or, if necessary, repulse an attack from outside (presumably an attack from NATO), but Soviet military planners assumed that large-scale operations against Yugoslavia would be part and parcel of any war against NATO.⁵⁰ Hence, the two contingencies could not really be separated. Stalin himself shared this view, in part because he had been receiving highly classified intelligence reports in late 1950 and 1951 claiming that the United States was ‘exerting pressure on Yugoslavia to speed up its official entry into NATO’.⁵¹ These claims were inaccurate—US policymakers at the time were still ambivalent at best about fuller military cooperation with Yugoslavia—but the Soviet foreign intelligence service continued to insist in its memoranda to Stalin that the US government was trying to bring Yugoslavia into NATO to form a coordinated front against the Soviet Union. Developments that followed the January 1951 meeting, such as the inception of US and British arms supplies to Yugoslavia in the late spring of 1951 and the establishment of US–Yugoslav intelligence cooperation in late 1951, undoubtedly reinforced Stalin’s belief that Yugoslavia would soon enter NATO.⁵²

This perception was further strengthened by the initiation of multilateral contacts in early 1951 among Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey about the formation of a Balkan Pact. Even though Greece and Turkey at that point were not yet members of NATO (their admission into the alliance was approved in September 1951, and they formally joined in February 1952), their entry was known to be only a matter of time. Soviet foreign intelligence officials repeatedly warned Stalin in 1951 and early 1952 that the United States was intent on ‘converting Yugoslavia into a military

beachhead for an attack against the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy'.⁵³ The intelligence reports claimed—inaccurately—that the United States was the main champion of the proposed Balkan Pact, which supposedly would 'bring Yugoslavia into the North Atlantic Alliance' with assistance from Turkey and Greece. In reality, Greece and to a lesser extent Turkey had taken the lead in pushing for a Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia.⁵⁴ US policymakers, far from being the main champions of the idea, were distinctly uneasy about the commitments such a pact might impose on the United States, which already had some 200,000 of its troops fighting in Korea and did not want to be stretched thin with a large array of new collective defense obligations in the Balkans.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, even if Soviet intelligence officials were misrepresenting the US position, the important thing is that Stalin increasingly had reason to suspect that Yugoslavia would eventually be integrated into NATO. From his perspective, even if Yugoslavia did not become a full member of the alliance, the prospect of much closer links between Belgrade and NATO would pose major complications for Soviet military planning in the Balkans. To the extent that Stalin wanted to bring Yugoslavia back into the Soviet sphere by any means necessary, he had an incentive to act before the purported US plans to facilitate Yugoslavia's entry into NATO were realized.

Concrete Military Preparations

Soviet and East European preparations for a massive 'counterattack' against enemy forces in Central Europe could easily have been adapted for an incursion into Yugoslavia if Stalin had eventually decided to launch one. As part of the post-January 1951 buildup, the USSR provided each of the East European countries with dozens of Tu-2 high-speed bomber aircraft, which would have played a crucial role in any coordinated Eastern bloc move against Yugoslavia.⁵⁶ Stalin had emphasized to the other leaders at the January 1951 conference that 'you will need to have a bomber force, at least one division per country initially, to carry out offensive operations'.⁵⁷ As a further boost to the East European countries' offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union supplied large quantities of Il-10 ground-attack aircraft for airborne assault forces, which would have spearheaded an attempt to seize strategic positions in Yugoslavia, including fortifications around Belgrade.⁵⁸

Moreover, under Soviet auspices the armed forces of the four Eastern bloc states adjoining Yugoslavia conducted war games in 1951 and 1952 that envisaged 'forward deployments' and 'large-scale offensive operations' to encircle and destroy enemy troops on Yugoslav territory. The Hungarian army in its exercises was specifically responsible for 'seizing the Belgrade area' and other strategic sites in Yugoslavia.⁵⁹ This task, though depicted in the context of a counterattack against an enemy occupier, obviously would have been an integral part of any joint Soviet–East European campaign to invade and occupy Yugoslavia. The Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces conducted similar exercises near their projected entry routes into Yugoslavia.⁶⁰ The Romanian government supported its army's preparations in June 1951 by forcibly deporting more than 40,000 civilians from the Banat and Oltenia regions along the Yugoslav border to the forbidding reaches of the Bărăgan Steppe.⁶¹ This mass deportation, which was closely coordinated with leaders in Moscow, was intended to remove 'hostile elements' and 'Titoist sympathizers' who might otherwise be a hindrance to Romanian military operations against the 'reactionary Yugoslav state'.⁶²

The Romanian army subsequently stepped up its maneuvers in the cleared-out regions, simulating large-scale thrusts across the border into Yugoslavia. By learning how to 'organize and command large-scale offensive operations in difficult conditions on the ground and in the air', how to 'concentrate forces that are superior in troop strength and equipment to break through enemy defenses', and how to 'distribute forces for the optimal structure of attack', high-ranking Eastern bloc military officers learned what they would need to know for a prospective invasion of Yugoslavia.⁶³

The rapid military buildup in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the experience derived from war games meant that, from mid-1952 until Stalin's death, the Soviet bloc forces confronting Yugoslavia posed a daunting military threat to Tito's regime. NATO intelligence analysts reported in late 1951 that the East European armies were acquiring 'significant offensive capabilities' against Yugoslavia, even without Soviet support.⁶⁴ A number of highly classified US intelligence assessments in the early 1950s, which kept close track of military developments in the USSR and the four Communist countries surrounding Yugoslavia, warned that 'the groundwork is being laid for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia' and that a full-scale Soviet and East European 'attack on Yugoslavia should be considered a serious possibility'.⁶⁵ Although US intelligence analysts

believed that such an attack was ‘unlikely’ in the near term, they concluded as early as March 1951 that if Soviet and East European forces embarked on a concerted offensive against Yugoslavia they would be able to occupy the country, destroy the Yugoslav army, and, over time, quell all guerrilla resistance:

The continuing military build-up in the neighboring Satellite states (increase in armed forces, stockpiling, re-equipment, gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry, etc.) has reversed the previous balance of military strength between the Satellites and Yugoslavia and has given the Satellites the capability of launching a major invasion of Yugoslavia with little warning. ... Combined Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance, and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.⁶⁶

This judgment was reinforced by the immense expansion of the Eastern bloc armies in the wake of the January 1951 conference. No longer was there any doubt about where the military advantage lay.

To be sure, the Soviet bloc’s growing *capacity* to invade Yugoslavia did not necessarily signal an *intention* to move in. US intelligence agencies in 1952 deemed it ‘unlikely’ that the Soviet bloc would embark on an all-out military attack against Yugoslavia by the end of the year. Western intelligence assessments in 1951–2 pointed out that the various signs of Soviet and East European preparations for an invasion—the ‘rapid increase in the capabilities of the armed forces’ in the four Eastern bloc states contiguous with Yugoslavia; the fact that the East European ‘countries adjacent to Yugoslavia have evacuated the majority of the civilians from key border areas’; the unrelenting Soviet and East European ‘propaganda [and] psychological preparations’ designed to ‘justify an attack on Yugoslavia’; the increased registration for compulsory military service in the four Eastern bloc states adjoining Yugoslavia; the ‘recurrent concentrations of [Eastern bloc] troops along the Yugoslav border’; and the increasing frequency of border incidents coupled with ‘rumors from Cominform circles of an impending attack on Yugoslavia’—did ‘not necessarily reflect a Soviet intention to launch an attack upon Yugoslavia’ in the near term.⁶⁷ US intelligence analysts noted that these actions might simply be an acute form of coercive diplomacy or part of a larger Soviet bloc effort to gear up for an East–West war in Europe, rather than being directed specifically against Yugoslavia. The analysts also surmised that if the USSR genuinely

intended to invade and occupy Yugoslavia, it would wait to do so until ‘the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Hungarian armed forces ... complete their reorganization and reach maximum effectiveness’ at the end of 1953 and until the Albanian military reached a similar state in mid-1954.⁶⁸ Stalin’s death in March 1953 came well before the reorganization of the East European armies was fully over.

Thus, even though Stalin, toward the end of his life, was overseeing a huge expansion of the Eastern bloc armed forces and was thereby ‘laying the groundwork’ for an invasion of Yugoslavia (regardless of whether that was the main purpose of the buildup), it is impossible to say what he actually would have done if he had lived another few years.⁶⁹ Despite the Soviet bloc’s extensive military preparations, and despite Moscow’s efforts to stir acute fears in Yugoslavia of a looming Soviet–East European attack, the available evidence suggests that Stalin never firmly decided—one way or the other—whether to embark on an invasion of Yugoslavia if coercion alone did not succeed.

RECONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET BLOC

Short of actually launching an all-out invasion, the Soviet Union had to put up at least temporarily with a breach in the Eastern bloc and the strategic loss of Yugoslavia vis-à-vis the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea. Other potential dangers for Moscow also loomed. Yugoslavia’s continued defiance raised the prospect that ‘Titoism’ would spread and ‘infect’ other East European countries, causing the Soviet bloc to fragment and even to collapse. To preclude any further defections and to bolster Soviet control in Eastern Europe, Stalin instructed the local Communist parties to carry out new purges and political trials and to eliminate anyone who might be aspiring to emulate Tito. The ensuing spate of repressions took a particularly violent toll in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.⁷⁰

The political purges that swept through Eastern Europe in 1949–54 differed fundamentally from the repressions that took place earlier, in 1944–8. The earlier crackdowns were targeted predominantly against non-Communists, whereas the purges in 1949–54 were focused mostly on Communists, including many high officials who had avidly taken part in the initial repressions. The show trials of Communist leaders were intended not only to root out anyone who might strive for a degree of autonomy from Moscow, but also to instill a general sense of fear in society, lend-

ing credence to official claims that ‘enemies’ were engaging in ‘subversive actions’.

Both of these goals contributed to the mobilization of the Eastern bloc countries for war. The sudden discovery of alleged Titoist and Western ‘spies’ in the ruling organs of the Communist parties created a war psychosis and fostered the perception that no one—not even those who seemed to be unwaveringly loyal to the Communist regime and to the Soviet Union—could really be trusted. Stalin had used this same approach in the USSR in the late 1930s when he wanted to secure the home front in the face of an approaching war.⁷¹ By early 1951 he once again believed that a large-scale armed conflict would soon break out, and he therefore was transferring Soviet methods to the East European countries so that they could uproot the ‘Titoist fifth columns’ in their midst.

Within the Soviet Union, the drive against potential ‘fifth columnists’ and the mobilization for war entailed a violent anti-Semitic campaign, preparations for a high-level political purge (targeted against Molotov, Anastas Mikoyan, Beria, and others), and ruthless counterinsurgency operations in the western areas of the country. All of these policies, to one degree or another, were adopted in Eastern Europe under Soviet supervision. The pronounced anti-Semitic overtones of the East European show trials, for example, were directly patterned on Stalin’s own luridly anti-Semitic repressions. Similarly, the armed campaigns against anti-Communist guerrillas in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and other countries in the mid- to late 1940s were based directly on—and pursued in conjunction with—the vigorous counterinsurgency operations in the USSR’s western republics.⁷²

As the Eastern bloc Balkan countries geared up for a large-scale external military confrontation in the early 1950s, they carried out mass deportations along their borders with Yugoslavia and arrested tens of thousands of people each year. In Romania alone, 6635 people were arrested by the Securitate in 1950; 19,235 in 1951; and 24,826 in 1952.⁷³ The aim of the deportations and arrests was not only to ensure that strategically vital border areas would be free of ‘Titoist sympathizers’ and other ‘enemies of the people’, but also to forestall any possibility of internal disruption. These policies, like others, were modeled closely on Soviet practices and often were directly supervised by Soviet state security officials who had organized mass deportations and arrests in the Baltic republics and western Ukraine. The deportations in Romania were larger than elsewhere, but the same basic approach was adopted in all the Eastern bloc countries adjoining Yugoslavia.

Stalin's efforts to prevent a spillover from Yugoslavia and to promote a common anti-Tito front had the desired effect. Soviet influence in Eastern Europe came under no further threat during his lifetime. From the late 1940s through the early 1950s, all the Eastern bloc states embarked on crash industrialization and forced collectivization programs, causing vast social upheaval yet also leading to rapid short-term economic growth. The entrenchment of CMEA institutions ensured that this growth could be harnessed for Stalin's own purposes.⁷⁴ The drastic expansion of the East European armed forces in the early 1950s required an ever greater share of resources to be devoted to the military and heavy industry, with very little left over for consumer output. However, because ordinary citizens in the Soviet bloc were largely excluded from the political sphere and were forbidden to engage in any sort of political protest, they had no choice but to endure a sharp, prolonged decline in living standards and many other hardships, both material and intellectual.

In that sense, no conflict between 'viability' and 'cohesion' yet existed in the Communist bloc.⁷⁵ Stalin was able to rely on the presence of Soviet troops, a tightly woven network of state security forces overseen by the Soviet state security organs, the wholesale penetration of the East European armies and governments by Soviet agents, the use of mass purges and political terror, and the unifying threat of renewed German militarism to ensure that regimes subservient to Moscow retained their dominant positions, free from any possible challenge. By the early 1950s, Stalin had established a degree of control over Eastern Europe to which his successors could only aspire.

NOTES

1. The declassification of archival materials in numerous countries, including crucial items collected by Leonid Gibianskii, has greatly illuminated the origins and evolution of the Soviet-Yugoslav split. See, for example, Leonid Gibianskii, 'The Origins of the Soviet-Yugoslav Split', in *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, eds. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 291-312; Jeronim Perović, 'The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 9, no. 2 (2007): 32-63; L. Ya. Gibianskii, 'Ot "nerushimoi druzhby" k besposhchadnoi bor'be: Model' "sotsialisticheskogo lagerya" i sovetsko-yugoslavskii kon-

flikt' [From 'indestructible friendship' to merciless struggle: The model of the 'socialist camp' and the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict], in *U istokov 'sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva': SSSR i vostochnoevropeiskie strany v 1944–1949 gg.* [At the sources of the 'Socialist Community': The USSR and the East European Countries in 1944–1949] ed. L. Ya. Gibianskii (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), pp. 137–63; and the valuable chapters by L. Ya. Gibianski, A. B. Edemskii, and A. S. Anikeev in Part IV of *Yugoslaviya v XX veke: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii* [Yugoslavia in the 20th Century: contours of political history] eds. K. V. Nikiforov et al. (Moscow: Indrik, 2011), 523–659. For an insightful and more extended analysis, see A. S. Anikeev, *Kak Tito ot Stalina ushel: Yugoslaviya, SSSR i SShA v nachal'nyi period 'kholodnoi voiny'* [How Tito broke with Stalin: Yugoslavia, the USSR, and the USA in the opening phase of the 'Cold War'] (Moscow: Institut slavyanovedeniya RAN, 2002), esp. 86–206. For a good sample of the newly available documentation, see 'Sekretnaya sovetско-yugoslavskaya perepiska 1948 goda', [Secret Soviet-Yugoslav correspondence from 1948] *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), nos. 4–5, 6–7, and 10–11 (1992), 119–36, 158–72, and 154–69, respectively, as well as the multitude of relevant documents in T. V. Volokitina et al. (eds.), *Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953*, [Eastern Europe in the Documents of Russian Archives, 1944–1953] 2 vols. (Novosibirsk: Sibir'skii khronograf, 1997 and 1999); and T. V. Volokitina et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953: Dokumenty* [The Soviet Factor in Eastern Europe, 1944–1953] 2 vols. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999 and 2002). The materials released in the early 1990s were discussed extensively in numerous articles at the time, including I. Bukharkin, 'Konflikt, ktorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt' (iz istorii sovetско-yugoslavskiiikh otnoshenii)' ['The conflict that did not have to be' (from the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations)] *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow) 6, 31 March 1990, 53–7; L. Ya. Gibianskii, 'U nachala konflikta: Balkanskii uzel', ['At the start of the conflict: The Balkan knot'], *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* (Moscow), no. 2 (1990): 171–85; I. V. Bukharkin and L. Ya. Gibianskii, 'Pervye shagi konflikta', ['The first stages of the conflict'] *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* (Moscow), no. 5 (1990): 152–63; L. Ya. Gibianskii, 'Vyzov v Moskvu' ['Summons to Moscow'] *Politicheskie*

- issledovaniya* (Moscow), no. 1 (1991): 195–207; and the related series of articles by L. Ya. Gibianskii, ‘K istorii sovetsko-yugoslavskogo konflikta 1948–1953 gg.’ [‘On the history of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, 1948–1953’] in *Sovetskoe slavyanovedenie* (Moscow), no. 3 (1991): 32–47 and no. 4 (1991): 12–24; and *Slavyanovedenie* (Moscow), no. 1 (1992): 68–82 and no. 3 (1992): 35–51.
2. For an insightful discussion of this issue, see L. Ya. Gibianskii, ‘Ideya balkanskogo ob”edineniya i plany ee osushchestvleniya v 40-e gody XX veka’ [‘The idea of a Balkan Union and the plans for implementing it in the 1940s’] *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), no. 11 (2001): 38–56. See also Leonid Gibianskii, ‘Federative Projects of the Balkan Countries and the USSR Policy during Second World War and at the Beginning of the Cold War’, in *The Balkans in the Cold War*, ed. Vojislav G. Pavlović (Belgrade: Institute for Balkan Studies, 2011), 63–81.
 3. Arkhiv Prezidental Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), Fond (F.) 558, Opis’ (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 397, Listy (Ll.) 107–110, ‘Zapis’ besedy generalissimus I. V. Stalina s marshalom Tito’ [‘Transcript of Generalissimo I. V. Stalin’s Discussion with Marshal Tito’] (Secret), 27 May 1946. The secret Yugoslav transcript of these talks, from Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (AJBT), F. Kabinet Maršala Jugoslavije (KMJ), I-1/7, Ll. 6–11, was published in *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), no. 2 (1994), 24–8, along with valuable annotations by Leonid Gibianskii. The two transcripts are complementary for the most part, rather than duplicative. For more on Moscow’s concerns about the Balkan issue, see several dozen top-secret cables and reports to Stalin and Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. 0144, Op. 30, Papka (Pa.) 118, D. 10.
 4. Analytical works and declassified document anthologies on this matter have appeared in both Bulgaria and Macedonia since the early 1990s, but nearly all of these are marred by one-sided interpretations and coverage. For a more evenhanded account, see Petar Dragišić *Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1944–1949* [*Yugoslav–Bulgarian Relations, 1944–1949*] (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007), 176–92.
 5. AJBT-KMJ, I-2/17, L. 70, ‘Shifrtelogramma’ No. 37-443-506 (Strictly Secret), from Stalin to Tito, 12 August 1948.

6. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), F. 17, Op. 128, D. 1165, Ll. 59–62, 'Kratkaya zapis' besedy Sekretarya TsK VKP(b) tovarishcha Suslova M.A. s general'nym sekretarem kompartii Vengrii tov. Rakoshi, sostoyavshayasya 19 fevralya 1948 g.' [Brief Transcript of VKP(b) Secretary Comrade M. A. Suslov's Discussion with the General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party Comrade Rákosi on 19 February 1948], Notes from Conversation (Secret), transcribed by L. Baranov, 21 February 1948.
7. See the valuable collection of declassified documents from the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive in 'Stranitsy istorii: Konflikt, kotorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt' (iz istorii sovetsko-yugoslavskikh otnoshenii), ['Pages of history: the conflict that did not have to be' (from the history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations)] *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow), no. 6, 31 March 1990, 57–63, esp. 57 and 59.
8. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 128, D. 1160, Ll. 6–7, 'Informatsiya o vos'mom plenum TsK Kompartii Albanii' ['Information on the Eighth Plenum of the Albanian Communist Party's Central Committee', Memorandum (Secret) to the VKP(b) Secretariat, from N. Puklov and P. Manchka, 15 May 1948.
9. 'Iz telegrammy V. M. Molotova A. I. Lavrent'evu dlya peredachi I. Broz Tito 31 yanvarya 1948' and 'Iz telegrammy V. M. Molotova A. I. Lavrent'evu dlya peredachi I. Broz Tito 1 fevralya 1948 g' ['From V. M. Molotov's Telegram to A. I. Lavrent'ev for Transmission to J. Broz Tito', 31 January 1948 and 1 February 1948], both of which are reproduced in the valuable collection of declassified documents from the Soviet foreign ministry archive in 'Stranitsy istorii: Konflikt, kotorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt', 57 and 59, respectively.
10. For useful analyses of the Yugoslav, Soviet, and Bulgarian roles in the Greek civil war, see Peter Stavrakis, *Moscow and Greek Communism, 1944–1949* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Jordan Baev, *O emfilyos polemos sten Ellada: Diethneis diastaseis* [The civil war in Greece: international dimensions] (Athens: Filistor, 1996); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 56–7; and Artiom Ulunian, 'The Soviet Union and the Greek Question, 1946–53: Problems

- and Appraisals', in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53*, eds. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (London: Macmillan, 1996), 140–58. Among many examples of the Soviet leadership's relatively cautious approach, see RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 128, D. 1019, Ll. 35–6, 'Beseda tov. Zhdanov s Zakhariadisom' ['Comrade Zhdanov's Discussion with Zahariadis'], 22 May 1947 (Top Secret).
11. 'Kratkaya zapis' besedy Sekretarya TsK VKP(b) tovarishcha Suslova M.A. s general'nym sekretarem kompartii Vengrii tov. Rakoshi, sostoyavshayasya 19 fevralya 1948 g.' (see note 6 *supra*), Ll. 59–62.
 12. See, for example, RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 128, D. 1165, Ll. 95–9, 'Kratkaya zapis' besedy sekretarya TsK VKP(b) tovarishcha Suslova M. A. s chlenom Politbyuro Vengerskoi kompartii T. Revai, nakhodivshimsya v Moskve proezdom iz Stokgol'ma, gde on byl na XIV s"ezde kompartii Shvetsiya v kachestve gostya' ['Brief Transcript of VKP(b) CC Secretary Comrade M. A. Suslov's Discussion with Hungarian Communist Party Politburo Member Comrade Révai in Moscow on the Way Back from Stockholm, where He Was a Guest at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Sweden'], Memorandum (Top Secret) from L. S. Baranov to the VKP(b) Secretariat, 21 May 1948.
 13. This point is well illustrated by the documents in 'Stranitsy istorii: Konflikt, kotorogo ne dolzhno bylo byt', 57–63. See also 'Krupnoe porazhenie Stalina—Sovetsko-yugoslavskii konflikt 1948–1953 godov: prichiny, posledstviya, uroki' ['Stalin's huge defeat—the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, 1948–1953: reasons, consequences, lessons'] *Moskovskie novosti* (Moscow), no. 27, 2 July 1989, 8–9.
 14. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 162, D. 39, Ll. 149, 199–200, 'Vypiska iz osobogo protokola No. 66: Reshenie Politbyuro TsK VKP(b) "Ob ekonomicheskikh otnosheniyakh mezhdu SSSR i stranami narodnoi demokratii"' ['Extract from Special Protocol No. 66: Decision of the VKP(b) CC Politburo "On Economic Relations between the USSR and the Countries of People's Democracy"'], No. 66 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), 23 December 1948, with the attachment 'O tesnom sotrudnichestve mezhdu SSSR i stranami narodnoi demokratii' ['On Close Cooperation between the USSR and the Countries of People's Democracy'].
 15. Národní Archiv České Republiky (NAČR), F. 100/35, Svazek (Sv.), Archivní jednotka (A.j.) 1101, Ll. 3, 4, 'Zápis o schůzce

- zástupců šesti stran u Molotova v Kremlu dne 5. ledna 1949 0 9. hod. Večerní' ['Transcript of the Meeting of Officials from Six Countries with Molotov in the Kremlin, on 5 January 1949 at 9:00 PM'] (Secret), 5 January 1949.
16. See the handwritten and typed notes and marked-up draft resolutions from the secret three-day conference 5–7 January 1949 in RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1072, Ll. 7–15, 19–25, 33–43, 48–54; and in Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv (TsDA), F. 1-B, Op. 5, arkhivna edinitsa (a.e.) 30, Ll. 18–33. See also the full protocols from the meetings in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE), F. 561, Op. 13, D. 3, Ll. 42–55, which can also be found in TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 5, a.e. 30, Ll. 4–17. For further valuable documentation from the conference, see 'Zápisy z ustavjuících schůzi Rady vzájemné hospodářské pomoci a z jednání delegací s J. V. Stalinem, 1949, 5.-8. Ledna' ['Minutes of the Founding Meeting of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and of the Delegation's Session with J. V. Stalin, 5–8 January 1949'], in Karel Kaplan, *Československo v RVHP, 1949–1956* [*Czechoslovakia in CMEA, 1949–1956*] (Prague: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 1995), 213–36.
 17. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 132, D. 631, Ll. 25–9, 'Dokladnaya zapiska: Ob ekonomicheskom i vnutripoliticheskom polozhenii v Yugoslavii' ['Memorandum: On the Economic and Internal Political Situation in Yugoslavia'], Memorandum (Secret) from the Soviet embassy in Belgrade to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 3 April 1951.
 18. APRF, F. 3, Op. 66, D. 910, Ll. 167–74, 'Tovarishchu Stalinu I. V.' ['To Comrade I. V. Stalin'], Memorandum No. 12-s (Top Secret) from A. A. Gromyko, M. A. Men'shikov, A. M. Vasilevskii, A. G. Zverev, and B. P. Beshev to Stalin, 18 December 1950, with attached draft resolution of the Communist Party Central Committee and draft note to the Yugoslav government, reproduced in T. V. Volokitina et al. (eds.), *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope, 1944–1953*, 2:429–33.
 19. Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL), President's Secretary's Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 213: National Intelligence Estimates, CIA, 'National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952', NIE-29/2 (Top Secret), 4 January 1952, 3.

20. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 137, D. 629, Ll. 147–60, ‘TsK VKP(b) tov. Grigor’yanu V. G.’ [‘To the VKP(b) Central Committee, to Comrade V. G. Grigoryan’], Memorandum No. 6/3 (Secret) from D. Kraminov of the Soviet Committee of Radio Broadcasting to V. G. Grigor’yan, head of the VKP(b) Foreign Policy Commission, 13 October 1951, with texts of broadcasts appended.
21. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 137, D. 629, L. 6, ‘TsK VKP(b) tov. Grigor’yanu V. G.’ [‘To the VKP(b) Central Committee, to Comrade V. G. Grigoryan’], Memorandum No. 222-s (Secret) from I. Pozdnyak, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee on Radio Information, to V. G. Grigor’yan, head of the VKP(b) Foreign Policy Commission, 3 April 1951. See also HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence File, 1946–53, Box 211: Memoranda 1950–52, CIA, ‘Memorandum: Analysis of Soviet and Satellite Propaganda Directed to or about Yugoslavia’, 00-F-125 (Top Secret), 1 September 1950, 1–6.
22. For a description of the bizarre plots involving Grigulevich, see the handwritten memorandum from S. D. Ignat’ev, chief of the State Security Ministry, to Stalin, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 24, D. 463, Ll. 148–9. The full text of the memorandum is transcribed in Dmitrii Volkogonov, ‘Nesostoyavsheesya pokushenie: Kak sovetskii agent Maks gotovilsya k terroristicheskomu aktu protiv Tito’ [‘An assassination that did not happen: how the Soviet agent “Max” prepared for a terrorist act against Tito’], *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 11 June 1993, 7, which was the first publication to mention this scheme. It is discussed far more fully in the book by the late head of the Stalin-era covert operations branch of the Soviet foreign intelligence service, Pavel Sudoplatov, *Spestoperatsii: Lubyanka, Krem’l’, 1930–1950 gody* [*Special Operations: Lubyanka, the Kremlin, 1930–1950*] (Moscow: Olma-Press, 1998), 528–32. On other plots to assassinate Tito, see Marko Lopusina, *KGB protiv Jugoslavije* [*The KGB against Yugoslavia*] (Belgrade: Evro, 2001), 69–75; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 355–8; and the first-hand observations in Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast’* [*Time, People, the Regime*] 3: 119.
23. See, for example, TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 5, a.e. 55, Ll. 15–20, ‘Protokol za zasedaniето na plenuma na TsK na BKP, sustoyal se na 16 i 17

yanuari 1950 godina' ['Protocol of the Session of the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee's Plenum on 16–17 January 1950'], 16–17 January 1950 (Top Secret); and TsDA, F. 214b, Op. 1, a.e. 71, Ll. 66–117, 'Stenogramma ot suveshchanie na aktivistite na sofiiskata organizatsiya na BRP(k) po makedonskiya vupros' ['Stenogram of the Conclave of Activists of the Sofia Organization of the Bulgarian Workers' Party on the Macedonian Question'], 9 October 1948 (Secret). See also HSTL, President's Secretary's Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 213: National Intelligence Estimates, CIA, 'National Intelligence Estimate: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951', NIE-29 (Top Secret), 20 March 1951, 3. The East European state security forces also sought to disrupt alleged rings of spies and subversives in their own countries and 'turn' them so that they could be used as double agents against Yugoslavia. See, for example, TsDA, F. 1-B, Op. 7, a. e. 1560, Ll. 1–4, 'Predlozhenie otnosno: Realiziranata v D. S.—G. Dzhumaya razrabotka "Izmennik"' ['A Proposal in regard to the State Security's Efforts to Turn G. Jumai into a "Traitor"'], 10 February 1949 (Strictly Confidential).

24. RGASPI, F. 82, Op. 2, D. 1379, Ll. 106–10, 'Informatsiya ob organizatsii nelegal'nogo rasprostraneniya na territorii Yugoslavii izdaniy yugoslavskikh politemigrantov' ['Information about Efforts to Organize the Secret Distribution of Publications of Yugoslav Political Émigrés on Yugoslav Territory'], Memorandum No. 61ss (Top Secret) from V. G. Grigor'yan to V. M. Molotov, 22 August 1951.
25. General Béla Király, the commander of Hungarian ground forces 1949–50, later claimed that the vigorous US response to North Korea's attack against South Korea in June 1950 was the main thing that caused Stalin to abandon plans for an invasion of Yugoslavia. See Béla Király, 'The Aborted Soviet Military Plans against Tito's Yugoslavia', in *At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective*, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1984), 273–88. Király may be correct about the *short-term* impact of the US intervention in Korea on Stalin's calculus, but declassified materials reveal that the Soviet leader was emboldened after China intervened in the war and the US military effort bogged down. At a top-secret confer-

ence in Moscow in January 1951, Stalin declared that the US failure to defeat China and North Korea demonstrated that ‘the United States is unprepared to start a third world war and is not even capable of fighting a small war’. See the declassified notes of Stalin’s remarks at the conference, transcribed in C. Cristescu, ‘Strict Secret de importanță deosebită—Ianuarie 1951: Stalin decide înarmarea României’ [‘Of Top-Secret Importance—January 1951: Stalin Decides to Arm Romania’], *Magazin istoric* (Bucharest), 29, no. 10 (1995): 15–23. Király’s argument is further belied by the concrete evidence of Soviet and East European military preparations for a possible invasion of Yugoslavia. Before the Korean War broke out, Soviet and East European preparations for armed intervention in Yugoslavia were minimal, whereas at the height of the Korean War, in 1951–2, the Soviet bloc states were engaged in a massive military buildup, which would have been of great use for an invasion of Yugoslavia.

26. Khrushchev, *Vremya, lyudi, vlast’*, 3: 118.
27. See, for example, HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 215: ORE, CIA, ‘Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability to Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949’, ORE 44–9 (Top Secret), 20 June 1949; HSTL, President’s Secretary’s Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 215: ORE, CIA, ‘The Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action during 1949’, ORE 46–9 (Top Secret), 3 May 1949, 4; and László Ritter, ‘War on Tito’s Yugoslavia? The Hungarian Army in Early Cold War Soviet Strategy’, Working Paper of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, February 2005. Ritter skillfully debunks the claims made by Béla Király about alleged Soviet preparations in 1948–50 for an invasion of Yugoslavia, but Ritter’s impressive analysis contains a few important shortcomings. First, he focuses so much on Király’s account that he fails to give due weight to the crucial changes that occurred in the final two years of Stalin’s life. Second, Ritter refers to Eastern bloc planning and preparations for a ‘counteroffensive’ against Yugoslavia (and against Western countries that might join Yugoslavia in attacking the Soviet bloc), but he fails to acknowledge that planning and preparations for a ‘counterattack’ would be just as useful in carrying out an invasion of Yugoslavia. Nothing about these prepara-

tions was inherently 'defensive'. Third, Ritter focuses solely on Hungary and does not discuss the buildup and preparations under way in Romania and Bulgaria, two countries (especially the latter) that would have played far more important roles than Hungary in any prospective Soviet bloc incursion into Yugoslavia.

28. CIA, 'NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952', 4–5.
29. Figures derived from HSTL, President's Secretary's Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 219, Special Evaluation Reports, CIA, 'Possibility of Direct Military Action in the Balkans by Soviet Satellites', Special Evaluation No. 40 (Top Secret), 29 July 1950, 2; and Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White House: National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948–61, Executive Secretary's Subject File Series, Box 1, Miscellaneous File, 'National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956', NIE 12–54 (Top Secret), 24 August 1954, 19, esp. 'Appendix, Table 1: Soviet Forces Estimated to Be Stationed in the Satellites July 1954'.
30. London, The National Archives (hereinafter TNA), FO 371/87865, 'Review of the Military Situation in Hungary: The Likelihood of an Immediate Offensive against Yugoslavia Discounted', Memorandum (Secret) from G. A. Wallinger, British ambassador to Hungary, to the Foreign Office, 11 August 1950.
31. HSTL, President's Secretary's Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 216: ORE/1950, CIA, 'Evaluation of Soviet–Yugoslav Relations (1950)', ORE 8–50 (Top Secret), 11 May 1950, 5.
32. The most extensive notes were taken by the Romanian Defense Minister, Emil Bodnăraș, and by the Hungarian Communist party leader, Mátyás Rákosi, both of whom recorded Stalin's comments and provided many other details of the proceedings. Bodnăraș's notes were declassified in the 1990s and published in a monthly Romanian historical journal. See Cristescu, 'Strict Secret de importanță deosebită', 15–23. Rákosi's detailed account, evidently based on the contemporaneous notes he was able to take with him to Moscow in 1956, can be found in his memoirs, *Visszaemlékezések*, [*Recollections*] (Budapest: Napvilág Kiadó, 1997), 2: 860–6, esp. 860–2. A shorter account, attributed to the Czechoslovak defense

minister, Alexej Čepička, was published by the historian Karel Kaplan in *Dans les archives du comité central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc soviétique* (Paris: Ed. Albin Michel, 1978), 164–6. See also the brief but interesting retrospective comments of Edward Ochab in Teresa Torańska, *Oni [Them]* (London: Aneks, 1985), 46–7. Although Ochab was not the leader of the Polish United Workers' Party in 1951, he attended the conference in place of Bolesław Bierut, the party leader, who apparently was ill. Because Stalin had not yet decided how far he would go in allowing East Germany to deploy a regular army, no East German officials took part in the conference. Albania also was not represented at the conference, but Stalin and several other high-ranking Soviet officials met in Moscow in early April 1951 with the Albanian Communist leader, Enver Hoxha, and the chief of the Albanian General Staff, General Bekir Baluku, and discussed the need to strengthen the Albanian armed forces, particularly by equipping them with more tanks and combat aircraft. For a summary transcript of the meeting, see APRF, F. 558, Op. 1, D. 249, Ll. 90–7, 'Zapis' besedy I. V. Stalina s E. Khodzei, 2 aprelya 1951 g.' ['Notes of I. V. Stalin's Discussion with E. Hoxha, 2 April 1951'], Memorandum of Conversation (Top Secret), 2 April 1951, reproduced in *Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov*, 2: 504–9. The transcript tallies surprisingly well with the account of this meeting in Hoxha's memoirs, *With Stalin: Memoirs*, 2nd edn. (Tirana: 8 Nëntori Publishing House, 1981), 201–19. According to the transcript, Hoxha told Stalin that the Albanian army already numbered 150,000–175,000 troops plus 218,000 reserves, but these figures, compared to US intelligence estimates, are much too high even if the Albanian security forces are included with the army. See, for example, the 1949 Soviet–Albanian agreement on defense cooperation, 'Marrëveshje midis Ministrisë së forcave të Armatosura të BRSS dhe Ministrisë Mbrojtjes Kombëtare të RPSH mbi dhënien ndihmë materiale Ushtrisë Shqiptare' ['Agreement between the USSR Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Albanian Ministry of National Defense on the Provision of Material Assistance to the Albanian People's Army'], Doc. Nr. A-163/11 (Top Secret), 19 September 1949, in Arkivi Qendror i Forcave të Armatosura (Tirana), Fondi 100/1, Bobina 17, V. 1949, D 158.

33. On the earlier demands, see, for example, 'Protokol za zasedaniето na plenuma na TsK na BKP, sustoyal se na 16 i 17 yanuari 1950 godina' (see note 23 *supra*), L. 18. Stalin provided similar 'advice' to the Hungarian authorities in the last few months of 1950. See APRF, F. 558, Op. 1, D. 293, Ll. 80–2, 'Tovarishchu Stalinu Iosifu Vissarionovichu ['To Comrade I. V. Stalin'], 31 October 1950 (Top Secret), letter from Mátyás Rákosi to Stalin.
34. Cristescu, 'Strict Secret de importanță deosebită', 18.
35. Ibid., 17–18.
36. Ibid., 19. These figures, which were stipulated by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii and approved by Stalin, come from the documents transcribed by Bodnăraș. I have adjusted them slightly to take account of Albania's projected troop levels, which were not specified at the meeting.
37. Ibid., 20.
38. Hubert Zimmermann, 'The Improbable Permanence of a Commitment: America's Troop Presence in Europe during the Cold War', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11, no. 1 (2009), 3–27, esp. 4.
39. Rákosi, *Visszaemlékezések*, 2: 861.
40. Ibid., 862–3, 865. See also Cristescu, 'Strict Secret de importanță deosebită', 17–20.
41. 'Spravka-doklad G. K. Zhukova o sokrashchenii vooruzhenykh sil' ['G. K. Zhukov's Summary Memorandum on the Reduction of the Armed Forces'], Report to the CPSU Presidium (Top Secret), 12 August 1955, and 'Zapiska G. Zhukova i V. Sokolovskogo v TsK KPSS' ['Memorandum from G. Zhukov and V. Sokolovskii to the CPSU Central Committee'], Report to the CPSU Presidium (Top Secret), 9 February 1956, in *Voennye arkhivy Rossii* (Moscow), no. 1 (1993): 280–1 and 283–8 respectively.
42. Brussels, NATO Archives, (hereinafter NATO), C8-D4, MC 33, 'Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future' (Top Secret—Cosmic), 23 November 1951.
43. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 27–30ob, 'Prikaz Voennogo Ministra Soyuza SSSR No. 0085' ['Directive of the USSR Minister of War No. 0085'], Military Directive (Top Secretive) issued by Military Minister Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevskii, 30 April 1951. A cover note on L.

29 indicates that Vasilevskii's directive had been mandated by the VKP(b) Politburo and the USSR Council of Ministers two days earlier to implement far-reaching 'changes in the guidelines of the political organs of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union'. See also 'Pomoshchniku Sekretarya TsK VKP(b) tov. Shuiskomu G. T.', from G. Gromov, head of the VKP(b) Administrative Department, 15 March 1952, reporting on the fulfillment of USSR Council of Minister resolution No. 1404-704s, adopted on 28 April 1951.

44. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 136, D. 218, Ll. 109–12, 'Spravka o nedostatkakh v rabote zamestitelya po politichasti nachal'nika Glavnogo Upravleniya VOSO Genshtaba polkovnika Mikhina A. S., vskrytykh proverkoï rabotnikami politupravleniya v yanvare-fevrale 1951 goda' ['Memorandum about Shortcomings in the Work', Memorandum No. 203609s (Top Secret) from M. Zakharov, head of the Personnel Directorate of the Soviet Army's Main Political Directorate, to the head of the VKP(b) Administrative Department, 25 May 1951]. See also the follow-up reports on implementation, in RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 136, D. 218, Ll. 198–201, 'TsK VKP(b) tovarishchu Malenkovu G. M.' ['To the VKP(b) Central Committee, to Comrade G. M. Malenkov'], Memorandum No. 18656/s (Top Secret) from Marshal A. Vasilevskii and Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov to Georgii Malenkov, 15 November 1951 (a cover note from Georgii Malenkov on Ll. 196–7 indicates that he circulated the memorandum to other senior VKP(b) officials, including Mikhail Suslov, Nikita Khrushchev, and Pantaleimon Ponomarenko); and RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 136, D. 218, Ll. 202–5, 'Sekretaryu TsK VKP(b) tov. Malenkovu G. M.' ['To VKP(b) CC Secretary Comrade G. M. Malenkov'], Memorandum (Top Secret) from G. Gromov, head of the VKP(b) Administrative Department, 6 March 1952.
45. RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 136, D. 218, Ll. 161–4ob, 'O politicheskikh zanyatiyakh s soldatami i serzhantami' ['On Political Tasks with Soldiers and Sergeants'], No. 022 (Secret) from Marshal A. Vasilevskii and Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov, 5 September 1951; and RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 136, D. 218, Ll. 165–9, 'O marksistko-leninskoi podgotovke ofitserov Sovetskoi Armii' ['On the Marxist-Leninist Training of Soviet Army Officers'], No. 023 (Secret), from Marshal A. Vasilevskii and Colonel-General F. Kuznetsov, 5 September 1951.

46. CIA, 'NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952', 5.
47. Jindřich Madry, 'Období zbrojení a přezbrojování: Uzlové body komunistického rozhodování o Československu po Stalinovi' ['Phases of Armament and Rearmament: Nodes of Communist Decision-Making vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia after Stalin'], *Soudobé dějiny* (Prague) 1, no. 4–5 (1994): 623–39.
48. Some aspects of the Western military supplies to Yugoslavia were reported at the time in the US press, though not always accurately. See, for example, 'US Arms Delivered to Yugoslavia for Defense of Her Independence', *New York Times*, 20 June 1951, 1, 7. For more on this issue, see Anikeev, *Kak Tito ot Stalina ushel*, 189–203; Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Yugoslavia Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 81–119, esp. 98–111; Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 334–6; and Beatrice Heuser, *Western Containment Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948–53* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 117–24, 155–72, esp. 160–4.
49. CIA, 'NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952', 4.
50. NAČR, Archiv Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Československa (Archiv ÚV KSČ), F. 100/24, Sv. 47, A.j. 1338, 'O deyatel'nosti organov Severo-atlanticheskogo Soyuza v svyazi s sozdaniem atlanticheskoi armii i remilitarizatsiei zapadnoi Germaniei' ['On the Activity of the Organs of the North Atlantic Alliance in Connection with the Creation of an Atlantic Army and the Remilitarization of West Germany'], Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), forwarded by the VKP(b) Politburo to the leaders of the East European countries, February 1951. I am grateful to Oldřich Tůma for giving me a copy of this memorandum. Vojtech Mastny cites the document in his first-rate analysis of Soviet and Eastern bloc responses to NATO during the early years of the alliance, 'NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56', CWIHP Working Paper No. 35 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, 2002).
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 56. 'Appendix, Table 3: Estimated Satellite Air Forces, July 1954', in CIA, 'NIE: Probable Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956', 19. Bulgaria received three divisions of Tu-2 bombers totaling 120 aircraft, and Hungary and Romania each received one division of 40 bombers.
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 58. Nicolae Balotescu et al., *Istoria aviației române* [*History of Romanian Aviation*] (Bucharest: Editura Științifică și enciclopedică, 1984), 375, 380–1.
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60. Mircea Chirițoiu, *Între David și Goliath: România și Iugoslavia în balanța Războiului Rece* [*Between David and Goliath: Romania and Yugoslavia in the Cold War balance*] (Iași: Demiurg, 2005), 132, 135, 138–41. See also Gheorge Vartic, '1951–1953: Ani fierbinți din istoria Războiului Rece în relatarea generalului (r) Ion Eremia, opozant al regimului stalinist din România' ['Hot Years in the History of the Cold War in regard to General Ion Eremia, an Opponent of the Stalinist Regime in Romania'] in *Geopolitică și istorie militară în perioada Războiului Rece* [*Geopolitical and military history during the Cold War*] (Bucharest: Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 2003), 84–5.
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 62. AVPRF, F. 0125, Op. 39, P. 198, D. 76, Ll. 234–5, 'Zapis' besedy s A. Pauker' ['Notes of the Discussion with A. Pauker'], Memorandum No. 70-k (Secret) from S. Kavtaradze, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to Soviet Foreign Minister A. Vyshinskii, 1 March 1951; and AVPRF, F. 0125, Op. 39, P. 190, Ll. 33–6, 'Zapis' besedy s A. Pauker' ['Notes of the Discussion with A. Pauker'], Memorandum No. 166-k (Secret) from S. Kavtaradze, Soviet ambassador in Romania, to Soviet Foreign Minister, A. Vyshinskii, 11 July 1951.
 63. 'Feladat tisztázása', ol. 210.
 64. NATO/MC33, 'Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces', 22.
 65. See HSTL, President's Secretary's Papers, Intelligence File, 1946–53, Central Intelligence Reports File, 1946–53, Box 213:

National Intelligence Estimates, CIA, 'NIE: Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952'; CIA, 'NIE: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951'; and CIA, 'National Intelligence Estimate: Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29 "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951"', NIE-29/1 (Top Secret), 4 May 1951. See also, in the same source, CIA, 'National Intelligence Estimate: Soviet Capabilities and Intentions', NIE-3 (Top Secret), 15 November 1950, 17–18.

66. CIA, 'NIE: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951', 5–6.
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69. The quoted phrase comes from CIA, 'NIE: Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951', 5.
70. Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), *Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe: Elite Purges and Mass Repression* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2011); Lyubomir Ognyanov (ed.), *Borbi i chistki v BKP (1948–1953): Dokumenti i materiali* [*Struggles and purges in the Bulgarian Communist Party (1948–1953): documents and materials*] (Sofia: Glavno Upravenie na Arkhivite pri Ministerskiya Svet, 2001); Mito Isusov, *Stalin i Bulgariya* (Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo Sv. Kliment Okhridski, 1991), 171–218; George H. Hodos, *Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948–1954* (New York: Praeger, 1987); Wolfgang Maderthaner, Hans Schafranek, and Berthold Unfried (eds.), *'Ich habe den Tod verdient': Schauprozesse und politische Verfolgung im Mittle- und Osteuropa 1945–1956* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1991); and Adam B. Ulam, *Titoism and the Cominform* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952), 145–202. See also Vladimir Zelenin, 'Sovetsko-yugoslavskii konflikt 1948-ogo goda i Repressii v Vostochnoi Evrope', [*'The Soviet-Yugoslav conflict of 1948 and the repressions in Eastern Europe'*] *Novoe vremya* (Moscow), no. 31 (1989): 34–5. There is no longer any doubt that Stalin and his aides directly supervised the purges in Eastern Europe, especially the most spectacular of the show trials. See, for example, the relevant documents in *Vostochnaya Evropa*, Vol. 2; and *Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope*, Vol. 2.

71. Oleg V. Khlevniuk, *Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle*, trans. Nora Seligman Fvorov (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
72. See, for example, Nedyalka Grozeva et al. (eds.), *Goryanite: Sbornik dokumenti*, Vol. 1: 1944–1949 [*Guerrillas: A collection of documents*] (Sofia: Glavno Upravlenie na Arkhivite pri Ministerskiya Suvet, 2001), esp. doc. nos. 99, 103, 131, 147.
73. Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, Dosar 9572, Vol. 61, Foaie 1, ‘Dinamica arestărilor efectuate de către organele Securității Statului in anii 1950–31.III.1968’ [‘Pattern of Arrests Carried Out by the State Security Organs from 1950 through 31 March 1968’], Statistical Report (Top Secret) to the director of the Securitate, 17 April 1968. See also Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), 19–24.
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75. The notion of a trade-off between ‘viability’ and ‘cohesion’ is well presented in James F. Brown, *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey*, R-1742-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975).

From Regional Role to Global Undertakings: Yugoslavia in the Early Cold War

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INTRODUCTION

In 1945, Yugoslavia constituted itself as a socialist state. Its legitimacy derived from the most successful anti-Nazi resistance movement, under its charismatic leader, Josip Broz Tito, and the autochthonous social revolution carried out during the war of liberation. In the new reality of the world following a second global conflict, with the emerging ideological confrontation between two social systems, socialist and liberal capitalist, Yugoslavia firmly allied itself with its ideological paragon, Stalin's Soviet Union. Within three years, however, Tito and the Yugoslav leadership had rebelled against Moscow's tutelage, setting the stage for the first paradigm shift of the Cold War. The 1948 Soviet–Yugoslav break-up blurred, and eventually challenged, the fault lines of the Cold War. This chapter provides insight into how the policies of Yugoslavia and its leader, Tito, during the nascent Cold War contributed to paradigm shifts affecting the dynamics and structure of the Cold War system. It will focus on geo-strategic implications, namely the 1948 Yugoslav–Soviet break-up, the Yugoslav military realignment that followed the split and the creation of

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the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which aspired to challenge the Cold War bipolarity. In exercising disproportionate activism in the international system, Yugoslavia was the only country of the region that harboured the ambition to play a global role. Its leadership saw it as the means to safeguard the country's independence and security.

THE 1948 YUGOSLAV-SOVIET CONFRONTATION

According to Tito's biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, during the second half of 1947, the Yugoslav leader received confidential warnings about the 'preparations for Stalin's all-out attack against Yugoslavia and him personally'. The sources were trusted friends from his pre-Second World War Comintern days, whose names Tito never divulged. In early February 1948, the uncharacteristically worried and tired Tito confided in Dedijer that he had received information about the removal of his portraits across Rumania.¹ To the Yugoslav leader, who had witnessed Stalin's purges in Moscow in 1938, these signs were ominous enough to convince him to avoid attending the 10 February meeting in Moscow, to which he and the Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov had suddenly been summoned by Stalin. Instead, Tito dispatched his second-in-command, Edvard Kardelj. During the meeting at the Kremlin, Stalin attacked the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs for neglecting to consult Moscow on foreign policy issues. He singled out the questions of the Balkan federation, the alleged deployment of two Yugoslav Army divisions in Albania, and Sofia and Belgrade's continuing assistance to the Greek Communists. The following night, Kardelj was unceremoniously awoken at 2 a.m. to be driven to Molotov's office to sign a formal agreement compelling Yugoslavs to consult Moscow on all foreign-policy issues.²

On 22 February, a few days after Kardelj's return, Moscow informed Belgrade of the indefinite postponement of the Yugoslav-Soviet trade negotiations in Moscow that had already been stalled for more than a month. On 18 and 19 March, Tito received two *démarches* from Moscow announcing the withdrawal of all Soviet military and civil advisers from Yugoslavia.³ He immediately dispatched a letter to Molotov arguing that the cited reason for the withdrawal, the lack of Yugoslav cooperation, was nothing but a malicious fabrication.⁴ Moscow's response came in a letter dated 27 March, signed by Stalin and Molotov. The speed of the response suggested that it had been prepared in advance. The letter accused the Yugoslav leadership, among other things, of initiating slan-

derous remarks against the USSR and of repudiating Marxism–Leninism by abandoning the principles of the class struggle and the commanding role of the Party.⁵ On 8 April, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party backed Moscow’s accusations. This confirmed to Tito that Stalin had unleashed a campaign against him and the Yugoslav Communist Party.⁶

On 12 April, a closed session of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee supported a response drafted by Tito, which began with the statement that ‘no matter how much one loved the first country of Socialism, the USSR, one must not love less his own country’. It further qualified the Soviet accusations as ‘monstrous and false’ and accused the Soviet intelligence agencies of recruiting Yugoslav officials, a practice that the Yugoslav leadership found incongruent with ‘socialist fraternal relations’.⁷ During the next two months and in absolute secrecy, Moscow and Belgrade exchanged accusations, counter-accusations, and denials. As anticipated, during April, all Eastern European Communist parties sent letters to Belgrade endorsing Stalin’s accusations.

The confrontation between Moscow and Belgrade became manifest on 28 June 1948 with the publication of a resolution at the end of the Cominform meeting held in Bucharest. It declared the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the organization. The resolution accused Tito and the Yugoslav leadership of implementing policies aimed against the Soviet Union and the VKP(b) and for having abandoned Marxism–Leninism. It openly called upon ‘the healthy elements in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia [CPY]’ to replace Tito and his closest associates with a ‘new, internationalist leadership’.⁸ In response, Tito and the Yugoslav administration mobilized the Yugoslav Communist Party by convening its Fifth Congress at the end of July, the first since 1940, which ‘approved the position of the Central Committee [CC] of the CPY’ and declared the Cominform accusations to be ‘untrue, incorrect, and unjust’.⁹ The fault lines of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict were thus drawn.¹⁰

The Soviet–Yugoslav rupture and excommunication of the Yugoslav Party and its leader became a sensation on both sides of the Iron Curtain, among politicians and the public alike. Between 1945 and 1948, the Yugoslav regime was regarded as the most radical and most loyal Moscow ally in Eastern Europe. At the formative meeting of the Cominform, in September 1947, Stalin accredited Yugoslav representatives with spearheading the ‘critique’ against the French and Italian Communist parties, and Belgrade was selected as the seat of the new Communist organization.

True to its radical credentials, Tito's regime blindly replicated the Soviet system in Yugoslavia.

The break-up of relations between Moscow and Belgrade was total. Yugoslavia was immediately subjected to unprecedented pressure from the Soviet Union and Peoples' Democracies. Within days of the Cominform resolution, Moscow and its satellites cancelled the existing agreements with Yugoslavia on economic, military, or cultural cooperation.¹¹ By the end of 1948, the Soviet Union and Peoples' Democracies had imposed a total economic blockade on a country that suffered some of the worst destruction and loss of life in Europe during the Second World War.¹² To make matters worse, between 1945 and 1948, the Yugoslav leadership had made its economy fully dependent on Soviet assistance.¹³ Moscow and its allies also unleashed a vicious propaganda war against Belgrade.¹⁴ The satellite regimes initiated an unprecedented wave of purges against 'Titoists'. Between 1948 and 1955, forty high-profile trials against leading party and state officials were staged in People's Democracies. Equally, thousands of local communist party members, intellectuals and ordinary citizens were tried based on fabricated charges and, as a result, interned or executed.¹⁵ By far the biggest threat to the Yugoslav leadership was the prospect of Soviet and satellite military invasion. Yugoslavia was subjected to daily military provocations and the infiltration of armed groups from the neighbouring satellite countries. Between 1948 and 1953, 7,877 such border incidents were recorded, of which 142 were characterized as 'substantive' armed clashes. They continued for two years after Stalin's death, until the Soviet-Yugoslav normalization in 1955.¹⁶

Most historians blame Tito's 'national Communism' or his foreign policy adventurism, namely the deployment of Yugoslav troops in Albania and Tito's plan to create a Balkan federation with Bulgaria for the Soviet-Yugoslav break-up. The alleged unauthorized deployment of a Yugoslav division in Albania, in fact referred to Belgrade's agreement, in principle, to consider Albania's request for military assistance against possible attack by Greek government forces. At the time of the Moscow meeting, in February 1948, the division in question was still in preparation in Yugoslav Macedonia, and Tito intended to inform Moscow before any actual deployment was ordered.¹⁷ After expulsion from the Cominform, the Yugoslav leadership became convinced that Hoxha's request had been contrived in Moscow to substantiate later accusations against Tito.¹⁸ Likewise, the issue of the Balkan federation was an equally speculative accusation, as it never came close to implementation. At the end of their meetings in Yugoslavia,

in August 1947 and a few months later in Bulgaria, Tito and Dimitrov officially dismissed the idea as premature. Stalin's harassment of Dimitrov and Kardelj during the February 1948 meeting on this issue and accusations of insubordination can only be understood as part of constructing a case against Tito. How else could one interpret Stalin's complete position reversal, at the end of the meeting, when he insisted that the federation should be created immediately?¹⁹ Last but not least, historical evidence unequivocally confirms that Tito embarked on his 'own road to Socialism' only *after* the break-up with Stalin.

Further to the available evidence, this author is of the opinion that the Yugoslav–Soviet break-up was part of Stalin's plan to create a monolithic Communist 'camp'. The case against Tito and the list of accusations in Stalin and Molotov's letter of 27 March 1948 were drafted in a memorandum by the Foreign Policy Department of the Soviet Central Committee and submitted to the Soviet leadership on 18 March. On 5 April, the very same department had submitted a similar memorandum of accusations against the Polish Workers Party and its leader, Władysław Gomułka. Both memorandums had 'evidently been prepared on Soviet leadership's orders'.²⁰ Not by accident, the attack against Tito coincided with the February 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. All seemed part of Stalin's strategy, pursued after autumn 1947, to consolidate his grip on Eastern Europe.²¹ The attack on Tito, as the 'enemy within', legitimized purges throughout Eastern Europe, which secured Stalin's control over the local parties and leaderships, much as the purges in 1938 made it possible for him to consolidate his absolute authority within the Soviet Union. At the July 1955 Plenum of the Soviet Party Central Committee, the President of the Soviet Council of Ministers, Nikolai Bulganin, echoed by the Soviet Party leader, Nikita Khrushchev, confirmed that Stalin fabricated the 'sins' of which Tito was accused.²²

The Yugoslav–Soviet rupture in 1948 and the ensuing 'Yugoslav road to Socialism' destroyed the ideological uniformity of Stalinism. They challenged Stalin's authority and created the first schism in the post-October 1917 history of the international Communist movement. However, the 1948 split did help Stalin fulfill his goal. The process of the 'Sovietization' of Moscow's satellites and the imposition of the Kremlin's unchallenged hegemony was indeed achieved more easily following the break-up with Yugoslavia and Tito's excommunication. In the long run, however, the 1948 Soviet–Yugoslav confrontation had a corrosive impact on the Soviet bloc and weakened the international communist movement. Its impact on

the dynamics of the early Cold War were mainly negative for the Soviet Union.

YUGOSLAVIA'S MILITARY REALIGNMENT

A strategic consequence of the 1948 split was Yugoslavia's military realignment with the West. There can be little doubt that the ideologically formatted Yugoslav leadership had to undergo serious soul-searching over a period of time before they could contemplate and brave the leap from a rigid ideological mindset into a pragmatist mould. What helped this transformation were mounting threats representing a clear and present danger to the very existence of the Yugoslav regime. The first warning was the Soviet Note of August 1949, which threatened the use of 'other means' against Belgrade. This was followed by a campaign of high-profile trials in the People's Democracies bordering Yugoslavia against top-ranking leaders, namely the short trials and executions on 15 October of László Rajk, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on 17 December of Traicho Kostov, President of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers. Following the Soviet Note in August, the Yugoslav government immediately began preparations for partisan warfare against possible Soviet invasion. Secret bases and underground ammunition bunkers were built, and industrial plants in the interior of the country underwent transformation to war production. By 1950, 22 per cent of the Yugoslav GDP was being allocated for defence purposes, a staggering sacrifice for an economy that had already been brought to its knees after the imposition of the Soviet blockade.²³

What truly alarmed the Yugoslav leaders was when, on 25 October 1950, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River into Korea and Mao launched an open war against the US. Tito and his comrades understood this as a decoy for Stalin's attack on Yugoslavia, in particular when it was soon followed by the second Cominform resolution on 29 November, ominously entitled 'The Yugoslav Communist Party in the hands of murderers and spies', which openly called on the Yugoslav people to 'liquidate' Tito and his 'fascist clique'.²⁴ Within a week, the Yugoslav leadership decided to do the unthinkable—seek military assistance from the US.²⁵ Tito's confidant and wartime Partisan commander-turned-diplomat, Vladimir Velebit, was entrusted in December 1950 to initiate secret talks in Washington regarding the procurement of US military aid.²⁶ The US administration's positive response led to the Yugoslav Chief of Staff, General Koča Popović's offi-

cial visit to Washington within six months, in June 1951.²⁷ The formal Yugoslav–US military assistance agreement was signed on 14 November 1951, in Belgrade. Under article V of the agreement, Yugoslavia accepted a number of US military personnel.²⁸ In the next few years, the number of US military advisers attached to the Yugoslav Army, from the General Staff to individual units, would reach several thousand. In a complete break from the ideological legacy, political commissars in the Yugoslav Army units were abolished.²⁹ Between 1950 and 1955, Yugoslavia received approximately US\$1.5 billion of Western aid, half of which was military assistance.³⁰ Although the US supplied the bulk of military equipment, some also came from the UK and France. As a result, a tripartite committee (US, Britain, France) was established, which met regularly with the Yugoslav Army General Staff to discuss weapons requirements and deliveries, and coordinate Yugoslav defence planning with that of NATO. Yugoslavia, once the staunchest of Stalin's allies, became an important component of NATO's south-east European defence system.

The Belgrade meeting between the tripartite military delegation, headed by US General Thomas T. Handy and the Yugoslav General Staff on 16–20 November 1952 proved momentous. During the meeting, Yugoslavia insisted on receiving from General Handy reassurances about US security guarantees. Significantly, this was triggered by General Handy's remark, at the beginning of the talks of acceptability of a 'localized' war in Europe in case of Soviet attack.³¹ The prospect of becoming another Korea was anathema to the Yugoslavs. One of the key premises of Yugoslav military cooperation with the West was their conviction that it was the joint US and Western deterrent that had so far prevented Stalin from invading Yugoslavia. In addition, it appears that for some time the Yugoslav intelligence had been receiving information about rapid rearmament and manifold increases in troop levels in neighbouring Soviet satellite countries, coupled with an increased frequency of military manoeuvres on Yugoslavia's borders.³²

To Belgrade's dismay, the November meeting with the tripartite delegation ended inconclusively, prompting an immediate and dramatic Yugoslav reappraisal of their defence strategy. For almost a year prior to the meeting, Yugoslavs had remained deaf to Greek initiatives for the improvement of relations and joint security arrangements. However, only a day after General Handy left Belgrade, Yugoslav Defence Ministry officials informed the Greek Military Attaché in Belgrade that the 'stage [was] set for substantial developments'.³³ A Turkish military delegation

that visited Belgrade on 20 December found Yugoslavs eager to discuss a tripartite Greek–Turkish–Yugoslav military alliance. A few days later, a high-level Yugoslav Army delegation visited Greece making the same proposal.³⁴ What followed was an unprecedented Yugoslav diplomatic offensive. Within a fortnight, at the end of January 1953, the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers, Fuad Köprülü and Stephanos Stephanopoulos, were invited to Belgrade for extensive talks with Tito.³⁵ Two weeks later, between 17 and 20 February, Greek, Turkish and Yugoslav defence officials met in Ankara. Throughout, Yugoslavia did not spare efforts to accelerate the creation of a Balkan military alliance.³⁶ On the same day the defence experts' meeting concluded in Ankara, on 26 February, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries met in Athens and initialled the draft of the Treaty of Friendship and Assistance. Two days later, in Ankara, it was formally signed.³⁷ The agreement was, in essence, a declaration of intent and was to be followed by further negotiations leading to the signing of an official military pact.

However, the follow-up talks between the three sides stalled in the summer and early autumn of the same year. On the one hand, the US was reluctant to accept the indirect extension of NATO's article V to Yugoslavia, a member of a future Balkan pact with two NATO members, Turkey and Greece. The article stipulated the organization's obligation to provide aid in case of attack on any of its members—in fact, a US security guarantee through indirect association with NATO, while staying outside formal membership of the alliance, was precisely what lay behind the sudden Yugoslav enthusiasm for the Balkan pact.³⁸ On the other hand, as the result of the Italian–Yugoslav crisis over Trieste, which exploded in early October, Italy exercised strong pressure on the US for the pact not to be signed until the resolution of the Trieste question. The negotiations over Trieste between the British and Americans on the one side, with indirect Italian presence, and the Yugoslavs on the other side, began in earnest in December 1953. By early summer of the following year, substantive progress had been made to warrant the lifting of the Italian, as well as the US objections to the signing of the Balkan military alliance. The ambiguousness of the application of article V was simply sidetracked. Consequently, the Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was formally signed in Bled, Yugoslavia, on 9 August 1954.

The Pact represented a truly unique occurrence in the history of the Cold War. It was a military alliance between three countries of opposed ideological affiliation—between a communist Yugoslavia and two NATO

members, Greece and Turkey, sponsored by the leader of the anti-communist global alliance, the US. Ironically, through the entanglement of the Balkan Pact and NATO, the US indirectly agreed to extend security guarantees to the Yugoslav communist regime under threat of a possible attack by the USSR. Although never officially terminated, the Balkan Pact proved short-lived. For a number of reasons, by the end of 1955, it had practically faded into obscurity. The Soviet–Yugoslav normalization, which gathered pace in 1955, eliminated the security concerns that had prompted Yugoslavia to seek military alliance with Greece and Turkey, and NATO indirectly. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's new foreign policy orientation of non-alignment became incompatible with its membership of a military alliance that was associated with NATO. Lastly, the pogrom of the Greek minority in Istanbul on 6–7 September 1955 pushed Greco-Turkish relations to a nadir from which, thanks to the recurring Cyprus problem, they never truly recovered.

The Yugoslav–Soviet confrontation in 1948 had important geostrategic implications. The Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia, a possibility until 1955, would almost certainly have escalated into a confrontation between the two military alliances. Tito rightly calculated that Stalin would not contemplate attacking Yugoslavia if convinced that it could trigger a war with the West. Between 1950 and 1955, Yugoslavia became effectively incorporated into NATO's defence system through planning coordination, massive US arms deliveries and other military assistance. Belgrade's military realignment allowed for a modification of NATO's defence strategy regarding its south-eastern flank. Tito, however, consistently rebuffed Western attempts to formally join NATO. On the one hand, he was afraid that it would destroy the chance of normalizing relations with the USSR and the pursuit of independence from either bloc. On the other hand, Tito feared the presence of NATO troops within the country that could enable the West to topple his regime.

CHALLENGE TO COLD WAR BIPOLARITY

Arguably, one of the most important long-term consequences of the Soviet–Yugoslav split in 1948 was the role that Yugoslavia played in the creation of a Third World movement that would challenge the bipolarity of the Cold War—the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Together with Jawaharlal Nehru of India and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Tito was instrumental in transforming the idea of passive neutralism into a universal

movement of Third World countries with an ambition to play an active role on the global stage. Thirteen years after the 1948 event, Belgrade hosted the first meeting of the twenty-five heads of state or governments of 'un-committed' Asian, African and Latin American countries.³⁹

The international isolation imposed by the Soviet Union and its allies after the 1948 Cominform resolution constituted one of the biggest threats to Yugoslavia's independence.⁴⁰ In the first years of the Cold War, it was accepted as an inescapable truth that a country that had lost the protection of its ideological 'camp' would inevitably fall prey to the other side. For a year after the 1948 split, Tito was reluctant to seek Western support, hoping for reconciliation with Stalin. Yugoslavia continued to support the Soviet Union internationally, making itself more vulnerable to Moscow's pressure. Intimidated by the threatening Soviet Note of August 1949 and the trial and execution of Laszlo Rajk in September, Belgrade finally abandoned this self-destructive position. On 12 November, at the Fourth UN General Assembly, Yugoslavia publicly accused the Soviet Union and its allies of amassing troops on the Yugoslav borders.⁴¹ This represented a point of no return for Tito. At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership was convinced that the West would never reconcile itself with their socialist regime, and that the current friendly relations were a temporary marriage of convenience. Having risked so much after refuting the hegemony within their own ideological bloc, the Yugoslavs were determined to avoid the same from the other side. Tito learnt a lesson never again to rely exclusively on one bloc. In December 1949, the Party Central Committee accepted that, in future, Yugoslavia should '[be taking] advantage of the existing rivalry in the World, in order to secure its survival and further consolidation'.⁴² The following year, Yugoslavia successfully sought election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Speaking on that occasion at the Fifth UN General Assembly, Edvard Kardelj for the first time promulgated Belgrade's un-commitment to the blocs: 'The people of Yugoslavia cannot accept the postulate that humanity today has only one choice—a choice between a domination of one or the other bloc. We believe that there exists another road.'⁴³

Tito and his aides understood that they would need allies to remain un-committed to the blocs. Rebuffed by Western European social democrats who were firmly committed to the North Atlantic alliance, the Yugoslavs turned to the newly independent Asian countries, in particular India and Burma. At the time, as Tito later admitted, Yugoslavs had 'very limited knowledge about these countries'.⁴⁴ What initially attracted Yugoslavs to

Asia was ideological proximity. Belgrade noted that the Socialist parties played a prominent role in the political life of a number of Asian countries, namely Burma, India and Indonesia. In January 1953, a high-profile Yugoslav fact-finding mission was dispatched to Asia. It attended the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, Burma, and on its return, visited India. In 1950, Yugoslavia started posting its best diplomats to Asia. Their insights and information proved invaluable. As Tito acknowledged in an interview upon his return from India and Burma, in early 1955, 'when we embarked upon finding a *modus-vivendi* [between the two blocs] who could we turn to in the first place if not to Asian countries?'⁴⁵

Tito became particularly keen to enhance contacts with India and establish a relationship with Nehru. On a number of occasions, during 1950 and 1951, Yugoslavia and India adopted similar positions in UN discussions. The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry report on India's foreign policy, written ahead of Tito's first visit to New Delhi, pointed to several aspects that were particularly appealing to the Yugoslavs, namely that, due to its huge population, geostrategic position and rich cultural and historic heritage, India was poised to play a major role in the world, particularly in Asia.⁴⁶ In a confidential conversation during his first trip to India, Tito admitted: 'What would small Yugoslavia be able to do alone in this [struggle to secure an independent position outside the blocs] unless some big country would join in? That is why we are looking for allies. That was the goal of this trip.'⁴⁷ The report also pointed out that India's foreign policy engagement and international prestige 'far exceeded its current economic and military strength'.⁴⁸ This supported two critical premises behind Yugoslavia's new foreign policy strategy—that a small country could play a role in global affairs beyond the limitations imposed by its economic and military resources and capabilities; and that international prominence could safeguard it from falling prey to either superpower.

However, Belgrade was in no position to pursue un-commitment and relinquish the West's protective shield, as long as the threat of a Soviet military invasion remained.⁴⁹ All of this changed in autumn 1954 when Khrushchev's secret initiative to normalize relations with Belgrade was confirmed as genuine.⁵⁰ Together with the earlier signing of the Balkan Pact and the conclusion of the long-standing feud with Italy over Trieste in October, the normalization with the Soviet Union created a favourable and stable security environment for Yugoslavia, for the first time since 1945. This allowed the Yugoslav leader, in December 1954, to embark on a long trip to Asia, in search of allies. The most important of these would

be India's Nehru and Egypt's Nasser with whom Tito established sincere friendship, trust and common political *Weltanschauung*. In the next seven years Tito and Yugoslav diplomacy would make a critical contribution to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Crucial to these efforts were several of Tito's long voyages to Asia and Africa, during which he would help formulate and promote the governing principles of un-commitment to blocs, as well as to befriend and mobilize a number of Third World leaders behind the idea.

On 30 November 1954, on board his yacht *Galeb*, Tito departed on a two-and-a-half-month voyage to India and Burma, his first encounter with the Third World. On his return from India, during the passage through the Suez Canal, Tito for the first time met Nasser. By far the most important achievement of the trip was the series of talks between Tito and Nehru that lasted almost a fortnight. On 21 December, Tito delivered a speech before the Indian Parliament, in which he elaborated Yugoslavia's concept of non-engagement. He identified four major threats to global stability, namely inequality among states and nations, the interference of the big powers in the affairs of other states and peoples, the division of the world into spheres of interest and blocs, and colonialism. Tito also underlined the need for a global rather than regional approach to the activism of non-committed countries; that non-engagement meant maintaining equidistance from either bloc; and that rapid industrialization and emancipation from old colonial masters were possible through trade and economic cooperation between the non-engaged countries.⁵¹ The Joint Statement signed on 22 December, at the end of Tito and Nehru's official talks, stipulated that 'the policy of non-alignment with Blocs ... does not represent "neutrality" or "neutralism" nor passivity as is sometimes implied. It represents the positive, active and constructive policy.' The two leaders dismissed as absurd the allegation that they were intent on forming a 'Third bloc'. Most importantly, Tito and Nehru expressed hope that the 'principles of relations between countries that they have proclaimed would acquire a wider, universal implementation'.⁵² A far-reaching result of Tito's first trip to India was the rapport and firm bond established with Nehru. Six months later, Nehru visited Yugoslavia.

During this first trip undertaken to Asia, Tito realized that the newly liberated countries of Asia possessed huge political potential. The friendship and common political outlook with Nehru helped him achieve his strategic goal of aligning Yugoslavia with a country of immense footprint in Asia and of global prestige. During the trip, Tito made a critical contribution

to the conceptualization of non-engagement by injecting activism into the concept of neutralism borne out of traditional Asian pacifism. Last but not least, his first visit to Asia was conducted barely four months before the Bandung meeting of Afro-Asian countries. It certainly helped Tito to inject Yugoslavia, a European country, into the Afro-Asian initiative and the group's aspirations to enter the global political stage. Upon his return from Asia, the CIA made an accurate projection of Yugoslavia's long-term foreign policy strategy: '[Tito] will continue to regard his interests to be best served from a flexible position in which Yugoslavia can achieve benefits from both power blocs with a minimum of commitments to either'.⁵³

Emboldened by the success of his first trip and realizing the importance of personal encounters, Tito undertook to meet as many Third World leaders as possible, whether during his intercontinental travels or at home. In December 1955, he visited Ethiopia and Egypt. The trip enabled Yugoslavs to acquaint themselves with Africa and the Arab world. The visit to Egypt, in particular, cemented the bond between Tito and Nasser. It was, however, the two-day meeting in July 1956 between Tito, Nehru and Nasser, on the Yugoslav island of Brioni that proved to be a milestone on the road to non-alignment. This tripartite meeting unequivocally denounced 'the division of [the] world into military blocs'. More importantly, the three leaders declared their readiness to set an example and provide leadership for the new Third World initiative. They pledged to maintain continuous contacts and 'exchange of opinion' and invited other countries to join them.⁵⁴ The Brioni declaration articulated, for the first time, the proactive un-commitment to two blocs.

To maintain the impetus created by the Brioni meeting, Tito continued to play host to scores of Third World leaders and, in December 1958, embarked on his most ambitious trip to date. During a three-month voyage, he visited seven Asian and African countries, namely Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Sudan and the United Arab Republic (UAR). By this time, Tito's image as champion of the weak and underdeveloped was such that he received a rapturous welcome in every country he visited and was greeted as a true friend and a role model by their leaders.⁵⁵ During this trip, the Yugoslav leader intended to, and largely succeeded in, transforming the like-minded Third World leaders into a grouping with a common identity and a sense of kinship that would, in turn, enable them to play a more prominent role in international affairs. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was eager to encourage the transformation of the Afro-Asian Bandung identity into a global initiative in which, as a European

country, it could play a pre-eminent role. At the time Tito undertook this trip, the Soviet bloc and China had launched a new, vicious anti-Yugoslav campaign, aimed at isolating the country internationally and in particular in the Third World. Belgrade understood that strengthening its international standing through activism in the Third World would safeguard its un-commitment and successfully rebuff renewed efforts from the East to isolate it.

The official talks with his hosts and communiqués issued at the end of his visits reaffirmed the common commitment to basic principles binding the un-committed states—respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in other nations' internal affairs, non-aggression and the equality of all nations and races. Tito was particularly eager to reaffirm peaceful coexistence, which he deemed crucial for the building of trust among the un-committed states and their stronger bonding. With the leaders he met, Tito worked hard to achieve a shared outlook on international affairs and, thus promote common un-committed countries' positions on global issues. He also successfully argued that un-commitment was not passive neutralism, but active participation in the resolution of global crises. Crucially, Tito successfully impressed upon his hosts that true un-commitment encompassed a distance from both blocs and that the Soviets and the Chinese were as prone to political domination and economic exploitation of small countries, as were the Western powers. As one British diplomat commented at the time,

we feel that [the Yugoslav influence] can be particularly useful in so far as it is directed towards making clear to their Asian friends the true nature of Russian Communism ... Ideas of this kind are much more likely to make an impression on the Asian mind if they are put forward by the Yugoslavs than if they come from Westerners.⁵⁶

Tito's Afro-Asian tour in 1958–9 enhanced his image as a world figure and contributed towards the new awareness among the Third World countries of the role they could play in international affairs.

The new activism of the un-committed countries received recognition during the September 1960 fifteenth UN General Assembly. The Big Four Paris summit's collapse in May and the deepening Congo crisis had dangerously escalated Cold War tensions. This threatened the extraor-

dinary momentum of the African de-colonization and independence movements. Seventeen African ex-colonies were admitted to the UN during this General Assembly and almost without exception, they declared un-commitment to the major power blocs. An African leader, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, emerged as a prominent champion of the cause. The un-committed alliance declared their intent to strengthen the role of the UN General Assembly vis-à-vis the Security Council where the big powers had the power of veto, and to advance their presence in the international arena. The Tito–Nehru–Nasser axis, with the help of Sukarno and Nkrumah, rallied the Third World leaders behind them. This mobilization introduced a new force inside the UN.

The Third World leaders' dynamism and sense of common purpose demonstrated at the fifteenth UN General Assembly laid the ground for the organization of the first gathering of the heads of states and governments of the twenty-five non-engaged countries at the Belgrade Conference in September 1961. The Conference adopted several documents: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Non-engaged Countries; a Statement Concerning the Danger of War; and an Appeal for Peace. The leaders also sent identical letters to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. The Conference discussed all of the pertinent issues in the world and, despite some expressed differences among the participants, managed to garner agreement on the adopted documents. Although largely ignored by both blocs, each accusing the Conference of bias against them, the Belgrade gathering established the non-engaged states as a significant force in international affairs and paved the way for their future closer association.

Although the Belgrade Conference represented a true milestone for the future institutionalization of the un-committed countries, the fate of the Non-Aligned Movement was by no means secure. The Sino-Soviet split and the Cuban Missile Crisis represented a serious test for the nascent movement. Furthermore, China's radical challenge to the two superpowers' dominance and efforts to impose itself as the leader of the Third World threatened to sabotage the continuity of the gatherings of the non-engaged states. The road to the second Conference in Cairo, in 1964, was fraught with difficulties and, until the very last moment, was uncertain to take place. The next Conference was held in Lusaka, in 1970, a full six years after Cairo. Nehru died in 1964 and after the debacle of the Six-Day War in 1967, Nasser's prestige and standing in the Arab world

and among the non-aligned countries was but a shadow of what it used to be. By the end of the 1960s, the triumvirate of the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement had ceased to exist. It was left to Tito to carry the baton during the further challenges that the Movement faced throughout the 1970s, not least the 1973 oil crisis and the superpowers' (in particular the Soviet Union's) renewed attempts to draw the movement into its orbit. Several prominent members of the Movement, particularly Cuba, Vietnam and, for a limited period, Algeria were only too keen to do Moscow's bidding. This coincided with the efforts within the Movement to create bodies that would enhance its cohesion and effectiveness. At the Fourth Conference in Algiers in 1973, the Coordination Bureau was established with the task of coordinating the Movement's activities between the conferences, which were now occurring at regular three-year intervals.

During the 1970s, Tito, the only surviving founding father of the Movement, was often forced to use his authority to stave off attempts to align it with the Soviet bloc. Despite being an octogenarian and frail, Tito attended the fifth Conference in Colombo, in 1976, and the sixth in Havana, in September 1979, only eight months before his death. Havana was the stage for Tito's last but critical contribution to the Movement. Using all his authority, he managed to mobilize the vast majority of the attending representatives to repel Castro's attempts to draw the Movement closer to Moscow. In his last appearance among the non-aligned, Tito managed to preserve the true spirit of the Movement. During the two decades after the Belgrade Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, which officially adopted this name only at the Conference in Colombo in 1976, grew to 91 member states, the most numerous grouping of countries outside the UN. During its heyday, until the mid-1980s, the Movement consistently and persuasively fought for the democratization of international relations and representation of the small and the underdeveloped Third World countries. The Movement managed to put on the international agenda a number of issues of vital concern to the world's 'silent' majority, namely decolonization, threats to peace, disarmament, the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the promotion of the New International Economic Order, the creation of the New World Information and Communication Order, and South-South Cooperation.

CONCLUSION

Although arguably understated in historiography, Yugoslavia exerted a disproportional influence on the dynamics of the early Cold War for a number of reasons. The decision of the Yugoslav leadership to resist subjugation by Moscow in 1948 destroyed the accepted truth at the time that the Soviet bloc was an implacable monolith. Resistance to Moscow's relentless economic, political and propaganda pressure and the constant threat of invasion became a life and death struggle for Tito's regime pushing it to seek economic and, in particular, military assistance from the West. Given the ideological incompatibility between Yugoslavia and the West, this unnatural association represented a paradigm shift in the nascent Cold War. Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet fold forced its leadership to seek new premises to underpin their socialist identity and legitimacy. Tito and his comrades introduced a socialist model that was not only incompatible with but also challenged the existing Stalinist model. The so-called 'Yugoslav road to socialism' despite the Communist Party's political monopoly, did offer a more democratic socialism, based on social rather than state ownership and the participation of workers through a Yugoslav theoretical innovation—the system of self-management. In the long run, the Yugoslav alternative would prove corrosive for the Soviet ideological hegemony, first and foremost in Eastern Europe but also within the global communist movement. Moreover, the Yugoslav example proved attractive to many Third World countries seeking a model of rapid industrialization and socialist economy without the Soviet tutelage.

Expulsion from one bloc made Yugoslavs deeply averse to the idea of tying their fate with another. Within a few years after 1948 and, as soon as the danger of Soviet attack diminished, Yugoslavia embarked on the creation of what, at the time, was a unique position of un-commitment to either bloc. Aware that such a position, in the long run, would be untenable if Yugoslavia remained alone, Tito and his governing administration actively searched for allies. In this quest, he established a unique rapport and congruence of views on global affairs with India's Nehru and Egypt's Nasser. Later joined by Indonesia's Sukarno and Ghana's Nkrumah, the three leaders became the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement, a wide gathering of Third World countries seeking a voice in international affairs. Tito's personal activism and diplomacy contributed critically to this goal. The Movement created a lasting challenge to the rigid Cold War bipolarity. Following the split with Moscow in 1948, through its interna-

tional activism, Yugoslavia was the only Balkan country with the ambition to play a global role.

NOTES

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2. Vladimir Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948* (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), Meeting between Stalin and Yugoslav and Bulgarian Party delegations, Moscow, 10 February 1948, 168–87.
3. Ibid., Government of the USSR to the Government of Yugoslavia, Moscow, 19 March 1948, 196–7.
4. Ibid., Tito to Molotov, 20 March 1948, 198–9.
5. Ibid., Letter from the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) [VKP(b)] Central Committee (CC), signed by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) Central Committee (CC), 27 March 1948, 201–6.
6. Ibid., Report on the letter from A. A. Zhdanov with the Resolution of the Hungarian CP, 16 April 1948, 252.
7. Ibid., Report on the Meeting of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav CP, 12 April 1948, Belgrade/Letter of the CPY CC, signed by Tito and Kardelj, to VKP(b) CC and J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, 13 April 1948, 225–49.
8. *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ: 1945–1950* [*Documents on the Foreign Policy of SFRJ: 1945–1950*] (Beograd: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove/Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu/Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984), The Resolution of the Information Bureau on the situation in the CPY, Bucharest, 28 June 1948, 621–7.
9. *Dokumenti o spoljnoj ...* (1948), Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the CPY on relations with the Information Bureau, 266–7.
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12. *Jugoslavija, 1945–1964: Statistički pregled* [*Yugoslavia, 1945–1964: Statistical Review*], (Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku SFRJ, 1965), 174–8.
 13. *Dokumenti o spoljnoj ...* (1948), Speech by President J. B. Tito at the Fourth (extraordinary) session of the Federal Assembly of FNRJ on the economic development of Yugoslavia in 1948, Belgrade, 27 December 1948, 488–90.
 14. *Ibid.*, Statement by the Federal Assembly of the FNRJ on the propaganda campaign by the Information Bureau, Belgrade, 30 September 1948, 373–6.
 15. AJB Tita (Archives of J. B. Tito), KPR, I-3-a, SSSR.
 16. Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi Prilozi ...*, 3: 461–2.
 17. *Ibid.*, 291.
 18. Vladimir Dedijer, *Dokumenti 1948 ...*, 177.
 19. *Ibid.*, 179–82.
 20. According to Soviet documents, as quoted in Leonid Gibianskii, ‘The Soviet-Yugoslav Split and the Cominform’, in *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949*, eds. Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1997), 299 and 302.
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 22. Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (РГАНИ), Фонд 2, Опись 1, Ролик 6228, Дело 158, 90–100, Plenum of the CC CPSU, 4–12 July 1955; Bulganin’s address, Transcript of 9 July 1955, evening session.
 23. Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi Prilozi ...*, 3: 434.
 24. Arhiv Jugoslavie (AJ) AJ, 507, III/53, CPY Politburo meeting, 4 December 1950; The Second Cominform Resolution, ‘The Yugoslav Communist Party in the hands of murderers and spies’, Matra, Hungary, 29 November 1949, in *Dokumenti o spoljno-jpolitici ... (1949)*, 494–6.
 25. AJ, 507, III/53; CPY Politburo meeting, 4 December 1950.

26. Mira Šuvar, *Vladimir Velebit: Svjedok historije* [*Vladimir Velebit: Witness to History*] (Zagreb: Razlog d.o.o., 2001), 176–7; also, Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi Prilozi ...*, 3: 436.
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32. For more on Soviet bloc rearmament, see in this volume by Mark Kramer, ‘Stalin, the Split with Yugoslavia, and Soviet–East European Efforts to Reassert Control, 1948–53’.
33. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, VIII; Allen (Belgrade) to State Department, 24 November 1952, 597.
34. *Ibid.*, Peurifoy (Athens) to State Department, 31 December 1952, 600–2.
35. Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Archives (SMIP), SPA, 1953, F II/Turska I-48, Official talks between President Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü, 23 January 1953. Also, SMIP, SPA, 1953, FII/Turska I-48, Official talks between President Tito and the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, 6 February 1953.
36. *FRUS*, 1952–1954, VIII; Peurifoy (Athens) to State Department, 26 February 1953, 625–6.
37. In documents and in historiography, this Treaty is also referred to as the Treaty of Ankara, the Ankara Pact, and the Ankara Agreement. Henceforth, the term ‘Ankara Agreement’ will be used.

38. SMIP, SPA, 1953, F II / Turska I-48, Official talks between President Tito and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü, 23 January 1953.
39. The terms 'un-committed' and 'non-engaged' are used intermittently, as was the case at the time. It was only after the Belgrade Conference that the term 'non-aligned' gained prominence; it became the official name for the Movement at the Colombo Conference in 1976.
40. AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/7, Transcript of the Third Plenum of the CPY CC, Belgrade, 29–30 December 1949.
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44. AJ, 837, II-5-b-1, Speech by the President of the Republic in the Federal People's Assembly, 7 March 1955.
45. AJ, 837, IV-1-b, Tito's interview and conversation with Albert Hosiaux, the Editor in Chief of 'Le Peuple' magazine, 14 April 1955.
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48. AJBT, KPR, I-2/4-1; Report entitled 'India', prepared by the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry ahead of Tito's first trip to New Delhi, November 1954.
49. AJ, 837, II-5-b-1; Speech by the President of the Republic (Tito) in the Yugoslav Federal People's Assembly, 7 March 1955.
50. For more on the Khrushchev–Tito secret correspondence over the summer and autumn of 1954, see Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War*

51. AJBT, KPR, I-2/4-1, 876-880, Speech by President J. B. Tito to the Indian Parliament, 21 December 1954.
52. AJBT, KPR, I-2/4-2, The Joint Statement by the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, 22 December 1954.
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54. See text of Joint Declaration in *Borba*, 20 July 1956.
55. AJ, 837, I-2/11, Tito's report on his trip to Asia and Africa before the Federal Executive Council, Belgrade, 17 March 1959.
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PART II

Military Alliances and the Balkans

The Puzzle of the Heretical: Yugoslavia in NATO Political Analysis, 1951–72

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

By the early 1950s, the stalemate in Korea pointed to the possibility of a long Cold War, in which political and economic vigour could play an equally important role as military strength. Thus, the Atlantic Alliance, retaining its emphasis on the military level, started monitoring political and social conditions in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. These reports served as background material for the biannual ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).¹ This chapter focuses on the findings of the NATO committees and working groups regarding Yugoslavia's *sui generis* position in the Cold War. The chapter will discuss NATO political analysis, rather than the assessments of military authorities. It will be shown that analysts mostly viewed this pivotal country as a *regional* Eastern European power, and rather neglected its potential as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. Despite the Tito–Stalin split, Yugoslavia was regarded with relative suspicion and reserve, especially after its 1955 rapprochement with the Soviets. It was only by the mid-1960s, after the impressive reforms in its economy, that NATO experts became definitely convinced that Yugoslavia represented a real ‘heresy’ which could be exploited by the West.

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Some preliminary comments are necessary in order to put NATO analysis on Yugoslavia in perspective. There was a clear, though unspoken assumption in NATO reports on Eastern Europe: the alliance experts were more interested in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—the countries which we now call East-Central Europe—rather than the Balkans. In the ‘northern satellites’, the populations were notable for their Catholic and anti-Russian disposition, and communist rule had created unpopular regimes, imposed and supported by the Red Army. Moreover, these states had been parts of major European powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary), and were largely seen as captive Western societies with a great potential for dissent. Last but not least, they held crucial strategic positions in the European Cold War: they were adjacent to NATO’s central front, while Poland was also a vital link between the Soviet Union and its pivotal satellite of East Germany. In practical terms, the Balkans was seen as a peripheral area, of much less strategic importance. The communist states of South-Eastern Europe were economically backward. Moreover, this was an area where the Soviets enjoyed a measure of support: the Southern Slavic peoples were largely Orthodox and traditionally pro-Russian, whereas communism was a popular political force both in Bulgaria and in Yugoslavia. Thus, in NATO analyses, the communist Balkans was a region of relatively minor importance that generated low expectations. Yugoslavia was only a partial exception to this rule, on account both of its post-1948 dispute with Moscow and the fact that geographically it extended to the crucial area of Central Europe.

INFLATED EXPECTATIONS AND DISILLUSIONMENT, 1951–56

The Tito–Stalin split was a complicated affair. Even after 1948, Yugoslavia was a socialist country and Tito remained a convinced communist: ‘Tito’s independent concepts were the results and not the cause of the conflict with Stalin.’² Thus, an exceptional regime emerged, both communist and heretical. Although the second characteristic did not negate the first, the Western powers helped Tito survive.³

Early 1951 was a time of tense Western fears regarding Soviet intentions on Yugoslavia.⁴ Thus, it became the first Eastern European country to be examined in the developing process of intra-NATO political consultation. Notably, before the NATO discussion, the US informed its allies

that there was 'no prospect of Tito's return to graces of Kremlin. All available evidence indicates that break is final and irrevocable'. According to the Americans, the country commanded a strategic position, and Tito's possible destruction would have adverse effects throughout Europe; thus, the Yugoslav regime should be aided. Although the Americans did not foresee a Soviet attack on Yugoslavia, they were not prepared to rule it out.⁵

The discussion took place at the level of Council Deputies, namely the highest diplomatic representatives of the member states (in 1952 they would be replaced by the Permanent Representatives). The member states agreed that Yugoslavia's breach with Moscow had become unbridgeable, and the rearming of the Soviet satellite states created the danger of military pressure on Belgrade. Thus, the West should aid the Tito regime economically or even militarily, with the removal of barriers on export of arms and strategic raw materials.⁶ These assessments were parts of the wider evolution of Western policy towards the provision of military aid to Belgrade. Indeed, the State Department went out of its way to stress that a NATO recommendation for aid to Yugoslavia would also assist efforts to secure Congressional acquiescence to such assistance.⁷ By summer 1951, the Americans even suggested informal discussions with the British, the French and the Italians, regarding possible NATO responses to a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia.⁸ Early in 1952, in the first comprehensive NATO document on Soviet foreign policy, submitted to the Lisbon NAC, Tito's overthrow (though not necessarily through an invasion) was regarded as one of the prime Soviet aims.⁹

NATO's examination of the 'trends of Soviet policy' became more elaborate after 1953, when the relevant reports became biannual and were drafted by an expert working group consisting of diplomats of the member states. Yet, at this stage, Eastern Europe took a very minor part of the reports. After Stalin's death, the focus was on the evolution of the Soviet regime, its 'peace offensive' and the efforts to impede German rearmament. The Eastern European countries were seen as securely under Soviet control, with little prospect for dissent. Yugoslavia was rarely mentioned: NATO experts were content to note that the Soviet bloc was unlikely to attempt an invasion of the country. By 1954–5, the analysts detected a Soviet tendency to improve relations with Belgrade, but expressed little discomfort about it.¹⁰ This initial confidence of the NATO experts was based on Yugoslav dependence on Western aid, and on the Yugoslav–Greek–Turkish rapprochement, which led to the 1953–4 tripartite Balkan

Pacts.¹¹ Yugoslavia was seen as coming, even indirectly, very close to the NATO structure, and there was even talk, mostly by Greece but also by Turkey, of its possible entry into the alliance itself.¹² This, of course, was an exaggeration (the Italians were bound to react because of the Trieste dispute), but it also served as an additional indication that Tito would not succumb to Moscow's pressures or offers. During the same period, NATO military planners were interested in Yugoslavia's defence of the Ljubljana Gap, commanding access to the northern Italian plains.¹³

Thus, NATO experts assumed that Yugoslavia had little choice but to remain linked (or dependent), one way or another, to the West. However, Tito remained a communist, eager to play a more revolutionary role in world affairs but also to respond to probes by Moscow. These were necessary to boost his legitimacy, to prevent one-sided dependence on the West and to avert the danger of a Soviet invasion. By underrating these structural needs of the exceptional Belgrade regime, NATO analysts proved unable to foresee Tito's readiness to approach Moscow, which culminated in Nikita Khrushchev's impressive visit to Belgrade in May 1955.¹⁴

The Khrushchev visit was noted in NATO with interest but not with alarm: it was stressed that the Soviet leaders had 'failed' to bring Yugoslavia 'back into the Soviet fold', although their readiness to visit Belgrade was a sign of confidence regarding their control of satellite states; the idea of 'many roads to socialism' could also affect the satellites as well as China. Rapprochement with Yugoslavia was also seen as a tactic facilitating popular fronts in Western Europe, and promoting the picture of Soviet tolerance, which could help the Kremlin project its own vision of European security. It should be noted that once more, the experts focused on Soviet, rather than Yugoslav motives.¹⁵ However, in autumn 1955, Tito's assurances to Paul, the Greek king, and to the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that Yugoslavia would retain its independent position, seemed to confirm this initial moderate assessment.¹⁶

Soon, however, NATO experts started expressing reservations about Yugoslav policy. In the aftermath of the Khrushchev visit, Yugoslavia appeared eager to 'freeze' the military functions of the Balkan Pacts (which also received a serious blow by the start of the Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus), concluded economic agreements with Moscow, argued that NATO should change its character in an era of reduced tensions, and also largely sided with Soviet views on disarmament.¹⁷ Moreover, the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) turned the attention of NATO analysts to a different front. The turmoil in

Poland and in Hungary opened new prospects in a part of Eastern Europe which was seen as more important than the Balkans.

By September 1956, in a long document about 'the thaw in Eastern Europe', Yugoslavia was described as 'now more or less back in the Communist camp'. Evidently, Tito's visit to Moscow in June, and his new meetings with Khrushchev in September had a very unsettling effect on the NATO analysts. Although the reconciliation of the Kremlin with Tito was seen as a factor which had aided the rehabilitation of Wladislaw Gomulka in Poland, experts noted that Tito 'is not a liberal democrat', and reminded governments that prior to his split with Stalin he had been 'one of the most violent "leftists" among the satellite leaders'; Tito could not lure Eastern Europe towards greater independence from Moscow.¹⁸ Ironically, the NATO experts thought that Tito was returning to the Soviet fold, exactly when, as we now know, he was actively resisting Soviet pressures to do so.¹⁹ Following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, the relevant NATO report noted the alarm of the Yugoslavs, as well as Tito's speech in Pula and Belgrade's insistence on 'equality among socialist countries', a concept inherently unacceptable to the Kremlin. However, they stressed that both sides appeared careful not to revert to a 1948-like quarrel.²⁰ Interestingly, at the same time, US attitudes towards Yugoslavia were significantly different: Washington took the view that Tito was eager to export his 'heresy' to Eastern Europe, and actively tried to help him.²¹

DISTRUSTING YUGOSLAVIA, 1957–64

In 1957, a reorganization of NATO civilian machinery took place, marking an expansion of intra-alliance political consultation. The newly formed Committee of Political Advisers, consisting of diplomats from national delegations, undertook the drafting of separate regular reports on Eastern Europe. These included a section on Yugoslavia. However, analysis on Yugoslavia left much to be desired. The country was seen strictly in its Eastern European geographical context; NATO analysts underrated Yugoslav ambition, evident since the mid-1950s, to assume a leading role in a neutralist international group.²² Thus, the Political Advisers monitored, in their regular sessions, Tito's 1958–9 tour of Third World countries,²³ but continued to deal with Yugoslavia as a strictly Eastern European actor in their biannual reports. Moreover, NATO analysis largely neglected the need of the regime to maintain a 'middle' position between the two worlds: any perceived Yugoslav 'pro-Soviet' moves were instinc-

tively met with suspicions that Belgrade was reverting to the Soviet fold. Even in the Eastern European context, in 1957–9 the hopes of the alliance experts focused mostly on Poland, which, under Gomulka, was seen as the regional state with the greatest anti-Soviet potential: the experts even suggested that Poland had acquired a ‘semi-independent’ position, a remark indicative of Western wishful thinking on the matter.²⁴ It is clear that, once prospects appeared, even distantly, for a Polish move towards greater independence, Yugoslavia immediately became less important in NATO estimations.

After 1957, NATO analysis of Yugoslavia became, to a large extent, contradictory. During these years of constant fluctuations in Soviet–Yugoslav relations, the Political Advisers seemed unable to reach a clear view on the latter country. In April 1957, they noted that Moscow could not give in to Tito, as this ‘would undermine the whole fabric of the Soviet bloc’. However, Tito’s meeting with Khrushchev in Bucharest in August 1957 and Yugoslavia’s recognition of East Germany (‘a striking evidence of Tito’s closer alignment with Moscow’) caused grave concern among the NATO experts.²⁵ In January 1958, the Dutch delegation pointed to the Yugoslav recognition of East Germany, the ‘virtual cessation of ideological polemics and of bloc attacks on Yugoslavia’, the agreement for the resumption of Soviet economic credits and the ‘active Yugoslav support for Soviet foreign policies in certain instances’, and called for a re-examination of NATO policy, including the delivery of arms to Belgrade.²⁶

Yet, this pessimistic view of Belgrade went too far, and met with objections from other member states. The Americans stepped in to note that Yugoslavia continued its independent course: ‘Current situation [in] Yugoslavia does not in our view appear [to] justify significant change [in] NATO member attitudes toward Yugoslavia particularly on trade or arms sales’. Although the US had expressed to Belgrade its discomfort about the rapprochement with Moscow, the State Department understood that Belgrade had to support certain Soviet international policies. The most important element was Yugoslavia’s rejection of the concept of Soviet primacy: ‘[p]ersistence [of] such heresies indicate[s] Yugoslavia remains [a] disruptive force in [the] world Communist movement’. As for Soviet credits, the Americans continued, these were stretched out over a period of many years and it was not certain that they would be given in the end; Yugoslavia needed access to Western arms exactly to avoid dependence on the Soviet bloc in this sensitive field.²⁷ The British Permanent Representative, Sir Frank Roberts, also dismissed the Dutch reservations:

'if the Council were to re-examine NATO policy towards Yugoslavia every time that the Yugoslav Government made a gesture in favour of either East or West we should probably have occasion to do so every six weeks or so.'²⁸ During the relevant NAC discussion, the British, Italians, French, Canadians, Greeks and the Americans rejected the harsh line of the Dutch and agreed to monitor closely Yugoslav policy.²⁹

This monitoring, however, remained inconclusive. The NATO Political Advisers pointed to an important contradiction: ideological differences with Moscow remained, but Yugoslavia was taking pro-Soviet positions on major international issues. In 1958–9, the experts repeatedly expressed their discomfort, since they considered that in many issues, such as the German question and disarmament, the Yugoslavs were 'in line with' or 'close to' Soviet policies.³⁰ Based on their terms of reference, the NATO experts looked for 'clear' positions in the Cold War. But this was exactly what they would not get from Tito, who was both a Communist and the leader of a heresy, and who needed to play a game of delicate balances. In other words, Tito needed to be—and to *appear* as being—independent of the West.

The second Soviet–Yugoslav dispute in 1958 also left the NATO experts uncertain. Yugoslav refusal to accede to the 1957 Moscow declaration of the Twelve Parties (which confirmed Soviet preponderance), a renewed Soviet campaign against 'revisionism' since autumn 1957, and an open quarrel between Moscow and Belgrade over the 1958 Yugoslav Party programme (which insisted on 'equality' among socialist countries) indicated a continuing rift between Belgrade and the Soviet bloc.³¹ NATO experts noted that following the publication of the Yugoslav party programme, Bulgaria again expressed its disagreements with Belgrade over the Macedonian issue, and Albania raised the issue of Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia; Khrushchev failed to invite the Yugoslav Communists to the twenty-first CPSU Congress; and early in 1959, a Yugoslav request for observer status in COMECON (also known as CMEA) was rejected. Moreover, the Kremlin now cancelled credits for a Yugoslav aluminium industry, a decision that could even damage its image in developing countries, as it undermined Soviet claims that Moscow provided aid 'without political strings'. According to the experts, '[t]he fact that Khrushchev was willing to face this calculated risk shows his preoccupation with Tito's heresy'. By December 1958, after the execution of Imre Nagy, which was interpreted as a 'challenge to the Yugoslavs and a sharp warning to any potential dissident elements in the bloc', the Political Advisers described

Yugoslavia as 'a Communist power but not a Satellite'. By late 1959, the NATO reports pointed to an uneasy stabilization of Soviet–Yugoslav relations. It is also telling that the turning point in the NATO analysts' disillusionment with Gomulka came in spring 1959, when the Polish leader definitely sided with Moscow and condemned Yugoslav 'revisionism': this showed that, after all, attitudes towards Tito were the real indicators of dissent from Soviet policy.³² This was recognized, although indirectly, in a US note to the Committee of Political Advisers in 1961, stressing that Moscow's acceptance of the 'many roads to socialism' had aided Eastern European turmoil in 1955–6, while the 'second Yugoslav apostasy' of 1958 had limited Khrushchev's tolerance in Eastern Europe.³³ However, referring to a 'second apostasy' (not merely to a second *dispute*) also presupposed that Belgrade had come close to returning to the fold prior to 1958—which was a very debatable thesis.

It is possible to suggest an interpretation of the intra-NATO disagreements over Yugoslavia in the late 1950s. Despite their own unease about Tito's policies, the British and the Americans repeatedly cautioned their allies that Yugoslavia had retained its independence, and pointed out that a Yugoslav alignment with Moscow could only come at a price which Tito would not be willing to pay.³⁴ The available bibliography points to the 'surprising[ly] broad-minded' US attitude towards Tito in these years.³⁵ Moreover, from 1956 the Greeks had formed a 'special', though informal, relationship with Yugoslavia and repeatedly urged that the West show understanding for its position. As Athens pointed out to the Turks in July 1959, 'Yugoslav tightrope walking is the result not of a lack of sincerity, but of an effort to balance between conflicting pressures.'³⁶ For their part, the Yugoslavs evidently placed much value on their relationship with Greece: while the rapprochement with another Balkan country (a NATO member) provided Belgrade with an indirect connection with Western defence, it did not undermine in principle a neutralist discourse of 'protecting' the Balkans from superpower interdictions. Thus, reservations about Yugoslavia were mostly expressed by the NATO members which lacked a strong presence in the Balkans, such as the Dutch or the Germans who had suffered from Belgrade's recognition of the East German polity. However, things were interpreted differently by the larger powers or the countries of the south flank, which evidently had closer contact with Belgrade.

During the first half of the 1960s, NATO experts continued to be puzzled by Yugoslavia's 'pro-Soviet' foreign policy. The only heartening ele-

ment, the experts noted, was its differences with Moscow on the issue of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. They were critical of Yugoslavia's rather pro-Soviet posture during the 1961 Belgrade Conference which founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and often expressed the view that Tito's policies in the Third World, notably during the Congo crisis, were essentially anti-Western. At the same time, however, they realized that Tito's role in the NAM made him reluctant 'to return to the Socialist camp under conditions which would deprive him of most of his international audience'. Reservations towards Belgrade were evident in the 1961 intra-NATO discussion on East-West relations: despite their desire to develop commercial relations with the West, their links with Greece and an evident fear of an East-West deal being made over their heads, the Yugoslavs' criticism of the West on colonial issues was regarded as very embarrassing; the majority of NATO members agreed that contacts with Belgrade should be maintained, but 'combined with the admonition of not going too far'. The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, visited Belgrade in 1962, and Tito returned the visit in the following year. These were interpreted as an attempt by the Kremlin to utilize the NAM for its own ends, not least to curb Chinese influence in the Third World, but also as an indication that 'ideological difficulties have been sidestepped rather than resolved'.³⁷ The picture of a *sui generis* but essentially pro-Soviet Yugoslav policy, which did not easily fit traditional Cold War cleavages, persisted in the first half of the 1960s.

In a military alliance, this had further consequences. In the 1963 long-term threat assessment, NATO military authorities assumed that Belgrade might side with Moscow in case of a third world war. This estimation was refuted immediately by the Greeks (supported also by the French), who stressed that the Yugoslavs tended to side with the Kremlin in some major issues in peacetime, but would not do so in case of war.³⁸ This is another indication that the Greeks, enjoying a 'special relationship' with the Yugoslavs, often tended to speak on their behalf in the NATO bodies.³⁹ More importantly, however, and despite Congressional discomfort over aid to Yugoslavia, the US kept insisting in NATO that nonalignment precluded Tito from returning to the Soviet bloc.⁴⁰ The US attitude once more held the balance with the more reserved views of other member states.

WELCOMING THE 'YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT', 1965–72

In the mid-1960s, new patterns appeared in NATO analysis. The experts begun to detect serious economic problems in the Soviet Union, as well as a notable trend towards 'national roads to socialism' in Eastern Europe, facilitated by the ongoing Sino-Soviet quarrel.⁴¹ In this context, NATO's attitudes towards Yugoslavia evolved significantly. This was not due to any change in Yugoslav foreign policy, but to the far-reaching economic reforms of 1965.⁴² The radicalism of these reforms convinced NATO experts that a major change was taking place in Yugoslav affairs.

In 1966, the nature of the Yugoslav 'economic experiment' was debated at the Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (under the Committee of Economic Advisers). The relevant report noted that Yugoslavia, 'one of the least developed countries in Europe and comparable in this respect to Bulgaria and Romania', had achieved rapid growth rates in the second half of the 1950s, at the same time showing boldness in the search for a 'new road to socialism, different from that of the Soviet Union', including procedures of workers' self-management. However, by the early 1960s severe difficulties had emerged in the Yugoslav economy, due to bad harvests, unrealistic price fixing (a perennial problem of the communist economies) and unrealistic raising of wages by workers' councils. In July 1965, Belgrade embarked on a fresh reform, 'which, in view of its scope and effects, has been considered by some as a revolution'. It involved the abolition of 'political' price fixing for raw materials, a larger role for the banks in distributing investment, a revision of the tax system, and a devaluation of the dinar. The cost of living spiralled upwards and unemployment rose, but '[i]t is in the interest of the West that the economic reforms now implemented in Yugoslavia should be successful'. The Yugoslav 'experiment in "industrial democracy"' could encourage Eastern European countries to move in the same direction.⁴³ NATO experts did not suggest that Belgrade was on a sound economic path or on the road to political liberalization. They noted that the West had to support this effort to build 'a new brand of communism which contrasts with the bureaucratic type'.⁴⁴ In other words, Tito was now doing something which made sense in the NATO experts' world of the European Cold War.

This fundamental observation coloured assessments of Yugoslav international policy. The experts kept insisting that Belgrade was closer to the Soviets on many international issues, but now stressed that Tito was retaining his 'balanced' position between East and West. The Political Advisers

noted Belgrade's alarm that there might be an 'unprincipled compromise' between Moscow and Beijing following Khrushchev's fall. Yet, the NATO analysts did not appear alarmed at indications of a smoother relationship between Tito and the new leadership in the Kremlin. They stressed that this presented advantages to both sides. Belgrade was acquiring increased legitimization from Moscow's acceptance of its communist identity and was benefitting from economic dealings with the Soviet bloc; at the same time, Moscow needed Yugoslav support against the Chinese, not only in Eastern Europe but also in the Third World. Yugoslavia became associated with the COMECON in 1964, was invited for the first time since 1948 to the twenty-third CPSU Congress, and admonished US policy in Vietnam. At the same time, it was also developing its trade with the West and joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Political Advisers noted the fall of Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 and the eruption of Serb-Croat differences, but they appeared anxious to stress that the country retained 'a more demonstrably non-aligned attitude', and was on a path acceptable to the West.⁴⁵ Sceptics still existed: in January 1966, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group even posed the question whether 'the point had passed at which Yugoslavia was of more use to the West than to the East'.⁴⁶ However, this was not the dominant view.

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, NATO experts appeared anxious regarding Soviet intentions towards Belgrade, 'the most serious source of contamination'.⁴⁷ They were also worried as the Soviets denounced Yugoslav 'economic revisionism', while Bulgaria and Yugoslavia again engaged in a strong polemic over the Macedonian problem (the revival of this Sofia-Belgrade dispute always accompanied the rise of tensions in Yugoslav-Soviet relations).⁴⁸ As part of NATO contingency planning, in autumn 1968 and spring 1969, the Economic Advisers studied the vulnerability of Yugoslavia in case of sanctions by the Soviet bloc. The relevant reports noted that the country was facing the problems of a developing economy which was trying to correct the rigidities of previous years. Moreover, Yugoslav industrial machinery mostly came from the Soviet bloc, and a large part of its trade was directed to the COMECON countries. Thus, Soviet bloc economic sanctions could bring Belgrade to a difficult position, and in this case the West should respond by providing aid, including credits, irrespective of the country's already heavy indebtedness. If that were done, Soviet economic sanctions would again, as in 1948, fail to bring the Yugoslavs to heel.⁴⁹

Contingency studies about a possible Soviet invasion or political/military pressure reached a climax in late March 1969, when the Senior Political Committee presented a document covering all countries, from the Mediterranean to Finland, including Yugoslavia. The Political Committee insisted that the Brezhnev Doctrine had severely complicated the strategic landscape, since the notion of a 'socialist state' (the defence of which could legitimize invasion) was vague. Yet, Yugoslavia was a difficult target. Although it was seen by the Kremlin as a renegade socialist country, Soviet pressures in the past had proved ineffective, and '[b]y identifying himself with the non-aligned world, Tito has greatly increased the political price the Soviets would pay for any action against him'. Furthermore, the conquest of the mountainous Yugoslav interior would be a difficult operation, and the reaction of the West would be strong, precisely because a Soviet operation would have serious repercussions on the Mediterranean and NATO's southern flank. Thus, the Political Committee envisaged a strong deterrent role for the West in the Yugoslav case. However, only 'timely and appropriate preventive diplomacy' was envisaged.⁵⁰ Supporting Yugoslavia's international position was also laid down in spring 1969 as one of the guidelines for NATO members on the road to détente.⁵¹ In September 1969, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, visited Belgrade, and the two countries reaffirmed the principles of the 1955 Belgrade declaration, including non-interference in domestic affairs. This, according to the NATO experts, strengthened Tito's international stature, but was an 'uneasy truce' rather than a 'genuine rapprochement'.⁵²

In the following years, NATO experts repeatedly stressed that Yugoslavia was safely out of the Soviet orbit. Its leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement, Nixon's 1970 visit to Yugoslavia, and the Bulgarian–Yugoslav dispute over the Macedonian issue, which again reflected the uncertainty in Yugoslav–Soviet relations, were noted as evidence that Belgrade was maintaining its distance from Moscow. Brezhnev's unofficial visit to Belgrade in September 1971 was not noted with much concern. In mid-1973, it was expressly noted that Yugoslav economic dealings with the Kremlin did not entail a turn towards Moscow.⁵³

Instead, attention now focused on new areas of uncertainty: the economy, Tito's succession, and the internal Yugoslav institutional balances. The prospect of Tito's succession was raised in the November 1970 report. The experts foresaw a reorganization of the Yugoslav governmental system towards a collective structure, and noted that this was important to prevent a succession struggle, which might give the Soviets a

pretext to invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine and invade the country. Indeed, the constitutional reforms of summer 1971 were interpreted as an attempt to prepare the road for collective leadership in the post-Tito era: power, including economic power, was transferred from the Federation to the Republics. The NATO experts noted that collective leadership would become the 'dominant force in policy formation', but time was needed to reach a new balance between the Federation and the Republics. The 1971 constitutional reform strengthened the federative republics, which resulted in an 'aggravation of particularist tendencies', at a time when economic problems had not been solved (the dinar was devalued twice in that year). The experts remained strongly sceptical about prospects for the country. The Eastern European reports of 1971–2 pointed to Tito's purge of the Croatian and the Serb parties, noting that this was an attempt to check particularism, and to allow the Communist Party to emerge as the main unifying force in the country. However, the experts also noted the contradiction between a decentralized institutional system and centralized Party control. In early 1974, NATO experts noted that Tito's succession would probably be smooth, and that his successors would try to preserve their uncommitted position between East and West: 'their ability to do so should be viewed with caution but not pessimism'.⁵⁴

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter tells the story of a 'sideshow', which was how Yugoslavia was viewed by NATO analysts, who tended to focus on the major subjects of the Soviet economy, society and policies. The alliance civilian machinery did not produce special reports on Yugoslavia: the country was mentioned only in relation to other themes.

NATO analysis on Yugoslavia remained largely problematic. It should be noted that at that time, NATO reports were agreed between the diplomats of many states. This meant that these documents expressed the lowest common denominator of their authors, and were unlikely to lead to an intellectual breakthrough. At the same time, some of the NATO countries, for example the US, Britain, France or those of the south flank, dealt closely with Yugoslavia and understood its peculiar needs better than other members, who sometimes failed to appreciate the pressures exercised on Belgrade. Still, the main problem was that NATO analysis attempted to understand a heretical country using 'orthodox' perceptions of the Cold War. Tito had quarrelled with Moscow, but remained a com-

munist, constantly in need of proving the revolutionary character of his regime. The NATO experts always suspected that this communist leader would have an instinctive tendency to return to the fold. They also often failed to appreciate that Yugoslavia did not share their own 'orthodox' perceptions of the Cold War as a conflict between two rigid world views. Indeed, Yugoslavia claimed exactly the opposite, namely, that there was such a thing as a 'third road'. On many occasions Tito was seen as unable or unwilling to 'deliver'. This, however, was not confined to the Yugoslav case. By its very terms of reference, NATO analyses tended to follow, or even reproduce, the dominant, mainstream Cold War cleavages. They were relatively successful when analysing the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc. However, when assessing actors such as the Third World or the Non-Aligned, who challenged these Cold War cleavages, they tended to interpret them through a Cold War 'lens'.⁵⁵ To a great extent, the Third World or the Yugoslav perspectives did not appear on NATO analysts' 'radar'. This deficit of NATO analysis must be seen in relation to two additional interrelated levels.

First, NATO experts monitored Yugoslavia as a regional, *Eastern European power*, and included it in their *Eastern European reports*. Thus, they tended to neglect the Yugoslav ambition to be a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, a crucial aspect of the revolutionary identity and thus the legitimization of the Titoist heresy, especially after 1955. Recent research has shown that the Soviet–Yugoslav reconciliation helped Belgrade pursue a neutralist policy.⁵⁶ Yet, NATO analysts were uncomfortable with both concepts. They believed that Belgrade had an inflated view of its own international standing. It was not until the mid-1960s that they developed an understanding for Yugoslav neutralist/global ambitions and this happened only after the Yugoslavs had 'delivered'; that is only after the 'tangible' Cold War reality of Yugoslav economic reform, something of importance within the Eastern European context into which Yugoslavia had been placed by NATO analysts.

The second point involves the NATO experts' perceptions of Eastern Europe. There was an instinctive tendency to downplay the importance of South-Eastern Europe, compared to the more 'important' Central European part of the Soviet bloc. Of course, the experts were correct in pointing out the anti-Soviet potential of Poland, evident in the long run, or the relative economic backwardness of the Balkan states. Even a leading expert such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (although much more balanced towards Yugoslavia compared to the NATO analysts) referred to a notion

which he called ‘Gomulkaism’, revealing both his hopes regarding Poland, but also the extent to which the much more relevant notion of Titoism shaped Western expectations. Western experts continually hoped to find *a Tito* in the ‘more important’ space of East-Central Europe.⁵⁷ At the same time, there was always a barely concealed demeaning description of the communist Balkan societies, which were regarded as much less able to engineer change. Yugoslavia was a clear indication that this was not entirely true. However, it remained a ‘secondary’ topic in NATO analysis, and probably in Western Cold War perceptions in general.

NOTES

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31. Maurer, *La réconciliation soviéto-yougoslave*, 208–14; Swain, *Tito*, 129–34; Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, 202–5.
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37. See the reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, NATO/CM(60)41, 22 April 1960; CM(61)29, 14 April 1961; CM(61)118, 27 November 1961; CM(62)111, 30 November 1962; CM(63)27, 6 May 1963; CM(63)99, 28 November 1963. See also NATO/PO/61/142, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 9 February 1961, and PO/61/425, summary of replies, 12 April 1961, and the contributions of the national delegations on the Belgrade Conference in NATO/AC/119-WP(61)37. See also, Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson and the Nonaligned World*, pp. 69–82 and 181–4.
38. TNA/FO 371/173387/4, UK delegation, Paris, to FO, 20 February 1963.
39. It is telling that during a Greek–Yugoslav crisis over the Macedonian question in 1962, Athens took particular care not to alarm the Yugoslavs. Before holding military manoeuvres on the common Yugoslav/Greek border, the Greeks sought special permission from the NAC to notify Belgrade. See Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War*, p. 115.
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Yugoslavia, August-December 1971', 7 February 1972; CM(72)6, 'Yugoslavia: Economic Problems and Prospects', 8 February 1972.

55. See mostly, Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 110–57.
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Between Global and Regional Cold Wars: Turkey's Search to Harmonize Its Security Engagements in the 1950s

Aysegül Sever

In December 1956, the NATO Council approved the Report of the 'Three Wise Men' on the restructuring of the alliance, which made a bold observation:

NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty and that common interests of the Atlantic community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community.¹

Even before this general statement, 'concern for harmonizing relations' even beyond the NATO area had already become the motto articulating security perceptions of the Menderes governments (1950–60) in Turkey.

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Since its accession to NATO, intra-alliance relations regarding regions beyond NATO territory have been Turkey's major concern. Not long after the Second World War, Turkey's geographical location placed it at the nexus of the multiple defence arenas of the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey's regional defence involvement in the Balkans and the Middle East came as an extension of its alignment with NATO in 1952.

Following its accession to NATO, Ankara perceived a strong connection between its role in the southern flank of NATO and its regional defence roles in the Balkans and the Middle East. Several works have examined various aspects of Turkey's role in the regional pacts. This chapter confines itself to elaborating on Turkey's experience of interplay between the regional pacts and NATO as far as intra-alliance relations were concerned. Turkey was not the only NATO member of the respective pacts or the only NATO power that regarded the link between regional and global as crucial. However, in both cases Ankara was perhaps the most persistent defender of such a linkage and also shouldered serious challenges regarding the coordination of its role as an ally in NATO's general strategies with its regional security role in the Balkans and the Middle East. The priorities and perceptions of NATO's allies were not monolithic in any region. In view of this, Turkey's regional initiatives in the Balkans and Ankara's very early reactions to NATO's 'out of area' problems in the Middle East could serve as examples to shed light on the challenges involved in the interaction between regional and global security engagements. Being the only NATO member with a long border with the Middle East, Ankara especially embarked on a mission of persistently bringing Middle East defence issues to the NATO Council, and consistently defended the close liaison between NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

EARLY COLD WAR REGIONALISM AND TURKEY'S SECURITY AGENDA

In the 1950s, Turkey's security agenda was preoccupied with the classical Cold War concerns of having a strong defence mechanism in place against the Soviets under NATO, as well as the need to fulfil its overextended regional security role in the neighbouring areas and to manage intra-allied tensions over Cyprus. This created a complex web of relations and priorities which is worth examining. Turkey's regional roles and its NATO role

were interwoven and therefore extensively complementary. The regional roles were largely voluntary, but Turkey's NATO allies, the US in particular, strongly encouraged them. Ankara's alignment with NATO put it at the centre of Cold War polarization in its neighbourhood. In this respect, Ankara even took the risk of overlooking its own regional problems—even the one with Greece over Cyprus—for the sake of general alliance interests.

In Cold War politics, the balance of power between the East and West blocs dominated the regional security environment and constrained regional powers. This was most evident early in the Cold War. Even though regional powers are currently accepted as pivotal actors in their respective regions and 'occupy a certain hierarchic position in global power distribution', the balance between global and regional power hierarchies in the 1950s was significantly unfavourable towards regional powers.² All regional organizations were considered as an extension of the then existing power struggle between the two blocs.³ In view of this, Turkey's first priority was to become integrated into the Cold War security system via NATO and then to serve the regional security needs of the alliance.

In the face of a number of Soviet demands, including the cession of bases in the Turkish Straits and some territories in Eastern Anatolia to the Soviets, as well as a revision of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish Straits, all Turkish governments after 1949 campaigned hard to be accepted by NATO. Ankara's desire to be part of the alliance carried ideational and strategic concerns. The Turks regarded 'NATO as an extension of the US' and considered their NATO membership as a protective shield against security challenges posed by the Soviet Union. Besides, they considered it as an opportunity to cooperate with the US on a larger scale through the 'institutionalization of the alliance'.⁴ This expectation was eventually fulfilled with Turkey's accession to NATO in 1952. In May 1951, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff had already clearly recognized the critical role Turkey could undertake in safeguarding the West's southern flank in Europe by diverting large numbers of Soviet troops and by improving the defence of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.⁵ In addition to seeking military security, the Turks believed that their acceptance by the Atlantic alliance was a recognition of Turkey's Western identity and its becoming an equal partner of Europe. As Aybet describes, 'this was essentially a western identity which rested upon the legitimacy of collective defence and was constructed within a framework of military security'.⁶

By 1952, the strengthening of Turkish national self-esteem due to NATO membership, over-enthusiasm on the part of the Menderes governments towards an active foreign policy and encouragement from its Western allies made Ankara a very influential actor in the politics of regional security schemes. Instead of making a regional pact a stepping-stone to integration with the Western alliance, Turkey's membership of NATO brought about serious regional engagements. These expected multiple security roles in the surrounding regions resulted in significant cooperation over a vast area, but also served as sources of disagreements between Turkey, its Western allies and countries in the region. Irrespective of the area in which Turkey became involved, the regional powers and Turkey itself took its NATO identity very seriously. Ankara consistently sought a close link between NATO and the pacts because it considered them complementary. Therefore, when Italy expressed its opposition to the Balkan Pact due to the Trieste problem with Yugoslavia, and Anglo-US differences over Suez negatively affected the Baghdad Pact, Ankara became most alarmed about the effects of all these on the security of the West.

During the post-war period, Turkey's attitude towards the Middle East or the Balkans exhibited typical characteristics of Cold War regionalism. The balance of power between the superpowers dominated questions of regional security. Regional powers like Turkey enjoyed much less liberty in regional politics. Regional cooperation focused particularly on military security considerations and was put into effect in security initiatives such as the Middle East Command, the Balkan Pact, and the Baghdad Pact. 'Realist state-based matters of high politics' were then the driving force behind Ankara's participation in any regional cooperation efforts, rather than self-initiated or regional actor-driven regionalism.

Concurrently, Ankara's interest in the region, either by promoting the Balkan Pact or the Baghdad Pact did not carry exclusively nationally defined ideational load, but it also involved strategic expectations from the West, particularly from the US in terms of military and economic assistance. It was Ankara's security-based perceptions of the post-war world, rather than its regional identity, that led it to undertake such regional initiatives for the first time since the beginning of the Republican era. After its entry to the Atlantic alliance, Turkey considered the Balkans and the Middle East as regions that sooner or later would become Cold War battlegrounds. In view of this, Turkey was ready to be part of Cold War regionalism, provided its NATO alignment would continue.

Consequently, Ankara took active roles in the promotion of the Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact. In both cases, Ankara favoured imminent and very close organic ties between NATO and the regional pact signatories. This was not a radical expectation, but sometimes caused concern and disagreement among NATO allies. Ankara also regarded the pacts as a prospective strong link between NATO and Turkey, and expected these pacts to create an extra bond between regional allies of NATO in the Balkans (Turkey and Greece) and the Middle East (Turkey, Britain, and the US).

THE FIRST TEST FOR HARMONIZING TURKEY'S SECURITY COMMITMENTS

In the early 1950s, Ankara became alarmed by Soviet expansion in the Balkans. However, this region was not at the centre of Turkish foreign policy considerations. The last time Ankara took an interest in a Balkan cooperation was in 1934, when Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Romania became signatories to the Balkan Entente against the revisionist powers of that period.

Unlike Greece and Yugoslavia, Turkey did not experience wartime occupation or regime change. In that sense, Turkey was an outsider to the area due to its non-belligerent status during the Second World War. Moreover, it faced no dispute over its small territory, Eastern Thrace, in the Balkans. Therefore, its early interest in Yugoslavia's break from the Soviets was not a result of its own immediate security considerations, but rather a general concern about bordering a region in which Soviet influence prevailed. After Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform on 28 June 1948, Ankara, along with its allies, especially the US, perceived the rift between Belgrade and Moscow as a good opportunity to weaken the monolithic character of the Communist bloc and thus weaken the Soviet camp.⁷ Until the Korean War, Turkey's possible contribution to the West's defence was generally appreciated in relation to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, rather than South-Eastern Europe. This changed when Turkey became involved in the defence of Europe as a member of NATO's Allied Forces in South-Eastern European Command.

Concurrently, Turkey's serious efforts to incorporate Yugoslavia into the West began in earnest after its entry into NATO. As two Balkan member states of NATO, Greece and Turkey held talks in an attempt to coordinate their defence plans and enhance their military position in

the Balkans. The US, Britain and France had already demonstrated their support for the Tito regime by providing economic and military aid in 1949. In late 1949, the Americans concluded that Tito's political independence represented an important asset for the West. It was believed that the Soviets' success in overthrowing Tito would threaten to overturn the balance of power in the region, endangering the position of Greece and Italy. Ideally, Athens and Ankara hoped for the conclusion of a tripartite Greek–Turkish–Yugoslav defence pact, which would also associate Yugoslavia with NATO's southern flank. In considering the incorporation of Yugoslavia into the alliance, Bulgaria was a crucial concern. Due to its geographical position, Bulgaria could threaten all three countries. Moreover, it was the most reliable Soviet ally and had 'the better equipped and probably the better trained' army in the region.⁸ Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia all border Bulgaria. Each country assigned a sizeable part of its forces to guarding its borders, and each wanted to know how the other would act in a time of emergency.⁹

Compared to Greece and Yugoslavia, the threats Turkey faced from illegal border crossings and border violations were negligible, but they had started increasing steadily. Unexpectedly, the most serious post-war Balkan challenge to Turkey came not in the form of a Bulgarian military threat, but rather from Bulgaria's provocative use of the Turkish minority issue. In August 1950, the Bulgarians announced their decision to deport large numbers of Turks in Bulgaria to Turkey. The Bulgarian government sent a memo to the Turkish Embassy in Sofia demanding that Turkey admit 250,000 members of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria within three months.¹⁰ This demand put the then newly elected Menderes government in a difficult position. The refugee crisis was eventually resolved in December 1950, but Turkey still had to accept 51,951 Bulgarian Turks.¹¹ This development was the first incident that drew Turkey's attention to possible risks originating from Bulgaria.

The growing ties between Yugoslavia and NATO allies also motivated Turkey to develop a closer relationship with that country. The rapid improvements in Greek–Yugoslav relations also affected Ankara. This shift prompted Turkey to further develop relations with Yugoslavia, given that Greece, which had been having serious territorial and ethnic disputes with Yugoslavia, was ready to cooperate with Belgrade.

Greece and Turkey's cooperation in drawing Yugoslavia into the Western camp was an important indicator of the Cold War partnership between these two regional members of NATO. Following the Venizelos–

Ataturk period, Greek–Turkish relations reached their best state for the second time in the early 1950s. After the war, Turkey and Greece were incorporated into US assistance programs under the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The pro-Western governments of Adnan Menderes in Turkey and Marshal Alexandros Papagos in Greece (1952–5) advanced bilateral relations and further improved cooperation with the West. Against this backdrop, both sides were ready to initiate a campaign for partnership with Yugoslavia for the sake of Balkan security. In January 1953, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, stated that the time had come to admit Yugoslavia to NATO, preferably by direct entry. He also stated that ‘if direct entry into NATO is not possible, an alternative solution should be sought through creation of a separate three power alliance such as EDC [European Defense Community] with reciprocal guarantees with NATO.’¹² On this issue, the Foreign Minister asked for direct guidance from the Americans about Yugoslavia before his visit to Belgrade. In December 1952, the State Department instructed its Ambassador to tell the Turks that

we are not able at this time to give any definitive views either upon the question of Yugoslavia’s adherence to NATO or the creation of a complementary tripartite or quadripartite defence arrangement linked with NATO. We believe that for the time being there should be no commitment of forces or political commitments which might be inconsistent with Greece’s and Turkey’s present responsibilities to NATO. Nevertheless, we look with considerable favour upon continuation of talks between the Turks and Yugoslavs on the basis of contingent military planning.¹³

This was not the reply Ankara had hoped for. Köprülü subsequently complained that one of his principal difficulties with the West had been its ‘desultory’ approach to Yugoslavia.¹⁴

It was clear that Turkey was anxious to move on to a military pact with Yugoslavia. However, the three countries initially failed to go ahead with a binding military agreement in the absence of full US or NATO backing. They had to be more patient in getting their allies’ full approval. It was clear to the US government that Turkey and Greece hoped for more positive military collaboration with Yugoslavia, which was vital to their own security. ‘Close political association between these countries, all relatively isolated from Western Europe and with less possibility for receiving assistance in the event of war, would provide Greece and Turkey [an] addi-

tional element of security to that which NATO provides.’¹⁵ Nevertheless, the US was not interested in a military pact because it did not want NATO to be obliged to participate in a war over Yugoslavia, given the membership status of Greece and Turkey.¹⁶ Moreover, the US did not want to discomfort Italy over Trieste. Consequently, the two Balkan states’ search for a binding security pact was not immediately supported. To overcome US reservations, the Turkish Foreign Minister suggested the informal creation of what he termed the Southeast Europe Defence Organization, which included Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, as well as the US, the UK, France and Italy. Meanwhile both Greece and Turkey were ready to overlook their emerging Cyprus crisis for the time being. At this juncture, the intra-allied dispute was overlooked and NATO functioned as a deterring factor in this respect.¹⁷ Meanwhile, an important obstacle to proceeding with the pact was the Italian opposition. Turkey established a very close relationship with Italy to influence it favourably towards the Balkan Pact. Ankara became quite attentive to Italian concerns over Trieste and made serious efforts towards resolving the problem. During talks over the Balkan Pact, Turkey never neglected Italy’s concerns. Important visits were exchanged with the Italians. Foreign Minister Köprülü visited Rome in December 1952, but none of Turkey’s efforts came to fruition. Ankara sometimes expressed its frustration with the Italians’ attitude, arguing that the Italian opposition to the Balkan Pact ‘is basically [a] bargaining position to assure Italy [of a] favourable solution to [the] Trieste problem.’¹⁸

A friendship treaty with Yugoslavia was the most Turkey and Greece could achieve for the time being. On 28 January 1953, during his visit to Tito, Köprülü proposed a tripartite Greek–Turkish–Yugoslav treaty of friendship. In his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Köprülü emphasized the two sides’ equal enthusiasm about the launch of the treaty.¹⁹ However, the US and the other leading Western allies had already made it clear that contingent military planning should continue on a tripartite basis as a matter separate and distinct from the projected Friendship Pact. Accordingly, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (the Ankara Treaty) was signed between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece on 28 February 1953 in Ankara.

Soon after the treaty was signed, attempts to turn it into a military alliance gained momentum. On 20 April 1954, during a visit by Tito to Turkey, the two sides agreed on the launch of a military alliance. As a last-minute attempt, Turkey approached Italy about joining them, but no progress was achieved. At this time, American restraint became evi-

dent in Article 10 of the Treaty of Military Alliance, the so-called Bled Treaty or the Balkan Pact, which was signed on 9 August 1954. Article 10 stated that 'the provisions of the present Treaty do not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Greece and Turkey resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949'.²⁰ The three Balkan states eventually agreed that any armed aggression against one or more of them in any part of their territories would be considered an act of aggression against all of them. This was the mutual military undertaking that Turkey had been seeking. Just before the pact was signed, the Turkish delegation to NATO had made it clear that 'the Pact is identical with those of NATO, the form adopted has been modelled as closely as possible on that of the North Atlantic Treaty ... Turkey and Greece ... have achieved a task implicitly laid on them by the NATO Council'.²¹ Accordingly, it was NATO's turn to harmonize the two pacts. The Turkish delegation's communication also pointed out that 'armed aggression against a country of the NATO area, from which it is difficult logically to exclude Yugoslavia, could not remain localised', so NATO and the prospective Balkan Alliance were *ipso facto*, complementary.²²

This harmonization turned out to be wishful thinking because of the unexpectedly fast rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR. Whereas Yugoslavia had urged for a military alliance after the Friendship Treaty, the post-Stalin Soviet peace démarche had already progressed. Just prior to the signing of the military pact among the three states, Khrushchev had sent a secret letter to Tito in July 1954. When Tito responded on 11 August 1954, the first exchange between Belgrade and Moscow since the disintegration of relations in 1948 was complete. The exchange of letters laid the foundation for Khrushchev's historic visit to Belgrade in May 1955. In light of this dialogue, the Balkan Pact was destined to fail.²³ Along with this, the rise of the Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey in 1955 also made the pact obsolete. The pact was short-lived but remained 'the only formal military alliance between ideological foes'.²⁴ It was also significant in displaying the difficulties involved in the coordination of policies among the NATO allies, even when they had agreed on the fundamentals of Cold War politics. The regional powers were able to set up a regional pact, despite the slowness of forthcoming NATO support. On the other hand, they were also responsible for the demise of the pact by their choice of individual actions.

EFFORTS TO COORDINATE NATO RESPONSIBILITIES WITH MIDDLE EAST SECURITY: 'OUT OF AREA' CHALLENGES

Harmonizing Middle Eastern security issues with NATO's agenda was one of Turkey's leading priorities during its involvement in the Baghdad Pact. This was perceived as crucial because Turkey is the only NATO state bordering the Middle East. However, it was a difficult endeavour, since the Middle East was formally outside the 'NATO area' and thus was part of the heated intra-alliance debates regarding 'out-of-area' commitments. In promoting the Baghdad Pact, Ankara reminded its NATO allies of the difficulties involved in Middle East defence. These reminders increased towards the late 1950s because the pact faced difficulties during the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1958 Iraq coup. Turkey's position over Suez gave the first serious signal of Ankara's perception of a more extended role for NATO in the Middle East. The 1956 Suez war and the ensuing regional crises, the 1957 Syria crisis and the 1958 Iraqi coup, also accelerated Ankara's desire to see a concrete liaison between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish government increasingly brought the issue to NATO meetings.

Having participated in the British-led MEC (Middle East Command) and the MEDO (Middle East Defence Organisation) early on, Turkey's real commitment to the defence of the Middle East came into existence in the pursuit of a new American defence initiative, the so-called Northern Tier concept. The concept was formalized after the tour of the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in the Middle East in May 1953. It was based on the premise that countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey were more vulnerable to the Soviet threat than other states in the Middle East; therefore, they should constitute the core of any prospective defence pact for the region. During Dulles' short visit to Ankara between 25 and 27 May 1953, Menderes told the US Secretary of State that his country must be 'the backbone' of defence in the Middle East, and expressed his support for any American initiative promoting regional defence.²⁵ Both Menderes and President Celal Bayar argued that Turkey's social and political stability, its military superiority and, above all, its determination to fight Soviet expansionism could draw regional support for the new Western initiatives in the region.

The Menderes administration immediately launched a full-scale diplomatic initiative to ensure Arab support for the pact. However, countries

such as Egypt and Syria were far from ready to join in. Consequently, it was decided that the Northern Tier states should not wait indefinitely for countries such as Egypt to join the treaty but should concentrate their efforts on Iraq and obtain a firm response from that country. Subsequently, ensuring Iraq's participation became the main aim. In his diplomacy towards Baghdad, Menderes relied on his personal closeness with Iraq's pro-Western Prime Minister, Nuri Said, forthcoming military and economic assistance from the US, and several last-minute promises given to the Iraqis regarding the Palestinian question. All of these worked out and led to the so-called Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955. The Americans and the British expressed their delight with this early success. Turkey thus became instrumental in ensuring Iraq's pivotal participation in this crucial Western venture in the Middle East.²⁶ From then on, Ankara conducted a diplomatic offensive in the Middle East, especially towards Iraq, something which had never been seen in the Republican period before. The offensive brought about the Baghdad Pact, which became the first and the most significant example of the execution of the Northern Tier strategy. Although Turkey and its Western allies were delighted with the pact, the Egyptian government responded to the Turkish–Iraqi agreement very unfavourably. The Egyptian President, Gamal Abdul Nasser, regarded it as a betrayal and accused Iraq of breaking solidarity in the Arab world to enter into defence relations with countries outside the Middle East. The pact with Iraq had a negative effect on Turkey's relations with most Arab states, since Ankara was accused of being a Western 'puppet' and of destroying Arab unity. On the other hand, the pact delighted some of Iraq's NATO allies. Britain viewed the proposed Turkish–Iraqi treaty as a first step in launching a Western defence system in the Middle East. The British regarded the pact as an opportunity to renew the Anglo–Iraqi Treaty of 1930 (which was due to expire in 1957) under the umbrella of a Turkish–Iraqi pact. In January 1954, J. M. Troutbeck, the British Ambassador to Baghdad, suggested that a direct Turkish–Iraqi exchange of views on the defence question could help 'to show the Iraqis that a neighbouring Asiatic country could accept a close military alliance with the West and the presence of Western service personnel on its soil without any derogation of their national sovereignty and dignity'.²⁷

According to Article 1 of the pact, the contracting parties declared their intention to cooperate for their security and defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 5 made it clear that the pact would be open for accession to any member states of the Arab League or any other state

concerned with the security of the Middle East. In this article, it was also stated that, 'any acceding State Party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements in accordance with Article 1, with one or more states parties to the present Pact'. With the inclusion of this provision, the British were entitled to sign a special agreement with Iraq as soon as they joined the pact. After the signature of the pact with Baghdad, the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, informed the NATO Council that

the pact between Turkey and Iraq had consequences which went far beyond the Middle East, and should be considered from the point of view of world strategy rather than of Middle East strategy ... He asked NATO to believe that if a coordinated effort were made, the stability of the whole Middle East area might in the near future be vastly increased.²⁸

Between 1955 and 1959, the Menderes government's primary goal in the Middle East remained the promotion and strengthening of the Baghdad Pact. The government believed that successful operation of the pact would improve the country's overall profile as a NATO ally, and open up the possibility of receiving more economic and military assistance from the West, especially the US. However, soon after the Baghdad Pact was signed, an anti-pact bloc under Nasser's leadership began to emerge as Egypt and Syria announced that they were going to sign an alternative 'agreement'. Turkey viewed this as a hostile act and reacted strongly. Ankara went so far as to threaten Syria, stating that if the Syrians insisted on this anti-pact policy, Turkey would consider breaking off relations with Damascus.²⁹ Predictably, the Turkish government's pressure caused protests across the Arab world, which alarmed the West. American and British missions in the Arab countries also warned their respective governments about the possible negative consequences of Turkey's tough approach towards the Arabs. In other words, Turkey was now suffering adverse regional consequences because of its pro-Western policy. These warnings were echoed in messages from Arab governments, including that of Iraq. Towards the end of March 1955, both the British and American governments simultaneously came to the conclusion that the Menderes administration's attempts to reduce Egyptian and Syrian opposition to the pact had, in fact, been counterproductive and appeared to be causing serious anti-Turkish as well as anti-Western sentiments in Ankara. Accordingly, the Turks were warned against hastily attempting to draw the Arabs into the pact. Dulles advised his Ambassador in Ankara that, 'we fear Turkish methods if continued will

arouse in [the] minds of Arabs including Iraq apprehensions regarding Turkish intentions and fear of domination by Turkey with consequent threat to attainment [of] area objectives we [are] both seeking.³⁰ The Anglo-American suggestion was met with a frosty response in Ankara. The Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Nuri Birgi, expressed his government's surprise about the British and American misgivings concerning Turkey's attitude and asked bluntly what else they wanted his country to do.³¹ Despite warnings from its allies, and despite its own disappointment at the US attitude, Turkey continued with its vigorous campaign to secure further Arab support for the pact.

Notwithstanding Turkey's frustration with the Syrian–Egyptian opposition, the subsequent accessions of Britain, Pakistan and Iran raised Turkey's hopes about the pact's success. Both the Americans and British paid tribute to the Turkish leaders' ability to sell the pact in the region, to the Iranians, for instance.³² Nonetheless, the Turks' uneasiness about the pact's future increased when their Western allies made overtures towards the Egyptian leader in order not to lose him to the Soviets altogether.

Ankara was disappointed by what it perceived as the guarded reaction of its NATO allies, Britain and the US, to the 1955 Egyptian–Czech arms deal. The government believed that the deal was a clear indication of Egypt's integration into the Soviet bloc. Turkey therefore urged its allies to concentrate their efforts on attracting additional Arab states to the Baghdad Pact to isolate Nasser.³³ However, Britain and the US did not think that it was an appropriate time to alienate Egypt. It was only after Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in summer 1956, that the British position changed radically and the crisis brought about new challenges for the three NATO allies with special interests in the defence of the Middle East—the US, Britain and Turkey.

With the support of its two NATO allies, Turkey continued its active role in the Middle East. Turkey's occasional differences with the US over the latter's lack of membership of the Baghdad Pact or differences between the two countries on the methods to attract regional countries to the pact had occasionally strained relations. However, the Suez affair affected Turkey's relations with its two NATO allies rather differently: the Menderes government found itself in a very uncomfortable position because of Anglo-American responses to Nasser's nationalization of the Canal. Although both major Western powers condemned the nationalization, they took different positions on the substance and thus forced Ankara to make a choice between the two. Ankara also found it difficult

to coordinate its regional security preferences and general NATO policies over an 'out-of-area' dispute. Being a NATO ally with multi-regional roles, Turkey was bound to get involved in this debate.

French and British attempts to draw their allies into their global politics was met with disfavour in most NATO states and angered the Americans. The military campaign against Egypt led Dulles to make a strict delineation between the NATO area and the rest of the world:

Now there has been some difference in our approach to this problem of the Suez Canal. This is not an area where we are bound together by treaty. Certain areas we are treaty bound to protect, such as the North Atlantic Treaty area, and there we stand together, and I hope and believe always will stand absolutely together.³⁴

This US–British–French disagreement led to a serious crisis in the Western bloc. After the UN Security Council failed to end the problem because of the French and British vetoes, the US took its ceasefire resolution to the General Assembly. The Menderes government reluctantly supported the American resolution at the General Assembly, but this was far from being a firm indication of Turkey's distaste for the Anglo-French military intervention in the Suez Canal. While the Western Alliance was in disarray over Suez, Ankara did not like being forced to choose between two allies—Britain and the USA. It seemed that the Turks did not resent Britain's military campaign against Egypt as much as that of the US. Thus, when the US proposed to use the General Assembly instead of the Security Council as a discussion forum due to British and French vetoes, the Turkish delegate at the UN abstained. Ankara might have liked to see Nasser being given a harsh lesson over his nationalization of the Canal. Before the crisis, Menderes had already clarified his government's stand on the issue by stating that he did not regard the Canal dispute as a bilateral problem between the UK and Egypt, but one which concerned the whole of NATO strategy. Supporting the British standing, Menderes had argued that

the Egyptians could not properly maintain today that the nature of the British position in the Canal Zone is one of imperialism or of merely maintaining British interests. Turkey is convinced that the UK is acting as guardian of an outpost of one of the key positions of the free world.³⁵

This was identical to Turkey's reaction to the French presence in Algeria. Turkey didn't differentiate between some NATO allies' colonial interests and the general interests of the alliance. Strained relations with Nasser also made Ankara a reluctant partner of the US over Suez. The leaders of Turkey and Egypt had been pursuing policies in the region which were incompatible. While Nasser was trying to reduce his country's dependence on the West, Menderes was keen on strengthening its ties with the same countries. Moreover, Ankara was backing Iraq in its historic leadership contest between Iraq and Egypt. Finally, the Menderes administration was uncomfortable with the improvement recorded in Egyptian–Greek relations. Due to Turkish misgivings about Egypt, the government preferred to see firm American backing of the British over Suez. However, this didn't happen. Turkey eventually felt compelled to side with the US over Suez. This half-hearted support was also clear during NATO discussions. During the ministerial session of the NATO Council in December 1956, Menderes stated that, 'although NATO defence planning is limited to the defence of the NATO area, it is necessary to take account of dangers which might arise for NATO because of developments outside that area'.³⁶ He added that NATO and the Baghdad Pact were 'complementary' and liaison between the two defensive systems was essential. Turkey and Britain were full members of the pact and the US was participating in certain activities of the pact, so for the defence of NATO's southern flank 'the state of defence of the Baghdad Pact' was essential.³⁷

By the late 1950s, discussions on the Middle East situation and the possibility of a liaison between NATO and the Baghdad Pact became a regular item on the agenda of NATO ministerial meetings. As Turkey became alarmed about the rise of communist influence in Syria in 1957, it emphasized the dire consequences of such a development for the whole of NATO. During the NATO summit of December 1957, Zorlu warned that 'NATO countries should realise that the menace is general and real.' He asked for the support of not only the UK and the US, but also the whole of NATO. He stressed that, 'it is not the intention to demand any extension of NATO responsibilities to the defence of the Baghdad Pact countries but NATO countries can on the other hand lend strength and support to stem the tide of Soviet subversion.'³⁸ From then on, the Council members were equally divided as to the intimacy of the links that should be established between NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

The 1958 coup in Iraq heated this debate even further because the future of the pact was at stake. As the US and Britain deployed forces in

Lebanon and Jordan respectively to protect the regimes there from the fate of Nuri Said in Iraq, NATO states verbally supported these decisions. The Menderes government went further than the others. The US was allowed to use the İncirlik base in southern Turkey.³⁹ The opposition criticized the Menderes government for letting the Americans use İncirlik without any NATO involvement. Foreign Minister Zorlu accepted the fact that the base was used outside NATO, but described the opposition's criticism as pointless by declaring that using İncirlik 'was nothing more than assisting forces going to defend [a] small friendly country at [the] request [of] that country'.⁴⁰ It was evident that Turkey was not particularly concerned with the dilemmas of out-of-area involvements.

In 1959, in an attempt to safeguard the Baghdad Pact following the 1958 Iraq takeover, NATO talks concerning the strengthening of military ties between the alliance and the Baghdad Pact organisations continued, and Turkey, as always, strongly defended these firm links. Because of strong opposition from countries such as Norway and Canada, no binding agreements were made, but closer consultation on military issues and the possibility of further assistance from NATO countries to the region were agreed.⁴¹ All the way along, the Turkish delegations or Turkish statesmen advocated closer liaison between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. Actually, this was too much to ask in view of the consistently declining popularity of the pact in the late 1950s, and consequently, the advocacy of the Turkish statesmen was to no avail.

CONCLUSIONS

Alignment with NATO put Turkey at the centre of Cold War polarization in various regions. Ankara regarded this situation as unavoidable and therefore accepted to engage in the regional challenges of the Cold War. The Menderes governments hardly made any distinction between region-specific challenges. Any anti-Western development originating from the Balkans, the Middle East or somewhere else was considered as a variation of the same Soviet menace. Any nationalist movement or any anti-Western act was easily condemned as a global challenge to the Atlantic alliance and the global interests of the West. Due to its multi-regional character in geographical and cultural terms, Ankara, perhaps more than any other NATO ally, was very attentive to the idea of setting up interalignments between pro-Western regional security initiatives and NATO. This was also closely

related to Ankara's desire to draw attention to its prospective roles in the regions which were vital for its own national security.

However, commitments on a global scale against the Soviet Union did not bring about an easy understanding between NATO allies in regional politics. Hard-pushed regional pacts generally failed to strengthen NATO or secure unanimity in its ranks. Turkey's desire to connect all the regional defence schemes with NATO one way or the other was closely related to the nature of the international order, which then side-lined regional roles for regional security.

The feeling of interdependence in the Alliance had some moderating effect on some regional issues, but not necessarily in regional politics. Therefore, Turkey's NATO identity provided a degree of coherence for intra-NATO relations regarding regional politics, but fell short of improving the regional security environment or contributing to a well-functioning interdependence between NATO and the aforementioned pacts to which Turkey dearly committed itself. In essence, Cold War NATO failed to solve the conflict between its 'area' and 'out-of-area' roles, which however was a constant challenge for Turkish policies.

NOTES

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3. Björn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism Revisited', in *Theories of New Regionalism*, ed. Fredrick Söderbsum et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 23.
4. Şuhnaz Yılmaz, 'Turkey's Quest for NATO Membership: The Institutionalization of the Turkish-American Alliance', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 481–95.

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13. Ibid., 608.
14. Ibid., 605.
15. *FRUS* 1952–4, VIII, McGhee to State Department, 6 February 1953, 618.
16. David R. Stone, 'The Balkan Pact and American Policy', *East European Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1994): 393–405; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967* (London: Routledge, 2006), 36–42.
17. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, 'Revisiting NATO's Stabilizing Role in South-eastern Europe: The Cold War Experience and the Longue Durée', *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 12, no. 4 (2012): 515–31.
18. *FRUS* 1952, VIII, McGhee to State Department, 6 February 1953, 618. On 31 May 1954, the US, the UK and Yugoslavia signed an agreement solving the problem of Trieste.
19. *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* [Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], 1950–4, Dönem IX, Cilt 20/2, 23 February 1953, col. 825.

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31. NARA, RG 59, 682.87/3–2955, Warren to Dulles, 29 March 1955.
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34. John Foster Dulles speech, 2 October 1956. Quoted in Veronica M. Kitchen, 'Arguing Identity and Security: Out of Area Intervention and Change in the Atlantic Community', PhD Thesis, Brown University, Rhode Island, 2006, 91.
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The Warsaw Pact in the Balkans: The Bulgarian Perspective

Jordan Baev

INTRODUCTION

Radical political transformation in Eastern Europe since the early 1990s has been responsible for a large-scale declassification process of the formerly top secret Warsaw Pact archives. Between 2010 and 2013, the Bulgarian military and military intelligence records for the whole Cold War era up to the 1990s were also made available. During the previous two decades, the author of this chapter had a chance to reveal and publish a huge amount of new archival documents¹ and to analyze some important issues on the role of Bulgaria in the Warsaw Pact, particularly about the doctrinal and organizational development of the East European bloc and the Bulgarian attitude toward the major global and regional postwar conflicts.²

This study contributes some new viewpoints on the Warsaw Pact policy on NATO's southern flank from a Bulgarian perspective, by discussing in particular, the 'distribution of roles and goals' among the member states, the dilemma of the nuclear/missiles proliferation, and the reconnaissance of NATO war planes and joint military exercises in the region. Special attention is devoted also to belated attempts for the reform of the Warsaw Pact at the end of the 1980s, just before its inevitable dissolution following the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

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The way the Soviet political model was imposed on Eastern Europe implicitly indicated that the creation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 actually marked not the beginning, but the end of an initial stage of political and military integration in the Soviet bloc. In the late 1940s the system of bilateral agreements had already been completed. Unlike the treaty of collective defense which later led to the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, these first bilateral agreements for mutual assistance had such obscure definitions of the *casus foederis* that it was difficult to predict when and under what exact circumstances the Soviet and East European armies would begin military operations. The initial period of multilateral military cooperation was marked by a secret summit held at Stalin's initiative in Moscow on 9–12 January 1951. All East European political and military leaders supported indisputably the idea of establishing a 'Coordination Committee for the build-up of the Armed forces in the countries of people's democracy'.³ Within a couple of years after that meeting, the East European Armed Forces were intensively rearmed and reorganized following the Soviet pattern.

THE FORMATION OF THE WARSAW PACT

The original idea for the build-up of an East European collective defense system was declared in a general way at the Moscow Conference of the Soviet bloc leaders (29 November–2 December 1954). On the basis of the documents available, one can assume that until mid-March 1955 the Soviets' East European partners had no idea of either the nature of the proposed alliance or the approximate date of its establishment. An order by the Bulgarian Defense Minister, Gen. Petar Panchevski, on 8 March 1955 stated that an Air Defense Forces staff exercise was to take place from 9 to 13 May under his command.⁴

It becomes clear that at the time it was not known yet that an international conference was to be held during that very same period. On 19 March, however, Gen. Panchevski left urgently for Moscow. Three days later, the Soviet Foreign Ministry gave official information about the consultations that took place among the delegations of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR, regarding the decisions of the Moscow Conference. Only on 1 April 1955, at a Soviet leadership meeting, was the Minister of Defense Marshal Georgy Zhukov assigned the task of preparing a draft of the joint military structure of the future alliance. Thus, the opening of the Warsaw

Conference was postponed from 25 April to mid-May 1955. Only on 2 May were the East European leaders informed that the constitutive meeting would take place from 11 to 14 May 1955 in Warsaw.⁵

In preliminary consultations, just before the opening of the meeting, the Defense and Foreign ministers agreed on the final contents of the draft documents. The Bulgarian Defense Minister, Gen. Panchevski, accompanied by the Head of the General Staff's Operations Department, Col. Atanas Semerdzhiev, left for Warsaw as early as 6 May 1955 and remained there for another three days following the end of the meeting.⁶ In his memoirs Gen. Semerdzhiev⁷ stated: 'In the course of the next few days because of the total lack of information regarding my duties I felt extremely uneasy ... Especially, since the instructions given to me in Sofia were rather scanty.'⁸ During the third session on 12 May 1955 Bulgarian Prime Minister Vulko Chervenkov discussed the situation in the Balkans, stressing especially the US military bases in Turkey and Greece. The leaders of all invited delegations adopted unanimously the draft treaty which was introduced in the fourth session of 13 May 1955 which lasted precisely twenty-five minutes. According to the provisions of the Treaty, the supreme leading body of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was the Political Consultative Committee (PCC). In a separate confidential session, a special decision to create a Joint Armed Forces (JAF) and Unified Command of the Armed Forces was also adopted.⁹

As early as the time of the Korean War the Balkans had lost its strategic priority compared to the time of the Truman Doctrine. During the lifetime of the Warsaw Pact, Central and Western Europe formed the so-called 'forward echelon' in the global confrontation between the two blocs. The strategic direction of the Balkans occupied a secondary place in Soviet war plans. For this reason, the Albanian estrangement and the Romanian 'dissidence' evoked neither forceful nor indeed any counteractions by the Kremlin (unlike in Hungary and Czechoslovakia), especially since they both followed a staunch Communist and anti-capitalist orientation.

At the very moment of its creation the organization assigned specific observation and analytical tasks to each of its member states on the basis of the fighting capacity and military power of their neighboring countries that were members of NATO. Thus Bulgaria and Romania were assigned the examination of NATO's intentions and actions in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East region.

The practice of holding bilateral and multilateral Soviet bloc meetings started, where the tasks and goals for each country at the time of

the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 were discussed. The first such multilateral intelligence services meeting was held in Moscow in March 1955, with the participation of eight East European delegations. The Soviet representatives raised the question of intelligence information exchange and joint operative measures directed against the 'main adversary'—the United States of America—and Great Britain. Taking the NATO joint bureau as an example, they insisted that the Soviet bloc intelligence activity be oriented in three main directions: (1) Infiltration and recruiting agents within the NATO ruling circles with the principal aim of obtaining information regarding NATO secret agreements and resolutions; (2) Obtaining information on joint military exercises, war plans, and rearmament of the NATO armies; (3) Obtaining new information concerning disagreements between NATO member countries. Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania took up common intelligence measures against Turkey and Greece.¹⁰

Soon after the first multilateral intelligence meeting of the Soviet bloc in March 1955, the Bulgarian communist leadership approved the proposals in accordance with the meeting's recommendations: 'The main direction in the work of Intelligence services was determined—Turkey and Greece, where the American and British imperialists are building their military bases, are organizing intelligence centers and schools, and are converting these countries into a springboard for aggression against Bulgaria and other socialist countries.' A specific Bulgarian national peculiarity was the use of the term 'main adversary' for Turkey, while in common Warsaw Pact terminology the same term was used for NATO and the USA. The basic tasks of Bulgarian intelligence agencies in this direction were specified as followed:

- A. Intelligence on US and British military plans for using Turkey and Greece;
- B. Reconnaissance of the military and secret agreements for creation of new US and British military bases on Turkish and Greek territory as well as the arrangements under multilateral NATO agreements;
- C. Obtaining information about the military potential, mobilization readiness, rearmament (in particular regarding the nuclear weapons), and defense industry of Turkey and Greece; their Air Force and Naval bases, and the use of the fortification installations at the Black Sea Straits, Izmir, and Cyprus; obtaining information on the use of atomic energy for military purposes, about the radar installations, chemistry, bacteriology, and geology;
- D. Revealing the internal contradictions between the ruling circles in Turkey and Greece as well as the existing contradictions of these countries with the USA and Great

Britain; E. Infiltration inside the intelligence centers and schools of the USA, Great Britain and other capitalist countries on Turkish and Greek territory aiming to learn and counteract their aggressive intentions; F. Infiltration within the enemy immigration organizations aiming to spoil the plans of US, British, Turkish, Greek and other capitalist intelligence agencies to use the emigration against Bulgaria; G. Our intelligence residents in Israel and Egypt to orient their activity for availing the opportunities of intelligence work in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.¹¹

REARMAMENT OF THE BULGARIAN ARMY

The first decision ever for the eventual deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles on Bulgarian territory was discussed even before the establishment of the Warsaw Pact. Special Soviet military teams made reconnaissance trips between 1953 and 1955 to Romania, Bulgaria, and the GDR to gather information on potential deployment locations of R-1 (SS-1) and R-2 (SS-2) missiles. The initial decision was against such a deployment because of the 'limited effectiveness' of those weapons. However, on 26 March 1955 the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev signed a joint top secret decree No. 584-365ss, formulated by the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers of the USSR regarding the stationing of strategic ballistic missiles units in four different regions.¹² According to this document, the 72nd Engineering Brigade had to be transferred to the Soviet Forces Group in the German Democratic Republic; the 73rd Brigade to Bulgaria; the 90th Brigade to the Trans-Caucasian Military Zone; and the 85th Brigade to the Far East Military Zone. The Kremlin's decision envisaged the deployment of the newest intermediate range ballistic missiles R-5M (SS-3) with a codename '8K51'.

There is no available information why the decision of 26 March 1955 never applied to Bulgaria. The main reason was probably the unstable political situation within the Warsaw Pact after the twentieth CPSU Congress of February 1956 and the new Soviet bloc initiatives of 1957 for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe and the Balkans. Actually, the 73rd Brigade with R-5M missiles was stationed at the end of 1956 in Volgograd region and in 1960 it was transferred to Kolomiya in Ukraine. Interesting evidence that has become available in the last few years confirms the strategic importance of Bulgaria for Soviet war plans. On 3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev had intensive talks with his Chinese host Mao Zedong in Beijing, in the presence of Soviet Defense Minister

Marshal Rodion Malinovski. When the discussion turned to nuclear proliferation issues, Chairman Mao mentioned Turkey, where the USA had established many military bases. In return, Khrushchev commented that the US bases in Turkey ‘are all in our sights’, and went further:

They’re planning to build bases in Greece, but that’s even easier. Throw a rock down from the Bulgarian mountains and they’ll be gone. Even America is under the gun now. We must thank our scientists for the creation of inter-continental missiles.¹³

In 1958–60 a new military doctrine was formulated in the USSR. Although previous regulation and normative documents since the early 1950s had also included as a primary task the preparedness of the Armed Forces to fight in terms of a nuclear strike, the new military doctrine determined the inevitability of a general ‘missile/nuclear war’. The views of the Soviet leaders were well manifested during a top secret Warsaw Pact Unified Military Command meeting in October 1960 in Moscow. The Soviet Chief of Staff, Gen. Alexei Antonov, underlined in his basic report the perspectives for battle actions with the use of nuclear and missile weapons. The Supreme Commander of Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, Marshall Andrei Grechko, argued in his own report that future wars would begin by using missiles and/or nuclear weapons within the entire enemy’s territory—not only against selected tactical targets. Of great importance was also the statement of the Soviet Defense Minister Marshall Rodion Malinovski:

Saying that we cannot strike first does not mean that we shall wait to be struck first. This means exactly that our work should be maintained in such a way that if we receive immediate information about enemy’s intentions to deliver a blow against us we shall be ready at that very moment to get ahead of them, and our rocket-nuclear strikes shall immediately find the enemy’s targets.

Further on, Marshall Malinovski assured East European partners: ‘In case of emergency you will receive the necessary missile-nuclear weapons and you will use them as you wish. Hence, you have to be trained to use such nuclear weapons.’¹⁴ Following those instructions, the local military commanders planned adequate measures. A directive by the Bulgarian Minister of Defense described the ability to locate enemy missile sites and to be prepared for a surprise nuclear attack by NATO countries.¹⁵

The possibility of deploying Soviet nuclear weapons was carefully examined in many US military and intelligence estimates in the early 1960s. A CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIA) of 2 February 1960 noted: 'The Soviets would almost certainly be unwilling to provide them [East European states] with nuclear weapons.' In annual United States Army, European Command (USAREUR) intelligence estimates for 1960, 1961 and 1962 there were included data about the construction of SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites in Albania and Bulgaria as well as the increase of Soviet submarines located in an Albanian Mediterranean base. However, all reports concluded that most probably Soviet nuclear weapons had not been delivered to Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. The USAREUR intelligence estimate of 1965 drew a general conclusion: 'There is no firm evidence that the Soviets have moved nuclear warheads into the satellites, with a sole exception—East Germany.'¹⁶

Actually, the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee summit, held in March 1961 in Moscow, approved a secret decision for rearmament of East European armies with modern missile weapons. According to a Soviet government resolution No. 546-229 of 8 June 1961, R-11M missiles should be delivered to the smaller allied armies without nuclear warheads. Through the implementation of a Warsaw Pact decision, between 1961 and 1966 Bulgarian armed forces first received Soviet tactical missiles R-11 (8K11), known by the West as Scud-A, followed by missiles Luna (9K714), known as Frog-4. In those years, three missile brigades were formed in Bulgaria—the 56th brigade of the Second Army (location Karlovo); the 66th brigade of the Third Army (location Yambol); and the 46th brigade of the First Army (location Samokov). Another unit, the 76th missile regiment, was subordinated to the General Staff strategic reserve troops in Telish, Pleven region. The former commander of Bulgarian Missile Troops Lt.-Gen. Dimitar Todorov, confirmed categorically the archival evidence showing that until the end of the Cold War Bulgaria did not receive nuclear warheads on its territory. Secret bilateral agreements between Sofia and Moscow provided that 'the approved number of nuclear warheads with fixed KT should be kept on Soviet territory', more specifically in Ukraine, and would be delivered to Bulgarian armed forces only upon a decision of the Warsaw Pact leadership.¹⁷

At the peak of the Berlin crisis in summer/autumn 1961, Bulgarian military intelligence prepared a number of analyses and information reports on the correlation between the intensification of global military and political tensions and the increased activity of NATO ships in the

vicinity of the Black Sea. According to a report of 5 August 1961, the US government had requested Turkey to close the Black Sea straits if the USSR did not accept a compromise on the Berlin issue. According to another information file from the same service, dated 1 September 1961, the commandment of the Egerli Black Sea naval base was put on advanced alert and was ordered to present daily reports on the Black Sea coast situation to the Turkish navy staff in Ankara.¹⁸

On 8–9 September 1961, a separate meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense ministers was held for the first time in Warsaw. The Supreme Commander of the JAF, Marshal Andrei Grechko, delivered a report and ‘practical matters related to the improvement of the combat readiness of the troops comprising the Joint Armed Forces’ were discussed. Immediately after the delegation returned from Moscow, the Bulgarian Minister of Defense, Gen. Ivan Mihailov, addressed a report to the Communist leadership of the country on 15 September 1961, suggesting a number of measures for ‘improving the combat readiness of the Bulgarian People’s Army’. At a meeting held on 20 September, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) Politburo adopted a special resolution No. 230, ‘On the consolidation of the defense capabilities of the country’.¹⁹ This was a typical example of the decision-making process on military issues in East European countries: the Soviet military ‘recommendations’ were adopted immediately by the political leadership of each country and were forwarded further as directives or resolutions to the local armed forces commanders.

The Cuban missile crisis also had an indirect influence on the Balkans and the Mediterranean area. Just before the crisis started, from 15 to 19 October 1962, an operational and tactical Warsaw Pact exercise took place in Romania and Bulgaria and their contiguous Black Sea territorial waters. Marshal Grechko, Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, gave special emphasis to NATO Forces in the Balkans and the Mediterranean thus underlining the importance of the straits in NATO geostrategic planning as they lay at the crossroads of three continents, very close to the most important lines of communication in the Mediterranean.²⁰

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND WAR SCENARIOS

The issue of nuclear proliferation in Europe influenced directly the military planning and strategic thinking of the two Cold War blocs. This was clearly reflected in doctrinal concepts and war scenarios that for many years

took for granted the inevitability of a general nuclear war. The joint Soviet, Romanian, and Bulgarian armed forces exercise of June 1959 projected an initial NATO attack through Yambol and Burgas to Russe in the first two days of the war. The principal task of Bulgarian and Romanian forces was to organize an 'active defense' for holding back NATO forces until the deployment of the main Soviet forces.²¹ At the end of another joint exercise on Bulgarian territory in June 1961, the Warsaw Pact Supreme Commander Marshal Andrei Grechko underlined the importance of battle readiness for 'actions within the situation of radiation contamination of the region and the atmosphere'.²² In a discussion following that exercise, Marshal Ivan Bagramyan noted that, in case of massive nuclear war 'the medical losses within the first four days of the war in the Balkan war theater would exceed 12 per cent of the combat forces'.²³

The war scenario of the Warsaw Pact SOYUZ-63 exercise considered more specifically all possibilities for 'allied Air-Defense response to the massive enemy air and missile attacks'. According to Warsaw Pact military experts, NATO operations would be carried out by two initial air strikes with the use of 14 tactical ballistic missiles, 12 cruise missiles, and 1044 aircraft. The 'Northern' (Warsaw Pact) forces would respond with massive blows against 'the troops, airfields, means of communication, naval bases, administrative and industrial centers' of the 'enemy' in order to bring out Turkey and Greece from the war.²⁴ In most Warsaw Pact scenarios—as was the case of the largest joint exercise on Bulgarian territory, SHIELD-82—the principal task was 'the destruction of the missile and nuclear weapons of the enemy'. The Warsaw Pact Allied Command suggested that in the 'Balkans strategic direction' the Bulgarian armed forces should keep the enemy outside their territory for 3–12 hours until the Soviet air force could respond.

The framework and main dimensions of the Warsaw Pact multilateral coordination regarding reconnaissance and evaluation of NATO large-scale exercises is perfectly presented in the operational plan for 'interaction' regarding the then forthcoming WINTEX-75 exercise, signed during the Information & Radio Technical Intelligence departments' session in Sofia in January 1975. Bulgaria was assigned the task of reconnaissance of Greek and Turkish armed forces; Hungary of the Italian's; Czechoslovakia and the GDR of NATO armed forces in the Central European War Theater; Poland of NATO armed forces in Central and Northern European War Theaters; while the USSR was tasked to observe NATO Allied Commands in European, Atlantic, and English Channel (La Manche) War Theaters.

Major NATO communication centers were objects of electronic surveillance by the various East European military intelligence services: Bulgaria—transmitters in Izmir (Turkey) and Kato Souli (Greece); Hungary—Andrews Air Force Base in America; the German Democratic Republic (GDR)—the US base at Pirmasens in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); Poland—Karup Air base (Denmark); Czechoslovakia—Brunssum (the Netherlands) and Casteau (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Belgium); and the USSR—Torrejón Air Base (Spain) and Siebelbach Air Force Communication Station (Germany).²⁵

The Bulgarian and Hungarian military intelligence services focused on the regional South European and Mediterranean exercises, a substantial part of the AUTUMN FORGE series, like DAWN PATROL (first started in 1969, renamed in 1981 to DISTANT HAMMER); DEEP FURROW (started in 1969); DISPLAY DETERMINATION (a joint air force exercise, started in 1977); DETERRENT FORCE (a joint naval exercise), and ACTIVE EDGE (a joint air defense exercise, started in 1977). The pattern of monitoring activities was presented in an analytical report about the activity of Bulgarian military intelligence electronic units on reconnaissance at the WINTEX/CIMEX-79 strategic command and staff exercises (6–23 March 1979).²⁶ Thirty new electronic stations were deployed by a special Radio Technical Intelligence brigade for the monitoring of NATO winter exercises and 46 stations more by the three land forces Radio Technical Intelligence detachments and one Naval Radio Technical Intelligence unit. Thus, the number of the stations for radio and radar position finding was increased twice for that particular electronic reconnaissance operation.

During the WINTEX/CIMEX-79 exercises, 117 sources of NATO electronic communications were monitored, 80 of them newly recognized. In general, 946 messages were recorded, 515 of them from NATO and US command sources, the rest from Turkish and Greek military stations. About 150 of the recorded messages were sent in open texts, while some used ciphered messages and symbols, signals, and commands that had been deciphered in previous WINTEX exercises. The intelligence data acquired before and during the first phase of WINTEX-79 (a transition from peacetime to war with changes from military vigilance to reinforcement alert) enabled an understanding of the disposition of some NATO war-time control facilities in Southern Europe in messages sent by communications centers in Naples, Vicenza, Izmir, and Padua. In the second phase of the exercises (first defensive and then counteroffensive operations in the initial war period with/without use of tactical nuclear weapons), extensive

and various data were collected about the participating troops and staffs, areas of disposition, command points, control communications systems, and so on.

The first meeting of the PCC of the Warsaw Pact after Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power took place on 22–3 October 1985 in Sofia. It was a regular session, planned originally to be held on 15–16 January of that year,²⁷ but it had been postponed because of the illness and death of Gorbachev's predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko. Echoing the spirit of previous years, Gorbachev and the other East European leaders repeated the call for an 'offensive' against the 'aggressive imperialistic circles', for the neutralization of the US 'Strategic Defense Initiative' and the prevention of the 'disruption of the military parity' between the two blocs. However, a new orientation was given through talks for the improvement of the PCC's structure and operation. The organization adopted a general resolution for the establishment of a Multilateral Group for Current Mutual Information (MGCMI). Further proposals were introduced in the minutes with regard to a more active attitude toward 'human rights' issues and 'the new international economic order'.²⁸

In 1987 a latent confrontation regarding an ethnic issue emerged between two Warsaw Pact member states. At the fourteenth session of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA), held in Moscow on 24–5 March, Hungary sought for the first time to put forward at a multilateral meeting the issue of its ethnic minority in Transylvania, but the other participants refused to recognize any cultural differences between Romanians and Hungarians in the country. However, for the first time in the history of the Warsaw Pact, a bilateral conflict between member countries was made public. During the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in April 1987 Hungary raised the issue again, this time seeking also indirect support from the West.²⁹ Similarly to the Hungarian case, Bulgaria found no support from her East European allies, except from the USSR, when she raised a similar ethnic dispute with a NATO country, namely Turkey, about the Turkish minority in Bulgaria which the Bulgarian authorities presented as part of the 'imperialistic attack against Socialism'.

The Bulgarian government tried several times to win the support of her Warsaw Pact allies. The official Bulgarian position was also presented at regular multilateral meetings with Warsaw Pact ambassadors in Sofia. However, with the exception of Moscow and East Berlin, the other East European allies were unwilling to become part of an international dispute

regarding Bulgarian Turks. The BCP Central Committee for the party and state leadership of 10 June 1988 came to an important conclusion:

Up to now in various international institutions only the Soviet delegations (USSR, Belarus, and Ukraine) supported Bulgaria, usually to counteract the USA interference in favor of Turkey. Despite our efforts at different levels, the other socialist countries do not manifest any wish to support our cause at the international forums. The attitude toward the 'revival process' varied and depends on the state of the relations of each one country with Turkey.³⁰

In June 1987, the Bulgarian leadership adopted a resolution on the new Warsaw Pact defense doctrine, which introduced the principle of 'reasonable sufficiency'.³¹ Several months later, Todor Zhivkov insisted at a meeting with Gorbachev in the Kremlin on 16 October 1987 that, in view of the position of Turkey, the defense doctrine should be revised regarding NATO's southern flank, especially the strategic position of the Balkans. This position reflected the argumentation presented in special reports of the Bulgarian Foreign and Defense Ministries on 15 September 1987: Bulgaria's interests required that the whole territory of Turkey should be included in the zone, whose boundaries were subject to negotiations for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms.³² A report by the Foreign Minister Petar Mladenov on 2 February 1989 favored the Bulgarian position:

Our specific responsibilities for the WTO Southern flank determine in our approach an accounting for the considerable exclusions of the Turkish territories and forces, the non-participation of the SFR [Socialist Federal Republic] of Yugoslavia in the negotiations and the eventual reductions, the inclination of the SR [Socialist Republic] of Romania towards quick and unilateral reductions as well as the consideration of the circumstance that on the Balkans the dynamics of the military effort depends not only on the East-West relations but also on the armament race between Greece and Turkey. At the same time our economic interests do not permit us to let the Balkans lag behind in the general processes and eventual limitations and reduction of Armed forces, weapons and defense expenses.³³

Despite repeated diplomatic efforts, Bulgaria found no support among her East European partners, except for the USSR. Until the conclusion of the Vienna talks, all steps taken were the result of regular consultations and agreement between the Headquarters and the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE WARSAW PACT

In the dramatic year 1989 two contradictory tendencies divided the members of the Pact, obvious as early as April at the eighteenth CMFA conference in Berlin. Romania and the GDR attacked Moscow and the rest more and more openly for 'concessions to the West' and for producing an inner crisis in the 'socialistic system'.³⁴ In contrast to that, Hungary and Poland insisted on a non-confrontational and 'non-bloc' approach as well as for radical reform of the political system, including the adoption of a pluralistic parliamentary democracy, something unthinkable until that time. Zhivkov, the doyen of the East European communist rulers, positioned himself in a manner that was reminiscent, to a certain extent, of his behavior during the Czech and Polish crises (in 1968 and 1980–1, respectively).³⁵ Officially, he appeared rather moderate, publicly praising Perestroika and Glasnost policies, but privately he criticized the 'unacceptable concessions' and 'power surrender'. In view of the ever growing differences between the WTO member states, Mikhail Gorbachev insisted to both West as well as East European leaders that the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' was irreversibly rejected, a position he also repeated to Zhivkov on 23 June 1989 in Moscow during his last meeting with the Bulgarian leader.³⁶

On 22 August 1989 Zhivkov prepared a special secret memo for the Politburo with the title 'Considerations on the situation in Poland'. Polish communists were criticized several times for 'losing power' although they held in their hands the presidency, the armed forces, and the police. At the end of his memo Zhivkov summarized as follows:

The Polish phenomenon, if it can be called so, has national as well as international dimensions. Its reverberation is extremely strong in all ends of the Globe. The resonance is of particular significance in the world of socialism. Depending on the outcome of the situation in Poland—that obviously should be a concern and a responsibility of all brotherly parties.³⁷

The radical changes that took place in East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia three months later and the bloody strike in Romania ultimately transformed the political map of Eastern Europe putting most sharply in question the future of the ex-communist military and political alliance. On the eve of the regular PCC meeting in Moscow in June 1990 the Czechoslovak delegation presented several radical proposals: the termination of the expert group activities; the re-naming of the Committee

of Defense Ministers into 'Military Committee'; and the reorganization of the Allied Armed Forces Headquarters in the sense that 'the obligations toward the Alliance are fulfilled exclusively through the defense of one's own national territory'. At the last stages of the Vienna negotiations on arms reduction in Europe (July–November 1990) visible differences between Central European and Balkan allies emerged. They mostly concerned the extent of the envisaged reduction in numbers and national proportions. For the first time in the Warsaw Pact history, this matter produced differences between Soviet and Bulgarian positions.³⁸

The PCC meeting in Moscow adopted an important resolution for the establishment of a 'Temporary Governmental Plenipotentiary Representatives Commission for the Reconsideration of all aspects of the Warsaw Pact activities'. The first session of the new 'Temporary Commission' took place in Czechoslovakia on 15–17 July 1990. Most delegations agreed that military functions should be gradually integrated into a future all-European security system. Only the Hungarian position suggested more radical measures, including the termination of the Warsaw Pact itself in the near future. Delegations from the USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania, however, insisted on transforming the organization into a 'treaty of sovereign states with equal rights' while Poland proposed a 'treaty of a collective system with purely consultative functions'. At the next Group session on 18–19 September 1990 in Sofia the position of the three Central European countries was transformed into a final proposal for the overall liquidation of the military structures of the Pact.³⁹

In late September 1990 the Hungarian government suggested that an extraordinary PCC meeting should take place on 4 November for the purpose of transforming the WTO into a strictly political organization. During the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and the Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in late November 1990 in Paris, the PCC meeting was finally scheduled for the end of February 1991. Later, Gorbachev informed Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev of an agreement among the allies to draw up a resolution in that month 'for the dissolution of the military structures of the Pact by the 1st of April 1991'.

On 25 February 1991 a 'Protocol for the termination of the defense agreements concluded within the Warsaw Pact and liquidation of its military bodies and structures' was agreed in Budapest. According to the resolution, on 31 March 1991 the activities of the Committee of Defense Ministers would be terminated just like those of the Unified Command of the Joint Armed Forces, the WTO Military Council, the Headquarters of

the Technical Committee, and the Unified System of the Air Defense. The military treaties of 14 May 1955, 17 March 1969, and 18 March 1980 were canceled.⁴⁰

On 17 May 1991 the Czech President Václav Havel addressed an official invitation to his East European colleagues to carry out the Czech proposal of February, namely to hold a concluding PCC meeting on 1 July 1991 in Prague with the purpose of signing a joint protocol for the termination of the activities of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Indeed, on the agreed date, 1st July 1991, after 36 years of existence, the East European military-political alliance was terminated. In their official speeches addressing this last PCC session, the leaders of the six member countries of the Pact did not miss the opportunity to judge the alliance in the light of history, each one offering his own evaluation. The Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev spoke first, pointing out that

The non-democratic model of unequal mutual relations on which the Alliance was founded, its predominant military orientation, and accumulating for decades burdens as a result of unlawful and regretful actions, brought about the present and logical natural end.

The Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall exclaimed: 'Gone is the Cold War legacy which brings back sad memories' and added that with the dissolution of the Pact the aims of the 'Hungarian Revolution of 1956' were fulfilled. After him the Romanian President Ion Iliescu stated with emotion: 'In 1968 we were against coming here but now we are pleased to arrive'. The Soviet Vice-President, Georgii Yanaev, who 50 days later became a key figure in the unsuccessful coup that brought about the disintegration of the USSR itself, was the only one who gave a different appraisal of the WTO activities and decisions: 'The Warsaw Pact was a child of its Era, it served to guarantee the security of the member states, playing the part of an instrument for the maintaining of the "military and strategic balance". The years in which the Warsaw Pact existed were years of peace in Europe.' At the end of the discussion the participants of the WTO's last meeting agreed with the words of the Bulgarian President Dr. Zhelev: 'Let us leave the History to make its impartial evaluation'.⁴¹

The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was not 'an immediate response to the creation of NATO', as it was often declared by the Warsaw Pact propaganda announcements. It was, rather, used to subordinate the smaller East European countries to the Kremlin's aims

and policies in the post-Stalin era. However, the bi-polar confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO determined for many years the fragile Cold War model of the *balance of terror*. The arms race that culminated between the two global military blocs in the last three Cold War decades contributed in some way to the breakup of the East European economies, which resulted in the collapse of the communist regimes.

NOTES

1. Most of those collections can be viewed online at the Cold War International History Project site in Washington, DC—<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project>, and Parallel History Pact on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (currently PHP on Cooperative Security) site in Zurich—<http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/>.
2. The author's first monograph on the matter was published in 1995—*Cold War Military and Political Conflicts and Bulgaria*—the last one, in 2010—*European Security System and the Balkans in the Cold War Years*. Several publications stressed especially the specifics of Bulgarian–Romanian relations within the Warsaw Pact framework and Todor Zhivkov's role as a 'mediator' between Bucharest and Moscow: Jordan Baev, 'The Warsaw Pact and the Southern Tier's Conflicts, 1959–1969', in *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intra-bloc Conflicts*, eds. Ann Mary Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 2008); Jordan Baev and Kostadin Grozev, 'Bulgaria, Balkan Diplomacy, and the Road to Helsinki', in *The CSCE 1975 and the Transformation of Europe*, eds. Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008). An encyclopedic article was also published in 2008—Jordan Baev, 'Warsaw Pact', in *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, ed. Ruud van Dijk (New York: MTM/London: Routledge, 2008), 2: 960–2.
3. With a special secret resolution of the Bulgarian leadership, Prime Minister Valko Chervenkov and Defense Minister Gen. Petar Panchevski were appointed as national representatives at the 'Coordination Committee': Sofia, Central State Archive (TsDA), Fond 1-B, Opis 64, A.E. 124.
4. Veliko Tarnovo, State Military Historical Archive (DVIA), Fond 1, Opis 3, A.E. 17, 8.

5. Vojtech Mastny, 'We Are in a Bind. Polish and Czechoslovak Attempts at Reforming the Warsaw Pact, 1956–1969', *CWIHP Bulletin*, 11 (1998): 230.
6. DVIA, Fond 1, Opis 3, A.E. 17, 154.
7. Col.-Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev has been the longest ever Chief of General Staff of an East European Army—from March 1962 to December 1989. In early 1990 he served also as Minister of the Interior, and between July 1990 and January 1992 he was a Vice-President of Bulgaria.
8. Atanas Semerdzhiev, *Prezhivianoto ne podlezhì na obzhalvane* [There is no appeal for the survived years], (Sofia: Hristo Botev Publishing House, 1999), 171.
9. Sofia, Diplomatic Archive (DA), Opis 7-P, A.E. 602.
10. Sofia, Commission of State Security Dossiers Centralized Archive (COMDOS), Records 'M', Fond 1, Opis 5, A.E. 152. As is well known, Albania rejected the invitations to attend such multilateral security meetings in February 1961, and Romania, in May 1964.
11. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 64, A.E. 210.
12. Mathias Uhl and Vladimir Ivkin, 'Operation "ATOM", in The Soviet Union's Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the GDR', *CWIHP Bulletin*, 12/13 (2001): 299–308; Mathias Uhl, *Krieg um Berlin?* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008).
13. Washington, DC, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, *Dmitrii Volkogonov Papers*, Reel 17. Cited for the first time in David Wolf, 'New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–59', *CWIHP Working Paper* (Washington, DC), no. 30 (August 2000), 57.
14. DVIA, Fond 1, Opis 2, A.E. 75: 155, 171, 176–7.
15. DVIA, Fond 1, Opis 2, A.E. 74: 213.
16. Washington, DC, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), RG 218, Geographic File, 1958, Box 12; RG 263, Entry 29, Box 11; RG 319, Boxes 1155–6, File 950 871.
17. Dimitar Todorov, *Ракетните войски на България* [Bulgarian Missile Troops] (Sofia: Air Group 2000 Publishing House, 2007), 306, 351. More on the subject in Jordan Baev, 'Nuclear Proliferation in the Balkans', *Etudes Balkaniques*, XLVII, nos. 2–3 (2011): 22–50.
18. COMDOS, Records 'M', Fond 1, Opis 10, A.E. 73: 29, 77–8.
19. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 6, A.E. 4581: 1–31.

20. *Vojensky Historicky Archiv*, Praha, MNO-1963, 65/65, sf. 17/1. More on the subject in Jordan Baev, 'Bulgaria and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *CWIHP Bulletin*, 17–18 (2012): 522–34.
21. DVIA, Fond 24, Opis 2, a.e. 4: 101–6.
22. DVIA, Fond 22, Opis 8a, A.E. 8: 34.
23. DVIA, Fond 22, Opis 8a, A.E. 8: 180.
24. DVIA, Fond 22, Opis 8a, A.E. 17: 78–9.
25. COMDOS, Records 'VR', Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1069: 106–9.
26. COMDOS, Records 'VR', Fond 23, Opis 01288, A.E. 1119: 196–205. In new information immediately after the end of WINTEX-79, it was noticed that for the first time since 1973 joint communications between Greek and Turkish armed forces had been monitored—reliable evidence for the return of Greece into NATO military activities.
27. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 66, A.E. 1025: 1–3.
28. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 1025.
29. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 2805: 3591. Some Western analysts even discussed a year later the probability of eventual military clashes between Romania and Hungary: Budapest, Open Society Archive (OSA), Fond 300, Subfond 8, Series 3 (Radio Free Europe Background Reports), Box 120, Folder 4, RAD Background Report, no. 130, 27 July 1989—Douglas Clarke, 'The Romanian Military Threat to Hungary', 1–8.
30. 'Възродителният процес': Международни измерения. 1984–1989 [*The Revival Process: International Dimensions, 1984–1989*], vol. II (Sofia, 2010), 582–3.
31. A somewhat flexible definition relating to balances of power between individual countries or power blocs. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 2971; DA, Opis 57-P, A.E. 187.
32. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 3247: 1–5; A.E. 3475a : 1–4.
33. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 5591: 5–6.
34. In a memo on Foreign Ministers' talks in East Berlin, Petar Mladenov noted that for the first time in the twelve years of CMFA history, a host country's representatives [GDR] from the beginning adopted a 'specific, reserved approach' in regard to the international situation. Mladenov suggested a presumption that there were confidential contacts between the GDR and Romanian leaders in advance for coordination of a common position against the

process of Perestroika: TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 35, A.E. 3649. Mladenov's supposition was true. Even on 30 March 1989 Nicolae Ceausescu raised a question about the 'contradictory processes in Hungary and Poland' before the East German leadership. In a response the East Germans shared 'the same concern': Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR in Bundesarchiv [*SAPMO-BA*], Berlin, IV Z/2035/52.

35. Jordan Baev, 'Bulgaria and the Political Crises in Czechoslovakia and Poland', *CWIHP Bulletin*, 11 (1998): 96–101.
36. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 3698.
37. TsDA, Fond 1-B, Opis 68, A.E. 3735a: 21.
38. DA, Opis 47-10, A.E. 32: 17–19, 39–41; A.E. 44: 18–23.
39. DA, Opis 47-10, A.E. 34: 32–5.
40. DA, Opis 47-10, A.E. 27: 8, 18–19.
41. DA, Opis 48-10, A.E. 38: 68–104.

PART III

Uneasy Relations with the
Superpowers

The Balkan Challenge to the Warsaw Pact, 1960–64

Laurien Crump

Stigmatized as a ‘cardboard castle’ on its foundation in May 1955 the Warsaw Pact (WP) suddenly came to life in early 1961.¹ In the shadow of the incipient Sino-Soviet split the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha was the first to explore the scope for manoeuvre within an alliance under pressure. His attempts to stretch the limits of the WP created an example for Romanian dissidence. They also paved the way for the multilateralization of an alliance that has conventionally been considered a Soviet ‘transmission belt’ with ‘little sense of mutual interest’.² Despite a growing awareness among scholars that ‘NATO as a multilateral forum offered small member states the opportunity to make their influence felt in a significant way that put to test the alliance’s major powers’ during its crisis in the 1960s,³ the multilateralization of the WP tends to be overlooked in historiography.

This chapter addresses this hiatus by using a wealth of recently declassified material from the archives in Bucharest and Berlin to examine the effect of Albanian and Romanian dissent on the WP’s development from a

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cardboard castle to an increasingly multilateral alliance.⁴ During the early 1960s intra-bloc dynamics began to undermine Soviet initiatives. This culminated in a meeting of deputy foreign ministers in December 1964, convened by the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members, in which multilateral dynamics eclipsed the appearance of unity. An analysis of the Balkan challenge to the WP in the first half of the 1960s thus contributes to a new understanding of Cold War history, and, consequently, of the Cold War at large.⁵

THE ALLIANCE AS AN EMPTY SHELL

The first five years of the WP's existence seem to vindicate its cursory treatment in historiography. Founded in May 1955 as a reaction to the FRG's accession to NATO, the WP was indeed a Soviet brainchild. Conceived at a time of peaceful coexistence, the alliance did not primarily serve the usual purpose of heightening the security of its allies. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev intended to trade it instead for the dissolution of NATO and to replace the two with a European Security System under Soviet tutelage.⁶ The Warsaw Treaty was hastily modelled after the North Atlantic Treaty, with 'friendship' substituted for 'equality', but otherwise almost identical.⁷ The alliance's only official organ was the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), which generally consisted of the party leaders, the prime ministers, the ministers of foreign affairs and of defence. Unlike NATO, the WP had neither a secretary-general, nor a secretariat, thus lacking a solid infrastructure.

Failing to dissolve NATO, Khrushchev quickly lost interest in the WP, which was only convened three times in five years to rubber-stamp Soviet directives. It played no role as an institution in such important events in the Soviet bloc as the Hungarian revolution in 1956. Khrushchev bilaterally consulted several Eastern European leaders just before the second Soviet invasion on 4 November 1956, but he did not use the multilateral framework of the Warsaw Pact. Nor did Hungary's withdrawal from the WP trigger the second invasion, as is often assumed.⁸ The declaration of neutrality by the Hungarian communist leader Imre Nagy constituted, instead, a desperate attempt to gain support from the United Nations when he realized that Soviet troops were entering Hungary again.⁹

The fact that the WP was initially an empty shell provided the smaller allies with unforeseen opportunities to define the alliance according to their own interests. The most geopolitically insecure countries within the

WP, Albania and the GDR, were the first to explore the possibilities of the WP to boost the status of their own country. Although the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha initially regarded the alliance as a safety-valve against potential Yugoslavian irredentism, the WP lost its appeal to the Albanians when Khrushchev succeeded in mending relations with the Yugoslav leader Josip Tito in June 1956.¹⁰ Regarding Khrushchev's rapprochement with Yugoslavia a threat to its own existence, and considering de-Stalinization a threat to its personality cult, the Albanian leadership grew increasingly critical of its Soviet ally.¹¹

The same applied to the Chinese leader Mao Zedong, whose radicalization at home and abroad was at loggerheads with Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States.¹² The Chinese leadership used the PCC meeting in February 1960 to openly criticize the 'revisionism (...) in the present communist movement', while Khrushchev compared Mao with 'a worn-out rubber boot' at the ensuing banquet in turn.¹³ This Sino-Soviet antagonism intensified with the Chinese publication of the so-called 'Lenin Polemics' in April 1960, in which Mao challenged Khrushchev's leadership of the communist movement, and Khrushchev's open condemnation of Chinese policies during the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party in Bucharest in June 1960. The burgeoning Sino-Soviet split provided Hoxha with an alternative source of protection. The Albanian leadership accordingly decided to explicitly side with China during the Moscow conference of communist parties in November 1960, while suggesting a convention of the WP in bilateral talks with the Soviet leaders in order to solve a dispute about the Soviet naval base at Vlorë.¹⁴ This was the only aspect that physically tied Albania to the alliance, since Albania did not share any borders with WP countries, and the Albanians used their complaints about the Soviet treatment of Albanian sailors at Vlorë as a pretext to question Soviet hegemony in general and to rally other WP members against the Kremlin.

Moreover, during his speech at the Moscow conference, Hoxha was the only NSWP leader to treat the WP as an instrument to undermine the Kremlin by arguing that the Soviet leaders had transgressed the provisions of their own treaty by not convening the WP during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, while consulting with the 'traitor of Marxism Leninism', Tito, instead.¹⁵ Albanian leaders were accordingly the first to suggest the convention of a PCC meeting, as well as criticizing the Soviet stance in the WP. As the communist movement was beginning to fall apart

due to the incipient Sino-Soviet split, the Albanians had subtly shifted the emphasis to the hitherto latent WP.

Despite profound disagreements, the Moscow conference resulted in a common declaration, later known as the 'Moscow Declaration', which fine-tuned the Declaration of communist parties from 1957, and repeatedly stressed the fact that all communist parties were 'sovereign' and 'independent', and had 'equal rights'.¹⁶ Although this declaration primarily reflected a Chinese attempt to establish China as the equal of the Soviet Union (SU) and a Soviet attempt to mend matters with the Chinese, its contents would come to haunt the Kremlin in the future. Meanwhile, Hoxha would explore the scope for manoeuvre, which the Sino-Soviet disagreements had created, to the full.

THE ALBANIAN CHALLENGE

The period after the Moscow conference marked a new course in Albanian foreign policy, which heralded a further deterioration in Soviet-Albanian relations. The Albanian leaders were actively engaging in talks with the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in order to define their position vis-à-vis the 'revisionist' Khrushchev. Zhou Enlai emphasized that Albania was a member of the WP, and that it therefore would be 'inappropriate for us to interfere in this [military aid] matter'.¹⁷ The Albanian leaders nevertheless seemed quite ready to force a break with the Kremlin, and used their fourth party conference on 13 February 1961, to which they had invited all communist parties, to explicitly formulate their autonomous stance and undermine the Soviet leaders.

During this conference the Albanian leadership declared itself instead of the Kremlin 'the vanguard' of the communist movement, claimed that the Albanians and the Chinese had 'determined and ensured the Marxist-Leninist contents of the [Moscow] declaration', and blamed Moscow for 'threatening' the 'independence and sovereignty of Albania'.¹⁸ Moreover, Hoxha announced a foiled (and fictitious) invasion by Yugoslavia, Greece and the American Sixth Fleet to consolidate his power by creating a 'psy-chosis of war' in Albania, and to take control of Soviet warships in the WP naval base at Vlorë.¹⁹ The Albanian conference was accordingly a turning point in Albanian foreign policy, in which the Albanians sealed their break with the SU in favour of China and tried to use the WP naval base for their own purposes. The Albanians were, as such, the first public dissidents within the WP.

A month after the Albanian party conference, in March 1961, a PCC meeting was convened in Moscow, which *inter alia* dealt with the Soviet–Albanian dispute. This provided the Albanian party leadership with the opportunity to use the WP as a platform to further assert their autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow. The Soviet–Albanian split and the disintegration of the international communist movement thus spilled over into the WP at Albanian initiative. At this meeting the Albanians intended to use the WP as an instrument to undermine Soviet hegemony. In anticipation of a triumphant denouement of the PCC meeting, the Albanian leadership had invited the entire Diplomatic Corps and all foreign correspondents to a big press conference in Tirana before setting out to Moscow.²⁰

The Albanian leaders had, however, miscalculated. Their self-proclaimed status as the vanguard of the communist movement during the party conference had antagonized their allies, who considered the Albanian self-glorification and Soviet-bashing exaggerated. During the PCC meeting, the other NSWP members did not turn against the Soviet leadership, but against the Albanian leaders, who had also failed to inform their allies of the alleged plot by Greece, Yugoslavia and the American Sixth Fleet. This was a violation of article 3 of the Warsaw Treaty, according to which all members should keep one another informed of potential threats to their sovereignty. The Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, was particularly vexed about the Albanian move, which he considered ‘incompatible with the Warsaw Treaty’.²¹ Since Bulgaria also shared a border with Greece, a NATO country, the alleged plot would pose a serious threat to Bulgarian security. On Zhivkov’s initiative the other WP members unanimously decided to sanction the Albanian leadership by withdrawing the Soviet fleet from Vlorë, unless the Albanians improved the situation.²² The Warsaw Treaty, a mere effigy of its North Atlantic counterpart, suddenly acquired a power of its own and was used to discipline one of its members. The NSWP members would continue to explore the inadvertent power of the Warsaw Treaty in future. The treaty was, as such, no longer a Soviet transmission belt, but it evolved into an instrument that the NSWP members could use for their own benefit.

Meanwhile, the WP had provided the Albanian leadership with a platform for its critique of Soviet hegemony. The Albanian leadership had, however, been so unsuccessful in rallying support from the other NSWP members that it kept its return to Tirana secret—in contrast to its departure. The Albanians chose to consolidate their relations with an ally *outside* the WP *after* their failed attempt to gain support against the SU *within* the

WP: the Albanian contacts with China tripled in the period directly *after* the PCC meeting.²³ Although the ‘Albanian problem’, as it came to be called, was kept silent both in the Albanian press and in the communiqué that was issued after the meeting, it featured all the more in the correspondence that the Albanian leadership initiated by complaining about the WP decision to withdraw the Soviet fleet from Vlorë.²⁴

The Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu criticised WP members for assuming ‘that Albania had practically placed itself outside the Warsaw Pact through its politics’, and complained that ‘this attitude, unprecedented in the relation between sovereign states, represents an impermissible interference in our internal affairs’, thus once again echoing the Moscow Declaration.²⁵ However much his allies disagreed with Shehu’s complaints, the rhetoric concerning his stance in the WP would inspire the Romanian leadership a couple of years later. Moreover, the Albanian leaders had antagonized their allies by suggesting that the sanction concerning Vlorë was a ‘unilateral decision of the Soviet Union’, which was refuted by all NSWP leaders, and regarded as ‘an insult’ by the Romanian leadership, who used it to assert their ‘independence’.²⁶ By emphasizing that the sanction was *not* a Soviet decision, but a WP decision, the NSWP leaders made a clear distinction between the WP and the SU, which is often overlooked within historiography.²⁷

Although it may be tempting to attribute the NSWP response to Soviet pressure instead, the empirical evidence points in another direction—Soviet annoyance at the fact that the Hungarians were the first to reply to the Albanian letter, and internal memoranda between party leaders and their ministers about whether to reply to the Albanian letters or not suggest that the Kremlin had no control over the correspondence.²⁸ On the contrary: the correspondence inadvertently served to liberate the NSWP members from potential Soviet pressure.

The correspondence about the Albanian problem was the ideal vehicle for the NSWP members to formulate their own stance within the WP, and to underline their autonomy. Since it was an issue that directly concerned the alliance and the decision-making within it, NSWP leaders felt at liberty to define the scope for manoeuvre within a pact that, at least in theory, belonged to them as much as to the SU. This theory now acquired a force of its own. By denying the Albanian charge of Soviet pressure, the NSWP members did not do the Kremlin an unambiguous favour, since they implicitly also denied Soviet hegemony. It was this correspondence, rather than the Albanian attitude at the meeting, that effectively served to

multilateralize the alliance, since there was no scope for Soviet unilateralism in a dynamics that was beyond Soviet control. The Albanian leadership had inadvertently contributed to the effort of the other NSWP leaders to emancipate, instead of emancipating themselves. Moreover, by using the WP as a platform to determine the Soviet–Albanian clash, which mirrored the incipient Sino–Soviet split, the Albanians had imbued the alliance with new importance: it had now become the prime arena for the NSWP leaders to explore their scope for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Soviet leadership.

THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP

Hoxha continued his outright humiliation of the Warsaw Pact by refusing to turn up at the meeting of WP first secretaries, which was convened from 3 to 5 August 1961 in Moscow for the endorsement of the closure of the inner Berlin borders—a euphemism for the construction of the Berlin Wall.²⁹ Even the correspondence had been delegated to a junior secretary, Hysni Kapo, who explained that Hoxha could not participate ‘due to health-related reasons’, but that the Albanian leadership would like to have materials to prepare for the meeting.³⁰ This time the Albanians had gone too far in exploring the scope for manoeuvre: during the meeting the East German leader Walter Ulbricht proposed to exclude the Albanian delegation, since it had only sent a junior secretary.³¹ All other first secretaries supported this measure, and the Albanian delegates were asked to leave.³² The dispute between two NSWP members sealed the end of Soviet control. Instead of being disciplined by the Kremlin, the NSWP members increasingly disciplined one another.

The Chinese observers nevertheless strongly opposed Ulbricht’s motion, and thus the Sino–Soviet split once more spilled over into the WP.³³ Albanian defiance was such that the Albanian delegation displayed ‘not the slightest intention to leave’, stayed at the banquet ‘in order to continue the work against the general will’, and managed to postpone the discussion about the closing of the intra-Berlin borders until the next day, when the Kremlin’s security guards blocked its entrance.³⁴ The fact that the Albanian leadership had already bought a return ticket scheduled for departure on 4 August—one day before the end of the meeting—indicates that the sabotage of the convention was premeditated.³⁵ The Albanian leadership nevertheless retaliated by keeping both the meeting and the WP declaration about the closing of the inner Berlin borders secret, publishing their own declaration instead, much to East German chagrin.³⁶

Moreover, Hoxha complained to the Soviet leadership a month later that '[t]he organisers of this unprecedented measure, which should in fact place the Albanian People's Republic outside the Warsaw Treaty, have put a great responsibility upon themselves as splitters of the unity of the Warsaw Treaty and of the socialist camp.'³⁷ The Albanian complaint was to no avail, since Ulbricht's proposal heralded a period in which the Albanians were not allowed to attend any PCC meetings unless they sent their party leader. The Albanian attempt to explore the room for manoeuvre *within* the WP resulted in being placed *outside* it. The Albanian leaders thus failed to reap the fruits of the burgeoning multilateralization of the alliance, to which they had contributed themselves.

The Albanian leadership had, nevertheless, reiterated the emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs from the Moscow Declaration within the WP, while formulating several issues that would come to haunt Soviet leadership in the future, such as the request for materials in preparation for the meeting, the invocation of the Warsaw Treaty in defence of its own stance, and the issuing of separate declarations in case of disagreements; all of these paved the way for the more successful emancipation of the Romanian leadership a couple of years later. By that time the Albanian 'front had indeed spilled over to Romania', as the Polish politburo member Zenon Kliszko perceptively remarked, turning Albania into 'the Achilles heel of the socialist camp'.³⁸

SINO-ROMANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

The Romanian leaders still sided with other WP members in their condemnation of both the Chinese and the Albanian course throughout 1960 and 1961. The Soviet attempt to create a kind of 'common market' with an international division of labour within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which would reduce Romania to the mere provider of raw materials, nevertheless impelled the Romanians to turn against the Kremlin during a COMECON meeting in December 1961.³⁹ The Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej therefore grew particularly interested in repeated Chinese references to the Moscow Declaration and their emphasis on sovereignty, independence and non-interference in the voluminous Chinese correspondence with the Soviet leadership. The Soviet solo course during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 also united the Romanian and Chinese leaders in their severe condemnation of Soviet unilateralism.

It is remarkable that the Romanian leaders only began to concentrate on the principles of ‘sovereignty and national independence’ enshrined in the Moscow Declaration, after the Chinese had repeatedly emphasized these. The Chinese attitude towards the Kremlin was, in fact, a still greater eye-opener to the Romanian leadership in their criticism of the Kremlin than the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁴⁰ In a meeting with the Soviet politburo member Yuri Andropov in early April 1963 in Bucharest, the attitude of the Romanian leaders echoed the Chinese one. Referring to ‘the extraordinarily important problem of sovereignty’ and to other parts from the Moscow Declaration, Gheorghiu-Dej justified Romanian disagreement with ‘the idea of a single planning organ’ within COMECON, and professed his willingness to attempt to mend the Sino–Soviet split.⁴¹ The Chinese leadership was in turn so impressed with the Romanian defiance of the Kremlin that it took the initiative in improving Sino–Romanian relations at the end of April 1963.⁴² Mutual interest in sovereignty had begun to forge a bond between the Chinese and Romanian leaders.

Sino–Romanian rapprochement stimulated the Romanian leadership to turn against the Kremlin within the context of the WP. Although Khrushchev asked his allies not to ‘disclose the divergences’, but to concentrate on the ‘friendship between Romania and the Soviet Union’, Gheorghiu-Dej told his Romanian comrades that ‘we are in a favourable situation (...), since the principal problem which gnaws at [Khrushchev] is the problem with the Chinese’.⁴³ During a PCC meeting in July 1963, which Khrushchev had convened in order to discuss the potential accession of Mongolia, the Romanian delegation was the only one to openly disagree with the Soviet proposal, even though the Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka had also formulated objections beforehand.⁴⁴ The Romanian leadership considered Mongolian admission inopportune, since the inclusion of an Asian member in the WP would turn the alliance against China.⁴⁵ Khrushchev ultimately decided to shelve the issue, which the Romanian leadership would regularly use as evidence that it had single-handedly prevented an escalation of the Sino–Soviet split.⁴⁶ The newly forged Sino–Romanian bond thus immediately paid off: by defending Chinese interests within the alliance, the Romanians had increased their own leverage over the SU by unprecedentedly using the WP to thwart a Soviet initiative. The meeting in July 1963 marked a reorientation in Romanian foreign policy, which also shows in the trade agreements that it concluded with *inter alia* Albania and China in the same year.⁴⁷

THE ROMANIAN ROAD TO 'INDEPENDENCE'

The Warsaw Pact, meanwhile, was accorded scant attention. It was therefore no surprise that the Romanian leaders undermined Khrushchev's proposal for 'more systematic consultations' on foreign policy in January 1964. They had considered this contrary to 'each country's indisputable sovereign right' to establish its own foreign policy.⁴⁸ They also undermined Ulbricht's attempt to convene a PCC meeting on 19 March 1964 on disarmament, which they considered a further attempt at foreign policy coordination.⁴⁹ The Czechoslovak suggestion to put 'the destructive activity of the PR China' on the agenda might have antagonized the Romanians, too,⁵⁰ and they told Khrushchev that April was not suitable, instead of replying to Ulbricht.⁵¹ Greatly offended, Ulbricht refused to comply with Khrushchev's request to propose a different date,⁵² and waited for a personal response from Gheorgiu-Dej, who ultimately, at the end of March, replied that April was simply impossible.⁵³ In April the Romanian leaders were far too busy with asserting their own independence, as we shall see below.

Meanwhile, the Romanian leaders used this opportunity to play the Kremlin and the East German leadership off against each other by writing Khrushchev that they only considered attending a PCC meeting if they could receive all the relevant materials beforehand to prepare for the meeting, thus echoing the Albanian request three years earlier. Khrushchev duly replied that '[s]ince the initiative for the convention of this meeting arose not from the CC of the CPSU, it is self-evident that we have no obligation to prepare documents for this meeting'.⁵⁴ The meeting, and its failure, had now become the sole responsibility of the East German leadership. Ulbricht had been outwitted by the Romanians, who firmly opposed his attempt to use the WP as a transmission belt for his own foreign policy interests.⁵⁵

Ignoring Ulbricht's increasingly desperate letters, the Romanians concentrated on a voluminous correspondence with the Soviet and Chinese leaders instead, trying to mend matters in the increasingly aggressive Chinese polemics that further aggravated the Sino-Soviet split. In a letter on 20 February 1964, a week after the East German attempt to convene a PCC meeting, the Romanian leadership asked the Soviet leadership not to publicise its criticism of the Chinese, and the Chinese leadership to stop the open polemics. The Romanians also sent the letter to all WP leaders, which left the Kremlin with little alternative but to comply. The

Chinese leadership made its stance dependent on a visit of a Romanian delegation to China, which it subsequently used to incite the Romanian delegates against their Soviet allies. The Chinese delegation even compelled the Romanians to practise self-criticism concerning their previous condemnation of Albania and China, and convinced them ‘that relations between socialist countries should be based on the principles of equality and non-interference in domestic affairs’, as consolidated in the 1960 Moscow declaration.⁵⁶ The Romanian visit to Beijing ironically increased Romanian–Soviet tensions instead of decreasing Sino–Soviet ones; the Chinese even intensified the polemics after the Romanian visit.⁵⁷

The Kremlin, meanwhile, seemed to be under such pressure from the Sino–Soviet split that it was willing to interpret the Romanian strategy charitably. Although the Soviet diplomat Iljuchin considered ‘the chances of success for the Romanian move slim’, he emphasized in a conversation with the East German leadership that ‘the Romanian attempt to stop the dangerous development should be highly esteemed’.⁵⁸ Soviet approval inspired the Romanians to take even more initiative, and in a letter to Khrushchev on 25 March 1964, when Ulbricht was still waiting impatiently for a Romanian reply, Gheorgiu-Dej even suggested that the Soviet, Chinese and Romanian communist parties ‘would direct a common appeal in order to cease the open polemics to all communist and worker parties’.⁵⁹ Thus the Romanian leadership indirectly placed itself on a level with the Soviets and the Chinese, while clearly prioritizing the communist movement over the WP. By riddling the draft of the appeal with such principles as non-interference, independence and national sovereignty, the Romanian leadership used the Moscow declaration to emphasize its own stance within the communist bloc.⁶⁰ The Kremlin again supported the Romanian suggestion, eager not to antagonize any of its WP allies during the Sino–Soviet split.

On a superficial level the Romanian endeavour had failed: their appeal for unity had been completely undermined by their counterproductive visit to Beijing. On a more important level the Romanians—who shared the Soviet view that the Chinese were never going to ‘capitulate’ anyhow—had nevertheless been very successful indeed:⁶¹ their attempts at mediation in the Sino–Soviet split had elevated them above their WP comrades, which had facilitated their opposition to Ulbricht’s attempts to convene the alliance. Moreover, as the politburo member Vasilichi Gheorghe put it, ‘the most important result of this action from our party is that (...)’

we have all become shrewder at the end of this action, so to speak, we know the matters much more than we knew them before'.⁶²

In addition, the Romanian 'mediation' had given such a boost to Sino-Romanian relations that the Romanian leadership discussed their WP stance on a regular basis with the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest, Liu Fan, thus using Chinese advice as a secret weapon against East German or Soviet attempts to further coordinate the alliance. Meanwhile, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai invited the Romanian leaders several times to China and explicitly incited them and the other WP members against the Kremlin, by stating that '[i]f all [WP members] will rise against Khrushchev, then his adventure will be reined in'.⁶³ The Chinese clearly realized the potential of the WP in general and Romania in particular to erode Khrushchev's power, and made the Romanians aware of this, too.

Putting their newly gained self-consciousness into practice, the Romanian leaders convened an extraordinary plenum of the Romanian Workers Party's Central Committee in April 1964, in which they used the draft appeal to all the communist parties as a basis for the formulation of their own stance, in a manifest that has later been called 'the Declaration of Independence', and has been considered 'the turning-point of Romania's *public deviation* in its foreign policy'.⁶⁴ Mentioning the WP only once, this declaration 'turned against any higher form of cooperation between the socialist countries', while attempting to 'reach a loosening of the cooperation', and to 'increase the scope for manoeuvre'.⁶⁵

The Romanian declaration served as an *implicit* protest against the WP, and as such explained Romanian reluctance to participate in another PCC meeting. In a tinge of irony the plenum took place on the very day on which Ulbricht had intended to convene the PCC. The declaration actually seemed directed against Ulbricht's attempts at foreign policy coordination, too, and directly undermined some of his proposals. The Romanians were the second WP members to deviate, although their deviation was more subtle, and therefore more successful, than the Albanian one.

Two months later the East German diplomatic services even had access to 'reliable sources' which suggested that '[t]he RWP [Romanian Workers' Party] did not agree with some decisions of the Warsaw Pact. It would accordingly no longer cooperate actively, but would merely observe the development in the Warsaw Pact'.⁶⁶ This is ironically exactly the role his allies feared French president Charles de Gaulle would adopt within NATO.⁶⁷ In the case of the WP it was the Sino-Soviet split which had once again facilitated this kind of emancipation from the Soviet grip, but

this time *within* the confines of the alliance. The Romanian challenge seemed more subtle than the Albanian one, and it had successfully called Khrushchev's bluff. Having agreed with the Romanian appeal to communist countries, he had indirectly sanctioned their independence, too.

THE DYNAMICS OF DISSENT

Putting their independence into practice, the Romanian leadership vetoed another proposal by Ulbricht to convene the PCC to discuss developments within NATO on nuclear sharing through multilateral force (MLF) on 27–8 November 1964.⁶⁸ At a cocktail party in Moscow, which served to celebrate Khrushchev's ouster on 14 October, the Romanian Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer explained to Ulbricht that he objected to the method by which the meeting was convened, since the Romanians wanted to know the items on the agenda on time so as to be well prepared.⁶⁹ They nevertheless agreed to an unprecedented compromise, which the East German leadership had suggested in exasperation at Romanian obstinacy, according to which the deputy foreign ministers would be convened on 10 December 1964, followed by a PCC meeting in January 1965.⁷⁰

During this meeting the Romanians nevertheless used the Albanian question in order to underline their own emancipation from the Soviet grip: they suggested inviting the Albanians again to the PCC meeting in January, which met with little enthusiasm, but was approved after vehement discussion. Moreover, the Romanian deputy foreign minister vetoed both a common communiqué about the contents of the meeting in question and the preparation of a communiqué that would be published after the PCC meeting in January 1965. The Romanian leaders explained to the Chinese ambassador Liu Fan after the meeting that '[a]ccepting a communiqué (...), would have blocked our freedom of action'.⁷¹ A meeting without a communiqué was unprecedented, and testified to the way in which the WP had turned into much more than a rhetorical ploy. Soviet control had yielded to NSWP manoeuvrability.

Romanian obstinacy frustrated Ulbricht's aims, but created room for genuine discussion within the alliance. The absence of a pre-concocted communiqué for the PCC meeting in January 1965 increased the scope for manoeuvre during that meeting not only for the Romanians, but also for their comrades. The *de facto* creation of an organ for the deputy foreign ministers, itself a product of dissent, further undermined unilateralism, whether it be of a Soviet or East German kind, since it served to

prepare the PCC meetings in a multilateral platform. A new kind of alliance grew into shape, in which dissent could prove a stimulus to new ideas rather than an obstacle.

Whereas the Romanian stance dominated the meeting of deputy foreign ministers, Ulbricht attempted to curb Romanian dissidence by writing a letter to the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on the same day in which he underlined the necessity for more cooperation within the WP.⁷² The next day the same topic came up in a private conversation between the East German deputy foreign minister Otto Winzer and his Soviet comrade Valerian Zorin, in which Winzer's suggestion to activate the standing committee for foreign policy questions, which had been created on paper in January 1956, but had never materialized, was applauded by Zorin, who encouraged the GDR to present a proposal on WP reform at the PCC meeting in January 1965.⁷³ The Romanians were extremely sceptical of the proposals on reforms, which they considered a way 'to re-establish the hegemony of the CPSU over the socialist countries' in another conversation with Liu Fan.⁷⁴ Romanian opposition to the East German zeal for reforms would loom large in the WP during the next five years, which testifies to the increasing influence of the NSWP members on the dynamics of the alliance.

THE WARSAW PACT AS ALLIANCE BY DEFAULT

Under pressure from the Sino-Soviet split the WP could no longer function as a mere Soviet transmission belt in the early 1960s. With Soviet hegemony challenged by Chinese ascendancy, the WP turned into a platform on which the smaller allies could explore how far the Kremlin would be prepared or forced to go to keep the alliance together. The archival evidence therefore yields a conclusion that is very similar to the current approach towards NATO. Not only did the smaller allies begin to explore and increase the room for manoeuvre in an alliance that was multilateral in theory and became so in practice, but within the WP, too, the 'crisis' started earlier than generally assumed, namely with Albanian defiance in 1961, which proved an inspiration to the Romanian leadership.⁷⁵ Moreover, the dynamics within the alliance was not only determined by the NSWP members' opposition to the Kremlin, as is often assumed, but also by the conflicting interests among the NSWP members themselves.

The Albanian dissent met with great indignity by the NSWP members, but the correspondence that followed in its wake sealed the decrease

of Soviet control. The WP was no longer an overarching collection of bilateral ties; the correspondence between the NSWP members created a multilateral dynamic that had been unforeseen by the Soviet leadership. The fact that the Warsaw Treaty had been hastily modelled after its North Atlantic counterpart facilitated the use of the WP as a multilateral platform. The right of veto undermined the possibility of the WP as a kind of mega-politburo, with the Soviet leaders in charge, which might have been what the Kremlin had envisaged. Without a secretariat and a secretary-general, and with the PCC meetings as the only official organ, the NSWP members had a lot of room to shape the WP, which turned into an increasingly multilateral alliance by default.

The Romanian leaders were particularly skilful in reaping the fruits of Albanian dissidence and the Sino–Soviet split. They intensified their contacts with the Chinese, but also remained within the confines of the alliance. Unlike the Albanians, they did not antagonize their allies, apart from the East German ones. They even did them a service, by preventing the alliance from turning into an East German transmission belt. They perceived particularly clearly that ‘[t]he prevailing principle in every communist party, according to which the minority has to submit to the majority, cannot be applied to the relations between communist and workers-parties’, as the Romanian leadership wrote to its Soviet comrades in January 1965.⁷⁶ Democratic centralism did not apply to the WP, and the alliance confronted the Kremlin with an altogether different way of conducting politics.

The most concrete product of this process was the convention of the deputy foreign ministers, which created room for real debate. The unprecedented absence of a joint communiqué, because of vehement disagreement, underlines that the NSWP members prioritized their own emancipation over unity. The meeting itself constituted the *de facto* creation of a new organ, since it was the first WP meeting at this level, and heralded a period of much more intense consultation between both party leaders and (deputy) foreign ministers within the WP, while paving the way for its reforms. The attempt to reform the alliance would dominate the next five years of its existence, and only succeeded after vehement discussion and numerous compromises, which in itself proves that neither the Soviet leadership nor the GDR leaders could use the WP as their transmission belt. On the other hand, their zeal to activate the standing committee after nine years of slumber clearly proves that the alliance was no longer a mere rhetorical ploy to present a united front to the Western world. In

the first half of the 1960s it had turned into a platform for genuine discussion, which is no mean achievement for an alliance that was created to be dissolved in the first place.

By January 1965 the worst fears had been allayed: Romanian participation in the meeting in December 1964 proved that its leadership wanted to avoid emancipating *outside* the confines of the WP. The fact that the party leader Gheorgiu-Dej announced his intention of attending the PCC meeting in January 1965, to the great relief and slight surprise of his allies, underlined that he had no desire to follow the Albanian *Sonderkurs*.⁷⁷ However fraught with tension the second half of the 1960s would prove to be—with perpetual discussions about non-proliferation and reforms, increasing Romanian dissent, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by five WP members in 1968—the NSWP members had already begun to reinvent the WP in the first half. The Balkan challenge to the Warsaw Pact had decisively contributed to the multilateralization of the former monolith.

NOTES

1. Quotation from NATO officials in *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991*, eds. Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2005), 1.
2. See respectively the preface in *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*, eds. Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1982), x, and John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 289.
3. Anna Locher, ‘A Crisis Foretold: NATO and France, 1963–1966’, in *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s*, eds. Andreas Wenger et al. (London: Routledge, 2007), 120–1.
4. For an extensive analysis of the multilateralization of the WP see Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–69* (London: Routledge, 2015).
5. For a brief overview of the Balkans in the Warsaw Pact based on mainly Bulgarian sources see Jordan Baev, ‘The Warsaw Pact and Southern Tier Conflicts, 1959–1969’, in *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts*, eds. Mary Ann Heiss and Victor Papacosma (Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2008), 193–205.

6. Cf. V. Mastny, 'Learning from the Enemy: NATO as a Model of the Warsaw Pact', *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung* No. 58 (2001), 10.
7. The Warsaw Treaty, 14 May 1955, in *Cardboard Castle*, 77–79.
8. E.g. Anthony Kemp-Welch, 'Eastern Europe: Stalinism to Solidarity', in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2: 219.
9. See 'Telegram from Imre Nagy to Diplomatic Missions in Budapest Declaring Hungary's Neutrality', 1 November 1956, in *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, eds. Csaba Békés et al. (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002), 332.
10. Cf. Svetozar Rajak, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957* (London: Routledge, 2010).
11. Bucharest, *Arhive Naționale Istorice Centrale* (hereafter ANIC), CC RWP, International Relations, 76/1960, 119, Minutes of a conversation between a delegation of the CPSU CC and the AWP CC, 12 November 1960.
12. Cf. Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2009) for an extensive account of the Sino-Soviet split from an ideological and a geopolitical perspective respectively.
13. Berlin, *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv* (hereafter SAPMO-BArch), DY 30/3604, 30, Letter from CPC CC to CPSU CC, 10 September 1960.
14. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 76/1960, 118–134, Minutes of a conversation between a delegation of the CPSU CC and the Albanian Workers' Party [AWP] CC, 12 November 1960.
15. *Ibid.*, 46.
16. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 81/1960, 113–157, DECLARATION of the conference of representatives of communist and workers parties, cf. *ibid.*, 125–6, 135, 156.
17. Memorandum of Conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai, Beijing, 18 January 1961, in 'Inside China's Cold War', *Cold War*

- International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin* 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), 196.
18. ANIC/RWP CC, Chancellery, 81/1961, 1–2, Report of the RWP delegation, February 1961.
 19. *Ibid.*, 3.
 20. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV/2/20/99, 189–91, Report from Tirana by König, Tirana, 17 April 1961.
 21. Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (hereafter PHP), <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=17894&navinfo=14465>, accessed 25 August 2013, ‘Speech by the Bulgarian First Secretary (Todor Zhivkov)’, 29 March 1961.
 22. PHP, <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=17888&navinfo=14465>, accessed 10 May 2013, ‘The Soviet-Albanian Dispute: Secret Resolution on Albania’, 26 March 1961.
 23. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV/2/20/99, 235–45, Report on relations between China and Albania from the middle of 1960 to the end of 1961, 6 January 1962.
 24. The Albanians were not as successful in defying the Kremlin as is often assumed. See, for a more upbeat account, William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift* (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1963), 176.
 25. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3590, 56, 59, Mehmet Shehu to the WP leaders/observers, April 1961.
 26. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3591, Maurer to the Albanian government, Bucharest, 21 June 1961.
 27. Cf. the more conventional claim from the Albanian historian Ana Lalaj: ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen Albanien und dem Warschauer Pakt lassen sich im Grunde auf die Beziehungen zwischen Albanien und der Sowjetunion reduzieren’, ‘Albanien und der Warschauer Pakt’, in *Der Warschauer Pakt: Von der Gründung bis zum Zusammenbruch, 1955 bis 1991*, eds. Torsten Diedrich et al. (Berlin: Links, 2009), 29.
 28. See, for an internal discussion on the correspondence, SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3590, König to Neumann, 5 May 1961, 164, and *ibid.*, 172–3, Neumann to König, 23 May 1961.
 29. Cf. Hope Harrison, *Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet East German Relations, 1953–1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 139–223.

30. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3591, 171, Hysni Kapo to Walter Ulbricht, 22 July 1961.
31. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3478, 11–14, Statement from Ulbricht about the Albanian behaviour.
32. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 2/1961, 220–225.
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35. Berlin, *Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes* (hereafter PA AA), Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR (hereafter MfAA), A 474, 21, Minutes of the meeting from 3 to 5 August 1961, top secret.
36. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IV/2/20/99, 227–9, Estimate about the Albanian attitude towards the conclusion of a German peace treaty, Berlin, 3 October 1961.
37. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3592, 82, Hoxha to CPSU CC, 6 September 1961.
38. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3387, 235–6, Report on a conversation between diplomat Mewis and Zenon Kliszko, member of the Polish United Workers Party, 24 November 1964.
39. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 14/1962, 15, Memorandum of discussion between Ghizela Vass and A. Scaciov, 14 December 1961.
40. *Pace* Larry Watts, 'Romanian Security Policy and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *CWIHP e-Dossier* 38 (May 2013).
41. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 13/1963, 2–3, Report of a discussion with Andropov, 2 April 1963.
42. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 55/1963, 5–7, D. Gheorghiu (Beijing), to the minister of foreign affairs, top secret, 25 May 1963.
43. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 39/1963, 121, Minutes of the meeting of the RWP CC Politburo meeting of 18 July 1963.
44. Cf. Lorenz Lüthi, 'The People's Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955–1963', *Cold War History* 7, no. 4 (2007): 487–8.
45. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 39/1963, 117, Minutes of the meeting of the RWP CC Politburo meeting of 18 July 1963.
46. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 6/1964, 23, Minutes of the plenary session of the RWP CC, 17 February 1964.

47. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IVA2/20/368, 17–25, Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Bucharest, 14 January 1964.
48. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 6/1964, 36, Gheorgiu-Dej to Khrushchev, January 1964.
49. Ibid., 44–5, Ulbricht to Gheorgiu-Dej.
50. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3877, 80, Novotny to Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] CC, 15 February 1964.
51. Ibid., 90–1, Khrushchev to Ulbricht, 20 March 1964.
52. Ibid., 95, Ulbricht to Gheorghiu-Dej, 26 March 1964.
53. Ibid., 98, Gheorghiu-Dej to Ulbricht, no date. See, for the Romanian discussion on this letter, ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 12/1964, 33, Minutes of the RWP CC Politburo session on 30–1 March 1964.
54. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3387, 86, Khrushchev to Gheorghiu-Dej, 10 March 1964.
55. Cf. Douglas Selva, ‘The Warsaw Pact and the German Question, 1955–1970: Conflict and Consensus’, in *NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, 179–80.
56. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 31/1964, Vol. I, 174–224, Minutes of the conversations between the RWP CC and the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] CC, 3–10 March 1964.
57. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3655, 166–70, Khrushchev to Gheorgiu-Dej, 31 March 1964.
58. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IVA 2/20/354, 55–6, Report about a conversation with Iljuchin from the Soviet embassy, 20 February 1964.
59. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3655, 139–40, Gheorgiu-Dej to Khrushchev, 25 March 1964.
60. Ibid., Romanian draft appeal as appendix to the letter from Gheorghiu-Dej to Khrushchev.
61. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 6/1964, 21, Minutes of the plenary session of the RWP CC, 17 February 1964.
62. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 16/1964, 113, Minutes of the plenary session of the RWP CC from 15 to 22 April 1964.
63. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 55/1964, Vol. I, 25, Minutes of a conversation between a Romanian delegation and Zhou Enlai, convened at Chinese initiative, 29 September 1964.

64. Dennis Deletant and Mihai Ionescu, 'Romania and the Warsaw Pact: 1955–1989,' *CWIHP Working Paper* 43 (2004), 72.
65. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IVA 2/20/359, 11–14, Information about the Romanian attitude to the policy of the Chinese leadership, 29 April 1964.
66. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IVA 2/20/368, 126, Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the GDR, Bucharest, 17 June 1964.
67. Cf. Locher, 'A Crisis Foretold', 111.
68. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3387, 184–5, Gheorgiu-Dej to Ulbricht, 19 November 1964.
69. ANIC/CC RWP, Chancellery, 70/1964, 29–32, Reception on the evening of 7 November.
70. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3387, 205–16, Letters from Ulbricht to individual WP leaders, 24 November 1964.
71. *Ibid.*, 193.
72. *Ibid.*, 254–5, Ulbricht to Brezhnev, Berlin, 10 December 1964.
73. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/3393, 13–25, Report of the meeting.
74. ANIC/CC RWP, International Relations, 5/1964, 163, Conversation between Bodnăraş and Liu Fan, 24 November 1964.
75. Cf. Vojtech Mastny, 'The Warsaw Pact as History', in *Cardboard Castle*, 28; Mastny calls the WP an 'alliance in crisis' in the period 1965–8.
76. SAPMO BArch, DY 30/3655, 185, Romanian CC to CPSU CC, Bucharest, 4 January 1965.
77. SAPMO-BArch/DY 30/IVA 2/20/369, 34–61, Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, Bucharest, 22 January 1965.

‘We Did Not Quarrel, We Did Not Curse’: The Price of Yugoslav Independence After the Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia

Ivo Banac

Soviet–Yugoslav relations went through various phases after the resumption of relations in 1955, but it is fair to say that they underwent a precipitous decline after the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yugoslav diplomat Veljko Mićunović, himself a veteran of various Yugoslav encounters with Moscow, has noted that with the coming of the Brezhnev regime all the accumulated dilemmas about the further development of the USSR were resolved. Mićunović did not elaborate, but in a passage that notes the innovative character of Khrushchev’s rule, the obvious conclusion is that the new trend was a throwback to earlier Soviet practices. Moreover, the USSR no longer required the Yugoslav *laissez-passer* for performance on the broad international stage.¹

The decline in relations was characterized by a series of incidents and confrontations, in which the Soviets regularly accused the Yugoslav side of stirring up anti-Soviet sentiments. For example, in September 1968, General A. A. Yepishev, the chief of staff of the Soviet Army political

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administration and former ambassador to Yugoslavia (1961–2), raged that the Yugoslavs were engaged in ‘a provocation, concoction, and disgrace. [...] All of this brings into question our previous relations and cooperation. I do not know who among you initiated the anti-Soviet propaganda and war hysteria, but this has assumed proportions unknown in any other country.’² General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, in a letter of 17 October 1968 to the Yugoslav leadership, warned that positive relations between the two countries were ‘inconsistent with the anti-Soviet campaign that was being waged in SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]’.³

In June 1970, Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin lectured Mitja Ribičič, his visiting Yugoslav counterpart, by pointedly reminding him that the Soviets, as in Czechoslovakia, would not permit the return of capitalism in Eastern Europe. He stressed that the Soviets expected solidarity ‘in the struggle for and the defense of the whole socialist system and *will not permit anybody, including individuals, not excepting those inside the country, to argue against that*’.⁴

Threats of this sort were accompanied by demands for military concessions and the reactivation of the pro-Soviet Yugoslav émigrés in the USSR (the so-called Cominformists, after the Cominform Resolution of 1948). In the 1970–1 period, Yugoslavia delivered five diplomatic démarches to the Soviet side over émigré activities and on similar breaches of diplomatic etiquette. For their part, the Soviets made some fifty protests to the Yugoslavs, mainly over unfriendly articles in the Yugoslav press.⁵

Faced with the steady decline of relations with Moscow, the Yugoslavs tried to find support among the maverick Communist-ruled Balkan countries—Romania and Albania, which, too, felt Soviet pressures. But their preferred partner was the West. Here, the diplomatic activities of Richard M. Nixon were of particular help. Nixon’s talks with Yugoslavia’s president Josip Broz Tito, on 30 September in Belgrade, two days after the death of the United Arab Republic (UAR) president Gamal Abdel Nasser, were centered on the Middle East. Tito took pains to reassure Nixon over Soviet intentions and stressed that the USSR was not interested in confronting the United States in the Middle East region.⁶

Nixon reciprocated by praising Tito’s moderation and recommended that the Yugoslavs talked to the new Egyptian leaders before the ‘radicals’ got to them. There was no agreement over Indochina, where Nixon insisted that the United States could not accept defeat. Despite this initial positioning, the true value of the American card became evident during the same visit on a lesser level, in the encounter between Mirko Tepavac,

Yugoslavia's state secretary for foreign affairs, and Henry Kissinger. Responding to Kissinger's direct question whether the Soviets were imperiling Yugoslavia, Tepavac, quite unlike Tito, responded that the widening of the Middle East conflict could lead to Soviet demands for military concessions from Yugoslavia. Hence, anything that the Americans could do to help the cause of peace would be of help. There ensued the key moment in the articulation of US policy toward Yugoslavia. Tepavac asked Kissinger to interpret a statement, made by Secretary of State William P. Rogers a few months earlier, that the US believed the USSR would be more cautious in the application of the Brezhnev doctrine to Yugoslavia. Tepavac noted that this suggested a far lesser degree of interest in Yugoslav security than was the earlier Washington norm. Specifically, he wanted to know if the Americans were making similar statements in direct contacts with the Russians:

Kissinger states that it is well known how they [the Americans] would not observe with indifference any Soviet military moves against Yugoslavia.

I [Tepavac] ask him what does 'would not observe with indifference' mean. Does it mean that they would be 'angry' or that they would offer resistance?

Kissinger specifies that they would offer 'every possible help' should we, too, fight. [...] No matter how Rogers's statement was formulated, the Russians ought to know that they should not entertain any designs against Yugoslavia without facing serious consequences.

I conclude that all should know that. [...]

Kissinger stresses a claim that independent Yugoslavia is their [American] interest, and that they do not wish to change us even if they could. They do not imperil us, but will likely—he adds—have to let it be known that the others should not do the same. Nixon's visit, he concludes, also has the aim of making that more clear. It would not be all the same to them should Yugoslavia, sacrificing its independence, get closer to the Soviet Union, although, they do not believe in that possibility.⁷

Kissinger touched upon the key dilemma in Yugoslav–Soviet relations. The Americans most certainly had no 'systemic' designs on Yugoslavia, preferring to let the Tito government order its own ideological priorities as it pleased, under the assumption that ideological innovations would promote Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union. But Tito's top-most priority was the preservation of the regime, something that could be pursued by ideological innovation of various kinds. After all, Yugoslavia's

regime stability could be purchased by ideological concessions to the East, something that Tito practiced before 1948. It probably did not occur to Kissinger that political independence could also be promoted by sacrificing ideological independence.

In fact, during the second half of the 1960s, Yugoslavia was in the throes of an ideological struggle between reformers and various conservatives. One aspect of this confrontation concerned the venerable national question, which re-emerged on the political scene with particular vengeance after the purge in 1966 of Aleksandar Ranković, the central figure of the conservative camp and the most senior Serbian politician. His removal translated into a loosening of Belgrade centralism. Because of Serbia's traditional resistance to decentralization, this also meant that the balance was upset in favor of Yugoslavia's periphery, particularly the reform-minded northwest—Slovenia and Croatia—but also to the benefit of all the prior targets of centralism—Bosnian non-Serbs, Albanians, and the other minorities. In Croatia especially, the new party leadership of Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar was already on record against centralist Yugoslavism and in favor of maximum home rule. The stage was set for arbitration over the limit of republic autonomy, which also meant the limit of reform. Tito still hedged his bets. As for conservative and centralist Moscow, there was no dilemma over its preferences in the case.

Typically, according to Yugoslav sources, the outgoing Soviet ambassador I. A. Benediktov took occasion to ask awkward questions during his farewell visits to Tito, Edvard Kardelj, Mitja Ribičič, and other Yugoslav leaders. He inquired

whether Yugoslavia would fall apart [...], what are the relations between the republics and the federation, whether the current [reforms] in Yugoslavia would inspire nationalism [...] in a conversation with the foreign secretary [Tepavac] at the farewell dinner given by the Soviet side [...]. Benediktov said that he became convinced of the 'true internationalism' of Serbs and Montenegrins, something that, however, he could not say for the Croats and Slovenes [...].⁸

The Soviets were not the only party that sought to profit from Yugoslavia's internal difficulties—political emigration also had its plans. On 2 December 1970, Dragutin Haramija, president of Croatia's Executive Council (government), sent a letter to federal Prime Minister Mitja Ribičič, in which he charged that the foreign ministry intelligence officers (notably

Đuro Pintarić of the Yugoslav Military Mission at Berlin) were spreading a ‘major insinuation’ that the leadership of Croatia was in contact with Dr. Branko Jelić, a Croat nationalist émigré, resident in West Berlin, who supposedly had established contacts with Moscow. The outcome of these ‘contacts’ would be an independent communist Croatia, from Trieste to the Drina River, integrated within the Soviet bloc and with the Soviet type of socialism. In exchange, the USSR would get military bases at Mostar and Rijeka. The source for these allegations was Jelić’s aide Velimir Tomulović, who was actually an agent of Yugoslav intelligence. Haramija demanded an inquiry and punishment for those responsible. The Soviets were very sensitive about these developments. On 9 December 1971, an employee of the Soviet embassy in Belgrade turned over a copy of Jelić’s newspaper *Hrvatska država* (*Croatian State*) to the Yugoslav foreign ministry, noting that the material was mailed from West Germany and that the Soviets were aware that this publication was forbidden, but that the Soviet side insisted ‘that they inform us of this, so that the impression would not be created that the embassy subscribes to such publications’.⁹

The émigré affair escalated during the period of inquiry. The members of the federal commission could not agree on a conclusion. When the commission met at the Brioni Islands on 23 April 1971 the majority concluded that ‘the federal administrative organs, their services, and individuals employed in them did not participate in any kind of conspiracy or in the initiation and dissemination of political intrigues about the alleged connections between the hostile emigration and the political leadership of SR Croatia’.¹⁰ The conclusion was not signed by a commission member Nikola Pavletić, himself from Croatia, and it was not accepted by two other Croat ministers, Mirjana Krstinić, and a Deputy Prime Minister Jakov Sirotković.

In order to resolve the matter the seventeenth session of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) met on the Brioni Islands on 28–30 April 1971. The atmosphere was tense and soul-searching. First the Executive Committee of the Presidency met on 28 April amid pleas from Edvard Kardelj (Slovenia) that the public must be soothed and also from Budislav Šoškic (Montenegro) that the matter ‘be left to the state organs’.¹¹ In line with the ambiguous attitudes to the ‘affair’, the Presidency concluded that

there occurred a strengthening of the external hostile subversive activity, which utilized our internal difficulties and relied in its activities on the

enemies in our country. In connection with this hostile—anti-Yugoslav and antisocialist—activity, an action that aimed at disqualifying the political leadership of SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia was organized with the aim of provoking political instability, inter-republic conflicts and lack of confidence, to weaken the unity and make more difficult the continuation of self-managerial socialist development of our country.

The Presidency accepted the conclusion of the Federal Executive Council that the federal organs of administration, their services and individuals who work in them, did not participate in any conspiracies.¹²

At the end of the Brioni meeting on 31 April 1971, just as the matter was swept under the carpet, Brezhnev telephoned Tito from a Politburo session in the Kremlin convened exclusively on the ‘account of Yugoslavia’. Tito reported on this conversation in the following way:

Comrades, I used the pause to have a lunch. [Vladimir] Bakarić went with me. During lunch my secretary came and said that Brezhnev is calling me by phone. Since these conversations with Moscow are very rare, perhaps once every two years, I was surprised that he is calling me precisely now, when we are having this meeting. For a long time we could not get a good connection, so that anything could be heard. I heard some voice and that his secretary Sergeyev wanted something, but we could not understand one another. Then I went to the open telephone, on which you cannot say everything. We greeted one another and I asked Brezhnev what is the matter. He says, Comrade Tito, all sorts of rumors are circulating. There is information that some of your troops are moving toward Belgrade, that the situation is critical, etc. [...] I said: ‘Comrade Brezhnev, we discussed for three days, now we are close to finish. All of this information that you have heard is disinformation. It is not correct, it is a lie. No troops are moving, nor do we need any troops to use for internal matters. I wanted to say, nor for external matters, but we were on an open line. I said that our discussions are good, that we are working on strengthening our Party, because we have before us big questions that we must solve, and only the Party can do that. Correct (he said). I told him—be certain that we have enough strength to resolve all of that by ourselves, with no help from anybody.’ [...] Now I want to say that it has come to pass what I have told you this morning at the beginning of the session, that this is not a trifle, that big conspiracies are being weaved around us and that I do not exactly know where the knot is bound. We shall have to cut this knot one day, not too long in coming. We must make impossible all of these conspiracies, intelligence centers, who are weaving a noose around our necks. That is why I warn you, comrades, that we shall have to

undertake certain firmer measures toward certain people abroad, whom you all know, for whom we already know, and we shall find out, you see, those for whom we now do not know well, who are playing a certain game, even if it is only that of a pawn.¹³

Five days later, on 5 May 1971 in West Berlin, Branko Jelić survived an assassination attempt despite the fact that he sustained more than a hundred wounds from an improvised explosive device. While he convalesced in a hospital another attempt on his life was made on 7 May. He died a year later as a consequence of these injuries. This was only the beginning of a rough new course.

In early July 1971 there ensued a dramatic meeting, summoned at Tito's request, with the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) CC in Zagreb. Besides the members of the Executive Committee, the meeting was also attended by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Vladimir Bakarić, Miko Tripalo, Jakov Blažević, and many other Croatian party functionaries. Tito was on the offensive from the start:

This time I shall talk first. You can see that I am very angry. That's why I summoned you and the meeting will not last long. The situation in Croatia is not good. I am receiving information about that from various sources. Croatia has become the key problem in the country when it concerns the rampage of nationalism. Such things exist in all republics, but now it is the worst among you. A different type of struggle against nationalism is necessary. It's not enough to denounce it at the mass meetings.¹⁴

Calling for a 'determined class struggle', Tito commented on the worsening state of Croat-Serb relations and demanded to know whether the leadership was aware that 'others are watching this. Can't you see that others will immediately present themselves should there be disorders? I will make order with our Army before allowing others to do that.'¹⁵ He did not fail to mention his April conversation with Brezhnev:

The petty-bourgeois spirit of the Belgrade *čaršija* [marketplace] is lively among you, too. All sorts of tales are told. Now they say here that I invented my conversation with Brezhnev, so as to frighten you and force you to unite. And the truth is that they held a meeting, that they already decided to go at Yugoslavia, but did not decide when.¹⁶

The last sentence was edited out in the official version of Tito's remarks.

Yugoslav developments increasingly troubled the Soviet leadership. In a letter of 6 July 1971 from the CPSU Politburo to the Yugoslavs, Brezhnev cautioned that various circumstances give cause for concern about the state of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. He declared the stories about how the Soviets favored Cominformist exiles or Croat émigrés ('Ustašas') as base 'concoctions' and decried the activities of those Yugoslav journalists who promoted such inventions. He proclaimed as completely unfounded all stories about the 'sharpening of any type of activities on the part of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia'.¹⁷ Brezhnev would soon be spared new Soviet–Yugoslav storms, which would take a back seat among Soviet concerns.

Richard Nixon's TV speech made from Burbank, California, on 15 July 1971, in which the American president disclosed the secret meetings of Henry Kissinger and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai and announced that he had accepted the invitation of the Chinese government to visit the People's Republic of China (PRC) 'before May 1972', was the beginning of the most important diplomatic realignment in decades. Two weeks later the LCY Presidency at its nineteenth session was already commenting on the effects of this news. Stane Dolanc (Slovenia) summed up Brezhnev's letter and the Soviet counteroffensive against Yugoslavia as something that is an expression of the 'internal needs of the Soviet leadership and of broader foreign policy concerns, especially after the Chinese–American contacts'.¹⁸ He noted that the forthcoming and much awaited visit of Leonid Brezhnev to Yugoslavia 'must be viewed from the angle of new developments in Chinese–American relations' and warned that the USSR would be increasingly interested in promoting its position in Europe. Dolanc anticipated a 'sharp settling of accounts in the [Soviet] camp, particularly in relation to Romania'.¹⁹

In response to Nixon's opening toward China, the Soviet bloc leaders convened at Crimea on 2 August 1971. The next day, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, member of the standing presidium of the Romanian CP CC, signaled to the Yugoslavs president Nicolae Ceaușescu's request for a meeting with Tito. The Crimean consultation took place without the leaders of Romania and Yugoslavia. Niculescu noted that Kosygin was in Romania for a COMECON meeting three days earlier, 'but there was not a word that such a meeting would take place at Crimea. Something is cooking, says Mizil.' Tito was cautious. On the margin of the message he wrote: 'I think that it would not be good to hold a meeting after the one at Crimea.'

It is better to wait a bit and then hold a meeting in our country or on the border. T.’²⁰

Tito’s caution was soon rewarded. On 10 August 1971, at Yalta, morose Leonid Brezhnev received Yugoslav ambassador Veljko Mićunović, who brought Tito’s letter to the CPSU General Secretary. In a three-hour conversation Brezhnev commiserated over the continuity of bad relations with Yugoslavia and claimed that the Soviets were for the best relations with Yugoslavia and ‘he personally always held that line’. Brezhnev denounced the Yugoslav behavior over the ‘Raspopović Affair’, involving activities of a Cominformist exile in the USSR, and the Yugoslav protest that ensued:

He categorically disassociated the CPSU, especially the leadership, from this, and everything that happened was really a trifle not worth attention. Brezhnev said, still criticizing Yugoslavia’s behavior, that the USSR never supported these Ustašas (referring to the Cominformists in the USSR), at which point Ostrovidov, the recording secretary present at our talk, intervened to explain who [was] who. Brezhnev demanded that I explain what happened. After my explanation and a reference to the fact that there [were] 300 Cominformists in the USSR, Brezhnev waved his hand and said that this [had] no significance; they [had] similar individuals in the CPSU, who [spoke] the worst of him, Podgorny, Kosygin, and others, all of it [meant] nothing.²¹

Brezhnev denied that the USSR opposed Yugoslavia’s independence and nonalignment, and stressed that the Yugoslav press was a stumbling block in the relations, although he knew that the press was independent in Yugoslavia. He spoke negatively about China, which was, according to Brezhnev, a victim of nationalism and ‘great state’ ideology. Nixon’s trip to Beijing was not important, as only the USSR was a partner for the Americans. As for China, ‘properly speaking it is not a nuclear power, and will not be for a long time. Economically, [China] means nothing’. He avoided any comment on good Yugoslav–Chinese relations, according to Mićunović, because the Russians ‘usually avoid speaking with us about matters that are very unpleasant when they conclude that they cannot change anything’.²²

Since Yugoslavia was a subject of discussion at the bloc summit at Crimea, Brezhnev explained that this was not at the Soviet initiative, but thanks to the Poles and the others ‘из содружества’ (‘from the commonwealth’) who wanted to know how to appraise Yugoslavia’s policies:

Brezhnev assured me that all were agreed when he told them that Yugoslavia was a socialist country and that they should not pursue policies that would alienate Yugoslavia, regardless of differences that exist (the main theme of the Crimean meeting was China and the consequences of the American-Chinese rapprochement), but precisely the opposite, they should strive to cooperate.²³

Moreover, although the intervention in Czechoslovakia was correct and took place only after all political means were exhausted, he denied the existence of the 'Brezhnev doctrine' and rejected all questions about the sovereignty of bloc countries. Unlike Khrushchev, who was constantly insulting the various bloc leaders, he treated them with 'deep respect'.²⁴

Still, Brezhnev was not convinced that Yugoslavia was on the right path:

Noting that these were our internal matters, Brezhnev commented on our situation in the way the Soviets did during the past winter and spring, the Brioni meeting, when our internal situation was appraised as grave and critical. Brezhnev, 'speaking as a friend', says that the Soviets for a long time were concerned about the events in Yugoslavia. All of these were our, Yugoslav, matters, but they, the Russians, as friends, must be interested. Brezhnev cited the following internal problems as proof: unemployment, the drain of our workers and specialists to the West, already half a million, or million, who knows, and, most important, public political conflicts among our republics, or nationalities. Brezhnev, like Kosygin three months ago, cited the USSR as an opposite example and asked: What would happen in the USSR if anything similar occurred here? Still disassociating himself by stating that he is expressing only his personal opinion Brezhnev stated that, no matter what we or they, the Russians, are saying, the fact remains that serious omissions, he will not say errors, were permitted in Yugoslavia, because, otherwise, all of this would not have happened.²⁵

He added that 'it remains to see what the roots of this are. He mentioned the role of the Party, of the state, the necessity of monopoly in foreign trade, central planning, that is, the Soviet system as the model.'²⁶ It is significant that Tito's thinking increasingly was not at great variance from that of Brezhnev.

The next day (13 August) Mićunović wrote an additional note on the Yalta meeting with Brezhnev. He was convinced that the Soviet pressures in the first half of 1971 stemmed from the fact that the 'Russians overestimated our internal difficulties and considered that Yugoslavia [was] so

internally weakened that it [would] not be capable of [...] offering energetic resistance to each Russian attempt of mixing into our internal matters.’ Further, Mićunović saw developments in the ‘great triangle’ and the ‘announcement of Nixon’s visit to Peking’ as inducements for a revision of aggressive Soviet policy towards various partners, including Yugoslavia. Despite Brezhnev’s gruffness, Mićunović anticipated an improvement of relations with the USSR, perhaps during Brezhnev’s forthcoming visit, although he admitted that Brezhnev might not be the best representative of a more reasonable group in Moscow. He was banking on the ‘second, opposite side’ in Soviet establishment.²⁷

By the end of August, writing from Moscow, Mićunović sent a series of opinions and proposals in connection with Brezhnev’s planned visit. This exceptionally subtle diplomat suggested that the ‘party’ character of the visit best suited the Soviets, because it signaled the specialness of the moment (‘after our “internal crisis” and the sharpening of the relations USSR–China. The press in the [socialist] camp is already writing about a new anti-Soviet axis in the Balkans: Yugoslavia–Romania–Albania’). As a result, he proposed that the Yugoslav side must insist on the discussion of real problems, for example, the Cominformist emigration (he suggested the continuation of the hard line in regard to ‘these deserters and traitors, but now mainly higher officers of the Soviet army and citizens of the USSR’).²⁸

Mićunović was especially insistent on a very suggestive thesis:

We have regularly reported that our internal situation has by far the most direct and stronger influence on our relations with the USSR than with any other great power. Our internal difficulties directly stimulate and incite the Russians to a policy of pressure toward Yugoslavia and mixing into our internal affairs, as was the case this spring.²⁹

He noted that the Soviets were ‘not particularly impressed’ by Yugoslavia’s proposed constitutional changes. Moscow, in fact, thought that these changes would lead ‘to a further weakening of Yugoslavia as a single state’.³⁰ These observations were falling on Tito’s ready ears.

In anticipation of Brezhnev’s visit, at the beginning of September, Tito was shoring up his flank. He was still unconvinced that Brezhnev’s visit would improve relations with Moscow. At the end of a conversation with the representatives of Dalmatian communes, partially under the influence of Mićunović, Tito noted that Brezhnev had no intention of discussing

economic and other problems: 'They want discussions along party line and, if we go only along the party line, we shall have an awful fight.'³¹ Tito's larger task was to mollify all contesting sides in Yugoslavia, so as to present a united front before the visiting Soviet leader.

Proceeding cautiously, Tito's Croatian tour, which started at Zagreb's 'Prvomajska' factory, started with an attempt to mobilize the workers against 'inter-republic squabbles' and the 'atomization of our republics'.³² But as the tour proceeded, he was increasingly giving arguments against alleged ethnic conflicts in Croatia, while simultaneously calling for harsh measures against the 'class enemy'. At Koprivnica, on 10 September, he said that tensions in Croatia were being 'blown up', although, in fact, it was individuals who caused trouble. These would have to face 'undemocratic measures'.³³ At Varaždin, he announced a need for purges of 'alien elements'. As usual, he was attacking intellectuals and professors, who

often go abroad, of course they are pro-Western in orientation, while abroad they hold several lectures and receive 10–15 thousands of dollars for a lecture, and here his salary keeps flowing. [...] All is lovely here in this democratic system. But we shall polish [*ošlifovati*, from German *schließen*] this democratic system ever so slightly, in order to make it socialist.³⁴

Two aspects of Tito's message—conciliation and threats of repression—were evident at the high point of his tour, during a televised toast to the political leadership of Croatia, in Zagreb's Hotel Esplanade on 14 September. After affirming that it was absurd to claim that 'great chauvinism is blooming' in Croatia, he nevertheless attacked the 'dishonest intelligentsia' and noted that 'everywhere in Yugoslavia there are those who look toward the West'. He vowed that 'there can be no democracy for those who are against our system'.³⁵ It was clear that Tito was quite ready to parlay with Brezhnev.

During the visit of the Soviet party delegation, Tito and Brezhnev quickly established a relatively warm atmosphere at meetings that were held at Belgrade and the military resort of Karađorđevo (Vojvodina). There exist no minutes of the one-to-one meeting between Tito and Brezhnev of 22 September. Mićunović subsequently has claimed that the Yugoslav leaders were led to believe that Brezhnev used the opportunity to affirm how the 'Soviet Union does not have—nor did it ever have—the intention of using force against Yugoslavia'.³⁶ During the first meeting of the delegations, on 23 September in Belgrade, in his introductory remarks

Brezhnev said: 'First of all, an old friendship exists between us. We did not quarrel, we did not curse', to which Tito added, 'We did not beat each other'.³⁷ Although Brezhnev was at times abrasive ('why do I speak this way, Broz?'),³⁸ he was very accommodating in his conclusion that, despite the differences, different paths in the construction of socialism, and different methods and styles of thought, none of that ought to be an occasion for strife, particularly under conditions of 'normal' interstate relations. ('This means that on the side of state relations nothing of significance exists that could be an occasion of some strife or disagreements.'³⁹)

Brezhnev was, after his own fashion, an animated, even witty conversationalist. He claimed that he did not understand the disagreements with the Yugoslavs. He attributed these to certain forces who prefer to have bad relations. Such forces, too, 'are actively working among us, but perhaps this [Yugoslavia] is a somewhat more advantageous environment'.⁴⁰ He was ironical about the Yugoslav ideology ('Nobody denies that Yugoslavia selected some road of its own, how do I call it—I cannot remember—self-management. We do not discuss this, we do not study it.') He suggested that obscure staff of theoretical journals occasionally took offense at Yugoslav innovations ('surely this is not forbidden'), but no party functionary, no member of the Politburo ever publicly criticized the Yugoslav ideology, 'although I personally have certain observations'.⁴¹ He denied any importance to the Cominformist exiles, all 300 of them,⁴² and stuck to the Soviet story on the harmful nature of the Yugoslav press. Most especially, Brezhnev was very emotional about claims that the USSR wanted to attack Yugoslavia: '(bangs with his fist on the table) I was never more excited than when I heard that in Yugoslavia they believe that the Soviet Union is thinking of attacking Yugoslavia'.⁴³

For his part, Tito admitted that there were 'conflicts' in Yugoslavia, but 'it is the greatest folly to speak of disintegration'. He allowed that the 'various enemies of socialism have raised their heads and have taken nationalism and chauvinism as the elementary basis for their attacks', but that it was untrue that he alone kept the whole country together.⁴⁴ Generally, Tito was far more conciliatory to the Soviet side than most members of the Yugoslav delegation, especially Mirko Tepavac, who was the subject of at least two Soviet barbs. Tepavac insisted that the term 'sovereignty' be used in the joint declaration, since controversial issues were generally resolved according to Soviet wishes. In this he was only partially successful; the phrase 'two sovereign states', a reference to the USSR and Yugoslavia, was added to the text.⁴⁵

As for Tito, the anti-Western and anti-American tone of his toast at Karađorđevo ('the West, bourgeois states, Western states, all the time are attempting somehow to keep us at a distance'⁴⁶), as well as his positive appraisal of Brezhnev's intentions, which Tito reported to the topmost LCY leadership on 3 October at Brioni ('I have already mentioned that Brezhnev, as the first order of business, put forth the question of the liquidation of blocs. This is a huge matter. They never spoke of this until now'), Brezhnev's attitude toward Yugoslavia ('We were not the first to put forth the question of sovereignty. [...] True, later in the conversations there were many difficult discussions'), and his supposed change of heart toward nonalignment ('This is the first time that he [Brezhnev] expressed a certain recognition of Yugoslavia's nonalignment, and, with Yugoslavia, to the nonaligned'),⁴⁷ testify to his conservative mood in the fall of 1971.

Speaking on 5 October at a reception in Dubovac (Croatia) to the leading members of the Association of Reserve Military Officers of Yugoslavia (URVSJ), during the military maneuver 'Liberty 71', which was held in the Slunj-Karlovac area of northwestern Croatia, Tito was enthusiastic about the results of the Brezhnev visit and the end of Soviet pressures. He said that Brezhnev was misled by various sources 'from our cities, especially from Belgrade', but has come to his senses. 'While I have the army, I am afraid of nothing', Tito said, and added:

And now [Brezhnev] has come. And I must say that I am satisfied with the conversations that we had. Of course, everything that they wanted is not clear. But we are an independent country, we stand firmly on our positions, we stand firmly on our course of internal development of socialism, we firmly stand on the line of nonalignment. In one word, we do not deviate from this and that is what they had to recognize.⁴⁸

Tito concluded:

This meeting and visit brought about a certain relaxation [*smirivanje*]. Not only in our country, where people, nevertheless, were a bit worried, because the foreign press was thundering about maneuvers over there [USSR]. I told Brezhnev, moreover in a toast at Karađorđevo, we do not spend much time thinking about your maneuvers, they do not bother me much, nor am I busy over what they mean. When you have an army, of course you will drill. I said, we'll, too, have maneuvers now, and so that you would not be bothered, nor those Westerners, we placed the zone of maneuvers across Yugoslavia, so that nobody can complain. [Brezhnev] laughed. [...]

Relaxation has come, and, by God, the comments abroad are not bad. Most of the comments are good. Foreign comments are good: Yugoslavia gave up nothing; to the contrary, the previous situation was recognized. In a word, Yugoslavia remains what she has been with its foreign and domestic policy.⁴⁹

Tito's interpretation of the Brezhnev visit was repeated again and again during his numerous international meetings in the fall of 1971. On 18 October, in a conversation with the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi, Tito informed her about Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia. He stressed that

we cleared the question of sovereignty, so that [...] in our relations with the Soviet Union we remain on the principles of the 1955 [Belgrade] Declaration. It was Brezhnev who proposed this formulation. We told Brezhnev that we are not worried about the maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact. We consider that normal. If you have an army, it must have maneuvers.⁵⁰

Similarly, on 20 October, at a Cairo meeting with Anwar El Sadat, Tito attributed Egyptian problems with the USSR to disagreements between the Soviet leaders. He said that individual members of the Soviet leadership were inflexible, that Aleksei Kosygin was apparently particularly rigid, but that one could do business with Brezhnev.⁵¹

This stance was also taken during Tito's meetings with Richard Nixon at the White House (28 October). Nixon prompted an extensive discussion on the situation in the subcontinent, where the West Pakistani army was fighting a war against Bengali insurgency. Tito's concerns were different. He tried to signal that Yugoslavia's relations with the USSR were improved and at one point 'interjected that from his discussions with Brezhnev he had deduced that the Soviets also did not wish a war'. When he finally managed to turn the conversation to Brezhnev's visit, he pointed out that

there had been a great deal of speculation about Soviet intentions and threats as regards Yugoslavia. He had talked with Brezhnev alone and also with the two delegations present. He wished to point out that the draft declaration Brezhnev had brought with him—and the Yugoslavs had had no draft of their own—it had already clearly reaffirmed Yugoslav independence and sovereignty and stated that the 1955 principles remained valid. The final text as it emerged from the talks made clear that the USSR and Yugoslavia

were dealing with each other as two sovereign states and that Yugoslavia had the right to develop its own social system.

On Nixon's question 'if this applied only to Yugoslavia or went beyond it', Tito responded that 'the other East European countries were members of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, he believed that the Soviets were changing their policies.' Tito's policy stressed that Brezhnev was now much stronger, that 'he was now less restricted by the collective'. Whereas earlier 'the Soviets would not have been at all happy about [Tito's] going to the United States, now not only had they raised no objection, but Brezhnev had also asked that the Soviet wish for good relations with the U.S. be conveyed to [Nixon]'.⁵²

During the second meeting at the White House, on 30 October, Nixon stressed that

there was no question in his mind that, because of its self-interest, the USSR would continue its efforts to bring its neighbors under increased influence. The independence of Yugoslavia and Romania, regardless of these two countries' internal systems, was consistent with U.S. interests but was not consistent with Soviet interests.⁵³

Anticipating his visit to the USSR, scheduled for the spring of 1972, Nixon added that

one of the major questions to be discussed in Moscow would be the U.S. attitude towards the Eastern bloc. Our position would not be that of liberation; as Hungary has shown, liberation meant suicide. However, [Nixon] stressed, his position would be to avoid any kind of understanding with Moscow that would give the Soviets encouragement to fish in troubled waters in Yugoslavia or elsewhere. He felt that he did not have to say more than that.

He also reassured Tito that the US would not 'make any arrangements with the Chinese or the Soviets at the expense of third countries'.⁵⁴

These comments were certainly good news for Tito. They enabled him to adopt a much more self-assured stance in meetings with the Canadian leaders in Ottawa on 4 November. Tito told Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who was somewhat patronizing toward Tito, and Secretary for External Affairs Mitchell Sharp that, despite NATO's readiness to extend guarantees to Yugoslavia, 'We do not wish to have anybody defend us.

Those who have come to our defense can also be dangerous.’⁵⁵ Moreover, on 8 November, during a London meeting with Prime Minister Edward Heath and Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, Tito went very far in praising the Soviets:

Brezhnev this time showed a greater flexibility than before. We conducted extensive conversations, with delegations and tête-à-tête. I must say that Brezhnev brought with him a draft proposal for a joint declaration in which many positive things were included. We were a bit surprised that in the draft and in his statements Brezhnev himself spoke that in our relations we must remain on the Belgrade and Moscow declarations of 1955/1956. Full sovereignty was confirmed in the relations of the two sovereign countries. Brezhnev said that it is not true that the USSR was against the sovereignty of SFRY. He also recognized our right to develop our internal system as we see fit. Likewise, he accepted nonalignment in our foreign policy as a positive thing.⁵⁶

Moreover, Tito painted a rosy picture of Soviet intentions. He believed that Soviet policy toward the satellite states was changing in favor of a ‘freer’ course and that the Berlin wall would be removed should the European Security Conference succeed as a project. He rejected the idea that the USSR ‘plundered’ the East Europeans: ‘The USSR gives them a lot and in that sense they are a burden [to Moscow].’⁵⁷ It is significant that he was now openly skeptical about the prospects of reform:

Dubček made many errors. They were hasty, and went too far, too quickly. They negated everything in the past. They allowed the press fiercely to attack the USSR. And one should not forget that the ČSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] was in the Warsaw Pact, which, of course, does not change our principled stand in connection with that. During Brezhnev’s visit we did not at all discuss the ČSSR. If the people in the ČSSR are ready to accept the situation that they have, that’s their business. One must look at the situation realistically.⁵⁸

After his busy diplomatic autumn, Tito reported to the LCY Presidency and the government of Yugoslavia, on 19 November, in Belgrade. He pointed out that Nixon was ‘a bit surprised’ at Tito’s assessment that Brezhnev wanted better relations with the US.⁵⁹ Tito was irate that the Western statesmen, particularly Trudeau’s Canadians, did not understand Yugoslavia’s position:

I had to explain to them that we are not threatened by any imminent danger [from the USSR], that they are more or less dramatizing the situation more than is needed, etc., that we are sufficiently strong to insure for ourselves an undisturbed development. But frequently various articles appear and all is taken as a done deal. I think that much of it comes from our country, from our press, based on which they reach their conclusions over there. We shall discuss that at another occasion.⁶⁰

Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mirko Tepavac commented on Tito's exposé by noting that his visits and meetings in 1971 highlighted 'the period of significantly new dimensions in Yugoslavia's international bonds, and that is what essentially influences our position. We are defended neither by treaties nor guarantees; we are defended, really, by a high degree of our international connections.'⁶¹ Tepavac was bold enough to suggest that good relations with the Soviet Union might weaken Yugoslavia's position with the US.⁶² But, like Tito, he felt that

there were certain aspects of our internal situation that create difficulties abroad. I would like to turn your attention to the fact that, after a certain pause, certain unpleasant commentaries on the situation in Yugoslavia have started again; this must be noted and must be taken into account as an incentive for our appropriate action.⁶³

Tito himself was ready for action. Having bolstered his position with East and West, he was very open about his plans with Nicolae Ceaușescu during a brief visit to Timișoara, Romania, on 23 November. In a meeting that passed without any anti-Soviet intonations, Tito was frequently sardonic and in a patronizing mood. He explained to Ceaușescu that 'We certainly have more problems since we have six republics.' The reason was that based on Yugoslav federalism some people had concluded that the party, too, must be federalized. Stane Dolanc completed Tito's observation by stating that in a forthcoming party document it would be 'precisely and clearly stated that the LCY was a unitary organization and that it was the most important integrative factor in our system and in our country.' Tito added, 'Cohesive force, democratic centralism'.⁶⁴

With this background in mind, it is clear that Tito was ready for a confrontation with the Croatian leaders, when, after the beginning of a student strike at the University of Zagreb, he summoned an emergency meeting at Karadorđevo for 1 December 1971. Backed by the army and the conservatives, Tito prevailed. There ensued a major party purge,

which devastated Croatia’s reformist leadership and, by the fall of 1972, was extended to the Serbian party leadership and individual reformists in the other republics. The Soviets were pleased at this development. On 9 December, at Karađorđevo, Tito received N. K. Baibakov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the head of the Gosplan (State plan). Baibakov hailed Tito’s newest successes. In his response, Tito stressed that ‘we cannot allow the enemy to rage in Yugoslavia’. Baibakov agreed. ‘The enemy never sleeps’, he said: ‘If one waits, he will develop his dirty business. From time to time, actions must be undertaken against him.’⁶⁵

The cycle was completed. In 1968 the Yugoslavs denounced the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the most vitriolic terms. They sided with the Czechoslovak reforms, some of which were more advanced than their own, and defended the violated Czechoslovak independence. They resisted an array of Soviet pressures and threats, sought solace in various Balkan partnerships (including the most unlikely ones, with Albania, provided they were antagonistic to the Soviet Union), and won the support of the West, most especially that of Nixon’s White House.

The progress of the internal reform in Yugoslavia, especially the anti-center direction that it took in Croatia, encouraged the Soviet Union, and weakened Tito’s position. Already after the Brezhnev telephone call of 30 April Tito was set on disciplining the Croats, but that would have weakened his bargaining position with the Soviets. After the announcement of Nixon’s visit to Peking the Soviets were on the defensive. Their suspension of the rough treatment, made during the Brezhnev visit to Yugoslavia in September, their encouragement of Tito’s mediation role with the Americans, improved Yugoslavia’s position with both superpowers. The time had come to remove those obstacles that encouraged Soviet meddling. Political independence was defended by sacrificing the most offensive examples (to the Soviets and Tito) of ideological independence. Of course, there was a price to pay: cut to the bone, shorn of the illusions of hope, reform and internal home rule, the Yugoslav system became more brittle. Brittle systems easily break.

NOTES

1. V. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine 1969–1971* (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska revija, 1984), 15.
2. Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ, Archives of Yugoslavia), Belgrade. Fund 837: Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR, Cabinet of the

- President of the Republic), I-3-a/101-131, box 175: 3. Sovjetske izjave o odnosima sa Jugoslavijom, 17 September 1971, p. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
 4. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
 5. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box: 175: ‘Neke napomene uz material, Protesti, demarši, odbijanje sovjetskih zahteva koje vredjaju nezavisnost Jugoslavije’, 16 September 1971, pp. 1–2.
 6. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-130, box 182: Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa predsednikom SAD Ričardom Niksonom, 30 September 1970, p. 6.
 7. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/107-130, box 182: Zabeleška o razgovoru sa Henri Kisindžerom, 1 October 1970, pp. 4–5.
 8. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: 4. Interne izjave sovjetskih funkcionara o stanju u Jugoslaviji, 17 September 1971), pp. 2–3.
 9. Ibid., p. 3.
 10. AJ, Fund 507: Arhiv Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Jugoslavije—Predsedništvo (CK SKJ, Archives of the Central Committee of League of Communists of Yugoslavia—Presidency), III/153: 17. sednica (28, 29 i 30. IV 1971), Izveštaj Komisije saveznog izvršnog veća formirane 9. aprila 1971, p. 9.
 11. Ibid., Stenografske beleške sa sednice Izvršnog biroa Predsedništva SKJ, održane na dan 28 April 1971. u 21,30 na Brionima, pp. 2–3, 6–9.
 12. Ibid., Sedamnaesta sednica Predsedništva SKJ, p. 6.
 13. AJ, KPR, I-3-a-1, box 103: Završna reč predsednika Tita na sednici Predsedništva CKJ, 30 April 1971, pp. 104/1–2 MS.
 14. AJ, KPR, I-1/206, box 27: Riječ druga Tita na sastanku sa Izvršnim komitetom, 4 July 1971, pp. 1–2, 6.
 15. Ibid.
 16. Ibid.
 17. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: 3. Sovjetske izjave o odnosima sa Jugoslavijom, 17 September 1971, p. 10.
 18. AJ, CK SKJ-Predsedništvo, III/155: Diskusija S. Dolanca a 19. sednici Predsedništva SKJ (zatvoreni deo), Beograd?, 28 July 1971, p. 3.
 19. Ibid., p. 12.
 20. AJ, KPR, I-2/51, box 74: Ambasada SFRJ u Bukureštu, br. 281, 3 August 1971, p. 2.

21. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: Razgovor sa Brežnjevom 10. avgusta (10 August 1971), p. 2.
22. Ibid., p. 6.
23. Ibid., p. 10.
24. Ibid., p. 12.
25. Ibid., pp. 13–14.
26. Ibid.
27. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: Povodom razgovora sa Brežnjevom od 10. avgusta (Moscow, 13 August 1971), pp. 1–6.
28. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: Povodom posete Brežnjeva Jugoslaviji/mišljenja i predlozi/ (Moscow, 25 August 1971), pp. 3, 5–6.
29. Ibid., p. 15.
30. Ibid.
31. AJ, KPR, II-1/208, box 27: Reč Predsednika Tita na kraju razgovora sa predstavnicima opština Dalmacije, 1 September 1971, pp. 3–5.
32. AJ, KPR, II-1/208, box 27: Govor Predsednika Tita u ‘Prvomajskoj’, 8 September 1971, p. 7.
33. AJ, KPR, II-1/208, box 27: Reč Predsednika Tita na kraju razgovora u Koprivnici, 10 September 1971, pp. 4–5.
34. AJ, KPR, II-1/208, box 27: Reč Predsednika Tita na kraju razgovora (Varaždin, 10 September 1971), pp. 6–7.
35. AJ, KPR, II-1/208, box 27: Odgovor Predsednika Tita na zdravicu Savke Dabčević-Kučar, 14 September 1971, pp. 2–6.
36. Mićunović, *Moskovske godine*, p. 145.
37. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: Stenografske beleške sa razgovora Josipa Broza Tita, Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i Leonida Iljiča Brežnjeva, generalnog sekretara Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza, 23 September 1971, p. 2.
38. Ibid., p. 11. Mirko Tepavac had a much darker impression of Brezhnev’s performance: ‘In theatrical anger, he [Brezhnev] hit the table with a pack of cigarettes, which then spilled over the table practically to Tito’s lap. He then got up, which meant that the meeting was over! Nobody spoke to Tito that way, nor did he speak that way with others. Tito remained gloomy and icy; and the rest of us—as if caught in the rain.’ A. Nenadović, *Mirko Tepavac: Sećanja i komentari* (Belgrade: Radio B92, 1998), 140.

39. AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/101-131, box 175: Stenografske beleške, p. 3.
40. Ibid., p. 6.
41. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
42. Ibid., p. 8.
43. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
44. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-131, box 175: Stenografske beleške sa završnih razgovora Predsednika SFRJ i predsednika Saveza komunističke Jugoslavije druga Josipa Broza Tita i Generalnog sekretara Centralnog komiteta Komunističke partije Sovjetskog Saveza, 24 September 1971, pp. 3–4.
45. AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/101-131, box 175: Zabeleška o neformalnom razgovoru između delegacija SKJ i KPSS prilikom definitivnog usaglašavanja teksta jugoslovensko-sovjetske izjave, koje je izvršeno u noći, 24–5. septembra 1971. godine u Karadjordjevu, p. 14. Tepavac recalled that Tito reprimanded him for his insistence. After Tepavac showed no remorse, Tito said resignedly, ‘You don’t know them ...’, Nenadović, 141.
46. AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/101-131, box 175: Zdravica predsednika Tita (Karađorđevo, 24 September 1971), p. 2.
47. AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/101-131, box 175: Izlaganje predsednika Tita na proširenoj sednici Izvršnog biroa Predsedništva SKJ, održanoj 3. oktobra 1971. na Brionima, p. 5.
48. AJ, KPR, II-1/209, box 27: Reč Predsednika Tita a kraju sastanka sa delegacijom Udruženja rezervnih vojnih starešina Jugoslavije (Dubovac, 5 October 1971), p. 11.
49. Ibid., p. 18.
50. AJ, KPR, I-2/49-3, box 91: Zabeleška o razgovorima između Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita i Predsednika vlade Indije Indire Gandi, 18 October 1971, pp. 12–13.
51. AJ, KPR, I-2/49-3, box 91: Zabeleške o razgovoru koji je vođen u četiri oka između druga Predsednika i predsednika Arapske Republike Egipta Anuar El Sadata, 20 October 1971, pp. 1–6.
52. AJ, KPR, I-2/50-1, box 92, pp. 4–5; Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger: Meeting between President Nixon and President Tito, 28 October 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, 578–86. Tito’s sunny report on the meeting with Brezhnev was undercut by Tepavac at the evening’s reception the same day, when he privately told Secretary Rogers, ‘I want you to

know, for your own ears, and your ears only, the meeting with Brezhnev did not go well.’ Unfortunately, Rogers and Nixon misunderstood the message to be Tito’s indirect way of signaling continued Soviet danger (Nixon: ‘they fear the Russians’), whereas this was a personal initiative by strongly anti-Soviet Tepavac. See *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1969–1972, XXIX, 586–9.

53. AJ, KPR, I-2/50-1, box 92, p. 3; Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger: Meeting Between President Nixon and President Tito, 30 October 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, 590–7.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
55. AJ, KPR, I-2/50-2, box 93: Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa predsednikom kanadske vlade Pjer Eliot Trudoom, 4 November 1971, p. 7.
56. AJ, KPR, I-2/50-53, box 93: Zabeleška, 8 November 1971, p. 2.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
59. AJ, KPR, I-2/50, box 92: Zajednička sednica Predsedništva SFRJ i SIV, 19 November 1971, p. 4/3.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 6/4.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 7/3.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 7/4.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 8/5.
64. KPR I-2/51, box 74: Stenografske beleške sa razgovora predsednika republike i Saveza komunista Jugoslavije Josipa Broza Tita i predsednika državnog saveta i generalnog sekretara Rumunske komunističke partije Nikolae Čaušeskua, 23 November 1971, pp. 23, 25–6.
65. AJ, KPR, I-3-a/101-133, box 175: Beleška o razgovoru Predsednika Republike sa Bajbakovim, 9 December 1971, pp. 3, 6.

The US, the Balkans and Détente, 1963–73

Effie G.H. Pedaliu

The consequences of Western tampering in the Soviet sphere, however nuanced, were felt not just within the target countries whose behaviour it sought to modify. Often, they were experienced in neighbouring Western countries as well. This chapter will examine how a confluence of the policies of ‘differentiation’ and ‘détente’, as implemented by the Johnson and Nixon administrations, stirred up the Balkan states across the Cold War divide in ways that were to have destabilising repercussions for the whole peninsula.

Even before the end of the Second World War, the Balkans experienced the tensions of the looming global conflict with such severity that the area projected a distorted image of the Cold War. Throughout the bipolar conflict the distribution of power between East and West in the peninsula remained very similar to that envisaged by the British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in their ‘percentages agreement’ of October 1944. However, this division along Cold War lines had been superimposed over an area where the Second World War had resuscitated and intensified deep-seated, pre-existing ethnic rivalries and atavistic tendencies. The Balkan ‘powder-keg’ had to accommodate

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itself to the Cold War, but even bipolarity could not arrest let alone extinguish the region's propensity towards fragmentation.

The Cold War was experienced differently in the Balkans than the other regions of Europe where a stable equilibrium was predicated on states pledging their unreserved allegiance to the bloc to which they belonged.¹ The significance of the Balkans for both superpowers was never likened to the Central Front where the divide was frozen and beyond challenge as shown by American reactions to the uprisings in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956. Within the wider edifice of Cold War norms, loyalty in the Balkans was prone to conditionality and disquiet on both sides of the Cold War divide emerged early on. In the Western camp, Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO since 1952, co-existed with their communist neighbours in the North in a state of armed preparedness, and yet only just avoided war with each other. Not even communism could suppress nationalism in the Balkan communist bloc which comprised countries that tolerated Soviet hegemony, seeing it as a necessary prerequisite for security and economic development and others that wished to see off Soviet domination and explore 'national' approaches to communist development. Yugoslavia's bid for independence in 1948 was inextricably related to Soviet unwillingness to back Tito's territorial and nationalist ambitions in Italy and the Balkans.² Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej's Romania began loosening its ties with the Warsaw Pact as early as 1958³ and its bid for 'independence from the USSR' accelerated when the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CMEA) failed to assign the country the industrial future that it wished.⁴ Enver Hoxha, the Albanian leader, expelled the Red Navy from Vlore in 1961 and ditched Soviet hegemony in favour China. His actions ensured that the Sino-Soviet split and China too, would also cast their long shadows over the region.⁵ By the early 1960s, there was just one communist country in the Balkans that remained loyal to the USSR and Moscow's trust in it assigned Bulgaria the role of a Soviet *locum tenens*.⁶ Such unruly behaviour became possible only because the USSR lacked the economic and military resources to micromanage developments in what was a peripheral theatre of the Cold War.

After the suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the US needed to adjust its strategy towards Eastern Europe since 'liberation' had been exposed as being too risky. The new policy needed to be

less intrusive than intensive covert operations, but robust enough to achieve change behind the Iron Curtain, albeit more slowly, working through low-key economic and cultural infiltration.⁷ This strategy of differentiation would be extended from Yugoslavia and Poland to the whole of Eastern Europe. It was a finely nuanced policy that aimed to increase tensions subtly in the Soviet bloc by rewarding through marginal economic inducements, Eastern European countries that evinced signs of independence from the USSR and/or the Warsaw Pact or moves to internal liberalization.⁸ As Hixson puts it, Washington came to see that ‘gradual cultural infiltration could be a more effective weapon against the Soviet Empire than aggressive psychological warfare’.⁹

JOHNSON’S DIFFERENTIATION AND ITS IMPACT ON GREECE AND TURKEY

Fickle loyalties in the Balkans offered the best circumstances for the US to ‘hone in’ on the better instruments of differentiation. Economic and technical aid were particularly well-suited means to a region like the Balkans where countries were trying to escape economic backwardness.¹⁰ During Eisenhower’s last term and Kennedy’s short presidency, all efforts to unroll differentiation fully were disrupted by the frequent crises over Berlin, the adoption by West Germany of the Hallstein doctrine in 1955 and by fate. By the time Lyndon Baines Johnson came to power, the Cuban Missile Crisis (CMC) and the proto-détente it stimulated, had created a more hospitable environment for differentiation. The timing of the CMC, only thirteen months after the official establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961, boosted Tito, as international statesman.¹¹ The Romanians, who first heard of the CMC from the press, according to Garthoff, quite unexpectedly and hesitantly approached the US on 4 October 1963. The Romanian foreign minister Corneliu Mănescu tried to reassure Dean Rusk, the US secretary for state, of Bucharest’s disapproval of Soviet actions in Cuba and promised him that in a future crisis Romania would adopt a position of neutrality in exchange for the US not targeting Romania for nuclear retaliation. Rusk responded that the US would reserve its actions towards states that did not facilitate Soviet actions against it and its allies. In April 1964, the so-called ‘Romanian declaration of independence’ was issued, a public statement

expressing dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Pact and economic integration through CMEA.¹² The Albanians, meanwhile, regarded Soviet responses over the CMC as feeble.¹³ The crisis helped China deepen its toehold in Albania to cause discomfort to the USSR. Such manoeuvring by the communist Balkan states could not disguise the fact that the regional security environment during the CMC had deteriorated perilously as Bulgaria put its armed forces on a very public state of armed preparedness and this created profound fears not just in Belgrade, Bucharest and Tirana, but also in Athens and Ankara.¹⁴

The CMC and proto-détente affected America's Balkan partners deeply. Bulgarian bellicosity during the CMC led to palpable fear in Greece and Turkey that their nations could be in the front line of a side-show, a face-saving limited nuclear war aimed at preventing an all-out nuclear exchange. Both countries were also becoming introspective as they faced domestic volatility amplified by thier problems over Cyprus that brought them close to war. Turkey was directly affected by the crisis since the eventual resolution of the CMC involved the withdrawal by the US of Jupiter missiles from Turkish territory. When Turkey had accepted hosting the 'Jupiters' it had made its own political and economic calculations. The invisible earnings accrued from American military personnel associated with the Jupiter missiles would now stop flowing into the Turkish economy, and economic growth would also be affected since foreign capital could interpret the missile withdrawal as an indication of a waning US interest in the country. Therefore feelings of 'abandonment' grew in Ankara and questions were asked over the reliability of the hegemon.¹⁵

The year 1964 would prove crucial for US relations with Balkan states on both sides of the divide. Johnson decided that he needed to steady American relations with Eastern Europe and he wanted to co-opt Western Europe in this endeavour. On 23 May 1964 at Lexington, Virginia, he spoke about 'building bridges across the Gulf (sic) which has divided us from Eastern Europe'. He indicated that the bridges he had in mind were 'bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid'.¹⁶ His troubles with Vietnam prompted a return to this theme again on 7 October 1966. This time he tried to reassure the USSR by stressing that the American government did not wish to 'overturn other governments', but heal division through 'peaceful engagement' and in consultation with the USSR.¹⁷ In reality, however, the US adopted a mixed approach with differentiation as the third and most potent ingredient in the mix.

Johnson's attempts to promote differentiation had a Balkan flavour since Romania offered new opportunities and the US could use its own experience with Yugoslavia as a template to reward other 'good Balkan communists'. The channels of communication with Mănescu had been kept open and trade featured prominently in these exchanges.¹⁸ Johnson could see clearly that Romania was moving towards what Larrabee described as 'partial alignment' and he decided to take his chances and unfold the full panoply of differentiation by making credit guarantees available to it in June 1964.¹⁹ The Romanians used Vietnam as a means to expedite relations with the US by initiating well-timed approaches that presented Romania as an invaluable backchannel for communications between the United States and North Vietnam. These moves had started with Gheorghiu-Dej and gathered momentum under Ceaușescu. Unsurprisingly, their offers of help were always linked with Romanian wish lists for economic cooperation.²⁰ By 1965, there was a clear growth in Romanian trade with the US and Western Europe. By 1967, Ceaușescu had moved to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany, and Romania was to be the only Eastern European country not to sever relations with Israel after the Six Day War. Still, Johnson was careful not to pick favourites between Romania and Yugoslavia.

The apparent thawing of the Cold War and America's efforts to recalibrate its relations with Eastern Europe together with the increasing American focus on South East Asia did not play well with its allies in the Northern Mediterranean and the Americans knew it. From Portugal to Greece and Turkey, the launching of a détente process from a position of apparent weakness was perceived to be subtracting from Southern Europe's worth to the Atlantic alliance.²¹ Moreover, this perception was forming in a deteriorating security environment in the Mediterranean and Senator Mike Mansfield's (US Senate majority leader) resolutions calling for reductions in American troop levels in Europe. It is hardly surprising then that NATO member states did not accept détente until assurances relating to Mediterranean security had been embedded in the shape of the Harmel report in 1967 and the Reykjavik NAC in 1968 that earmarked NATO's southern flank for strengthening.²²

Johnson had to take a strong line with Turkey to keep the peace in NATO's southern flank. The 'Johnson letter' in 1964 turned Turkish ambivalence over détente into negativity. The almost explicit threat to Turkey that an invasion of Cyprus could invalidate NATO's obligation to

protect it in the case of Soviet attack was seen by the government of Prime Minister Inonu and by its supporters as being directly linked with proto-détente and as yet another sign of the diminishing reliability of the US.²³ Moreover, when the letter was leaked, it disturbed delicate socio-political balances in Turkey and buttressed forces hostile towards NATO and the US. By 1968, matters had deteriorated to such a degree that the American Sixth Fleet was greeted by hostile crowds in Turkish ports.²⁴

Attempts at any type of détente proved to be equally destabilizing for Greece where they generated feelings of both ‘abandonment’ and ‘entrapment’. Greece’s fears of abandonment had been present since the mid-1950s, and were exacerbated by the strains Cyprus caused in its relations with its allies. The early 1960s also raised fears of entrapment, when the crises over Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962 fostered fears that the country could become a target of retaliation or even for the staging of a Soviet diversionary manoeuvre spearheaded by Bulgaria.²⁵ The early 1960s in Greece had been years of domestic political transformation and the ‘opening to the Centre’ was propelling the country towards a more representative and inclusive socio-political system. Ultra right-wing elements in Greece feared that proto-détente was promoting over-democratisation at home and thus, their political nullification. Greek democracy was to prove too weak to thwart the conspiratorial activities of these circles. The dictators of the 21 April 1967 coup proclaimed themselves to be loyal to NATO and the US. At a time of upheaval and rising Mediterranean instability underlined by the Six Day War, the Johnson administration adopted an equivocal approach towards the dictators that helped them consolidate their position.²⁶

Even more ominously for Johnson, ‘the winds of change blowing in Eastern Europe’²⁷ which he had evoked in his New York speech in 1966 would have unforeseen results. The USSR proved to be less than forthcoming to ‘bridges’ with Eastern Europe.²⁸ In August 1968, the crushing of the ‘Prague Spring’ by the Warsaw Pact, demonstrated clearly how far and where within its sphere of influence the Soviet Union would tolerate the effects of differentiation and domestic dissent. Johnson’s fears over the security situation in the Balkans persisted well into September 1968 when he revealed to congressional leaders that the Soviets ‘might want to clean up Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia, at the same time’.²⁹ Rusk issued a clear caution to the Russians: ‘Soviet action against Yugoslavia would produce a far more formidable crisis than Czechoslovakia. We cannot look calmly at Soviet actions aimed at the Adriatic area.’³⁰ Soviet

action in Czechoslovakia failed to derail détente but it created a simmering apprehension of a sudden and unexpected Soviet overreaction.

SUPERPOWER DÉTENTE AND THE BALKANS

President Richard M. Nixon's 'era of negotiations' had been launched in anticipation of achieving a conservative cure-all for America's domestic and international problems.³¹ Nixon and his National Security Assistant, Henry A. Kissinger, would apply detente in more audacious, encompassing and often more imprudent ways than Eisenhower had. They exploited the process to manage and strengthen the Cold War order and repair America's self-confidence, domestic consensus and international credibility, but their intention was that detente would be ephemeral.³² The solidity of the Western bloc from internal challenge became a mandatory prerequisite for its successful pursuit. The Nixon administration came to perceive the Mediterranean region as an area where the balance of power could turn against the West under the stresses of Soviet opportunism, deeply entrenched ethnic disputes, the French challenge and the expansion of the Cold War into the Third World. This made the stability of the region vital for the security of the NATO area and underscored Southern Europe's important location at a critical fault-line in the North-South divide—a front line that had to remain impermeable to Soviet interests.³³ Nixon approached Mediterranean affairs with realism but cynicism too. For all the highbrow theorizing over its implementation, détente rested on some gross oversimplifications that led Washington to incline towards dictatorships over possibly unpredictable and fragile democracies.³⁴ The exclusion of Southern Europe from the détente process was the inevitable result such reductive thinking.³⁵ Italy, the only democracy in the region, sounded the alarm. Aldo Moro, the Italian foreign minister, told Nixon that the stifling pressure on the region ought to lessen but his appeal went unheeded.³⁶

Mediterranean volatility and détente tested severely Yugoslav relations with the US, the USSR and the NAM. Tito's 'national communist experiment' was based on getting Yugoslav independence from the USSR, and at the same time obtaining security and economic benefits from the West, though not to become part of it. Non-alignment offered him the best option, but by the 1970s the Cold War was moving into the Third World, spreading bipolarity worldwide and limiting the viability of the movement. As Kissinger put it, Tito's ability

to act as a non-aligned leader was 'in part a luxury that depend[ed] on American power'.³⁷ During the Six Day War, Tito allowed a Soviet airlift over Yugoslav airspace, despite his reservations about excessive Soviet activity in the Mediterranean which he found threatening. He needed, however, to bolster Nasser at this time, a supportive ally to Yugoslavia within the NAM.³⁸ In the meanwhile, China was building its Mediterranean presence through aid for Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Syria.³⁹ Such activity by China was also to influence Yugoslav decisions during the Middle East war in 1967. By August 1968, any sense of 'honeymoon' between Belgrade and Moscow was long dead but this did not mean that Tito had become more pliant to Western imperatives nor that his headaches with the NAM were over. Détente also undercut Yugoslavia's relevance to non-alignment because African and Asian members perceived the process in negative terms. For them it was a disingenuous policy that aimed to reduce tensions in Europe whilst cranking them up in the Third World. In 1972, Tito endorsed the Tunisian and Algerian initiative for making the Mediterranean a 'lake of peace' in order to appease non-aligned states that were getting irate with his support for a European security conference. He had tried to link European and Mediterranean security issues, but this hurt the sensibilities of the US that saw the 'lake of peace' initiative as being likely to benefit just the USSR.⁴⁰

When Nixon visited Europe in 1970, one of his aims was to let the USSR and the Arab world know that the US would not tolerate any shifts to the balance of power in the Mediterranean.⁴¹ He made a point of visiting Yugoslavia. Tito echoed to him his by now familiar position that Israel ought to withdraw from the occupied territories; he reiterated his support for the creation of a Palestinian state and he also registered his unhappiness over the US Sixth Fleet having such a strong presence in the Mediterranean. The only issue with which Nixon could derive some comfort was that Tito wanted the Arabs to recognize Israel.⁴² The sullen attitude of Yugoslavia was directly related to its fears about how superpower détente was emboldening the Soviets and stirring up their interest in growing Yugoslav ethnic friction. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Yugoslavia's domestic fault lines had become more evident. When Brezhnev visited Belgrade in September 1971, he sharply criticized his hosts for their economic and political model and their reluctance to embark on closer relations with the USSR.⁴³ How rattled Tito had been

by this visit became clear when he visited the US. Although, American support did not stop, it became apparent that the Nixon administration was more interested in Romania and in Yugoslavia's political orientation after Tito's death.⁴⁴

The Nixon Administration demoted differentiation to subservience in the process of superpower détente. Its intensity was toned down and its focus shifted from Yugoslavia to Romania. Any complications that differentiation had brought about for America's Balkan allies remained unattended and this led to uncertainty and unpredictability in the region. This prompted Zbigniew Brzezinski to talk about 'benign neglect'.⁴⁵ In this environment an upgraded role for Romania was to Yugoslavia's detriment.⁴⁶ This upset the delicate equilibrium that Johnson's differentiation had established in the communist Balkans, an equitable differentiation without favourites. Yugoslav dissatisfaction with what Belgrade perceived to be American inattention welled up in May 1973 when articles appeared in the local press claiming that the Voice of America (VOA) news service 'gives its microphones over to Ustashi emigres'.⁴⁷

Romania's elevation in America's Balkan pecking order, however, was not just about differentiation. It came about because the US thought that Ceaușescu could smooth US access to China—something that Yugoslavia could not offer so readily.⁴⁸ There was no disguising that the Romanians were better placed to play the role of the intermediary.⁴⁹ Nixon had visited Romania in August 1969, almost a year before he visited Yugoslavia. The discussions between Nixon, Kissinger and Ceaușescu focused on China. The Romanians were eager to do America's bidding over China so long as this did not vex Moscow and was advantageous to them.⁵⁰ As Dragomir suggests, the main objective of Romanian foreign policy during détente was not to find a new hegemon but to secure its national interests.⁵¹ The Soviets monitored Ceaușescu's manoeuvres closely and they demonstrated their irritation over closer Sino-Romanian relations and Ceaușescu's visit to China by holding two major Warsaw Pact military exercises 'South 71' and 'Opal 71' alongside Romanian borders.⁵² In turn, the Americans were careful not to cause irrevocable damage to relations between the USSR and Romania, since this could unpick their efforts to effect détente.⁵³ Therefore, from early on the Nixon administration used the Kissinger–Dobrynin backchannel frequently to ensure that they did not push Soviet toleration to breaking point and, as well, to maintain

the 'noughty agreement', as Churchill referred to the percentages agreement of 1944. Over time, how frequently Romania was mentioned during Kissinger–Dobrynin discussions was to become a weathervane on the state of health of détente.⁵⁴

BALKAN FEARS AND 'MICRO-DÉTENTE'

For the Balkan states, superpower power détente raised the fear that their national interests would be compromised on the altar of superpower cooperation. Such insecurities led the Balkan countries to launch their own micro-détente process in order to break out from the asphyxiation of superpower détente. At the same time, a local détente held out a prospect of stimulating economic development, blunting Soviet intrigue and preparing for the post-Tito era. Also, Chinese interest in the region offered new economic development opportunities.

By the mid-1970s, China had supported two five-year development plans in Albania; it had given Albania an interest-free loan of 1.55 m yuan⁵⁵ and it had furnished the country with chemical weapons.⁵⁶ What Albania had found attractive initially about China was its geographical remoteness, but after the events of 1968, Hoxha decided that with the Soviets aroused and the Greek dictators conspiring against him, China could not really protect his country.⁵⁷ The Albanians tried to block the roads that the Red Army could use to access their country by seeking improved relations with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. At the same time they buried the hatchet with Greece. Hoxha's first step was to approach Tito. Yugoslavia and Albania succeeded in expanding their economic and cultural relations and by 1971 Hoxha had re-established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with both Yugoslavia and Romania and secured recognition of Albania by Greece.⁵⁸

Bulgaria also seemed willing to resume the limited rapprochement with its Balkan neighbours it had achieved with Greece and Romania in the early 1960s.⁵⁹ Zhivkov's objectives were mixed since differentiation had had its impact in Bulgaria too. He needed access to development funds and technology from the West to modernize the Bulgarian economy. However, Zhivkov's motives were an amalgam of national and Soviet objectives and this made his potential partners more wary. By promoting multilateral cooperation in the Balkans he hoped to weaken NATO's southern flank, sign up supporters for the long-standing Soviet aim of

convening a conference on the security of Europe and arrest pressures for further fragmentation within the Eastern bloc arising from super-power détente. He initiated diplomatic contacts with Turkey, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania and even courted Italy. Aldo Moro visited Sofia in April 1970; Ivan Bashev, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, visited Athens in May 1970; in September, Zhivkov met Ceauşescu; in October, the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel visited Sofia; in November, the Albanian Foreign Minister Gogo Kozma did so too; and in late November, Zhivkov initiated an exchange of correspondence with Tito to restore Yugoslav–Bulgarian relations to a tense, yet correct level.⁶⁰ These initiatives were accompanied by agreements for economic cooperation and Bulgarian promptings for achieving even ‘a greater improvement in the political climate in the Balkans’.⁶¹ However, Bulgaria’s close relationship with the USSR always loomed large and tentative exploratory US–Bulgarian talks on expansion of trade foundered on Bulgarian objections to the VOA transmitters sited in Greece. As well, the US National Security Council (NSC) thought that the State Department under William Rogers’ tutelage was taking unnecessary risks by overextending its generosity to Bulgaria. In the end, the NSC opinion prevailed. The Zhivkov–Brezhnev relationship was just too strong to tamper with.⁶²

The Romanians were similarly active with diplomatic initiatives but their objectives were more opaque and complicated than the other Balkan countries. They too wished to frustrate marginalization by the superpowers and to expand their trade with other Balkan countries. However, their initiatives were more ambitious than those of their neighbours. They wished to create a ‘Balkan bloc’ and aspired to a local détente that would be essentially multilateral in nature, similar to the Stoica plan for a ‘nuclear free Balkans’. What Romania was attempting was to pull away from the USSR and yet, at the same time, do its bidding by proposing multilateral cooperation in the region to undermine the southern flank by compromising Greek and Turkish *miens* in NATO.⁶³

Unlike the Romanians, Tito was determined that any cooperation in the area would have to be on a bilateral basis. With the USSR’s special relationship with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia’s complex ethnic make-up and the tensions between the two Balkan states over the Macedonian Question, any multilateral arrangement that included Bulgaria held the danger for Tito that the Soviets could exploit Yugoslav ethnic problems as a pre-

text for intervention. At the same time, Yugoslavia had much to gain from 'Balkan détente'. Its economic experiment with self-management had run out of steam and Tito's aim now was to reinvigorate the economy through Balkan trade and use regional cooperation to prevent his neighbours from exacerbating Yugoslav own problems.⁶⁴

Balkan détente was a subversive process essentially. Whilst its participants acquiesced fully to bipolarity, they tried to tamper with its rigidity. Paradoxically, the Greek junta emerged as an active promoter of Balkan cooperation, while Turkey remained aloof and its engagement with the process was confined to ensuring that it did not get isolated. Very simply, the Balkans did not feature highly in Turkish foreign policy priorities. Relations with the West and economic development were its main foreign policy aims and superpower détente had caused much disappointment in the country. Turkey remained thus, on the sidelines, brooding, but not entirely disengaged.⁶⁵

Stoicism and biding for the right time were not characteristics of the Greek junta's foreign policy. It dived headlong into Balkan détente, a policy that had been elaborated in the Greek foreign ministry, but which the junta would pursue with typical clumsiness. The dictators approached Balkan détente with one very specific aim seeing it as a means of acquiring an international role that would not be circumscribed by their undemocratic credentials. With typical cunning, the regime wanted both international respectability and economic aid to help it achieve complete consolidation domestically, so it used the process to startle Greece's traditional allies in the West into abandoning their perch sitting. The dictators were quite open about their intentions. Stylianos Pattakos, the junta's number two, put it thus to Sir Robert Hooper, the British ambassador in Athens—it was just 'something for Greece to fall back on'.⁶⁶

The timings of the junta's Balkan initiatives are of interest here. Its first efforts to improve relations with its Balkan neighbours began just after it narrowly escaped censure by the UN in February 1968 and as the Council of Europe (CoE) was preparing for the hearing of the 'Greek Case' in May 1968. In the spring of 1968, the Greek Foreign Minister, Panagiotis Pipinelis, a very experienced diplomat and the architect of Greece's rapprochement with Bulgaria in 1964, proposed the establishment of a 'Balkan code of good conduct'. Pipinelis was the ultimate realist of Greek diplomacy. His original proposal had fallen on deaf ears, but

after the events in Czechoslovakia it encountered more fertile ground in Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Then, in 1969, as moves against Greece in the CoE gathered pace, the junta became more deeply involved in secret, exploratory diplomacy with its northern neighbours. In early 1970, Greece signed trade agreements with Bulgaria and Romania. Pipinelis could not hold back his glee just after the signing of the Bulgarian trade agreement in March 1970, when pointedly, he said in an interview that ‘the Bulgarian press is more correct in its attitude toward Greece than is Sweden.’⁶⁷ Pipinelis’ death in June 1970 paved the way for the dictators to open up diplomatic relations with Albania in 1971, a country with which Greece had been in a technical state of war since 1945.⁶⁸ During the seven years of dictatorship, Greek trade with the Eastern bloc almost doubled in value.⁶⁹

The junta’s deliberate ‘cat and mouse’ game with Greece’s Western allies created fears that it might well decide to side with Balkan countries in ways that could undermine the unity of NATO.⁷⁰ On the one hand, in 1971 Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, the Alternate Greek Foreign Minister, resisted signing up to a common position with Bulgaria on the Middle East and Vietnam and also with Romania on a ‘Balkan nuclear free zone’.⁷¹ On the other hand, by June 1971, he would use Balkan détente as a means to threaten his NATO allies by half implying that Greece had other options if ‘the malevolence’ shown towards it continued.⁷² Those games worried London sufficiently enough to prompt a discussion between the deputy under-secretary of state in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Sir Thomas Brimelow, and Xanthopoulos-Palamas, on Greece’s stand over multilateral cooperation in the Balkans.⁷³ When Brimelow pressed Xanthopoulos-Palamas on whether Greece was willing to agree to the convening of a Balkan conference, he obfuscated along the lines that ‘things must be allowed to mature’ before any multilateral steps were taken.⁷⁴ Xanthopoulos-Palamas was prepared to exert maximum pressure on Greece’s NATO allies but also careful not to be drawn into challenging the major global policy objectives of the US. The FCO concluded that no man of his impeccable Western credentials—he was a former ambassador to the United States and an ex-permanent representative to NATO—would engineer the ‘de-alignment’ of Greece. It also interpreted Greece’s Balkan policy as a ‘bluff’ aimed at soothing its feelings wounded by ‘the perceived coolness of the Western European countries’.⁷⁵

The Americans too, were not sure exactly how to interpret the junta's haste to strike up relations with communist countries both near and far away. The Nixon administration was not worried about the possibility of 'de-alignment'—this is why it had given the regime its strongest verbal and material support. However, Balkan détente and the growth of Chinese international activity combined with improved Sino-American relations created a mix that was too unstable for the US to control effectively.⁷⁶ Greece's actions, in particular, had increased Soviet uncertainty. Moscow worried that an anti-Soviet bloc could be established in the Balkans and Soviet suspicions were not exactly unmerited since China's policy towards the Balkans was indeed aimed at establishing such a grouping.⁷⁷ The Eastern bloc media, thus, were employed to issue warnings to Yugoslavia and Romania against any attempts to revive the pre-war multilateral arrangements of the 'Balkan entente' of 1933 by sending the message that any such efforts were to the detriment of 'socialist unity'.⁷⁸

The involvement of Greece also raised Soviet doubts about the role of the US in all this scheming because of the close relationship between the Nixon administration and the junta.⁷⁹ But, the US needed to steer clear of Sino-Balkan intrigues and avoid giving an opportunity to the Soviets to exploit détente in order to undermine Romania and Yugoslavia.⁸⁰ The Americans became anxious that any ineptitude on the part of Greece in the Balkans could lead to a further Soviet encroachment into the Eastern Mediterranean and undermine superpower détente. In this context, the US found Greek posturing irksome as Nixon and Kissinger were well aware of Soviet sensitivity in the Balkans. The 'China card' had been intended to make Russia pliable and perhaps even paranoid, but not desperate and dangerous.⁸¹

Despite the opacity and the complexity of the key participants' motives, the Balkan detente seemed to have a chance to blossom. Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia established a network of bilateral arrangements in, for example, commerce, culture and tourism. Balkan detente was a provocative process. Whilst its adherents acquiesced fully to bipolarity, they tried to breach its rigidity. However, in a bipolar world such efforts across the divide were to have a short life. By the end of 1973 Balkan détente ran out of steam. Superpower détente, together with America's attempt to develop a triangular relationship with the two foremost communist countries, and yet another Middle Eastern war, made the international situation too perilous for a détente in the Balkans and stifled it. Profound and new insecurities now led the Balkan countries to become involved in the European détente process. The global recession precipitated by the OPEC

(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo after the Yom Kippur War on top of the pressures resulting from Nixon's unravelling of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 hit the Balkans hard. The Yugoslav economy was particularly badly hit as it was closely dependent on Western economies. The oil crisis did not directly affect Romania, but the prolonged stagflation in the global economy hurt its exports. Bulgaria became even more dependent on Russia for oil and from 1973 onwards the foreign debt of the country spiralled forcing it to turn to tourism to earn the foreign currency it needed to pay for its oil supplies. Fuel shortages and social disruption would be the legacy from OPEC to the communist Balkan states. Meanwhile, Albania returned to isolationism and Greece turned towards 'a primitive foreign policy approach'. The conditions had now become too challenging for a Balkan détente to prosper.

CONCLUSIONS

Although differentiation and détente destabilised the Balkans and ultimately undermined each other's efficacy, both did succeed in chipping away at Soviet might. The 'era of negotiations' was based on the premise that the superpowers would be able to control any unintended consequences of détente that could undermine their control. Pressures from the US to inhibit change in the Mediterranean were paralleled by Soviet attempts to solidify Eastern Europe. As John Campbell acutely observed: 'détente, of course, does not have the same purposes for all concerned, and some may find its fruits bitter or the sugarplums unripe'.⁸² A shared fear of marginalization brought the countries of the Balkan peninsula together to remind their patrons that they could not be taken for granted. They attempted to avoid being squeezed into irrelevance and decided that in order to digest superpower détente and not be ingested by it, they had to take action by embarking on a local détente. In a bipolar world, however, such efforts could only be short-lived because of the actions of the superpowers and above all, because of the tendency of the region to fragment.

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PART IV

Balkan Dilemmas in the 1970s and
1980s and the ‘Significant Other’:
The EEC

The Only Game in Town? EEC, Southern Europe and the Greek Crisis of the 1970s

Eirini Karamouzi

INTRODUCTION

On 28 May 1979, Greece—against all odds and five years ahead of Spain and Portugal—signed the Treaty of Accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in Athens.¹ It was the culmination of an effort that had commenced in the late 1950s when Greece had become the first country to be granted association status on 9 July 1961.² In 1975, the then Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis who oversaw Greece's transition to democracy, applied for EEC membership as a long-lasting measure to protect the country's nascent democratic institutions, secure its social cohesion and economic modernization, and ultimately guarantee enduring integration in the West. Greece had experienced a dictatorship since 1967, a period that abruptly ended in 1974 with a Greek-sponsored coup d'état against the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios and the subsequent double Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This was neither the first nor the last time since the inception of the Greek state that the political and intellectual elites turned to Europe.³ Greece had a tradition of participation in numerous alliances throughout its modern history because of its small size, economic backwardness and unstable geopolitical neighborhood.

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Such alliances had enabled Greece to strengthen its national security and advance its economic development. Often, however, such a reliance on external allies subjected Greece's domestic politics and policies to foreign influence and in lack of Greek ownership allowed several political elites and their followers to view these alliances, including EEC membership, either as a panacea that would cure all the country's problems or as a plague to be blamed for the country's ills.⁴

Not surprisingly therefore, the second enlargement, namely, the accession first of Greece and then of Spain and Portugal, has been revisited by historians and political scientists alike recently, especially following the opening of the state/Community archives of the 1970s and early 1980s.⁵ The bulk of the historical work on the enlargement of the Community, however, has a rather introspective character.⁶ Research on Greece and the EEC, albeit limited, tends to adopt a national approach, examining the contributing role of domestic economic, political and social factors.⁷ Such an approach highlights the interaction between domestic forces and the development of the applicant's European policy. Nonetheless, it fails to capture the transformative impact of enlargement on the EEC itself, the importance of the effects of negotiations on its institutional structures and its political cohesion, and finally, on the way the Community as an organization debates and responds to the pressures and demands of applicants.⁸

This chapter, in adopting a multi-level and multi-archival analysis, will focus on Greece, which was the first out of the three Southern European countries to dive into the fray of enlargement, and secondly will concentrate on the internal deliberations amongst the nine EC member states in the critical period between Athens' formal application in June 1975 and the Community's decision to open up entry talks with Greece in February 1976. Although the period under examination precedes the formal negotiations between Greece and the EEC that commenced at the end of 1976, it is extremely telling of the Nine's thinking in their political decision to say 'yes' to Greece and of the Community's ultimate motivation to expand southwards in the 1970s.

Greek entry to the EEC constituted a landmark in the Community's enlargement history and its evolution for two reasons. It presented a genuine challenge to the Nine who had to deal with the changing nature of applicants—from long established democratic and market economies to recently democratized and economically less developed states. Secondly, and linked to these countries domestic volatile situations and the evolving international system of détente, it was a round of accession where the

importance of Cold War calculations for the stability of Europe's southern flank were pronounced.⁹

GREECE'S NASCENT DEMOCRACY KNOCKING ON THE EEC'S DOOR

As soon as the dictatorship fell, the EEC was seen as the only appropriate forum where Greece could restore its confidence and support the country's democratization process. The freezing of the Athens Association Agreement of 1961 after the coup, coupled with the forced withdrawal from the Council of Europe in 1969, had contributed to the symbolic association of Europe with democracy in Greek eyes. In marked contrast to the perceived American stance of indifference and even tolerance towards the Colonels' rule, the EEC's use of political and economic sanctions had helped undermine the legitimacy of the military dictatorship.¹⁰ Whilst Washington remained essential to Greek national security,¹¹ within Karamanlis' small circle one clear conclusion was drawn. Greece needed to reduce over-dependence on the USA and achieve multilateral diplomacy without questioning the vital premises of the post-1945 Greek foreign policy of belonging to the West. The newly pursued multilateralism included policies unthinkable to pre-1974 conservatives. Karamanlis took personal interest in expanding the web of political but mainly economic relations with the Balkan states.¹² However, such policies, despite their symbolic importance, produced limited practical results. Conversely, EEC membership seemed to offer a viable solution to the Greek domestic predicament and accelerated progress towards membership became a top priority on the government's agenda. Europe offered the Greeks an alternative model for democratic growth untarnished by the real and alleged sins of the United States.¹³

The surprising arrival of the Greek application for membership, however, rocked the EEC boat with a series of economic, institutional and political problems. The Athens government could have hardly chosen a worse moment to apply. The 1973 oil shock that plunged the industrialized West into recession put the Community model under duress. Indeed, several Community policies had suffered substantive setbacks that made the member states uneasy at the prospect of a fresh widening, only two years since the previous enlargement and whilst Britain was renegotiating its own membership.¹⁴ The situation was made all the more critical by the

presence of a geopolitical dimension that had been mostly absent during the first enlargement. Security came to the fore suddenly, when Greece decided to withdraw from NATO's military command on 14 August 1974 in the wake of the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The simultaneous fall of the other two southern European dictatorships of Portugal and Spain coupled with the political and financial turmoil that beset Italy during the same period, exacerbated fears of potential destabilization of the Western position throughout Southern Europe. Worries about the Western system's balance were compounded by the prospect of accepting Greece, whose relations with its largest neighbor and the strategically pivotal state along NATO's southern flank, Turkey, could only be described as hostile. Admitting Greece would inevitably entail the risk of getting the Community entangled in the Greco-Turkish dispute and, as a result, disturb the equal distance the Community sought to maintain between the two countries—bearing in mind that Turkey was not only a key NATO member but also an associate EEC member.

Alongside the geopolitical concerns, the economic dimension was setting off alarm bells in Brussels. Greece's depressed economy and inefficient civil administration would further test the Community's institutions. If the Greek state were to enter the EEC, it would have to undergo substantial structural changes for which the Community would most probably bear the financial brunt in the form of transfers of resources. Crucially, Greece was never examined on its own merits but rather seen as a forerunner of the other two emerging Southern European democracies: a 'Yes' to Greece would make it much harder to say 'No' to Spain and Portugal. The prospect of a Mediterranean enlargement in turn would provide unwelcome competition and further strain the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Ultimately, it would oblige the Community to proceed to a full-scale reform of CAP in order to ease Italian and French concerns about Greek and much more importantly, Spanish competition in Mediterranean agricultural produce.

Arguments on both the Community and the Greek side were familiar to the Commission. It shared the need not to snub the Greeks in their precarious political climate of transition but as a guardian of the Treaties felt it bore the responsibility to point out the challenges that possible entry would pose on the institutional and political development of the EEC. Moreover, the Commission assumed that Greece, as one of its officials put it, 'had been fed a rather heavy diet of positive commentary about Greek membership from the very highest levels of governments in mem-

ber states' and thus failed to recognize the need for a preparatory period of economic aid that would enable it to overcome its structural weaknesses and adapt more easily to the Community's mechanisms and policies.¹⁵ The Commission's Opinion, finally submitted to the Council of Ministers on 28 January 1976, was considered to be a lukewarm statement which on one hand recognized fully the democratic obligation in accepting Greece's bid for membership but on the other considered the upcoming enlargement as an opportune time to deepen the process of European integration. The suggestion for an affirmative reply to Greece but with a ten-year pre-accession period would address these conflicting anxieties.¹⁶ In an unprecedented act in the enlargement's history and following Athens' strong reaction and heavy-handed lobbying of the Nine, the Council defied the Commission by unanimously rejecting its Opinion merely two weeks after its submission. There was no dispute that the Greek application involved an economically and politically fragile country whose possible inclusion in the Community could bring closer to home the Greco-Turkish dispute at a time of perceived Eurosclerosis.¹⁷ However, such anxieties gave way to the overwhelming imperative of finding a new international role for the EEC by aiding the nascent Greek democracy with the ultimate aim of stabilizing the country within Western institutions and thus preventing a possible knock-on effect on neighboring Spain, Portugal and Italy in the precarious geopolitical climate of Southern Europe.

HOW DID ENLARGEMENT BECOME A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL?

The collapse of right-wing authoritarianism in Greece, Spain and Portugal was an undisputed conclusion by 1975, and the question was how both sides of the Atlantic were willing to deal with it.¹⁸ The unanticipated toppling of the Portuguese dictatorship on 25 April 1974 that sunk the country into political turmoil caught the West off guard.¹⁹ The new military-dominated regime in Portugal was undecided as to the direction in which to take the country and whether or not to hand over power to a democratically elected government. There were concerns that the country might slide towards a kind of Euro Communism and undermine Portugal's membership of NATO. Such concerns were strongly voiced in Washington. For Kissinger, it was essential to isolate Portugal, as the country had been allegedly 'lost' to Communism.²⁰

Europeans were equally troubled about Portugal's uncertain future with Harold Wilson, the then British prime minister declaring Portugal a 'test of détente'.²¹ However, the Nine progressively adopted a more confident view, putting emphasis on strengthening the hand of the democratic forces in Portugal, which had a foothold in the new government in the form of Mario Soares, a democratic socialist who had long lived in exile.²²

Only four months after the Carnation revolution, the Greek dictatorship instigated a coup against Makarios that ultimately led to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Cyprus issue per se was not as essential to the strategy and contingency military planning of the United States and NATO. American interest in Cyprus was essentially a preventive one: to keep its political problems from boiling over and throwing wrenches into the Greco-Turkish relationship.²³ As a State department briefing paper of early August 1974 declared: 'the US does not have fundamental interests in Cyprus itself but we do have a major interest in the effect of the Cyprus problem on fundamental US interests in Greece, Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean'. Consequently, the paper concluded that 'our strategy is directed toward removing Cyprus as a bone of contention between Greece and Turkey'.²⁴ Kissinger was eager to cooperate with the British on the Cyprus front especially since America's latitude had been restricted by the strong and influential presence of the Greek lobby in Congress. Moreover Britain, as signatory to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee of the Cypriot state was thrust into a position of responsibility. However, the British lacked the power to take effective action as they suffered from what James Callaghan, the foreign secretary, described as 'responsibility without power'. Since 1964, successive British governments had adopted a policy of 'impartiality and non-involvement' with their priority remaining the retention and safety of their military facilities on the island while giving the Americans the first say. The main nexus of such a policy was that no unilateral military action could be taken without American cooperation.²⁵ In fact, in 1975, London had wished for a complete British military withdrawal from Cyprus but fretted over the negative impact of such an act on its special relationship with the USA 'given the global importance of working closely with the Americans'.²⁶ It was not only Britain though that was in dismay. Generally speaking, it is true that the handling of the Cyprus crisis was not a success for any of the actors involved. *The Economist* declared that 'the Turks have had their way in Cyprus. For everyone else concerned there is only failure to report.'²⁷

The newly installed government in Athens, confronted with a rapidly growing popular anti-Americanism and the humiliating consequences of the recent double Turkish invasion in Cyprus, was under pressure to act.²⁸ Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis concluded that war against Turkey would be a highly dangerous option, as the seven years of the *junta* had left the country's defenses in a precarious state. In a private meeting of political leaders, it was concluded that Greek armed forces 'were unprepared, inadequately equipped and in no position to declare war on Turkey'.²⁹ Instead of war, Karamanlis announced the country's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure and requested the US to enter into renegotiations on the future of US bases on Greek soil.³⁰

The threat to NATO's southern flank in the aftermath of Greece's withdrawal from its military command and the country's unstable domestic political situation during transition to democracy loomed large. Although Karamanlis was firmly attached to the West and his government had made it clear that withdrawal from NATO was the least damaging course that had been open to it and the only acceptable policy to the public at the time, fears over Greece's future policy orientation remained, abetted by the rise of the left in domestic politics. The newly formed Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) under Andreas Papandreou, despite coming third in the 1974 legislative elections, was becoming a progressively popular party campaigning on an anti-American and anti-EEC platform. An illustration of this line of thinking was evident during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Athens in May 1975. Karamanlis went on to explain to the Chancellor that, although his parliamentary control was complete and the country's NATO withdrawal had reached its limits in political gain, it would be a mistake to assume that he could or would pursue policies which were unacceptable to either to his opponents or Greek public opinion.³¹ The Nine knew that failure to grant Karamanlis a success on the EEC application front would undermine his position, jeopardize the country's smooth democratization process and in turn, its foreign policy direction.³²

All of these fears over Greece were exacerbated by its potential spill-over effect on neighboring countries in the Southern European region. Indeed, in the mid-1970s the Western system in Southern Europe seemed increasingly under threat.³³ Besides the Greco-Turkish conflict, the Cyprus issue and the Portuguese question, Spain's Franco dictatorship seemed to be nearing the end in 1975 with the renewal of the 1953 base agreement with the USA up in the air. Western leaders were equally concerned about Italy's domestic instability and economic crisis. Anxiety

heightened even more with *compromesso storico* and the probability of the Italian Communist Party coming to power. All of these helped exacerbate the already dismal strategic outlook in the Mediterranean region. In contrast to the first postwar decades when the American fleet dominated the Mediterranean, the 1970s witnessed a growing Soviet infiltration of the southern coast states.³⁴ In the face of deep economic malaise, Britain had already undertaken a military spending review that had led to a phasing out of its Mediterranean defense.³⁵ The Americans expressed fears about British withdrawal warning that ‘the impact on the Southern region would be very serious, ... and the reductions in UK air forces stationed in Malta and Cyprus would be grave’.³⁶ These fast-paced developments played out against the transformative environment of superpower détente.³⁷

Despite its conservative character of stabilizing the status quo, détente between the two superpowers had unintended consequences in the volatile environment of Southern Europe where the relaxation of the once constraining framework of the Cold War further fostered domestic instability.³⁸ Romano and Romero rightly point out that ‘a far more complex and lasting pattern of intra-European détente has thus emerged. Focus and emphasis have shifted from the conservative intent of détente policies pursued by the two superpowers with the aim of consolidating bipolarity, to the transformative and destabilizing effects unleashed across the Iron curtain’.³⁹ In the minds of the political elites on both sides of the Atlantic therefore, Greece’s geopolitical and internal unstable order became part and parcel of this changing setting of crisis in Southern Europe.⁴⁰

The United States declined to act on its own. The tide of anti-Americanism with its ebbs and flows had swept Southern Europe with limited room for maneuver. To make matters worse, the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate had paralyzed the presidency with Congress becoming more assertive. The Ford administration no longer enjoyed the same flexibility in foreign affairs, a development that would add an unexpected layer of complexity in the conduct of US foreign policy.⁴¹ The Turkish embargo and the halting of aid to Vietnam represented the victory of Congress over a weak president.⁴² Especially, the US embargo on arms for Turkey was an illustration of how the US ‘could be paralyzed to the disadvantage of NATO’.⁴³ German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher talking with Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro about Turkey ‘found it grotesque, that after NATO has guaranteed our security for over 25 years, we find ourselves in internal disarray due to our inability to handle our own problems’.⁴⁴

In an effort to overcome such constraints, the Americans looked—not immediately in the case of Portugal but quite forcefully over Greece—to their European allies for help. A paper on transatlantic cooperation highlighted the importance they placed on the EEC's regional stability role:

During the past year the EC Nine have gradually refined a common approach to problems in the Mediterranean's northern ties, based on a desire to promote stability and political moderation and using the joint instruments of trade concessions, financial assistance, and ultimate closer association with or without membership in Europe. The Nine's approach reflects a growing sense of responsibility, based on self-interests. There is a major US interest involved in accepting and encouraging the sharing of the Mediterranean burden with the Nine.⁴⁵

Echoing a similar sentiment on the other side of the Atlantic, the Germans understood Karamanlis' predicament and noted that 'although his own position on NATO and on the US presence in Greece was well known, we should not expect him to alienate public support at this stage by pro-American gestures or by a conspicuous return to NATO'.⁴⁶ The Germans, like the rest of the Nine, came to support Greece's wish to join the Community knowing very well that the Community's unequivocal support would find approval with Greek public opinion and buttress the new social order, if only because the Greek government had oversold membership as being key to protecting democracy. Similarly, Paris concluded that

we must concern ourselves with not leaving this country on its own before the appeals of neutralism or the Soviet Bloc. There is therefore a certain urgency to consolidate a government born in adversity and with new setbacks threatening its existence. The tools at the Nine's disposal to help Greece are political and economic.⁴⁷

The British shared the need for the EEC to offer the solution as by their own admission 'We are too poor to do much ourselves. Logically, we should leave it to others to make the running ... We should therefore be ready to encourage our allies to help. The Germans and the French are the key'.⁴⁸ It was therefore within an EEC context that Britain chose to act and through this medium to consult with the Americans.⁴⁹ The policy of enlargement, however, for the Europeans did not seek to reduce the role of the United States in Greece.⁵⁰ Europeans had the diplomatic and political means of influence that *complemented* those of the United States.

Even the French did not desire to antagonize or undermine the United States' relationship to Greece. On the contrary, the French thought that 'far from encouraging Greece to move even further away from the Atlantic alliance, the specific action of the Nine could redirect this country away from such danger'.⁵¹ The offer of full membership to the EEC would assist the Greek government's democratization effort and in turn keep the country aligned to the Western system, as 'Greece needs now more than anything the moral support of its Western friends'.⁵² As Max Van der Stoep, the Dutch foreign minister, underlined when commenting on the anti-Americanism dominating Greece, 'Today Greece feels the need to establish closer relations with Europe. But this must not imply antagonism with the United States'.⁵³

Overwhelming events forced the USA and EEC to confront the Greek and more generally the Southern European problem in a coordinated manner. Utilizing new, more effective multilateral Euro-Atlantic forums—already in place to address the darkening economic outlook—Western powers cooperated in tackling the Greek crisis.⁵⁴ During this intense consultation phase, the major members of the European Community, in agreement with the United States, concluded that in order to ensure stabilization in Southern Europe they should anchor these countries firmly to the EEC either through closer association or full membership, even at the cost of the US losing direct political influence and its economic interests suffering.⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The question of Southern Europe, and in particular Greece's EEC membership was to be framed primarily in Cold War terms. The Community was at the same time defensive and assertive in facing up to the Greek challenge. It was wary of the possible diluting effects of a Greek and in turn a Southern European enlargement on its institutions and of the financial costs involved, but at the same time it was eager to respond to the applicants' calls for the need for stabilization in the form of democratization, social cohesion and economic modernization. Accepting Greece was the only policy the Nine could successfully follow in order to mitigate and to dispel anti-Western feelings in the country and facilitate the Greek government's efforts to keep the country within the Western fold. Therefore, Greek accession talks constituted a key episode in the course of which the Community discovered its power as a stabilizing factor in a Cold War cri-

sis. In accepting Greece's bid for membership, the Nine set out on a path that would eventually lead to far-reaching changes in the whole nature of the Community and its role as an international actor.⁵⁶ By utilizing its newly found soft power—centered on the promise of enlargement—the European Community redefined itself as a civilian power and differentiated—most of the time in a complementary way—its role within the Atlantic world, offering a *European* solution to the European crisis of the South in the 1970s.⁵⁷

NOTES

1. This chapter draws on argument and some textual material formulated in my book: Eirini Karamouzi, *Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The Second Enlargement* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
2. The Athens Agreement was signed on 9 July 1961 and came into force on 1 November 1962 under the Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome. The Association provides among other things, the establishment of a customs union, harmonization of Greek and Community policies over an array of topics such as agriculture and transfer of resources to Greece for the advancement of its economic development with the ultimate aim of full membership.
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 8. In the last decade, however, increasing efforts have been made for a multinational approach to the analysis of European integration in the fields of both history and political science. See Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (eds.), *European Union Enlargement: A*

- Comparative History* (London: Routledge, 2004). Equally pioneering was Ludlow's monograph on the first British application: N. Piers Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK application to the EEC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Luc Brunet (ed.), *The Crisis of EU Enlargement*, LSE IDEAS Special Report (London, 2013).
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Under the Shadow of the Soviet Union: The EEC, Yugoslavia and the Cold War in the Long 1970s

Benedetto Zaccaria

This chapter analyses the relationship between the EEC and Yugoslavia during the 1970s within the broader framework of the Cold War in Europe and the Mediterranean. The historical appraisal of this relationship has been profoundly influenced by the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 and, in particular, by the role played by the EEC and EU (European Union) in this context. The first, unsuccessful Community attempts to mediate a peaceful solution between Belgrade and the secessionist republics in 1991 are regarded as the starting point of the EEC/EU's involvement in the Yugoslav scenario, as if no substantial political relations had developed between the parties in the preceding years.¹ The EEC policy towards Yugoslavia during the Cold War has therefore been dismissed as a policy of neglect, based on the idea of the Balkan country as a mere trading partner.² Yet analysis of recently declassified documents from several Community and Yugoslav archives disproves this interpretation.³

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The present work offers a reappraisal of the historical roots of EEC–Yugoslav relations, demonstrating that the Community had been actively involved in the Yugoslav question since the 1970s, a time when profound changes occurred in the evolution of the East–West confrontation, Yugoslavia’s internal dynamics and the process of European integration. This study is structured around three major questions. The first concerns the problem of Balkan and Mediterranean stability and its link to negotiations for the first trade agreements concluded between the parties in 1970 and 1973. The second regards the issue of Yugoslavia’s transition after the death of Josip Broz ‘Tito’ and how the Community contextualized this problem within the broader Southern European scenario of the mid-1970s. The third is linked to the Community’s efforts to preserve Yugoslavia’s non-aligned stance in a context marked by the decline of superpower détente and the death of Tito, on 4 May 1980. The last part of the chapter is devoted to how these questions interacted in determining the course of EEC–Yugoslav relations in the ‘post-Tito’ era.

SEARCHING FOR STABILITY IN THE BALKANS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

The first EEC–Yugoslav trade agreement, signed in March 1970, was a direct consequence of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The Prague events and the assertion of the Brezhnev Doctrine had aroused considerable concerns in the West about possible Soviet action against other socialist countries, including Yugoslavia, a thorn in the side of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe going back to the 1948 Tito–Stalin split.⁴ Perceived Soviet pressures in the Balkans also extended to the Mediterranean basin, due to the expansion of the USSR’s military relations with the Arab world after the 1967 Arab–Israeli war and the consequent increased presence of Soviet naval units in the area.⁵

It was during this troubled international conjuncture that trade negotiations between the EEC and Yugoslavia opened in October 1968. Exploratory talks between the parties had in fact started in the mid-1960s. Unlike the Soviet Union and its satellites, which had condemned the EEC as NATO’s economic arm, Belgrade had adopted a realistic attitude towards the newly installed Community. The Yugoslav leadership was conscious that expansion of trade with EEC member states (France, West Germany, Italy, Benelux (‘the Six’)) was a precondition for the country’s

industrial development and the success of the internal market-oriented reforms launched by the 'liberal' wing of the Yugoslav leadership in the mid-1960s in order to develop and modernize the country's industrial system. This process concerned marked opening-up of the country's economy to Western industrial output, the adoption of new trade legislation aiming at attracting new foreign investment, and the establishment of an external customs tariff.⁶ The innovative character of this reformist process gave new impetus to the country's relationship with the EEC, which represented the main source of industrial technology and know-how. And yet, the rise of imports from Western Europe had had a backlash economic effect, due to the impressive growth of Yugoslavia's trade deficit vis-à-vis the EEC which, from 1965 to 1967 had increased from \$196 million to \$455 million.⁷ Faced with the need to balance imports and exports, Yugoslavia sought trade concessions in the industrial and agricultural field on the part of the Six.

However, exploratory talks with the Community had been affected by Belgrade's *a priori* opposition towards any hypothesis of association or preferential (that is, discriminatory) agreements along the lines of those concluded by the Community with Greece and Turkey in 1961 and 1963. From the viewpoint of the Yugoslav leadership, such agreements would infringe Yugoslavia's non-alignment—the pillar of the country's foreign policy—and its image among the Third World countries.⁸ The first negotiating mandate, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 30 July 1968, welcomed Yugoslavia's requests, envisaging as it did the conclusion of a non-preferential agreement. However, to Yugoslavia's dismay, the Six had excluded the agricultural sector from future negotiations.⁹ In fact, according to the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), any non-preferential concession to Yugoslavia would have to be extended to all the Community's commercial partners. This was clearly against the protectionist orientation of the Community's Common Agricultural Policy that the Six had set up since 1958. This choice was a serious constraint to the development of EEC–Yugoslav relations, as in early 1968 agriculture accounted for 45 per cent of Yugoslavia's overall export to the Community.¹⁰

However, the Prague events changed the nature of EEC–Yugoslav relations, which shifted from an economic to a political dimension. On 5 September 1968, the Yugoslav embassy in Brussels declared to the European Commission its government's will to start trade negotiations as soon as possible, in order to face future Soviet economic pressures.¹¹ A few

days later, on 26 September, the Yugoslav diplomat Miloš Oprešnik was appointed ambassador to the EEC: this was the first time a Socialist country had entered into official diplomatic relations with the Community.¹² During the first round of trade negotiations (15–18 October), Belgrade asked for the inclusion of an agricultural chapter within the negotiating mandate and, in particular, facilitation for Yugoslavia's exports of baby beef to the Community (this asset represented almost 40 per cent of Yugoslavia's agricultural export to the EEC).¹³

The EEC member states, with the sole exception of de Gaulle's France, did not ignore Yugoslavia's requests and, within the Council of Ministers, agreed to foster economic relations with Yugoslavia as a means of enhancing the country's economic and political stability.¹⁴ Among the Six, Italy and the FRG were Yugoslavia's major advocates. Despite the age-old border question over the so-called Free Territory of Trieste, since the early 1960s Rome had recognized the political importance of strengthening relations with Belgrade: according to Italian diplomacy, this would have favoured the stability of the Balkans and Italian economic interests in this border region.¹⁵ As for Bonn, Belgrade had represented a matter of political concern since 1957, when the latter had recognized the German Democratic Republic, thereby challenging the 'Hallstein Doctrine'. However, in the late 1960s the Social Democrat leader Willy Brandt had included Yugoslavia in his broader *Ostpolitik* and, at the same time, had strengthened the FRG's support of EEC–Yugoslav relations as a means of favouring the overall relationship between Bonn and Belgrade.¹⁶

France, however, adopted a rather ambivalent attitude. Although Paris did not neglect Belgrade's independent course as a factor of stability in Europe, it regarded Yugoslavia as a potential competitor in the agricultural sector. This view affected French attitudes towards Yugoslavia within the Community framework until June 1969.¹⁷ Yet the electoral defeat of Charles de Gaulle in April 1969 and the subsequent election of Georges Pompidou gave new impetus to France's participation in the European integration process. Pompidou was aware of the strategic importance of the Community's Mediterranean dimension, lifted the French veto and the Six finally decided, in early November 1969, to include an agricultural chapter within the new negotiating mandate, envisaging tariff reductions of 25 per cent for baby beef.¹⁸ This decision, which led to harsh protests on the part of the Six's agricultural lobbies, was motivated by the unanimous political will of the major EEC member states to strengthen their links with Yugoslavia. The outcome of the revised French attitude was a reopening

of EEC–Yugoslav negotiations and the conclusion, in March 1970, of a three-year non-preferential trade agreement between Yugoslavia and the EEC. Beyond the concession in the field of beef exports, the agreement envisaged faster application of lower customs tariffs provided by the GATT Kennedy Round negotiations and the establishment of a Mixed Commission charged with carrying out the agreement.

This strictly non-preferential economic agreement was grounded on a well-defined, shared political rationale. Given Yugoslavia's wish to maintain its formal detachment from the Community, it represented the only way to strengthen Yugoslavia's position vis-à-vis Western Europe in a context of Soviet seemingly mounting pressure on the Balkans. As noted by the Yugoslav Minister for External Trade, Toma Granfil, it was a signal that the door of the EEC was not closed to future cooperation among the parties.¹⁹ From the Community viewpoint, the 1970 agreement—the first to be negotiated under the provisions of the Common Commercial Policy and to be concluded between the EEC and a socialist country—was also a message to Moscow, which continued to insist on its non-recognition policy towards the Community. It therefore suited the goals set on the occasion of the Hague summit of December 1969, when the EEC member states had agreed on relaunching the integration process in Western Europe and affirming the Community as an international actor with a well-defined identity.²⁰

The political rationale which had led to the conclusion of the 1970 agreement did not fade in the following years. Both parties were interested in enhancing bilateral relations. As emerged during a gruelling tour of Western European capitals between October 1970 and March 1971, Tito feared that the development of European détente during the preliminary phases of what would later become the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe might leave Yugoslavia in an isolated position between the European blocs.²¹ For their part, the Six contextualized the question of EEC–Yugoslav relations within the Mediterranean framework. Indeed, despite the emergence of superpower détente, the Mediterranean remained a 'sea of confusion' marked by geopolitical instability and superpower confrontation.²² Western stabilization strategies did not simply envisage the reinforcement of a military presence in this troubled region, but also the development of economic ties with Mediterranean countries.²³ The EEC was to play a crucial role in this area, as epitomized by the launch of the Community's Global Mediterranean Policy in the Paris summit meeting of October 1972.

The Community's presence in the region also comprised Yugoslavia. Centrifugal tendencies within the Yugoslav federation, which dramatically emerged in 1971 during the 'Croatian Spring' (a protest movement advocating greater political and economic rights vis-à-vis the federal government), had indeed emphasized the need for the major EEC member states to support the country's internal stability. In 1971, Rome considered Yugoslavia as a first line of defence for NATO's south-eastern flank.²⁴ This was to be the very rationale underpinning the Italian stance during secret negotiations for the 'Osimo Treaty' which, four years later, closed the border question with Yugoslavia.²⁵ Similarly, the West German government was convinced that Yugoslavia's independence was a factor of stability in the Mediterranean. As Willy Brandt confided to Georges Pompidou in July 1971: 'Can we and, if necessary, how can we prevent further turmoil in Yugoslavia when Tito dies? The Russians will surely try to take the country back. Yugoslavia's future is closely linked to the Mediterranean and I hope we will not lose sight of this question'.²⁶ Accordingly, the West German delegation to NATO reported that the development of both Yugoslavia's domestic situation and Soviet influence called for continued Western readiness to cooperate with the Yugoslav government.²⁷

Pompidou's France shared Italian and German concerns. Indeed, the Yugoslav Minister for External Trade, Boris Šnuderl, exerted constant pressure on Paris, declaring that the renewal of the 1970 agreement would make Yugoslavia appear less economically vulnerable in the Kremlin's eyes.²⁸ This claim was in line with the strategic analyses of the Quai d'Orsay on Yugoslavia:

Moscow's long-term plan is clear: drawing Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc. The strategic interests represented by the control of this country, with its geographical position in the middle of the Mediterranean's northern shore, and the perspective opened up by such control for strengthening Soviet influence in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, all oblige the policy-makers in the Kremlin to demonstrate their 'brotherly' feelings towards the Yugoslavs.²⁹

Great Britain, which was to become a member of the Community in 1973, also echoed similar concerns. Under Edward Heath's premiership, London regarded the Community as a means of stabilising NATO's southern flank³⁰ and, within this framework, linked the need to maintain 'the integrity, stability and prosperity of Yugoslavia' to the 'development

of the Yugoslav market economy and particularly its trading relations with the EEC'.³¹

Lastly, Western European evaluations about Yugoslavia could not ignore the American stance. The US administration, led by Richard Nixon, believed that the USSR would not meddle in Yugoslavian affairs, in order not to jeopardize the process of international détente.³² However, Washington was aware that Yugoslavia's stability needed to be sustained through long-term economic links between Belgrade and its Western European partners. For this reason, as the US representative to NATO declared in February 1973, the Community's power of economic attraction could represent a tool to favour Yugoslavia's economic stability without provoking Soviet counter-reactions in the Mediterranean.³³

Political instability in the Mediterranean arena and uncertainty about Yugoslavia's internal dynamics thus urged the EEC to focus once again on the Yugoslav question. From an economic viewpoint, Yugoslavia was included in the Community's Generalised System of Preferences (which covered industrial imports from developing countries) launched by the EEC in 1971, of which Yugoslavia became one of the main beneficiaries.³⁴ From a political viewpoint, a common position emerged within the inter-governmental framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) on 18 May 1972, in which the parties agreed on the need for a collective approach to sustain Yugoslavia's 'territorial integrity and independence'.³⁵ Yet the conclusions of the EPC meeting recommended treating the Yugoslav question with extreme discretion, so as not to endanger the status quo in the Balkans. Indeed, throughout the negotiations for the renewal of the 1970 treaty, the Yugoslav representatives in Brussels declared their firm will to conclude another non-preferential agreement, in order not to alter Yugoslavia's equidistance between the European blocs.³⁶ The new commercial treaty, signed on 26 June 1973, confirmed the provisions of the previous one but extended its duration to a period of five years, so as to favour continuity in trade relations. It also envisaged a mechanism of economic cooperation to be regulated within the context of the Mixed Commission. All in all, the agreement confirmed that the Yugoslav question required the EEC's presence in the Mediterranean region.

AFTER TITO, WHAT?

The link between Mediterranean stability and the preservation of Yugoslavia's independence became even clearer after the geopolitical turmoil which affected Southern Europe between 1974 and 1976, due to the crisis in Cyprus, the end of the Colonels' dictatorship in Greece, the 'Carnation' revolution in Portugal, the electoral rise of the Italian Communist Party under the flag of 'Eurocommunism', and Francisco Franco's demise in Spain. The Southern European crisis was acknowledged by the West as a geopolitical threat: what was feared was a spillover effect, a propagation of political instability from one country to another, affecting Western security interests in the region.³⁷ Yugoslavia was part of this scenario, because of the conundrum of the country's future transition to the 'post-Tito' era (in 1975, the Yugoslav leader was 83 years old and in poor health). In addition, its international stance seemed to be challenged by the decline of superpower détente, the rise of Soviet interventionism in the Third World, and the evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in which a pro-Soviet and radical faction headed by Cuba aimed at establishing direct connections between Socialist and non-aligned goals.³⁸

From a Western viewpoint, Yugoslavia's stability was confirmed as a Cold War imperative. A US National Security Council memorandum dated December 1975, which reviewed Western strategies in Southern Europe, dealt with the Yugoslav issue as follows: 'Developments in post-Tito Yugoslavia could have an important impact on NATO's southern flank. (...) A collapse of Yugoslav independence could demoralize moderates in neighboring states who would be sensitive to the advance of Soviet power nearer their borders.'³⁹ This position was stressed by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a US State Department counsellor and Henry Kissinger's advisor, during a NATO Council meeting held in Washington on 15 September 1976. In his view, the possible demise of Tito was one of 'the most worrying things on the world scene', adding that the 'Russians' were paranoid about attempts to win over Yugoslavia to the West or exercise influence within the country. Aware of the stabilizing role that his Western European partners could play in the southern European scenario through political and economic instruments, he argued that Yugoslavia was a problem in which the Community had to be directly involved.⁴⁰ As he would reiterate in December 1976 during a quadripartite meeting with his French, German and British counterparts—a regular pattern of political consultation which

characterized transatlantic relations during the Ford years (1974–6)⁴¹—the EEC should do all it could to build up its relations with Yugoslavia before Tito's death: 'Once Tito had gone, Yugoslav moves towards the Community could encounter stiff Soviet reactions.'⁴²

The EEC did not react passively to Sonnenfeldt's appeals. The EEC member states, the Nine after the 1973 enlargement, were conscious of the need to change the balance of EEC–Yugoslav relations. From an economic viewpoint, Western European embassies observed with great concern the demise of the 'liberal' wing of the Yugoslav leadership and the entry into force of a new federal constitution in February 1974 which, in the aftermath of inter-republican contrasts emerged in 1971, had transformed the country into an eight-unit territorial confederation. The Nine's commercial counsellors in Belgrade had carefully followed the unfolding of this constitutional reform and, in January 1976, drafted a joint report which stressed that the economic system introduced in 1974 had attributed too broad competences to the single federal republics, hindering the central government from managing the rise of debt, unemployment, inflation and low productivity of labour. In addition, the 1973 oil shock and the consequent economic recession in Western Europe had had a tremendous impact on the course of EEC–Yugoslav relations, and highlighted the Community's incapacity to implement the disposition of the 1973 agreement. Indeed, the import restrictions adopted by the Nine in 1974 to protect their markets had raised the Yugoslav trade deficit with the EEC to \$2 billion in 1975.⁴³

In early 1976, Yugoslav Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić had visited Brussels, London and Paris, and made a strong plea for the Nine to bring their economic behaviour into line with their expression of political support for Yugoslav independence.⁴⁴ Yugoslavia's appeal was also dictated by other two factors. Firstly, faced with the development of EEC relations with the CMEA—the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—and the People's Republic of China between 1974 and 1975,⁴⁵ Belgrade wanted to avoid finding itself in an isolated position between Brussels and the great poles of international communism, that is Moscow and Beijing.⁴⁶ Secondly, the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry regarded its Western European partners as a balancing factor which, in the long run, would avoid the superpowers' condominium over Yugoslavia.⁴⁷ Within this context, the Yugoslav representatives openly declared the need for a collective approach on the part of the Nine, which should demonstrate

the Community's confidence in their country's economic stability and non-alignment.⁴⁸

The EEC stance on the Yugoslav question was deeply influenced by the visit paid by British Secretary of State Anthony Crosland to Belgrade in early November 1976. Crosland attached great importance to the strengthening of EEC–Yugoslav relations. On 10 June 1976 he had briefed Prime Minister James Callaghan on the Yugoslav question, arguing that the EEC should achieve a more balanced relationship with the Community in order to prevent future Soviet pressures on the country.⁴⁹ His mission to Belgrade confirmed these views, as the theme of Yugoslavia's future relationship with the USSR frequently recurred during bilateral talks.⁵⁰ The British stance dominated an informal NATO summit focusing on Yugoslavia, held in Brussels on 8 November 1976. The meeting offered NATO's permanent representatives an opportunity for a *tour d'horizon* on the future of Yugoslavia. Several representatives, *in primis* the British, the Germans and the French, drew attention to the danger that divergences between rival factions in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia or between nationalities might emerge in the longer term. But, more than Yugoslavia's internal dynamics, what worried Western diplomats were alleged Soviet plans for the country. In fact, the permanent representatives did not expect Soviet military intervention after Tito's passing. What they feared was the growth of Soviet influence by other means, such as economic pressures or support for any separatist faction in the country if the Yugoslav internal situation seemed propitious. In this circumstance, they agreed to foster Western links to Belgrade through the EEC as a sign of Western support.⁵¹

SUPPORTING YUGOSLAVIA'S NON-ALIGNMENT

On 1 December 1976, a Community delegation headed by Max Van der Stoep, then President-in-charge of the Council of Foreign Affairs, and the European Commissioner for Internal Markets, Finn Olav Gundelach, went to Belgrade to meet Tito. This visit led to the conclusion of a 'Joint Declaration' on 2 December 1976. Although this declaration mapped the general areas in which cooperation between the EEC and Yugoslavia could be developed (in particular, agriculture, industry and finance), its primary goal was that of confirming Yugoslavia's non-alignment as the basic pillar of future EEC–Yugoslav relations. The declaration came right on cue. Yugoslavia had indeed suffered severe political pressure during

the official visit paid by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to Belgrade on 15 and 16 November 1976, that is, just two weeks before the Joint Declaration was signed. On that occasion, Brezhnev had publicly blamed the West for describing Yugoslavia as 'Little Red Riding Hood' and the Soviet Union as the 'Big Bad Wolf'.⁵² However, behind the scenes he had asked Yugoslavia to grant the Soviet navy access to its port facilities on the Adriatic coast, emphasized the 'natural' alliance between the NAM and the Socialist bloc, exalted the role played in the movement by Cuba, and asked Belgrade to favour the convergence between non-aligned and Soviet goals.⁵³ Yugoslav diplomatic representatives had reported Brezhnev's words to their Community counterparts. For the latter, this was yet another confirmation of the need to manifest their support for Yugoslavia's independence from Soviet pressures.⁵⁴

Therefore, after the signing of the Joint Declaration the EEC member states recognized the need to expand the content of the 1973 agreement in a broader cooperation agreement based on a preferential approach. The new Community strategy, prepared by Wilhelm Haferkamp, the European Commissioner for External Relations, and approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers in July 1978,⁵⁵ was favoured by the Carter Administration, which promised to support the extension of the Community's preferential links to Yugoslavia within the framework of the GATT.⁵⁶ The primary goal of this approach was to avoid Yugoslavia's isolation within the Mediterranean basin. Indeed, between June 1975 and June 1977, Athens, Madrid and Lisbon had officially applied for EEC membership, and between 1976 and 1977 the EEC had concluded cooperation agreements with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Jordan. With the only exceptions of Libya and Albania, Yugoslavia was the sole Mediterranean country without preferential links to the Community. Yet Rome, Paris, London and Bonn were reticent about granting Yugoslavia agricultural trade preferences and making concessions on labour free movement, which could endanger their national interests in agricultural, industrial and social sectors. In other words, they agreed on the principle of the new 'preferential' approach based on a cooperation agreement, but were not ready to accept its consequences: they were concerned about the economic costs of the Community's 'Mediterranean' enlargement and the electoral backlash for such concessions.⁵⁷

For its part, the Yugoslav government welcomed Haferkamp's initiative reluctantly, emphasizing that the preferential concession on the part of the Nine should not lead to modification of Yugoslavia's delicate economic

balance between the European blocs.⁵⁸ Moreover, a crisis within the NAM influenced the unfolding of EEC–Yugoslav relations. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 was considered in Belgrade as aggression against a non-aligned country inspired by the Warsaw Pact.⁵⁹ In the following months, Belgrade welcomed Beijing’s intervention against Vietnam, thereby creating new rifts in Yugoslav–Soviet relations. In this context, rumours started to circulate in Western embassies about Soviet troop movements near the Yugoslav borders.⁶⁰

The first negotiating round for the conclusion of a cooperation agreement in July 1979 opened against such a background of rising tension within the NAM. At the political level, the Yugoslav government wanted to maintain its traditional distance from the Community, so as to preserve its non-aligned credentials.⁶¹ In fact, this negotiating round took place on the eve of the non-aligned summit which would open in Havana in September. As stressed by Yugoslavia’s Foreign Minister Josip Vrhovec to his West German counterpart, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on 16 August 1979, the Havana conference would be a veritable showdown between Yugoslavia and Cuba.⁶² While the former represented the original spirit of the NAM, the latter embodied the pro-Soviet faction of the Movement. Yugoslavia’s goal in Havana was therefore that of preventing the NAM from becoming a ‘reserve for the Warsaw Pact’.⁶³ Western European embassies in Havana admired the performance of the Yugoslav delegation in Cuba. Indeed, Tito emerged as the leader of a ‘silent majority’ able to moderate Fidel Castro’s radicalism and delete from the Final Declaration all references to the Soviet bloc as the natural ally of the NAM.⁶⁴

Yugoslavia’s success during the Havana summit was, however, only apparent. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, a non-aligned country, in late December 1979 created new rifts within the movement and questioned Yugoslavia’s role within it. The NAM was unable to adopt a common stance vis-à-vis Afghan events, and even Belgrade avoided official condemnation of the Kremlin’s intervention. This attitude was dictated by fear: until then, the Soviet Union had never attacked a non-aligned country outside the Warsaw Pact.⁶⁵ The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan coincided with Tito’s hospitalization in Ljubljana on 4 January 1980.⁶⁶ The great uncertainty about Soviet foreign policy goals beyond the Afghan scenario and the imminent end of the Tito era convinced the Council of Ministers to overcome its protectionist attitude and approve a new negotiating mandate welcoming Yugoslavia’s commercial requests. This included the establishment of a preferential commercial system in

the agricultural and industrial sectors, a social chapter providing for the non-discrimination of Yugoslav workers within the EEC, and a financial protocol envisaging loans of 200 million units of account (about \$100 million) through the European Investment Bank (EIB).⁶⁷

As had happened in the aftermath of the Prague events, the major EEC member states accorded such concessions despite the opposition of their agricultural and industrial lobbies.⁶⁸ In fact, they all shared the common goal of keeping Yugoslavia as close as possible to the Community. Italy, which held the presidency of the Council, favoured Yugoslavia's requests within the Community framework: this position was manifested by Italian Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga during an Italo-Yugoslav summit held on 18 January 1980.⁶⁹ The same view was reiterated by French Foreign Minister Jean-François Poncet during an official mission to Belgrade on 6 February 1980.⁷⁰ The conclusion of the cooperation agreement was also facilitated by the *Auswärtiges Amt* which, under Genscher's ministry, stressed the political connection between the EEC-Yugoslav agreement and the preservation of Yugoslavia's future stability.⁷¹ The British government, now led by Margaret Thatcher, supported the rationale of the agreement by following the policy developed by her predecessors.⁷² Lastly, a visit paid by the President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins to Belgrade on 28–9 February 1980, set the seal on the new agreement.

However, the effects of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis of the NAM affected Belgrade's attitude.⁷³ On the one hand, the Yugoslav negotiating team, headed by Stojan Andov, realized that the preferential agreement envisaged by the Council's negotiating mandate was 'a necessary evil', which served to anchor Yugoslavia to the Western European market at this delicate historical juncture.⁷⁴ On the other hand, Belgrade agreed, on condition that the new agreement should be *sui generis* and exclude the principle of economic reciprocity. Indeed, Andov stressed that Yugoslavia should be treated as a developing country and that preferential concessions should not alter Yugoslavia's formal equidistance between the blocs.⁷⁵ Thereby, the Yugoslav negotiators excluded their country from any prospect of future economic integration within the EEC.⁷⁶

The link between the question 'After Tito, what?' and the unfolding of EEC-Yugoslav relations was marked by its particular timing: the Cooperation Agreement was signed on 2 April 1980, and Marshal Tito died on 4 May 1980. Beyond its economic content, which corresponded to the Council's mandate mentioned above, the newly signed agreement was the means of creating the closest form of involvement in a common

future with the EEC which Yugoslavia's non-aligned principles allowed it to accept.

ENTERING THE 'POST-TITO' ERA: THE LEGACY OF THE 1970s

At the dawn of the 1980s, the relationship between the EEC and Yugoslavia followed a clear-cut track. Both the EEC and Yugoslavia shared a common goal: the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans. For the Yugoslav leadership this was a precondition to favour a smooth transition towards the 'post-Tito' era. On their part, the EEC and its major member states contextualized the question of Yugoslavia's independence within their stabilization policies in the Mediterranean region. But the evolution of EEC–Yugoslav relations in the course of the 1970s had highlighted the fact that Yugoslavia's stability depended on a number of external variables beyond the Community's control, such as the rise of inter-republic contrasts within the federation, Soviet military activism beyond the borders of the Warsaw Pact, and the evolution of the NAM. As long as the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean seemed to challenge Yugoslavia's political independence and Western interests in the region, Belgrade was to be kept clearly outside the Western sphere of influence, so as not to provoke any East–West confrontation over the Balkans.

This conclusion sheds new light on the Community viewpoint vis-à-vis Yugoslavia's internal dynamics in the post-Tito era. Centrifugal tendencies within the Yugoslav federation were analysed by EEC policy-makers through the lens of the Cold War. As noted above, they were aware of the structural weakness of the Yugoslav federation (low productivity of labour, high rate of inflation, inter-republican economic rivalry) but were mainly concerned with the possible rise of Moscow's influence among the conflicting parties and the potential change of Belgrade's international alignment in case of a power vacuum. Yugoslavia's post-Tito leadership itself—a collective presidency made up of eight members, whose chairmanship was to rotate every year among the individual federal republics—described inter-republic contrasts and mounting political tension in Kosovo in the early 1980s as 'Cominformist' attempts at destabilizing Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ In such a situation, Community interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs at both political and economic levels was to be resisted firmly, as it might be counterproductive and endanger its internal equilibrium. This viewpoint

clearly emerges in a confidential joint report drafted by the Nine's commercial counsellors in Belgrade on 25 July 1980.

According to the report, the EEC should avoid conditioning economic cooperation to the implementation of market-oriented reforms (in other words, the Community was not to impose any 'Brussels consensus' on Yugoslavia) but, conversely, it was to offer unconditional support to Belgrade's efforts to foster political centralization at federal level, even though this would imply the infringement of the single republics' constitutional prerogatives.⁷⁸ In view of this, relations were perforce limited to a number of specifically economic areas, namely trade, finance, and technical, scientific and agricultural cooperation. This was the way of establishing a direct, although low-profile, connection with the Yugoslav federal government. In the post-Tito era, this meant a lack of substantial political evolution in EEC–Yugoslav relations, which followed the path of the 1970s. Indeed, the minutes of the meetings of the Cooperation Council established by the 1980 agreement, so far the only available source covering the whole decade of EEC–Yugoslav relations before Yugoslavia's collapse, confirm that enhanced forms of cooperation between the parties, such as an association agreement envisaging political links, were not officially taken into consideration by Belgrade and its Community partners until the late 1980s.⁷⁹

Two key factors were to revolutionize the balance of EEC–Yugoslav relations. The first was Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking', which paved the way to official Soviet recognition of the EEC and offered greater space for manoeuvre to Soviet satellite states vis-à-vis the Community.⁸⁰ The second was the political turmoil which affected Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and heralded the demise of the Soviet empire. During the Cooperation Council meeting of 27 November 1989, Budimir Lončar, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister, asked for the start of negotiations for Yugoslavia's association to the Community. He argued that Belgrade was now ready to overcome the historical limitations of EEC–Yugoslav relations:

We believe the time has come to seek together new forms of our relations employing new modalities and directions. This implies, of course, a more appropriate institutional framework that would enable greater participation by Yugoslavia in the process of European integration and the functional integration of its economy into that of the Community.⁸¹

The Cold War era was fading and, with it, the shadow of the Soviet Union over the relationship between the EEC and Yugoslavia.

CONCLUSIONS

As demonstrated in this chapter, all agreements concluded between the EEC and Yugoslavia during the 1970s concerned the broader question of Balkan and Mediterranean stability. Despite their limited economic scope, the 1970 and 1973 trade agreements were meant to reinforce the bonds between Yugoslavia and the Community, faced as they were with Moscow's ambition to strengthen its political, economic and military influence in the Mediterranean basin. The 1976 Joint Declaration confirmed Yugoslavia's non-alignment as the basis for future EEC–Yugoslav relations, proving the importance of the Balkan region in Western stabilization policies in Southern Europe. The 1980 cooperation agreement was a means of keeping Yugoslavia as close as possible to the EEC in view of the post-Tito era, the crisis of the non-aligned movement and Soviet international expansionism. However, Yugoslavia's strict non-alignment—a condition for its internal and external stability—precluded any prospect of future integration between the parties. The same limitation was to affect the development of bilateral relations until the very end of the Cold War. Faced with the demise of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's crisis in the early 1990s, the Community came to be involved in the Western Balkan scenario, drawing on a diplomatic tradition which, in fact, went back to the 1970s.

NOTES

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Balkan Dilemmas in the 1970s and 1980s: A Point of No Return?

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INTRODUCTION

After the Greek civil war the Balkans ceased to be at the forefront of Cold War tensions.¹ The 1950s were marked by the consolidation of American hegemony in Greece and Turkey and Soviet dominance in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. Yugoslavia followed ‘third-way socialism’ as an equidistant policy between capitalism and socialism after the Tito–Stalin break-up of 1948.² This division into ‘three worlds’ was completed by the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO (1952) and the inclusion of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania in the Warsaw Pact (1955). Yugoslavia retained its place between East and West through the Balkan Pact (1953/4), which connected indirectly Yugoslav defense with NATO members Greece and Turkey.³ Rapprochement with Moscow after Stalin’s death let Belgrade take a leading position in the Non-Aligned Movement (1961). Albania’s choice for China after the Sino-Soviet split (1960–89) completed the colorful political map of the Balkans as a miniature of the international division of power politics.⁴

This chapter deals with the ways that political and economic change in the socialist Balkan countries caused a crisis of orientation in the final

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decades of the Cold War. The historiographical approach used here was deemed necessary for presenting also the various themes that attracted the attention of research, thus the evaluation of Balkan realities, from one period to the other. A main argument is that increasing Western influence put socialism on a path of irreversible decline that was only accelerated by the nuclear pressure of the Reagan administration. This applied not only to Soviet satellite states, but also to Yugoslavia and Albania. Even though the historical sub-terrain of political cultures and nationalism permits cross-bloc research, a broader study would go far beyond the scope of the chapter in this book. Accordingly, the West-oriented Balkan countries, Greece and Turkey, are considered only in relation to the challenges faced by socialist regimes. For similar reasons, Western influences are explored mainly through the lens of American–Soviet interaction in the Balkans as the main field of change. The relations of the EEC with certain socialist countries are not dealt with separately, although research on this topic is rapidly growing.⁵

THE BALKANS BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND OBSCURITY

Even though the Balkans constituted a potentially significant theater in case of total war, they never came close in strategic importance to Central or Eastern Europe. For this reason they held a marginal position in the nuclear map of the Cold War.⁶ Neither Washington nor Moscow wished to risk a nuclear escalation for the sake of the region. Yet, they both desired a stable Balkan region for securing safe passage from Europe to the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East.

Cold War bipolarity disrupted local political conditions, above all nationalism, a major political force in the post-Ottoman Balkans.⁷ Nationalistic conflicts were muted in the name of international security, political stability and economic development: these became new ‘great ideas’ on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Leaving behind a long period of wars, civil wars, political weakness and economic backwardness, the Balkan states sought to make the best out of foreign intervention. Despite resentments against the dominant role of the superpowers in the organization of postwar regimes, they realized that external protection was a guarantee against domestic instability and foreign aggression. The departure from ‘old politics’ generated a revitalizing feeling of all-out modernization in the first two postwar decades.⁸

However, national identities or national aspirations were not buried forever. Ecumenical ideological principles of liberalism/capitalism and Marxism/communism absorbed 'petty' nationalistic ideas as long as the Balkan states were under the close surveillance of their respective bloc leaders, the USA and the Soviet Union. The first relapses occurred in the mid-1950s. Khrushchev's doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence' enabled latent discontent to resurface. Different countries raised different issues. Demands for democratization were high on the agenda in countries familiar with industrialization, like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR) and, to a certain extent, Poland. The uprisings of 1953 and 1956 in those countries called for economic and political liberalization with the aim of national improvement. That reformist wave was decisively crushed by the Soviet Union, as it would happen again later, in 1968, with the Prague Spring.⁹ In contrast, Balkan nations, haunted by incomplete nationalist programs and slow industrialization, attached more importance to matters of ethnic and national identity, minority issues and borders. This tendency grew stronger in the 1960s, when 'national communism' emerged as a hybrid of socialist organization with the promise to consider more carefully local needs in the realization of socialism.

Détente was also differently exploited in East and Central Europe, on the one hand, and the Balkans, on the other. Whereas Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR benefitted from Basket II (economic, environmental and scientific cooperation) and Basket III policies (human rights, humanitarian and cultural issues) of the Helsinki Final Act (1975), Romania and Bulgaria became absorbed with issues of nationalism, identities and state control rather than strategies for economic development and fairer political participation.¹⁰ Albania was no exception, even though it followed China and later the doctrine of self-reliance.¹¹ Yugoslavia's federal organization (Yugoslavism) prevented domestic tensions only as long as Tito was in power.

The mixture of communism and nationalism that ultimately prevailed did little to redirect the historical path of anti-liberal regimes that perpetuated inequalities between ethnic majorities and minorities, cities and villages, patrons and clients, and youth and older generations. The formalistic adoption of communist norms and canons left traditional values and deep-seated patterns of political behavior virtually intact. The impersonal nature of modern bureaucracy continued to mismatch with the familiar ways of small communities (parish, village, neighborhood): family

patronage, incapacity for long-term planning, Orthodox morality, amoral familism¹² and ambivalence towards modern state mechanisms.¹³

THE TRANSITION FROM STALINISM TO 'NATIONAL COMMUNISM'

Until the 1970s, the Balkan satellites were utterly dependent on Soviet economic support and political guidance in order to survive and pursue modernization. Tremendous suffering, material destruction and, in some cases, also defeat in the Second World War were undermining confidence in a national path of peace and growth.¹⁴ Chronic weaknesses such as economic underdevelopment and stillborn democratic institutions were further eroding opposition to Moscow.

An additional disincentive was American reluctance to confront the Soviet Union for Eastern Europe after the Greek Civil War and the Korean War. The uprisings of 1953 in East Germany and 1956 in Poland ('Polish October') and Hungary had produced only lukewarm verbal statements in the West. Rifts in Western unity were also responsible for Washington's lessened emphasis on the strategy of 'breaking the monolith'.¹⁵ The Suez Crisis that placed the USA opposite to Britain and France over decolonization broke out almost simultaneously with revolts in Poland and Hungary (October–November 1956).¹⁶ Moreover, since 1954 NATO had had to deal with the thorny Cyprus question that brought repeatedly Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and disturbed NATO unity.¹⁷ The quarrel between John F. Kennedy and Charles de Gaulle over NATO's nuclear strategy (1958–62) triggered the withdrawal of France from the military planning of NATO (1966), followed by the denial of EEC membership to Britain in both 1963 and 1967.¹⁸ Conflicting Western plans over defense pacts in the Near and Middle East,¹⁹ but also American political interventions in Latin America,²⁰ made it even more difficult for the USA to undertake campaigns for the support of Eastern Europe. Realizing that a confrontation in Europe was unthinkable, the two superpowers preferred to transfer their antagonism to the regions that had emerged from decolonization since the mid-1950s. Their priority was to complete decolonization and to compete for influence in the Third World without risking a general war.²¹ In this context, the Balkans were of secondary importance in the immobile Central European front.

The centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe were shaped under the strict supervision of Moscow, which, apart from military security, provided

raw materials, energy, basic industries and know-how for enabling satellites to industrialize and manufacture for national needs as well as for the 'integrational' needs of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). In the 1950s the production of oil, coal, steel and electricity in the East was doubled. Czechoslovakia and East Germany worked as engines of industrial growth. East Germany, traditionally less developed than the territories that constituted West Germany, became the ninth industrial power in the world in the 1960s.²² The annual growth rate in the socialist East reached 3.1 percent between 1951 and 1987. In the same period the annual industrial growth rate in Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia was running at 9 percent with Bulgaria climbing to 12.7 percent.²³

Socialist states experienced the benefits of economic growth: employment was universal permitting decent wages and unprecedentedly satisfactory standards of living to the many, the rate of illiteracy was drastically curtailed, agricultural production was mechanized and urbanization created an expanding middle class of workers. Most peasants and workers had now the chance to send their children to university, a privilege previously reserved for local elites. This was a powerful tool of social mobility, as the new elites, mostly party members, substituted the old ones (*Ersatz-Klasse*) without genuinely changing the dependence of farmers and villagers on powerful groups.²⁴

As has been amply shown, communism served the historic desire of East European countries to catch up with the more developed industrial West European countries.²⁵ In spite of the enormous cost of economic transformation through industrialization, East European countries indeed approached the level of economic development that historically characterized the other part of the continent. Some of them surpassed South European economies until the early 1960s. Socialist countries in the Balkans saw themselves as equals with their neighbors Greece and Turkey. Catching-up in the economic and military sphere entailed an important dimension of international respectability that weighed heavily, especially in countries that had suffered territorial and political losses in the Second World War (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria). The period of rapid economic growth lasted almost 25 years, between 1950 and 1973.²⁶ Intensive modernization offered Moscow and state socialism a high degree of legitimacy in the first postwar period.²⁷ Regarding the Balkan satellites, noticeable differences existed between Bulgaria and Romania.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria entered a radical industrialization and urbanization process under the first Five-Year Plan (1949–53). About 700,000 farmers became industrial workers until the early 1960s. Yet, agriculture continued to account for a large part of national production and more than half of the total labor force.²⁸ The head of the communist party Vulko Chervenkov (1950–6) combined absolute loyalty to Moscow with aversion towards the USA.²⁹ His political withdrawal in 1956 permitted the young Todor Zhivkov, a representative of the ‘national’ approach to communism, to stand out from the collective leadership that had emerged during the de-Stalinization process. Zhivkov’s power was consolidated in the early 1960s with a series of measures for the slowing down of Soviet-led collectivization and industrialization. Bulgaria exported mainly agricultural and lightly manufactured goods—food and tobacco, for example—in exchange for machinery and raw materials from the Soviet Union and more industrialized satellites. Over one quarter of exports were sent to the Soviet Union. Following the improvement of trade relations with the West in the 1970s, about 15–20 percent of Bulgarian exports reached Western markets.³⁰

The relative success of the Five-Year Plans was reflected in mass unemployment—10,000 workers were sent to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.³¹ Despite persistent investments in industry and technical education, Bulgaria failed to compete with Czechoslovakia or Hungary in output and quality of industrial exports. Permission for the cultivation of small private land plots in the 1970s did not change that reality. Foreign debt, as a main source of credit for such investments, rose from \$3.2 billion to \$9.2 billion between 1985 and 1989.³²

Zhivkov exploited détente to take full control of both the Communist Party and the State Council which held legislative and executive powers under the 1971 Constitution. The creation of a cult dictatorship was confirmed through the appointment of family members in key positions—prominent among them the appointment of Zhivkov’s daughter, Lyudmila Zhivkova who took charge of the state’s cultural and media policy between 1975 and 1980.³³ Minorities became a favorite target of the regime. In the mid-1980s the so-called Rebirth (or Revival) Process was aimed against the predominantly rural Muslim and Turkish minorities with the purpose of assimilating them into the Bulgarian urban industrial labor force.³⁴ Other ‘enemies of the state’, like the Orthodox Church, students and intellectuals were systematically disabled. Only after 1985 did they react forcefully,

starting with the internationalization of nuclear or environmental problems (the Chernobyl and Kozloduy nuclear accidents, for example).

Romania

The Romanian experience with communism was similarly irrigated by local historical conditions. Romania was Stalin's first priority regarding the Balkans in 1944–5. A strategy of popular fronts kept out British intervention, which, in turn, focused on the maintenance of civil war-ridden Greece in the Western orbit. The regime of Georghe Gheorghiu-Dej, actual leader of the Communist Party since 1952, consolidated communist power through the expansion of membership in the Communist Party of Romania. Its 250,000 members in 1945 equaled the strength of its much older Bulgarian counterpart; between 1964 and 1975 members increased from 1.2 million to 2.6 million.³⁵ The powerful security police, *securitate*, was the main instrument of intimidation, responsible for massive detentions of regime opponents until the end of the 1950s.³⁶

Collectivization was undermined by anti-Russian feelings and failing economic planning. Urbanization was promoted for the sake of industrialization and for controlling the big, scattered agricultural populations. Romanian industry yielded mainly light industrial products and manufactured items. Thanks to local reserves, it was less dependent on Soviet oil than Bulgarian and Albanian production. When the international trade embargo receded in the mid-1950s, Bucharest opened trade with Western countries. Assuming leadership in 1965, Nicolae Ceaușescu intensified trade ties with the West. The USA granted Romania most favored nation treatment in 1975. Romania had previously entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1971 and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1972. In 1971, Ceaușescu made a trip to China and North Korea that was meant to stress emancipation from Moscow and, at the same time, attract attention and financial support from the West.³⁷

In the first half of the 1970s annual growth rate was equivalent to 5 percent by Western standards. Access to Western markets and loans gave Romania the opportunity to stand out as a second 'maverick' in the Balkans next to Yugoslavia.³⁸ The picture deteriorated in the second half of the decade with industrial growth falling to half, compared with the period 1970–5, and the unemployment rate growing rapidly. To deal with indebtedness in the 1980s, the Ceaușescu regime cut imports and introduced an industrialization program of autarky that removed thousands of villagers to

industrial centers (sistemeazărea/systematization). In parallel, state reproduction policies aimed to create a population of 30 million within a few years, but this only resulted instead in thousands of abandoned children.³⁹ The political dark side of Romanian self-reliance included a dearth of basic goods and the violent suppression of opposition, especially of young intellectuals. Family patronage was a salient feature of this regime, too. Many members of the Ceaușescu family were appointed to important party and state positions to exclude others who might question Ceaușescu's authority.⁴⁰ All in all, the regime owed its longevity more to political maneuver within bipolarity rather than to genuine political dissension or economic achievement. This proved a nemesis for Romania and the Ceaușescu regime when the socialist camp collapsed.⁴¹

Albania

Albania felt from the outset uncomfortable with the division of power within the socialist bloc. Owing much to Tito's contribution in building up a wartime resistance movement, the communist regime that prevailed in 1946–7 sought refuge in Soviet protection. This was also a way out of the simultaneous Anglo-American pressure to carve Albania out of the Eastern bloc. Enver Hoxha followed Moscow after the Tito–Stalin split in order to block Tito's plan for a Balkan federation that would unite all Albanians under Yugoslav leadership.⁴² Yet Albania could not catch up with the needs of industrialization and collectivization. Blaming it on her dependence on imported Soviet oil, Hoxha distanced the regime from the Soviet Union after Stalin's death and finally joined China in 1960.⁴³

The Chinese card paid out. Up to 1975 financial assistance amounted to \$838 million, compared to only \$300 million of previously received Soviet assistance. Peking satisfied Albanian demands, providing an oil refinery in 1969 (Fieri) along with other industrial investments. Hence, Albania became a significant market for Chinese economic and political interests.⁴⁴ But the rapprochement of China with the West turned Albania away from Peking, mainly out of fear of a potential Sino-Yugoslav understanding. The worsening of Sino-Albanian relations stimulated the improvement of relations with neighboring countries in an effort to alleviate Tirana's new doctrine of self-reliance. The same policy was pursued by Hoxha's successor Ramiz Alia until the end of the Cold War.⁴⁵

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia stands out as a unique case. Here, a reformist spirit was already reflected in the constitution of 1952 in terms of protection of personal rights and decentralization. But central power remained in the hands of Tito and the merciless security police forces that restricted freedom and public opinion.⁴⁶ A more genuine liberalization started in the 1960s through amendments to the 1952 constitution regarding the rights of Muslims and the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Worthy of note was the establishment of an Albanian-language University in Pristina (1969) and the cultivation of educational and cultural ties between Albania and Kosovo.⁴⁷

In general, third-way socialism as a special genre of national communism could not balance economic performance with federal arrangements. Slovenia produced in the 1970s and 1980s 20 percent of gross national product and 25 percent of hard currency exports, but represented only 8 percent of the population. The People's (then Socialist) Republic of Macedonia (PRM/SRM) and the province of Kosovo, on the other end of the spectrum, belonged to the poorest regions, but also to the fastest growing ones in terms of population and, therefore, representation, in federal institutions. The PRM/SRM and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with almost 2 million and 4 million inhabitants, respectively, outnumbered Slovenia (1.8 million) and Montenegro (610,000) and were partly equal with Croatia (4.7 million).⁴⁸

Calls for decentralization became loud in the 1970s, culminating in a mass protest Croat movement in 1971 ('Croat Spring'), leading to the introduction of a new SFRY federal constitution in 1974.⁴⁹ Two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were redefined as constituent members of the Yugoslav federation and, hence, gained extensive rights in legislative, police, educational and economic matters. However, autonomy provided fertile ground for the revival of nationalism, both on the Serbian side, as well as among Albanians and Croats who sharpened their identity knives on long-standing anti-Serbian resentment.⁵⁰

Tito's death was a critical turning point. Serbian policies were reversed in favor of re-centralization and suppression of minorities.⁵¹ Since the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement of the 1950s, relations with Albania, Bulgaria and Greece remained also volatile with open issues regarding Kosovo and PR/SR Macedonia.⁵² All in all, Yugoslavia became the 'sick man' of the Balkans long before Western economic and political pressure accelerated the end of communist Europe.

ILLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES UNDER 'NATIONAL COMMUNISM'

National communism flourished in the Eastern bloc thanks to the lessening of direct Soviet control in the organization of state and economy. It was initiated gradually in the course of the 1970s as a child of Soviet strategy towards détente. The Brezhnev administration sought to take advantage of détente in order to shift economic resources from financing bloc modernization to the improvement of its own strategic arsenal after the (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SALT I) Treaty in 1972.⁵³

National communism offered political advantages after the embarrassing crashing of the Prague Spring.⁵⁴ An obvious complication had been Romania's vehement refusal to participate in the Soviet-led invasion, a decision that actually inaugurated its autonomization and the consolidation of the Ceaușescu regime.⁵⁵ West of the Iron Curtain, Soviet policies also alienated orthodox communist parties: new splinter parties embraced alternative socialist doctrines (Titoism, Maoism, Castroism, etc.) or they joined the reformist movement of Eurocommunism which curbed the appeal of communism to West European middle-class workers.

Soviet disengagement allowed communist states to breathe more freely. But it deprived them gradually of valuable economic and political resources. A major challenge for those countries was to preserve the high growth rate of previous years and to maintain their role in the Soviet system of economic integration. Both were crucial for retaining the advantages of socialism, namely economic safety, employment, social cohesion and ideological unity. That challenge involved a further dilemma: whether the socialist regimes would stick to the inherited socialist model of import-substituted industrialization or if they would give in to the appealing sirens of import-driven consumerism.⁵⁶

Abundant Western credit favored the latter. In the 1970s, good economic conditions continued only thanks to loans from Western banks. These were awash with investible money when the 1973 oil crisis arrested development in Western economies and inflicted a serious blow on the stagflation-hit American economy. Western credit permitted East European economies to maintain growth with a strong consumerist element.⁵⁷ Prosperity, in turn, offered more legitimacy to the regimes of the national communist sort.⁵⁸

Similarly, European détente substituted any attempt for domestic reform.⁵⁹ Massive imports of Western capital and technology enabled socialist countries to preserve their manufacturing function within the

CMEA, thus satisfying also Moscow's needs in manufactured goods. The switch from import-substitution to export-led growth made up for the financial disengagement of the Soviet Union from East European economies. Additionally, the Soviet Union benefitted greatly from the 1973 oil crisis, as it secured her higher oil prices for almost a decade. Across the socialist Balkans, debts were served through new debts and economic optimism was reinforced by the gradual initiation of socialist countries in international organizations. Yugoslavia became a member of the GATT in 1966, Romania in 1971 (whereas Bulgaria only in 1996 and Albania in 2000). Yugoslavia signed a Cooperation Agreement with the EEC in 1980 after a decade of trade agreements.⁶⁰ On its part, Yugoslavia, already more open to the international capitalist economy, relied heavily on Western loans to subsidize economic improvement, redistribute wealth to all federal entities and ease interethnic tensions.⁶¹ Until the end of the 1970s, 75 percent of Yugoslav exports went to Western countries.⁶² East–West trade—a dead zone in the 1950s⁶³—became now a flourishing sector for Balkan countries.⁶⁴

East European borders opened for Western money, products, ideas and lifestyles.⁶⁵ The young generation of baby-boomer students fertilized the idea of national communism with past national struggles for independence and identity. Young people, yearning for better jobs, living standards and more personal and regional freedom, became an explosive material in the 1970s. They demanded better access to decision-making and a sharper national identity next to socialist solidarity.⁶⁶ Older party elites not only tolerated, but also encouraged this attitude, as nationalism offered an ersatz to 'more dangerous' liberalizing reforms and democratization. The same trend occurred in 'maverick' Yugoslavia. Serbian nationalism wore the veil of Yugoslavism, which was destined to fade away after Tito's eclipse. In a way, internal democratization, nevertheless, under the 1974 constitution, actually facilitated disintegration and, consequently, intensification of Serbian nationalism.

Human rights activism, culminating between 1975 and 1989, 'contaminated' socialist countries with Western ideas of freedom, democracy and personal opportunity.⁶⁷ Transcending national borders, the international mobilization for human rights activism helped open East European borders to Western ideas and products. Western lifestyle arrived, too, in a subtle way.⁶⁸ The young generation acquired access to products of Western mass culture and lifestyle (cinema, television series, festivals, etc.) and icons of the 'affluent society' from art, science, politics and other fields of

life. Various rights movements (women, youth, etc.) exerted an irresistible appeal.⁶⁹ A number of international organizations (e.g. Transparency International, Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International) ‘intervened’ with fact-finding missions and special reports that raised awareness and inspired local human rights activism.⁷⁰ The human rights dimension of the Helsinki Final Act exposed the Soviet system as an anti-paradigm at a time when democratization was acquiring top priority in the developed and developing world.⁷¹

Political optimism was brutally hit by the energy crisis of 1979. Between 1979 and 1982 Western credit banks refocused on the American economy which became loan-thirsty after the introduction of Reaganite neoliberalism. The disarming of the Keynesian economy, originating in the late Carter administration, opened the way for massive privatization and globalized financial speculation.⁷² As financial interest was shifting from the socialist and the Third World (Latin America, Asia, Africa) to the West, banks demanded repayment of their loans in order to play in the new lucrative, globalized version of capitalism in the West. To that effect, interest rates were acutely raised, thus rendering the return of loans by the indebted Balkan countries, very costly and in the end impossible.⁷³

A direct complication was the inability of socialist countries to pay their loan obligations. First liquidity, then insolvency crises set in. Unable to get manufactured goods from Eastern Europe, Moscow increased her imports from the West and demanded more imports of Soviet raw materials by the satellites. A second consequence was widespread economic dislocation expressed in decreasing production, rising unemployment, runaway inflation, breakdown of the supply and demand system, high commodity prices and basic commodity scarcities, falling standards of living, proliferation of diseases and a rise in mortality—most noticeably the high child mortality rate towards the end of the 1980s.⁷⁴

Under the conditions of liberalized and dollarized national economies, hard-currency debt rose immensely. In Yugoslavia, foreign debt was \$18.6 billion in 1983. Inflation rose to 2,000 percent and unemployment ran at 20 percent for most of the 1980s. Romania’s foreign debt reached \$8.4 billion in 1982. Unemployment caused serious miners’ strikes that were crushed by the security police of the Ceaușescu regime. His policy of nullifying foreign debt started yielding fruit in 1983. In effect, it put Romania on a path of utter social suffering and economic destruction that left it practically bankrupt at the end of the Cold War.⁷⁵ Bulgaria avoided excessive foreign debt, but was still hit by economic anomalies because of its close connection with the Soviet economy.

The Soviet Union was neither flexible nor ‘Stalinist’ enough to bring the satellites back in orbit. Foreign indebtedness and insolvency was one side of the coin. The other, historically more important, was the incapacity of national communism to move autonomously in the world economy, particularly in an increasingly globalized economy that shifted emphasis from state-led industrialization to volatile financial services. National communist regimes proved incapable of producing genuine social and economic change, blocked as they were in games of domestic power and old-fashioned nationalism with a strongly anti-democratic bias.

DEAD-END DILEMMAS

The 1970s and 1980s marked a turning point in the Cold War. Détente became an umbrella concept for East–West rapprochement in various fields. Beneath the calm surface, an escalation of the arms race caused new rifts between *and within* the blocs.

The allies of both superpowers felt abandoned by the continuing shift of priorities to the Third World. This was equally true for both East and West. In 1974 Greece became the second NATO member to withdraw from the military planning of the organization following its inaction over the Turkish invasion in Cyprus.⁷⁶ Britain managed finally to enter the EEC in 1973 with a weakened economy after a double French veto baptized in de Gaulle’s skepticism towards its ‘special relationship’ with the USA.⁷⁷ Anti-Americanism ran high due to the Vietnam War and to Washington’s tolerance or support of dictatorial regimes in the Third World.⁷⁸ More and more West European countries elected social democratic governments that promised economic reforms and lessening of East–West tension.⁷⁹ At the same time, terrorist organizations challenged the democratic–capitalist order of the postwar *Pax Americana*.⁸⁰

Détente was further damaged by economic problems. The two energy crises of the 1970s brought Western economies to a halt. Western Europe became ambivalent as to the advisability of a continuous confrontation with the Soviet Union at the peak of the ‘Euromissile crisis’ (1977–87). François Mitterrand sought to renationalize French economic policies, leaving aside the targets of the Common Market.⁸¹ As a new member of the EEC, Greece renegotiated the conditions of membership in 1981–82 to protect its fragile economy and democracy. Democratization was more feasible than growth in Spain and Portugal, too.⁸² At the dawn of the 1980s, European integration seemed to reach an impasse (‘Eurosclerosis’). It was only in the mid-1980s, when the nuclear race subsided and the

Soviet Union turned to structural reform under Mikhail Gorbachev, that European integration and transatlantic relations could celebrate a return to political and economic normality.⁸³

On the other side of the coin, the Eastern bloc began to shatter. It found it impossible to interact with capitalism and maintain socialism. Cheap Western credit had allowed socialist economies to survive but not to thrive, to sustain cheap exports but not to produce a better economic structure. Huge foreign debts brought socialist economies to their knees as they could not raise enough money, despite their desperate 'export offensives'. Long-term economic deprivation, political oppression and nationalism made the Balkans a theatre of intense political violence when the Iron Curtain finally fell, quite in contrast with the 'velvet' ending in the rest of the communist countries. Outright war would soon prove the end of communist Yugoslavia in the most traumatic way of all.⁸⁴

The gap between disintegrating Eastern Europe and integrating Western Europe could not be deeper and the comparison could not be more toxic for the future of communism. The hard-won battle of catching up with the developed West, a reality in the 1950s and in the 1960s, was lost again. The transformation of the world economy in the *zeitgeist* of neoliberalism was exerting enormous additional pressure.⁸⁵

But the fate of the communist model had been decided earlier, in the political and economic dilemmas of the 1970s and early 1980s. It was then that socialist states proved unable to offer alternative paths to modernization, to conciliate financial freedom with economic discipline and political reform. National communism had proved an equally oppressive and counterproductive system of governance with Soviet-controlled state socialism and, moreover, unable to produce modernization and legitimacy beyond political/cultural path-dependency.

The Soviet Union had a great share of responsibility in the collapse of Eastern Europe that led finally to its own disintegration. First, it failed to move away from geopolitical to geo-economic priorities in the framework of détente; second, it failed to propose an economic alternative to the transitional capitalism that emerged in the 1970s; and last, but not least, it was wrong in the calculation that it could use the advantages of Western capital without putting its own system to the test.

Making that choice, in obvious connection with the self-fulfilling élan of their huge industrial-military establishment, the Soviets entered a self-destructive race that was destined to exhaust their economy if an economic crisis occurred. This did occur painfully in the 1980s. When

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed in 1987 for the termination of the last fierce nuclear arms race between Moscow and Washington,⁸⁶ it was too late for Gorbachev to win back control and political legitimacy. For the socialist countries, a full turn to the West was the ultimate, obvious choice out of the old dilemmas.

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PART V

Identity, Culture, Ideology

Yugoslavia: The 1950 Cultural and Ideological Revolution

Miroslav Perišić

It is no exaggeration to assert that the new cultural policy conceptualized and inaugurated in Yugoslavia in 1950 was one of the cornerstones that enabled the creation of a socialism that was distinctly more liberal than the existing Soviet model. In the long run, it would help Yugoslavia create for itself a new position within the Cold War international system. This policy shift opened up Yugoslavia's culture and science to the West, created links with countries in and beyond Western Europe, and challenged the Soviet-type cultural heritage of 'Socialist realism'. The new policy signaled Yugoslavia's intention to find a way to improve its cultural and scientific life through fostering unlimited cultural and political cooperation worldwide, particularly with the West, that would change the image of Socialism not only in Yugoslavia but also globally.

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THE ERA OF TURNING PRACTICE INTO VULGARIZED THEORY, 1945–48

Between 1945 and 1948, Yugoslavia's international cultural cooperation was almost exclusively with the People's Democracies. It was based on reciprocity and mainly consisted of visits by artists and Ministry of Culture officials, exhibitions, and the translation and publication of (mainly Soviet) literary works. In the main, these exchanges were ideologically predetermined, while their actual artistic quality or value was of little or no interest. Yugoslavia often welcomed inferior foreign artists whose work was far less impressive than that of most domestic artists. On the other hand, it had to send artists from the pre-agreed fields of art, rather than those whom it might have chosen to send based on merit. Such cultural cooperation contributed little to the advancement of art in Yugoslavia. Miodrag Protić, a renowned Serbian painter and art critic, later wrote that Socialist realism was not art at all and that it took more than it offered.¹ According to Richard Sennett, 'revolutions distort time', while Vilfredo Pareto asserted that 'revolutions represent a special case of upset equilibrium', recalling the metaphor of a river being driven from its riverbed after a particularly fierce disturbance, causing it to flood, before resuming its original route.² Applied to the Yugoslav revolution, Sennett's assertion is best illustrated by the words of Miloš Minić, Yugoslav Communist Party and government official who, speaking in 1945 at the Parliamentary Legislative Committee meeting on the issue of the draft Law on the Organization of Courts, declared:

If ... we were to appoint judges who are lawyers, then we would award preponderance to formal justice. However, the justice should be dispensed by people who know how to preserve the heritage of the War for National Liberation. The political context and relevance of the new laws are better appreciated by people who took part in the War of National Liberation than by the lawyers who interpret the letter of the law.³

There were many similar examples of turning daily practice into vulgarized theory during the immediate post-Second World War revolutionary period in Yugoslavia. What then could be the role of knowledge in a state in which the Party⁴ monopolized everything, including knowledge itself; in which a rigid social framework eradicated the concept of the 'intellectual'; rendered meaningless freedom and individualism as key premises of artistic expression; and excluded doubt as the postulate of science and of

intellectual thinking in search of meaning, truth and universal values? And what role could intellectuals play in a society in which the Party was the sole and unchallenged center of power, constantly demanding that intellectuals' opinions must converge with those of the leadership; and one in which the roles were swapped—with the leadership assuming the role of creators, while artists and scientists were allocated the role of followers? Of course, one should not forget the wider context—the Yugoslav revolution occurred during the Second World War, within the Yugoslav anti-Fascist national liberation struggle and brutal fratricidal civil war, which shaped individual and collective destinies, not least the tragic fate of a number of pre-war intellectuals. Moreover, in the overwhelmingly agrarian Yugoslav society of that time, the extent of illiteracy and low educational levels is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, in 1945, some 80 per cent of soldiers in the Yugoslav Army had not completed even the eight years of elementary school.⁵ One should also bear in mind that the communist ideology, being collectivist and authoritarian in nature, was concomitant with the collectivist tradition and inclination towards strong leadership that prevailed among the Yugoslav peasant population. Intellectuals and civil servants formed a mere five per cent of the population between the two World wars. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's intellectual elite was divided along ethnic and ideological lines. The majority of pre-war intellectuals (some 70 per cent) were of bourgeois background and, as such, unappealing to the post-war communist regime.⁶ The Yugoslav Communist Party's attitude towards the intelligentsia was based on the Soviet doctrine, formed during the pre-war period. Having assumed power, the Yugoslav Party maintained its suspicious, antagonistic attitude toward intellectuals. This, however, would gradually change after the conflict with the USSR in 1948, when the regime was forced to build a state and a society based on new ideological premises.

During the Second World War, thousands of Yugoslav intellectuals were killed, died of natural causes, taken prisoner or emigrated. Following the establishment of the communist regime, a number of university professors were removed for political reasons. Reputable representatives of civic society and members of the cultural and scientific elites were harshly dealt with, particularly in Serbia. Thus, the Yugoslav leadership was quickly faced with dramatic consequences of the war and its own post-war ideological bigotry. The problems seemed insurmountable: national universities and high schools were both inadequate in number and of such poor quality that they could not satisfy the country's need for experts. After the war, teaching was not immediately resumed in many universities due to the

difficult economic situation and shortage of teaching staff. Additional professional schools and polytechnics could not be established, as the regime had to wait for the completion of education of students who had been sent to French universities in 1945 and to Soviet and Czechoslovakian universities in 1946.⁷ Due to the shortage of domestic experts, Yugoslavia was forced to import foreigners, although it could not count on their permanent presence. The 'thirst' for professionally and ideologically-trained teaching staff was omnipresent in schools and universities. The new revolutionary regime, having severed its ties with tradition, was craving a new intelligentsia, one that would be faithful to the Revolution and would loyally serve its ideals and the new society. The rise of the new expert elite resulted in the creation of a 'desired' type of intelligentsia. 'New' intellectuals were required to support the transition to the new society of Socialist realism and, in the long run, to become reliable supporters of a single party communist regime. Through their conspicuous omnipresence, in factories and fields, as well as theatres and universities, the new intelligentsia was expected to place itself at the disposal of an uncritical ideological *Weltanschauung*. In August 1945, one of the most respected Yugoslav newspapers, *Politika*, declared under bold headlines that several prominent Belgrade University professors were cultivating a vegetable plot in Belgrade Botanical Gardens. According to the paper, these professors 'took a shovel into their hands and used the fruits of their own work'. It also noted that intellectuals collectively travelled to rural areas on Sundays, 'thus dedicating their day of rest to the village'. *Politika* construed the symbolism of the new era and made it known what was expected of the intellectuals.⁸ The Party, which 'overnight had transformed itself into a state', posed the 'question as to how, [in revolutionary times] to reconcile one's own narrative with the general, grand narrative of history, one that is monumental and of steel; the question that had to be answered by each "technician of knowledge"'.⁹

The new Yugoslav intelligentsia was identified with the ideological goals, the changing habits, tradition and mindset, as well as its new designated role. Thus, the very substance of the concept of intelligentsia was being remolded. Doubt, critical deliberation and intellectual solitude became the main opponents of the Yugoslav intelligentsia's new identity. Ignorance governed knowledge; the power of the Party was stronger than that of knowledge. Among the early post-war intellectuals in Yugoslavia were the powerful and the weak, depending on whether they were intellectual-revolutionaries, intellectual-followers or intellectual-loners.

NEITHER IN THE EAST NOR IN THE WEST, 1948–50

The Yugoslav leadership did not perceive the accusations contained in the Cominform Resolution of 28 June 1948 as mere criticism, as Moscow attempted to present them; from the outset, Belgrade understood them as an act of defamation. Given their strong self-awareness of their unquestionable heroic contribution to the anti-Nazi struggle and the international revolutionary cause, particularly when juxtaposed against the record of other East European Communist Parties, it was unsurprising that the Yugoslavs were particularly sensitive to Moscow's efforts to discredit this legacy. Together with Albania, which the Yugoslav communists assisted throughout the war, Yugoslavia, with its communist-led resistance movement, was the only European country to effect a successful social revolution while simultaneously conducting a national liberation struggle against the Nazi and Fascist occupiers during the Second World War. Further to this key truth, there were also other 'demarcation lines' distinguishing the Yugoslav communists from communists in other countries. First, Yugoslavia earned its global anti-fascist legitimacy on 27 March 1941, three months before the war between Germany and the USSR broke out. When, following the 22 June 1941 German attack, Moscow issued instructions to communists throughout Europe to oppose the Nazis, the Yugoslav Party, unlike other European Communist Parties, was fully prepared to embark on a war of resistance against the occupiers. Furthermore, and unlike in other Eastern European countries, the Red Army was deployed on Yugoslav territory for two months only, from September 1944, when it assisted the Yugoslav Partisan Army's liberation of Belgrade. Throughout Yugoslavia's occupation, the anti-fascist resistance, the war of national liberation and the fratricidal civil war, the Yugoslav communists adopted slogans and terminology rooted in the Serbian freedom-loving tradition and legacy: courage; the warrior spirit of the liberators, buttressed during the First World War; probity; self-sacrifice; the sense of a unique historical mission; a sense of belonging to the league of 'just' nations; and the history of alliances and war coalitions with other democracies worldwide. Unlike communists in other countries, the Yugoslav communists created their own army and officer corps. All of the above reinforced the Yugoslav communists' self-confidence, as well as a sense of grandeur and awareness of their unique role within the epic European anti-Fascist struggle.

When it came to building Socialism, until 1948 the Yugoslavs undoubtedly looked to the Soviet Union as their unquestioned role model. Even

during this period, however, the Yugoslav Communist Party developed, albeit to a limited extent, idiosyncratic approaches. On the one hand, this was a consequence of the specific Yugoslav context in which the single-party monopoly was being imposed. On the other hand, it was a result of the strong feeling of sacrosanctity; of the need for independent expression; and the expectation that, due to its authenticity and successful record, it could not be treated as just another communist party within the international Communist movement. The Yugoslav Communist Party regarded itself as a revolutionary center in the Balkans and, as a result, compared itself only to the Soviet Communist Party. In some respects, Tito saw his relationship with Stalin as a partnership rather than subjugation, believing that it sufficed for him to inform the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party about certain issues rather than having to seek their approval.

After the 1948 Cominform Resolution, the Yugoslav party and state leadership realized that a return to the Soviet bloc was neither desirable nor acceptable. Seeking to build a different type of Socialism, as the only remaining alternative, the regime could not afford to remain isolated and lacking a clear perspective and international links as sources of support. To do so, however, they had to develop familiarity with the contemporary cultural trends and acquire the knowledge and expertise that existed in the West. Yugoslavia embarked on a process of changing its image in the world through culture. It aspired to present its Socialism as different from that of the Soviet Union and to portray itself as a unique champion of Socialism acceptable to the West. Tito no longer saw his prospects lying in the Soviet bloc—he could never be the leader of Soviet-sponsored communism. Instead, he set out to become the influential leader of a particular model of Socialism that would later prove to be far more liberal than the rigid Soviet model.

Between 1948 and 1950, Tito found himself in a truly unenviable position. Yugoslavia was suffering under an imposed economic and political blockade and unrelenting Cominform propaganda, the results of which were international isolation and a disastrous economic situation. In these circumstances, a legitimacy based on Socialist realism was not an entrance ticket into the Western world. Yet, viewed from a different perspective, this also presented an opportunity. Yugoslavia had two major achievements that attracted international recognition—the anti-Fascist legitimacy acquired on 27 March 1941, three months before the Soviet Union entered the war against Fascism, and a definitive break

with Stalin in 1948. For the second time in less than a decade since the outbreak of the Second World War, Yugoslavia was the focus of global attention and won admiration from the West. The bridge to the West had to be re-established. This time, however, the Party and state leadership were only too aware that they needed to implement internal changes if they were to impress the West. The fulcrum and instrument of this change lay within international cultural and scientific links as the premises of an open society. What followed were a complete metamorphosis of the mindset and a visible and qualitative change of cultural values. In the ensuing years, its increasing distance from the Soviet model of cultural policy contributed to Yugoslavia being viewed differently from other Socialist countries.

THE BIG SHIFT IN 1950: LESS IDEOLOGY—MORE KNOWLEDGE AND ACCEPTANCE OF WESTERN VALUES

On 30 January 1950, an official conference was organized in Belgrade on cultural and artistic propaganda abroad, building on the Third Plenary Session of the Yugoslav Communist Party Central Committee, held a month earlier, when the shift in Yugoslav cultural policy was announced. The meeting declared that a cultural leap abroad was critically important for Yugoslavia's recognition, particularly at a time when the Cominform countries were attempting to isolate Belgrade internationally. As later became evident, the liberalization of culture was relevant not only for Yugoslavia's international recognition but, equally, for the enrichment and modernization of its cultural, scientific and artistic life. At that juncture, in the fields of culture, the arts and sciences, Yugoslavia turned towards the West, in parallel with the rejection of Socialist realism's dogmatic heritage and the abandonment of Soviet views on culture. For some time though, albeit with lesser frequency, the Party rhetoric would use terms such as 'Westernism' and 'decadent art', ideological attributes previously reserved for the art of the 'capitalist and imperialist Western culture'.¹⁰ This change in attitude was dictated by the need to learn about the decadent art of the West: 'If we wish to learn about Western culture and art, even decadence, as it appears there, we should critically assess it and need not be afraid that it might have negative influence on us'.¹¹ Discussions at the 30 January conference repeatedly underlined the differences between the Soviet and Yugoslav views of the West, emphasizing the need for a definite, clean break from the Soviet position:

We should take a different position towards the Western decadence from the one the Russians took ... We are fully aware that, for instance, we cannot claim that we have overcome the Renaissance. It would be both farcical and wrong. Of course, we are far from Russian views ... we are establishing the relationship with foreign countries, with the cultured world in a way that is different from the one taken by the USSR.¹²

A cardinal new approach to cultural activities abroad was announced, initially within Europe and then beyond it. One of the important phenomena in the new perception of cultural and scientific links with the world was the insistence on expert opinion; knowledge was awarded supremacy over ideology. The new policy would become one of 'less ideology, more knowledge'. As the participants of the Conference of 30 January insisted:

Our relationship with the West must be analyzed comprehensively. The final word as to what and from which country should be allowed in must be given to the professional departments ... The assessment on what is of value and what is best should be rendered by our science, our professional associations, cultural and art organizations. They should have a final say and not bureaucratic bodies in ministries.¹³

At the same time, the very concept of cultural propaganda was placed under scrutiny and the conference reasserted the need for its fundamental redefinition.¹⁴

Recognition of the need to open up Yugoslavia to the West permeated together with an awareness of democratization of society. Culture and arts were seen as primary fields in which a conceptual shift was required. Such a shift implied the rejection of the Party monopoly over creativity; the liberalization of culture and science; and decentralization at state and institutional levels. In 1950, Yugoslavia began the process of opening up to the world; of establishing links with as many countries as possible; of opening its frontiers to foreign influence; of attracting public personae and artists from abroad; and of reaffirming its traditions and cultural legacy. The shift was, however, not only an imperative of the new cultural policy but also an important component of a foreign policy aimed at creating a new position for the country in the eyes of the West. The democratization of culture and its drive into the world acquired deeper significance, as part of the new political strategy. Internally, knowledge and expertise gained prominence and obtained freedom of expression. Externally, Yugoslavia was now

establishing a very different image compared to 1945–8. Yugoslavia in 1950 stepped outside the world to which it belonged, in search of a place within the wider international framework. The Party recognized that it did not create the Yugoslav people's culture. It insisted on learning about the tradition and admitted that the country's huge cultural heritage was inadequately valued and recognized during the previous, post-war period. The leadership now stressed that the republics and Yugoslav peoples had their own cultural specificities and different traditions, all of which must be respected, not least because they might hold a special significance for the country's international contacts.¹⁵

One of the most important objectives of Yugoslavia's promotion through culture was creating, in the eyes of the West, a distance between its own cultural policy and that of the Soviet Union. The 1948 conflict with the Soviet Union rationalized Yugoslavia's self-perception and revealed its negative aspects and backwardness. The extent to which its ideological closeness to Moscow had distanced Yugoslavia from contemporary trends and aspirations in the arts and sciences became all too evident: 'What did we actually have? Ignorance of what is happening out there. We perceived the West through the eyes of the Soviet Union.'¹⁶

A critical appraisal of the existing cultural propaganda abroad revealed the absence of a plan, as well as lack of due attention. It was also acknowledged that existing opportunities had not been exploited; that adequate cultural content had not been presented abroad; and that there continued to prevail a feeling of inferiority and, above all, a fear of Western influence. The question of Western perception of Yugoslavia became the focus of the Party's efforts to enhance the country's international reputation: 'We must show our country in a proper light, as one of rich cultural heritage and not a "wild" Balkan country, as it is being seen in the West.'¹⁷ The reassessment of the previous cultural policy and international cultural and scientific links brought into focus, among other things, the fact that Yugoslavia's self-imposed dormant status in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) had handicapped its relations with other countries. It was emphasized that countries, which had been active in UNESCO had successfully promoted and translated domestic authors' literary and other works into world languages at no cost. Furthermore, the noteworthy achievements of Yugoslav ballet, music and opera remained confined within its boundaries, unknown to the world, due to the country's abstention from international festivals and

competitions. Yugoslav artists' creativity and output were stymied by an absence of comparison with European counterparts and standards.

The acknowledgment of existing failings and deficiencies resulted in the identification of tasks requiring immediate implementation, namely cultural forays into as many countries as possible, the enhancement of the quality of the content and participation of artists and their associations in cultural policy decision-making. Moreover, the existing 'state directive' was denounced and the de-bureaucratization of cultural exchanges was declared—in future, artists were promised full liberty to cooperate with their counterparts abroad, without state or Party interference. New departments were planned, dedicated solely to promoting international cultural cooperation and planning, and preparing cultural activities abroad. Ways of encouraging individual artists to establish contacts with their counterparts abroad were also actively sought. By 1950, a new awareness prevailed—that the establishment of such links was helping to improve Yugoslavia's cultural and scientific endeavors. This was enabling scientists and artists to acquire a clearer knowledge of the most recent cultural and scientific achievements in the world and, thus, had made it possible to import such knowledge into the country.¹⁸

Simultaneously, it was recognized that Yugoslav scientists and artists needed to travel abroad to visit the most prestigious foreign cultural and scientific centers and institutions. In particular, young and creative individuals were encouraged to acquaint themselves with the work of the world's authorities. To this end, various bureaucratic obstacles were dismantled and necessary official approval was fast-tracked. A 'capitalist' network was even introduced to facilitate exchanges—that of managers and agencies who organized cultural activities. This new approach resulted in the destruction of the existing ideological barriers and formal obstacles, and the introduction of Western models for organizing, planning and promoting cultural activities.¹⁹ Further ways to facilitate this international cultural breakthrough were being proposed, namely: the establishment of an international film festival; the better quality printing of material supporting activities abroad; the technical improvement of Yugoslav concert halls (for example, the walls of Belgrade's most prominent concert hall, Kolarac, were covered with propaganda slogans, now deemed an inappropriate setting for concerts by renowned international performers); Yugoslav impressionists' exhibitions abroad, believed to be of interest to foreign audiences; the publication of articles in foreign professional and academic journals; the encouragement of personal contacts among

Yugoslav artists who had pre-war links with artists abroad; overcoming the Balkan inferiority complex; addressing the West's ignorance of culture created in Yugoslavia; and acquainting the world with Yugoslavia's cultural heritage. Although the 1950 Paris exhibition of Yugoslav medieval frescoes aroused great interest, Yugoslav officials thought that much more could be achieved because 'copies [of frescoes] were shown at the exhibition and foreign experts should come [to Yugoslavia] to see the originals'. It was no coincidence that 'Dundo Maroje', a play by the Dubrovnik Renaissance author, Marin Držić was selected to spearhead the Yugoslav theatrical offensive in the West, as it was deemed representative of former links between Western and Yugoslav cultural heritage.

Cultural and social life in Tito's Yugoslavia was critically reshaped in 1950. It enabled the departure from the rigid Soviet Socialist realism as the model of socialist culture and influenced the change in the West's perception of Yugoslavia. Naturally, artists, writers and scientists wholeheartedly supported this change. However, its unique significance stemmed from the fact that it was the Party and state leadership that initiated and implemented this paradigm shift. The Yugoslav leadership had identified an opportunity as well as the means for Yugoslavia and its own brand of Socialism to be recognized as different from the Soviet Union and its bloc. In January 1950, Belgrade unequivocally proclaimed: 'We are at the beginning of a new era.'²⁰ Needless to say, this cultural opening encountered internal resistance, namely from the semi-educated Party 'simpletons' and lower-level Party apparatchiks. However, resistance came also from certain intellectuals, who were accustomed to working as instructed and whose standing was threatened by the new policy. According to the renowned Yugoslav historian, Branko Petranović, Socialist realism did not retreat easily, overnight. He quoted examples of jazz still being ostracized as anti-culture and of an article in the most prominent Yugoslav literary journal, *Književne novine*, admonishing one cinema's management for lack of ideological alertness—it succumbed to popular demand and extended the showing of the Western melodrama 'Why Did We Meet?'²¹

By 1950, Yugoslavia had established links with a number of international cultural organizations and associations and renewed its activities within organizations of which it had been a dormant member. Thus, on 31 March, Yugoslavia acceded to UNESCO, whose founding act it had signed back in 1945. That same year, the Yugoslav authorities began to study the West German universities' curricula and the system of professional education in both the US and West Germany. The Department

for International Scientific and Cultural Relations of the Council for Science and Culture started publishing regular digests of articles related to science, culture, arts and education from the international press, and a foreign press reading room was established.²² Simultaneously with the scientific and cultural opening of the country to the West, awareness was emerging of the need to promote knowledge about Yugoslavia. An official report from 1951 confirmed that the information about Yugoslavia in foreign textbooks was often incomplete, obsolete and, at times, even malicious. Yugoslav diplomatic representations abroad were instructed to approach the authors of textbooks and offer them up-to-date information. The report also highlighted the fact that education-related activities were among the least developed links with the international community. An example was quoted when the Belgrade government was unable to respond to interest in the Yugoslav educational system from France, Italy and Finland due to the outdated, inadequate information it possessed. A lack of English language textbooks was noted and, on the initiative of the British Council, the education, science and culture councils of the Republics were instructed to publish such textbooks.²³ Simultaneously, several countries expressed an interest in contacting Yugoslav scientists and scientific societies and institutions, proposing an exchange of publications and visits. For the first time, the Yugoslav authorities established a database of domestic scientists who could present lectures abroad. By 1953, some 300 Yugoslav institutions had established contacts with approximately 650 institutions in the West.²⁴

Between 1952 and 1954, Yugoslavia imported more than 50,000 books, journals and other publications from the West, including the USA. According to the assessment by the Yugoslav Committee for International Cultural Relations, between 1953 and 1963 some 17,000 Yugoslav scientists and experts received scholarships and spent time abroad undertaking specialist and doctoral studies or short-term professional advancement/study trips. In 1957 alone, of the 3,456 faculty members at Yugoslav universities, 951 had spent time abroad on study trips (27 percent of the university teaching staff).²⁵ In 1950, Yugoslavia began organizing several annual Slavistic seminars and in 1956 it became the only socialist country with representatives attending the meetings of the European Forum in Alpbach, Austria, where intellectuals from different countries discussed issues related to the economy, politics and culture. By 1954, Yugoslav judges were regularly attending expert conferences on independent judiciary, organized annually in Perugia, Italy.²⁶

Evidence of this unprecedented surge in Yugoslavia's cultural and scientific interaction with the rest of the world was the establishment in 1953 of the Committee for International Cultural Relations. It replaced the existing Department within the Council for Science and Culture, which had become unable to cope with the volume of activity. The Committee records show that it quickly proved unable to handle, follow-up and keep track of all the diversified international contacts. In an important step, international cultural contacts became decentralized—individuals and institutions started establishing links by themselves, augmenting further their versatility and intensity. This, in turn made it even more difficult to keep track of and oversee all of the cultural links being established. The Committee thus sought to identify a model for its role. There was no question that the international links should be liberalized. The Committee, to a large extent, was comprised of members of the artistic and theatrical associations. However, there soon arose the need to ensure that the interests of the whole were not compromised, and that Yugoslavia was being represented through works and activities of the highest artistic and scientific quality.²⁷ At the time of the drafting of the 1954 international cultural relations plan, the Committee asserted that the opportunities for cultural links had been growing year on year, primarily due to the more visible political role that Yugoslavia was playing internationally. The decentralization of international cultural links was assessed as positive. The exchanges became more intensive and versatile, and direct institutional and individual contacts with other countries created opportunities for the public abroad to learn more about social life in Yugoslavia.

The experiences that Yugoslav experts and artists brought back to the country also had a political hue. The questions their counterparts in the West posed to the Yugoslav intellectuals in the early 1950s were mainly linked to the issue of freedom:

What are the limits of freedom in Yugoslavia? What is the influence of the State on art? Does censorship persist and in what form? Are theatres, publishing houses and cinematography in the hands of the State? Who buys paintings? Who decides what should be published or staged? Are young artists awarded scholarships to study abroad?²⁸

The Yugoslavs confirmed that, in the eyes of the Western intellectuals whom they encountered during their travels, Yugoslavia was raising hope that a humane and democratic Socialism might be possible. Western

political and intellectual circles were increasingly interested and carefully monitored Yugoslavia's huge cultural and scientific leap that originated in 1950. Thus, in early 1954, Radio Stuttgart broadcast a special program dedicated to Yugoslav cultural life, which immaculately and correctly assessed the ideological and conceptual paradigm shift. The broadcast began with a telling introduction: 'When uttering the word Yugoslavia, one thinks of the entire Balkans and visualises an exotic, colourful world; the world fraught with passion and political tensions; where there are always wars, revolutions and assassinations. As a result, a Central European has no idea about the Yugoslav literature'.²⁹ The program ended with an analysis of the 1950s, claiming that it marked a new era for contemporary Yugoslav literature, and noted the lively debate in Yugoslav journals and press on the contemporary trends in world literature and the place of Yugoslav literature within it. The program's author concluded that the literary bureaucracy's demise was evident from the Party's changed role, which relinquished its direct control over literature.³⁰

In the Yugoslav leadership's eyes, from 1950 culture became the advance guard and an integral part of its foreign policy. In 1950, Yugoslav embassies in the West began to report a still minute but, nonetheless, marked change in the perception of Yugoslavia. This increasingly positive attitude towards Yugoslavia since 1948 was particularly apparent in Britain, where the country's visibility was spiked by the 27 March 1941 coup, which declared void the earlier accession to the Tripartite Pact. The Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Dr. Jože Brilej, reported that the London press' positive stance toward Yugoslavia was particularly evident after 1950.³¹ The increasingly frequent visits, performances and appearances by Yugoslav artists and scientists in London contributed to increased sympathy for their homeland. Still, according to the Ambassador, the prevailing perception continued to be that Yugoslavia was a country of brave warriors but of primitive culture and economic underdevelopment. Apart from the narrowest circle of connoisseurs of history and culture, in the early 1950s ignorance and a general lack of information about Yugoslavia was still pervasive in the UK, as evidenced by the fact that a considerable proportion of the British public confused Yugoslavia with Czechoslovakia.³² Dr. Brilej opined that, unless Yugoslavia built its reputation based on achievements in science and the arts, despite the respect its foreign policy had enjoyed since the 1948 break with Stalin, the country would continue to receive the pitiful affinity awarded to small nations, that were regarded as being 'culturally underdeveloped and thus not even close to being equal to other

European nations'. A presence on the world's stage and podia, as well as in galleries, universities and scientific institutes was, on the one hand, the road to Yugoslavia's affirmation through culture and, on the other hand, a way to dispel prejudice about a 'primitive Balkan nation' and build respect for the quality of Yugoslav culture.

The Yugoslav Ambassador appealed for a substantial increase of funding for advancing Yugoslav culture in the West and for an end to treating culture as a subsector of the media and propaganda. He underlined the example of Great Britain, which had long recognized the need for an independent organization such as the British Council, whose key task was to promote international cultural activity. The ambassador stressed that the recognition of Yugoslav culture was the most important task of its foreign policy, pointing to the example of 1951 when progress had been made: international visits by the Belgrade ballet, the national folklore ensemble and a number of individual artists; increased contact between Yugoslav and British artists and art galleries; and links with the BBC's music department. All of this, according to the ambassador, attested to how British institutions' and individuals' initial reservations might be overcome through persistent efforts. The Yugoslav Ambassador persistently strove to persuade the Yugoslav authorities to understand the significance of success in London because 'a presentation in Britain opens the doors to other Western countries'.³³

Performances by Yugoslav artistic groups and individual artists abroad enabled comparisons with their Western counterparts and contributed to advancement and learning. Professional assessment became important for identifying weaknesses and for the unbiased insight into the values and fine-tuning of their own criteria against international standards. Commenting on the Belgrade ballet performances at the Edinburgh festival, the Yugoslav Ambassador stressed their importance because the British public learned of the existence of ballet in Yugoslavia.³⁴ Within a year, the Yugoslav opera performed in the UK. After Paris, an exhibition of medieval frescoes was hosted in several Western European capitals. During the same period, Yugoslav folklore ensembles performed over 30 times in Britain. In 1952, an exhibition of Yugoslav popular art was hosted in Brussels, The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Paris and Geneva.³⁵ Commenting on the participation of Yugoslav films in the Edinburgh Festival, the Yugoslav Ambassador in London advised that, if the goal was for Yugoslav films to be seen abroad, their content and production must be adapted to suit a foreign public's requirements and tastes.³⁶ Dr. Brilej

proposed co-productions on non-political topics.³⁷ As a result, Yugoslav cinematography ceased production for several years, to reappear again in 1954 at Cannes and in 1955 at film festivals in Berlin, Venice, Edinburgh and Cannes.³⁸ Yugoslav cameraman Fran Vodopivec won a prize at Cannes in 1956 and, in 1957 a three-week Yugoslav Film Festival, organized by the British Society of Cinematographers, was held in Great Britain.³⁹

In 1950, particular attention was paid in Yugoslavia to the translation of domestic literary works into foreign languages, particularly English, French, Italian and German. The links with the Slavistic centers abroad became more varied and regular. That same year, 52 Slavistic seminars and libraries abroad were given free subscriptions to ten Yugoslav literary, artistic and social science journals. In an unprecedented move, the Yugoslav government also sent 300 journals and books to each Slavistic seminar abroad. Compared to only one case of Yugoslav studies existing at foreign universities before 1950, by 1953, six more had been founded: in Lyon, Bordeaux, Gottingen, Leiden, and at the Sorbonne and School of Oriental Languages in Paris. Likewise, by 1954, there were five readers in French literature and language, two in English and one each in Italian and German teaching at Yugoslav universities.

From 1950, artistic circles in the West began paying more attention to Yugoslav art. Exhibitions of medieval frescoes and popular art, as well as contemporary paintings and engravings, were highly appraised by critics. A strategic approach and planning were implemented to present and promote culture, tradition and contemporary art. In 1950, an exhibition of Yugoslav popular art was staged in Edinburgh and London, as well as the highly successful exhibition of medieval frescoes in the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. Exhibitions of Yugoslav popular art were hosted in Oslo, Stockholm and Copenhagen in 1951, as well as in The Hague, Brussels, Paris and Geneva in 1952. The aforementioned exhibition of Yugoslav medieval frescoes was held at the Tate Gallery, London, in the museums of Utrecht and Dusseldorf, and in the Palais de Beaux Arts in Brussels, as well as in Zurich, Munich, Vienna, Hamburg, Copenhagen, Helsinki, Stockholm and Oslo.⁴⁰ Initially, exhibitions of contemporary works by individual artists and groups were organized and funded by the Committee. However, from 1952, artists began funding and staging independent exhibitions. Primarily, these were artists who were already known abroad, such as Marko Čelebonović (exhibited in Paris in 1952 and 1953) and Predrag Milosavljević (exhibited in Paris in 1946, 1952 and 1954, and in Brussels in 1953). By 1953, a drastic change had occurred, whereby individual

artists ventured out of Yugoslavia independently, in search of recognition outside its borders and no longer sought assistance from the State Committees.

The turnaround in cultural politics had another positive effect—Yugoslavia opened up to foreign artistic and cultural influence. Belgrade hosted an exhibition of Swiss architecture in 1950 and, the following year, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Skopje, Sarajevo, Zagreb and Ljubljana hosted an exhibition of Swiss posters. A series of international exhibitions was organized in Yugoslavia in 1952, including the Exhibition of Contemporary French Painting, the Exhibition of the Palace of Inventions from Paris and the Exhibition of Works of Le Corbusier.⁴¹ In 1953, the Yugoslav public also had a chance to see foreign exhibitions, such as the ‘100 Years of Dutch Painting’, of Swiss engravings and French Tapestry. In 1955, Yugoslavia hosted the exhibition of drawings and sculptures of Henry Moore and, a year later, 34 foreign exhibitions, mostly of contemporary art, were staged nationwide.⁴² The enormity of this cultural shift becomes clearer if one recalls that, prior to 1950, there were virtually no Western art exhibitions in Yugoslavia, particularly of contemporary art.

This unique opening up to foreign culture was not limited to visual art. In 1954, contemporary Austrian composers held six concerts in Yugoslavia. A number of foreign theatres performed in Yugoslavia in 1955, of which Paris’ Théâtre National attracted the most attention. At the initiative of the French Embassy in Belgrade, a tour of the French theatre, Frères Jacques was organized in several cities, including Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Novi Sad. The famous French violinist, Henryk Szering, performed several concerts with the Philharmonic Orchestra. The Yugoslav public saw the Athens Theatre’s *Oedipus* and *Hecuba*, the Viennese Burg theater with Goethe’s *Ifigenia* and Schnitzler’s *Flirtation*, and Piccolo Teatro from Milan with Goldoni’s comedy *The Servant of Two Masters*. The famous British composer Benjamin Britten and the pianist Peter Pearsheld performed in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. The Dubrovnik Summer Festival hosted Lord Hardwood, director of the London Covent Garden opera.⁴³ British violinist and pedagogue, Max Rostal, toured Yugoslavia in 1956, and the violinist Ida Hendl held concerts in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. At the initiative of the British Ambassador, a festival of British film took place in Belgrade, opening with *Richard III*, directed by and starring Laurence Olivier. In June 1957, the Stratford Memorial Theatre, with Laurence Olivier and Vivien Leigh, performed *Titus Andronicus* at the Yugoslav National Theatre in Belgrade.

In response to huge popular demand, Olivier and Leigh organized an impromptu recital from Shakespeare's plays. That same year, the popular French singer, Yves Montand, held five concerts in Belgrade.

CONCLUSIONS

Judged by its proclaimed objectives and, in particular, by the impact it had in future years, the cultural paradigm shift of 1950 indisputably represented a cornerstone in the development of post-Second World War Yugoslavia. Due to the ideological confinement and rigidity of the period between 1945 and 1948, Yugoslavia had no ready answers for the problems that besieged the state and Party leadership after 1948. Books and textbooks by Soviet authors were published in 1949 and the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism and Leninism was still the only official ideology, while the creative spirit remained enslaved. Nevertheless, hints at changes were already discernible in certain high Party officials' speeches. The ultimate answer to the question as to where and how to proceed emerged in 1950. During that year, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia demonstrated the strength to change itself. The Party initiated and championed changes that spurred a paradigm shift in thinking, manifested in the critical reappraisal of the socialist legacy; the rejection of the Soviet role model of a centralized, highly ideological cultural policy; the repudiation of Socialist realism in arts; the selective return to tradition, particularly the medieval cultural heritage; the understanding of the advantages of the free exchange of knowledge with the West; the overcoming of angst about Western culture; the international promotion of Yugoslavia through its culture; the understanding of the need for professionalism in cultural policy; the awareness of the advantages of understanding Western culture and allowing it to be imported; the recognition of the need to create a new intellectual elite through education abroad; and the change in the criteria, standards and system of values applied to culture.

In 1950, Yugoslavia embarked on a path that would define it as the only socialist country to embrace liberal socialism and also as a country that was acceptable to the West and, following Stalin's death, also to the East. It would in the 1950s develop contacts with the Third World and in the 1960s become one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement, and, although small, would play a role in global international order until 1989. The paradigm shift in culture that occurred in 1950 marked not only a change in cultural policy, but one in mindset, as well. It is doubt-

ful, however, whether 1950 would have happened were it not for 1948. The conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union constituted a clash between two leaders, each of whom perceived his role in the socialist world differently. This conflict allowed Tito to attract the West's attention. Simultaneously, during 1948 and 1949, he was prepared to pay a high price for this. In late 1949 and early 1950, however, he was exhibiting enormous power of adjustment and an anti-dogmatic approach at home and, even more significantly, in foreign affairs. Importantly, Yugoslavia's Bolshevization was completed in 1948. In the circumstances following the confrontation with the USSR, however, an alternative had to be found but one that would not mean giving up on the revolutionary achievements and preservation of the socialist regime in Yugoslavia. The formula was found in 1950 and whatever the Party proclaimed by way of an international cultural breakthrough yielded results in the years to come.

NOTES

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3. *Politika*, 26 August 1945, 3.
4. Yugoslav Communist Party (renamed in 1952 The League of Communists of Yugoslavia), hereafter 'the Party'.
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8. *Politika*, 22 August 1945.
9. M. Protić, *Noah's Ark*, 235.
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artistic propaganda abroad, Belgrade, 30 January 1950. See also, Miroslav Perišić, *From Stalin to Sartre: Forming of the Yugoslav Intelligentsia at European Universities, 1945–58* (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008).

11. AJ, Committee for Science and Culture, f-29: Record of the discussion at the Conference on cultural and artistic propaganda abroad, Belgrade, 30 January 1950. See also Perišić, *Od Staljina ka Sartru*.
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13. Ibid.
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18. Ibid.
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26. AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-86, no. 205/56: European Forum in Alpbach; AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-86: Report on participation in a science course held at the International Study Centre, Perugia.
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28. AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-33: Notes on the journey to Switzerland and Germany, 12 May to 10 July 1953, by Oto Bihalji Merin.
29. AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-18.
30. Ibid.

31. AJ, Committee for Science and Culture, f-138: Report on Cultural Activities in 1951.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. AJ, Committee for Science and Culture: Department for International Scientific and Cultural Relations, f-138.
37. Ibid.
38. AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-33 and f-49.
39. AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-91.
40. AJ, Committee for International Cultural Relations, f-33a: Yugoslav Visual Art in the World Today 1949–55.
41. AJ, Committee for Science and Culture: Department for International Science and Cultural Relations, f-116.
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The Fusion of Regional and Cold War Problems: The Macedonian Triangle Between Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, 1963–80

Spyridon Sfetas

A NEW MACEDONIAN QUESTION: THE PARAMETERS

The Macedonian question was an older dispute which continued to influence Balkan politics during the Cold War period. Involving always more than two actors (Sofia, Belgrade, Athens and the emerging power centre of Skopje *within* federal Yugoslavia), it is an interesting test case of the interaction between local, national, regional and Cold War antagonisms.

The Macedonian question emerged as a territorial dispute in the last third of the nineteenth century, when a vicious antagonism unfolded between Greeks and Bulgarians for the eventual control of these Ottoman provinces. Following the Russo-Ottoman war, in 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano provided that Bulgaria would annex almost the whole of this geographical area. The Treaty of San Stefano was never implemented,

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as the other Great Powers rallied to prevent the indirect Russian domination of the Balkans through a Greater Bulgaria; in the same year, the Treaty of Berlin provided for a much smaller Bulgarian state, which did not extend to geographical Macedonia. The territorial settlement after the 1912–13 Balkan wars gave almost half of geographical Macedonia to Greece, almost 40 per cent to Serbia (later Yugoslavia) and only 10 per cent to Bulgaria. However, Bulgaria occupied Greek- and Serb-Macedonian territories during the First World War, and persisted in its non-recognition of the status quo even after its defeat in 1918. From 1919 to 1941, the term ‘Macedonian question’ mainly referred to the Serb–Bulgarian antagonism regarding the identity of the Slav population of Serb Macedonia (southern Yugoslavia); the Bulgarians put forward similar claims on the western areas of Greek Macedonia. Thus, in the interwar years the ‘Macedonian question’ referred mostly to a Bulgarian national programme.¹

After 1919, Belgrade refused to acknowledge the existence of a Bulgarian population in the Yugoslav south, and attributed the pro-Bulgarian sentiments of a large part of the population to well-organized Bulgarian propaganda. Belgrade held that this population was an ‘amorphous’ mass, which could easily be Serbianized; but its efforts failed. Serbianization depended much on good government and the raising of the living standards of the population. However, Serb policy was merely an abrupt response to the tension and insecurity which prevailed in Serb Macedonia until 1934, because of the armed action of the Bulgarian Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), and the lack of a comprehensive plan to counter economic and social problems of the area until at least 1938.²

The situation in Greece was different. The voluntary exchange of populations between Greece and Bulgaria, according to the bilateral treaty of 27 November 1919, deprived Sofia of a strong demographical basis for its claims; at the same time, the settlement in Greek Macedonia of many refugees from Asia Minor, following the Greek defeat by Turkey in 1922, strengthened the Greek element of the population. After the early 1920s, the Slav-speaking and bilingual citizens of Greek Macedonia were estimated at 120,000 people. Some, belonging ecclesiastically to the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul, identified as Greeks; some were pro-Bulgarian, and some had—according to the wording used at that time—a ‘fluid’ identity, although they were ‘amenable’ to Hellenization.³ Pro-Bulgarian Greek citizens often travelled to Bulgaria, but did not dispute

Greek sovereignty, and posed little problems for the Greek state; tellingly, IMRO did not undertake large-scale armed activity in Greek Macedonia.⁴

The Second World War produced major transformations. The Macedonian question was now placed on a radically novel ideological basis, in terms of a 'Macedonian nation' and 'Macedonian minorities'. During the interwar years the Slav population of Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia used to self-define by employing the term (Slav-)Macedonian. This was a geographical and relatively neutral term, which permitted them to avoid the 'dangerous' self-definition of 'Bulgarian' (which challenged Greek or Yugoslav sovereignty), and also differentiated them from newcomers in the area—Serb settlers or Greek refugees.⁵ However, the ideology of Macedonianism as an ethnic identity was put forward by the Communist International (Comintern). In 1934, the Comintern recognized the existence of a Macedonian nation in an effort to circumscribe Serb–Bulgarian antagonism, and to present an alternative to Serb, Bulgarian and Greek nationalism.⁶ The Balkan Communist parties accepted this prospect. In particular the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) saw in Macedonianism a potential to counter Bulgarian claims in Yugoslav Macedonia, and as a tool to integrate the south of the country into its projected, since 1937, Yugoslav federation.⁷

The transformation of the Macedonian question on a new basis was aided by the breathtaking political and social developments of the 1940s. In 1941 the Bulgarian army occupied the largest part of Yugoslav Macedonia, and was hailed by its population as a liberating force. However, the failure of Bulgarian administration of the area in 1941–4,⁸ and the defeat of the Axis in the war made the 'Bulgarian solution' impossible. From 1943, the newly founded Communist Party of Macedonia and the CPY adopted a new policy; in 1944, the former Serb Macedonia became a part of the Yugoslav federation as the federative People's [later Socialist] Republic of Macedonia (PRM/SRM).⁹ After the war, a new process for the creation of a Slav-Macedonian identity started: the disbanding of Bulgarian organizations, the adoption of the endings -ovski/evski for names, the projection of a Slav-Macedonian language based on local dialects and loans from the Serb language, the setting up of a separate Orthodox church, and the projection of the myth of the historical continuity of ethnic (Slav-)Macedonians since the medieval state of (the Bulgarian) Czar Samuel.¹⁰ In the 1940s, until the Tito–Stalin split, Yugoslavia also tried to 'export' the new Macedonianism

to Greek and Bulgarian parts of Macedonia. The PRM was seen as the Piedmont of the Macedonian region, and in 1946, during the Paris Peace Conference, the Yugoslav delegates called for the 'unification' of Macedonia under the PRM's aegis.¹¹ The Slav-Macedonian Liberation Front (SNOF) in 1944 and the People's Liberation Front (NOF) during the Greek civil war attempted to cultivate a Slav-Macedonian identity in the Slav or Slav-speaking population of Greek Macedonia. A large number of the soldiers of the communist Democratic Army of Greece were Slav-Macedonians.¹² At the same time, Communist Bulgaria under Georgi Dimitrov was subjected to tense Yugoslav pressures, and thus in 1947–8 conceded cultural autonomy to the Bulgarian population of its part of Macedonia, a step towards its Macedonization or possibly of its absorption by the Yugoslav PRM.¹³

Thus, the parameters of the Macedonian question had been radically transformed. From a Bulgarian national project, it had become an international issue, largely 'hidden' in the tensions of the erupting Cold War. It was a multidimensional problem, involving the emergence of a new Slav-Macedonian identity in the Yugoslav south, possible (until 1948) Yugoslav territorial claims on Greece and Bulgaria, the evolving Greek civil war (in which Belgrade was aiding the Greek Communists),¹⁴ and last but not least the unstable balances between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria *within* the Communist world. After the Tito–Stalin split, new transformations occurred. Yugoslavia could no longer harbour territorial claims, but it still needed the new Macedonianism in order to prevent Bulgarian interdictions in its territory; thus it continued to raise the Macedonian issue as a question of minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. In this complicated environment, the new Macedonian question was a handy tool for the projection of national and Cold War aims.

THE SOFIA–BELGRADE DIMENSION: HISTORY, POLITICS AND INTRA-COMMUNIST ANIMOSITIES

As the Soviet Union practically recognized the existence of a Macedonian nation and language, Bulgaria tended to shape its Macedonian policy according to the fluctuations of Soviet–Yugoslav relations. Following the Tito–Stalin split, Sofia stopped the policy of Macedonization in its part of Macedonia and in turn started denouncing the abrupt de-Bulgarization of the people in the PRM.¹⁵ This was another tool which the

Soviet bloc employed to press the rebellious Yugoslav leader. However, in 1956, following the Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement, Bulgaria again classified the population of Bulgarian Macedonia as Macedonian (rather than Bulgarian). Sofia thus felt vulnerable. The new Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement in 1961–2 made the Bulgarians worry that they would face a Yugoslav demand for an official recognition of a Macedonian minority in their country.¹⁶

By 1963, Todor Živkov had strengthened his position as secretary-general of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and as prime minister, and decided to adopt a more stable policy, independent, at last, from Soviet–Yugoslav relations. Speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the BCP in March 1963, Živkov said that there was not a historically traceable Macedonian nation; the falsification of Bulgarian history by the historians of the PRM and the projection of a Macedonian nation on an anti-Bulgarian basis was unacceptable. The Plenum's decisions aimed to place the Macedonian question on a realistic basis, at least in terms of Bulgarian policy: the 'Macedonian' nation had no historical roots in antiquity, in the Middle Ages or in the nineteenth century. Conditions *now* existed for the transformation of the Bulgarians into 'ethnic Macedonians' in the old Serb Macedonia, where the population had used the term 'Macedonian' to avoid self-defining as Bulgarian and face Serb reprisals; thus, this population finally identified with the Yugoslav peoples and now had a separate identity. The Plenum noted that the party had adopted a mistaken policy on the Macedonian issue from 1944 to 1948, and rejected any notion of a 'Macedonian minority' in Bulgaria, where similar conditions had not existed.¹⁷

These became the guidelines of the policy of Živkov's Bulgaria. In May 1967, an informal agreement was reached between the Bulgarian leader and Krste Crvenkovski, the chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslav Macedonia, to avoid putting forward these problems during international political contacts, but to allow historians to deal with them.¹⁸ However, the interaction between politics and history intensified. The one-sided proclamation of a separate 'Macedonian Orthodox Church' in the PRM in July 1967, the setting up of a 'Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts' in the same year, and the increasing autonomy of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) were seen in Bulgaria as challenges. In December 1967, the Political Bureau of the BCP examined ways to strengthen patriotic education of the Bulgarian Communist youth, through a mixture of proletarian internationalism and Bulgarian nationalism, which

were not seen as incompatible. The nihilist approach to Bulgarian history should be terminated. In a sense, it was a defensive discourse in the face of the perceived cultural aggression of the SRM:

We speak very little about Khan Asparoukh, the founder of the Bulgarian state, for Krum the Terrible, who saved the Slavs from assimilation and to whom all Slavic people must erect a statue, for Czar Symeon and the golden age of Bulgarian culture, for Czar Samuel, for Czar Kaloyan, for Czar Ivan Asen II [...] in our veins flows the blood of the Thracians, we are the legitimate heirs of the history and the legacy of the Thracians.¹⁹

Thus the Bulgarian–Yugoslav quarrel acquired a prominent historiographical dimension. The 1903 Ilinden and Preobražensko uprisings in Macedonia and Thrace respectively were seen as a glorious moment of Bulgarian history. Bulgaria adopted the Ilinden uprising and the signing of the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano (3 March) as national holidays. Speaking at the Tenth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist youth on 13 January 1968, Živkov made a strong reference to the major turning points of modern Bulgarian history:

Of the 13 centuries in total [of the history of the Bulgarian people], only during the last century the name of Bulgaria became synonymous of major heroisms of the people. The sacred and tragic April 1876, the Ilinden sacrifice in 1903, the military rebellion in autumn 1918, the unforgettable September 1923, the twenty-year struggle which finally culminated in the victory of the Socialist revolution in Bulgaria, are major events in the history of our country for which we have the right to be proud.²⁰

After 1968, interaction between politics and history was at its peak.²¹ Official celebrations in Bulgaria for the ninetieth anniversary of the 1877–8 Russo-Ottoman war and the Treaty of San Stefano sparked a new round of polemics between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Bulgarian historians classified the Russo-Ottoman war as progressive and liberating; the provisions of the San Stefano Treaty marked the territory of the Bulgarian nation.²² In Skopje, these were seen as a manifestation of Bulgarian territorial claims on the southernmost Yugoslav Republic. On the political level, Tito praised Alexander Dubček and the Prague Spring. He also denounced the Brezhnev doctrine on the limited sovereignty of the socialist states. Bulgaria had participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and had argued for the need to ‘defend socialism’ in Yugoslavia: this was also

seen in Belgrade as a sign of a potentially aggressive Bulgarian policy, or even as a sign of Bulgarian designs on Yugoslav Macedonia, in case of an application of the Brezhnev doctrine in Yugoslavia. Moreover, by the same time, 1968–9, Belgrade was annoyed at the tendency of the Bulgarian press to praise the participation of the Bulgarian army in the liberation of Yugoslavia in 1944: the Yugoslavs saw this as an effort to downplay the role of the Yugoslav partisans (the basis of Tito's legitimization), and to blur the war record of Bulgaria as part of the Axis. We now know that these Yugoslav fears were an exaggeration: rather than preparing an aggressive move, Sofia was trying to safeguard the shaken unity of the Warsaw Pact with Romania.²³ Still, a Bulgarian effort to take advantage of the post-invasion tensions and harass Yugoslav policies in Macedonia was evident.

In November 1968, following the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine and during discussions in Yugoslavia on defence in case of an invasion of the Warsaw Pact, the historical Institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences published a historico-political monograph on the Macedonian question which again alarmed Belgrade. The book suggested that two-thirds of the population of Vardar (Yugoslav) Macedonia was Bulgarian, who were subjected to a policy of de-Bulgarization. It also confronted the Yugoslav–Macedonian attempt to claim parts of Bulgarian history: the depiction of Clement of Ohrid as son of the 'Macedonian people', of Samuel as Czar of the 'Macedonian kingdom', and of the leaders of the Bulgarian reawakening in nineteenth-century Macedonia as 'ethnic Macedonians' (the Miladinov brothers, Grigor Parličev, Rajiko Žinžifov, Dame Gruev, Goce Delčev and Jane Sandanski). The Bulgarian Academy rejected the view that the setting up of the PRM had vindicated the ideals of IMRO. The Yugoslav Communists were accused of inconsistency, because in October 1940 they had accepted the view about the existence of a 'Macedonian nation'; according to Bulgarian academics, the Yugoslav Communist Party had thus aligned itself with the views of Serbian reactionaries, specifically Jovan Cvijić. It should be noted that on this the Bulgarian claim was mistaken: Cvijić regarded the Macedonian Slavs as an amorphous mass, who could be either Serbianized or Bulgarized; moreover, Bulgarian historians brushed under the carpet the fact that the Balkan Communist parties had accepted Comintern's recognition of a 'Macedonian nation' in 1934. Historians have criticized the BCP for its policy in 1946–7, when Sofia had ordered the people of Bulgarian Macedonia to declare themselves 'Macedonians'. Still, they also noted that Dimitrov himself, in the Fifth Congress of the BCP (December 1948)

had denounced the 'de-Bulgarization' policy in the Yugoslav PRM. Thus, according to historians, the BCP in the end corrected its mistakes of the past: in 1965, in the new census, the population of Bulgarian Macedonia had the right to express themselves freely, but only a small part declared themselves as 'Macedonians' rather than Bulgarians.²⁴

The Bulgarians thus were launching a major cultural counteroffensive, and the book was part of a virtual psychological war against Yugoslavia in the wake of the Brezhnev doctrine. But contrary to what the Yugoslavs feared, Bulgarian aims were defensive. The political message was in the conclusions:

The BCP regards the Macedonian question as a heavy legacy of the past, as the result of the machinations of the imperialist powers. But in today's context, the basic issue in the relations between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is not the Macedonian question, but the problem of their cooperation in the building of socialism. It is necessary to work hard to achieve friendship between the peoples of our countries, the cooperation of all Balkan socialist countries, and to approach the Soviet Union, because on this, above all else, depend the new achievements in the road for progress, peace, democracy, socialism; and on this also depends the blocking of the plans and the policy of international imperialism and of NATO in the Balkans.²⁵

Tito and Živkov tried to ease mutual misunderstandings or difficulties in the Macedonian question, and thus a Yugoslav delegation under Veljko Vlahović visited Sofia in November 1970. The Yugoslav side raised the issue of a 'Macedonian minority' in Bulgaria, and suggested that the Bulgarians were projecting the irredentism of the San Stefano Treaty. The Bulgarian delegation under Boris Belčev repeated the Bulgarian position: there was no 'Macedonian ethnicity' in the Middle Ages, and the Yugoslavs should not intrude in Bulgarian history; the population of the SRM had initially a Bulgarian consciousness, but for specific reasons they later adopted a 'Macedonian' consciousness; but since the Bulgarians of Bulgarian Macedonia had not been subjected to the same historical process as the Yugoslav south, they were Bulgarians, not a 'Macedonian minority'.²⁶ The positions were incompatible. Despite an improvement of Soviet–Yugoslav relations in 1973, Bulgaria did not change its attitude on the Macedonian question. Thus, Živkov's aim to put forward a stable

policy, independent of the state of Soviet–Yugoslav relations, had been realized.

In November 1975, after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Petâr Mladenov, visited Belgrade and proposed the signing of a bilateral declaration of friendship, which would include the recognition of the territorial integrity of the two states, the inviolability of the borders, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other party.²⁷ In January 1976, Belgrade replied that it would accept the proposal, with the inclusion of an additional clause on respecting the rights of the ‘Macedonian minority of Bulgaria’ and the Bulgarian minority in Serbia.²⁸ Sofia rejected this prospect. A joint Bulgarian–Yugoslav working group met in 1976–7, but failed to produce agreement. The Bulgarian side demanded that Yugoslavia accept that in the SRM a new nation was being born, and thus also that there was no Macedonian minority in Bulgaria.²⁹

But in 1978 a new problem arose in bilateral relations, on account of celebrations for the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian state. During the celebrations, the Treaty of San Stefano and Macedonia had a prominent place. Skopje accused Sofia of returning to the irredentism of 1878, and for putting forward territorial claims to the Yugoslav south. The Eleventh Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists (June 1978) called for the protection of the rights of the ‘Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and in Greece’, in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.³⁰ On 24 July 1978, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry issued a special brochure on the development of Bulgarian–Yugoslav relations:

there is no evidence to prove the existence of a Macedonian ethnic and state organization during the Middle Ages, and of a Macedonian nation at the time of the Bulgarian awakening. The historical evidence shows in an indisputable manner that the Bulgarians of Macedonia are among the most active in the shaping of the Bulgarian nation.³¹

Of course, in the Bulgarian text, the term ‘Macedonia’ referred to the wider geographical region, not solely to Yugoslav Macedonia.

But things became even more complicated after China’s attempt to involve itself in Balkan affairs, following the July 1978 split between Peking and Tirana. Hua Guofeng visited Bucharest, Belgrade and Skopje in August 1978. Sofia feared that this was a Chinese effort to cooperate

with Yugoslavia and Romania in isolating Bulgaria; according to Sofia, Chinese endorsement of Yugoslav positions in the Macedonian question was part of the initiative.³² In Skopje, Hua referred to the glorious history and traditions of the 'Macedonian nation', describing its resistance against foreign (namely, Bulgarian) occupation during the Second World War.³³ General (retd.) Mijailo Apostolski, the chairman of the Academy of Sciences and Arts in Skopje donated to the Chinese guest a three-volume 'History of the Macedonian People'. In September 1978, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and Arts retaliated with a publication in English of a long-awaited collection of sources on Macedonia (the wider region, not only the Yugoslav part), from the Middle Ages until the Second World War, pointing to the Bulgarian identity of its Slav population.³⁴ At that stage, on 6 October 1978, evidently anxious at the growing dimensions of the controversy, Tito, speaking in Skopje, referred to the need to overcome animosity:

There are countries which do not recognize the rights of national minorities. Our position is that the rights of all nationalities must be recognized, and that the problem of national minorities demands constructive solutions. As you know, I have met the president of the Greek government, C. Karamanlis. I told him that we are forced to place bilateral relations on a wider basis, and not to see them only under the prism of the—admittedly important—problem of the national minority. With Bulgaria, this problem took more serious dimensions, not through our fault, but we also must, through common efforts, persist in improving relations.³⁵

In response, Bulgaria sought to surprise Belgrade. On 6 October 1978, on the very day when Tito was speaking in Skopje, the Central Committee of the BCP sent a letter to the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists, suggesting the establishment of an international research project on the Blagoevgrad prefecture (of Bulgaria) in order to assess the population's ethnic identity and to examine the censuses of 1946, 1956, 1965 and 1975. However, the Bulgarians continued, similar international research should be undertaken in Yugoslavia, to include an analysis of the fate of the numerous (in the past) Bulgarians of Vardar (Yugoslav) Macedonia.³⁶ The League of Yugoslav Communists replied that the aims of the BCP were incomprehensible, and claimed that the latter proposal was incompatible with the previous Bulgarian proposal to recognize mutually the territorial integrity of the two states.³⁷

The Bulgarians then scored another point. During Brezhnev's January 1979 'leisure trip' to Sofia, the third volume of the memoirs of Cola Dragoičeva was published. Dragoičeva was a member of the Central Committee of the BCP, and chaired the League of Soviet–Bulgarian friendship. In her memoirs, the one-time partisan fighter discussed the voluntary decision of the regional committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to join the BCP in 1941 (at the time of the Bulgarian occupation of Yugoslav Macedonia), namely an event which the Yugoslav side termed as the 'treason of Šatorov'. Dragoičeva also extensively referred to Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Tito's representative who had played a major role in the creation of the PRM; she critically discussed the new Macedonian policy of Yugoslavia and referred to a Yugoslav attempt to annex Bulgarian Macedonia in 1944–8. She emphasized the de-Bulgarization campaign in Yugoslav Macedonia, which she attributed to the 'clique' of Tito and Koliševski.³⁸ On 4 March 1979, the Yugoslav journal *NIN* published an interview with Apostolski, the chairman of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of the SRM. Apostolski, a former General who had commanded the General Staff of National Liberation of Macedonia, disputed the accuracy of Dragoičeva's views, and denounced the hegemonism of Bulgarian leadership, who, as he said, imagined a descent from ancient Thracians, but lacked fighting spirit and owed their freedom to foreign protectors.³⁹

On 27 April 1979, a few days before Tito's new visit to Moscow, Živkov laid the blame on Yugoslavia, and invited the Yugoslav President to visit Sofia in order to overcome the new crisis.⁴⁰ Tito rejected the proposal. However, this new tension in Bulgarian–Yugoslav relations on the Macedonian question coincided with important developments in Indochina: Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the attack by China on Vietnam. The two Balkan countries had once more taken opposite sides. During his meetings with Gromyko on 23 and 24 April 1979 in Moscow, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Miloš Minić, complained of the alleged Soviet support for Bulgarian views on the Macedonian question and for the publication of Dragoičeva's memoirs during Brezhnev's trip. According to Minić, Dragoičeva disputed the very foundations of Yugoslavia, rejected the existence of the Macedonian people, and in effect projected Bulgarian territorial claims on the Yugoslav south.⁴¹ Tito expressed similar complaints to Brezhnev during his last visit to Moscow in May 1979. The Soviets replied that they were neutral in this dispute and called the two sides to solve the problem without help from third parties.⁴²

The controversy continued. From 16 May until 9 June 1980, the Belgrade daily *Politika* published extracts from the forthcoming memoirs of Tempo, in which he noted that the BCP had not distanced itself from the fascist policy of the Filov government in Bulgaria during the Second World War. This was a major blow against the Bulgarians, who retaliated with an effort to downgrade the impact of the resistance movement in Yugoslav Macedonia in 1941–4, and to praise the contribution of Bulgarian forces in the liberation of Yugoslavia in 1944. The Yugoslav historians acidly replied that Bulgaria had recognized a ‘Macedonian minority’ in 1946–8, but later backtracked.⁴³

Tito’s death marked a gradual toning down of the dispute. Yugoslavia now faced serious internal problems, and no longer regarded the recognition of a ‘Macedonian minority’ as a precondition for the development of bilateral relations. In its turn, Sofia turned its attention to the issue of the position of the Muslim minority in Bulgaria. Still, Sofia continued carefully to monitor Yugoslav internal developments, evidently believing that a crisis in Yugoslavia or the eruption of an Albanian question could bring the population of the Yugoslav south closer to Bulgaria.

GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA: BETWEEN CONFLICT AND ALLIANCE

Following the Tito–Stalin split and the re-establishment of Greek–Yugoslav diplomatic relations in 1950–1,⁴⁴ Belgrade refrained from putting forward territorial claims on Greek Macedonia. Yugoslavia had survived the dispute with Stalin thanks to US aid; Greece and Yugoslavia felt as strategic allies towards the challenge of the Soviet bloc, and this was reflected in their common participation in the 1953–4 Balkan Pacts together with Turkey.⁴⁵

Internal politics led politicians in Skopje to raise the issue of the ‘Macedonian minority’, but this was not put forward as a precondition of bilateral cooperation. For its part, Greece had protested against the settlement in the PRM of Slav-Macedonian refugees, who had fought with the Communist army in the Greek civil war. However, as long as the federal government in Yugoslavia remained visibly powerful, Athens believed that Belgrade would be in a position to restrain Skopje in the interests of common defence. On 18 June 1959, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a series of bilateral agreements on economic and technical cooperation, as well as a convention regulating border traffic. The latter agreement set up a zone

of 10 kms on each side of the border, including the cities of Florina and Bitol, where the inhabitants would be allowed free movement, the import and sale of specific products was authorized, medical doctors could practise, and fields could be cultivated by nationals of either country who had owned them prior to 1939. In 1961, when Yugoslavia started a process of decentralization, the federal Foreign Ministry raised the issue of the rights of a 'Macedonian minority' in Greece. In response, the Greek government under Konstantinos Karamanlis (himself a Greek-Macedonian), which had negotiated and signed the 1959 agreement, unilaterally suspended it; its implementation started again in 1964. This was a low-level crisis, in which the Greeks sought to attain a double aim: to show Belgrade their own 'red lines' on the Macedonian question, but also to avoid a rupture of bilateral cooperation which was seen as crucial in the face of the Soviet challenge.⁴⁶

After the mid-1960s, and especially after the imposition of a dictatorship in Greece in 1967, bilateral relations stagnated. The Greek junta was extremely suspicious of Yugoslavia, and the leaders of the regime often pointed to the Yugoslav role in the Greek civil war and to Yugoslav policy in the Macedonian question. Political contacts were minimal, and the Greek authorities proved reluctant to issue tourist visas for Yugoslav citizens. In May 1967, barely a month after its imposition, the Greek junta denounced the border traffic agreement of 1959.⁴⁷ In July, the Greek Cabinet issued a decree which deprived those political refugees who had 'acted anti-nationally' of their Greek nationality; their property could also be confiscated.⁴⁸ Evidently, apart from the opponents of the regime, this measure was also applicable in the case of Slav-Macedonian refugees who had fought for the secession of Greek Macedonia during the civil war, and had fled to Communist countries or were naturalized as 'Macedonians' in Yugoslavia. The proclamation of an 'Orthodox Macedonian Church' by the SRM on 18 July 1967, a step in Slav-Macedonian nation-building, sparked a strong reaction from religious institutions in Greece. In September 1967, the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece denounced the new Church as anti-canonical and lacking legitimization.⁴⁹ The other Orthodox Churches did not recognize it, as it had unilaterally seceded from the Serbian Patriarchate in violation of ecclesiastical rules.

After 1968, Greece tried to maintain its neutrality in the Bulgarian–Yugoslav cultural wars on Macedonia. Athens condemned the Soviet bloc's invasion of Czechoslovakia and declared its support for Yugoslav independence. However, it could not accept the Yugoslav position regarding the historical existence of a 'Macedonian nation', nor could it fully sup-

port the Bulgarian views, despite the fact that both Athens and Sofia were united in their rejection of the Yugoslav claim about the recognition of a national minority in both countries. The Greek Ambassador to Belgrade, Spyros Tetenes, suggested that Athens should place its emphasis on the Greek character of the wider Macedonian region from ancient times until the early twentieth century, making it clear that this should not be seen as a territorial claim, but as a defensive measure aimed to press Skopje to cease asking for the recognition of a national minority.⁵⁰

At the same time, the increasing autonomy of the Yugoslav Republics also influenced bilateral relations. As the SRM (and the other Yugoslav Republics) attained a significant measure of autonomy, the SRM started to suggest that the development of bilateral relations depended on the Greek recognition of a 'Macedonian minority' in the country. Skopje radio was prominent in putting forward this agenda, through its broadcasts *in Greek*. This convinced Athens that it was facing a propaganda offensive. On 17 March 1971, the Under-Secretary for the Prime Minister's office, and main ideologist of the Greek junta, Georgios Georgalas, stated:

These radio shows, as we are sad to note, are a thorn in the relations between Yugoslavia and Greece [...] They invoke texts from the past, by unknown authors, who claim that there is a Macedonian problem, Macedonian language, etc. But it is strange that the radio shows say these things not in the supposed Macedonian language, but in Greek. We cannot accept that the decentralization in Yugoslavia [...] allows Skopje to play such a role. Because we cannot believe that the autonomy of the mass media in Yugoslavia, of the radios, television and the press, give the right to a radio station to implement its own foreign policy.⁵¹

In 1970–2, on the road towards détente, the Greek government under Georgios Papadopoulos tried to make a Balkan opening.⁵² In September 1971, the visit of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, to Belgrade was a hopeful sign. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Mirko Tepavac, raised the issue of a Macedonian minority in Greece, but Palamas replied that the existence of idioms or linguistic varieties did not legitimize such a Yugoslav claim. Tepavac pointed to the revision of the Yugoslav constitution in 1971 and suggested that the improvement of Greece's relations with Yugoslavia presupposed good relations with the federative Republics. Palamas carefully noted that since Yugoslavia remained a united state, Athens would discuss matters with the

capital Belgrade: 'If (which we do not wish) any of the parts of Yugoslavia happened to acquire international legal personality, then of course we would study how to establish relations with it directly. I hope that you agree with me that this position is solidly based on International Law'.⁵³

After the Palamas visit, the Greek—Yugoslav Ministerial Committee met in January 1972 in Belgrade and in March 1973 in Athens. These were its first meetings since 1965. While progress was made on economic and commercial relations, during the Athens meeting the Greeks rejected a Yugoslav proposal for the conclusion of a cultural agreement. The problem was that the Yugoslavs had insisted that the new cultural programme should also be signed 'in the Macedonian language', and to mention expressly the federative SRM. This was an indirect effort to bring Greece to recognize a separate language in the Yugoslav south.⁵⁴ The Greeks were embarrassed by this Yugoslav demand. In a public statement, the Greek Alternate Foreign Minister, Faidon Anninos-Kavalieratos, complained that Belgrade sometimes acted as a hostage of the federative governments.⁵⁵

During the last phase of the dictatorship in 1973–4, the state of Greco-Yugoslav relations was disappointing. Economic projects which involved the Macedonian question stagnated, such as exploitation of the waters of the Axios/Vardar river, the construction of a channel connecting this river with the Morava and the Danube, the construction of a pipeline between Thessaloniki and Skopje, and the renewal of the agreement regarding the free Yugoslav zone in Thessaloniki harbour which expired on 14 June 1974. Bilateral relations were also burdened because of the new Soviet–Yugoslav rapprochement, and the coming into force of the new Yugoslav Constitution in February 1974: the Greeks feared that the new Constitution would turn Yugoslavia into a hybrid between a federation and a confederation.⁵⁶

Bilateral relations improved significantly after the restoration of democracy in Greece in July 1974.⁵⁷ Again under Karamanlis, Greece sought to secure Yugoslav support in its dispute with Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean. Karamanlis' visit to Ljubljana in early June 1975 inaugurated a new era in bilateral relations. The talks focused on the major political problems, including an appeal for the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus. The Yugoslav Prime Minister, Džemal Bijedić, raised the issue of the 'Macedonian minority', but Karamanlis refused to discuss matters on which there could be no possibility for consensus. Karamanlis knew that the SRM had enhanced its autonomy and could press Belgrade to raise the issue; thus, he decided to make clear his red lines from the

start.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, lower-level cooperation was revived: in early 1975, a new agreement regulated the traffic of Yugoslav trade from Thessaloniki harbour.⁵⁹

During Tito's visit to Greece on 10–13 May 1976 the climate was good. Bilateral economic and commercial exchanges were now booming. Tito continued to express his solidarity to Cyprus and to Greece, and even offered to mediate between them and Turkey. Tito had resented Karamanlis' position that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus became possible because Cyprus was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (and not of the West). However, the Yugoslav leader did not press the matter. Moreover, the Yugoslav delegation now included the President of the SRM, Boris Popov. It was probably because of his presence that Tito carefully raised the issue of the minority; Karamanlis replied that for Greece, Macedonia was a geographical, not a national term.⁶⁰ In October 1976, an agreement for military cooperation was concluded, providing for mutual support in case of an attack on Yugoslavia or a Greco-Turkish war.⁶¹

In 1977, clearing in commercial relations was abolished, and the numbers of Yugoslav tourists in Greece showed a steady increase. On its part, Greece was asking for increasing numbers of permits for lorries crossing Yugoslavia to reach Central Europe. Karamanlis raised this subject during his visit to Split on 16–20 March 1979, speaking to the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Veselin Đuranović. When the latter again carefully touched on the minority issue, Karamanlis replied:

We do not accept the existence of a minority. The bilinguals of Greek Macedonia have a Greek national consciousness. We had a civil war. A large part of these people [Slav-Macedonian autonomists] went to Skopje, and sometimes cause trouble. I do not think that it is wise to raise the issue. I always am so careful to protect our relations, that, even when I am being provoked by statements from Skopje I do not publicly react, exactly because I want to avoid adverse repercussions in our relations. But this matter can hurt us, because it does create reactions in Greece.⁶²

There was a marked difference in Belgrade's handling of Greece compared to Bulgaria. The recognition of a 'national minority' was not put forward as a precondition for the development of bilateral relations. In turn, Greece also tried to keep the Macedonian problem on the sidelines. Both countries felt that, even if their international positions were radically different, they needed each other in the context of the Cold War. Greece

feared that in case of Soviet ascendancy in Yugoslavia following Tito's death, the Macedonian question would again come to the fore through the revival of old Communist ideas about a Balkan federation; it was with such plans that the secession of Greek Macedonia had been discussed in the communist movement in the interwar and early postwar years. Thus, Greece did not wish the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which would upset Balkan balances.

CONCLUSIONS

There were multiple issues in the fusion of regional and Cold War problems. The former were 'hidden' within Cold War tensions. The Macedonian question, itself significantly transformed through intra-Communist politics, became the stick with which either Sofia or Belgrade used to beat each other, or a lever in their regional and ideological competition, especially during this era of *détente*. However, national positions on the Macedonian question were not merely a tool (or an alibi) for Cold War antagonisms. They also involved major national aims, and both states evidently harboured fears about the designs of the other party. Yugoslavia had used the new Macedonianism to promote its regional hegemony in the 1940s, but after the split with Moscow it feared that the old Bulgarian sympathies of the population of its southernmost Republic could be used to destabilize the Titoist regime. In turn, Bulgaria could accept the 'loss' of the populations of the Yugoslav south, and the notion of a new nation being created in south Yugoslavia, but could not condone the spread of PRM's national ideology within its own borders.

Greece's case is also interesting. Athens was significantly closer to Sofia on the substance of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonian history; however, it also held a deep distrust of Bulgarian policy on the Macedonian question (not only on the Cold War), and anyway felt that it needed Belgrade in order to balance Sofia. Thus, the Greeks tried to stay out of the dispute, but always gave priority to the strategic need to keep their channels to Belgrade open.

This use of a national dispute for Cold War ends entailed a fusion of history and politics. Of course, terms, concepts and perceptions always evolve in history, but the scale of the transformation of the Macedonian question after the 1940s was exceptional. Purely a security problem in the past, during the Cold War it acquired a notably new dimension, and became a dispute over identities. This meant that historical representations came to the

forefront, their politicization intensified, and they became integral parts of political exchanges. It was not, of course, a good omen for the future.

The tensions of the Macedonian question in the late 1960s and the 1970s point to the complicated interaction of regional realities and the Cold War. Regional or national problems preceded the Cold War, were transformed by it, and then acquired a new dynamic in its context. The regional states were interested not only in the 'prime' dispute of the Cold War, but also in the evolution of Balkan balances, which could determine the course of their national interests. These regional problems were minor from the point of view of the main actors of the Cold War, but crucial for the Balkan states. In the 'flanks', perspectives could be more complicated.

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Cutting Through the Cold War: The EEC and Turkey's Great Westernization Debate

Mehmet Döşemeci

The years 1960–80 have often been described as the most turbulent and crisis-ridden period in modern Turkish history—the Weimar years of the Turkish Republic. Domestically, these two decades were bounded by two military coups: the first in 1960, which created the socio-political framework for Turkey's first experiment as a truly open society, and the second in 1980, which brought this experiment to an abrupt end. Like Weimar Germany, Turkey's period of intense dynamism coincided with the birth and death of ideological multi-party politics, a time marked by a sense of immanent self-alteration.

Most scholars of the Second Turkish Republic (1961–80) have read its ideological and physical battles through the lens of the Cold War.¹ There have been good reasons for adopting this lens. Externally, Turkey's geo-strategic position—a large landmass situated between Europe and the Middle East, a shared border with the Soviet Union—and political

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control of maritime access to the Black Sea, certainly drew the avid interest of both superpowers. Internally, Turkey's chief concern with modernization and how to achieve it also pulled Turks into debates over available models of economic and social development—invariably associated with the different Cold War camps. As recent scholarship has powerfully demonstrated, the Cold War also operated on a cultural register, working its way into the domains of Turkish literature, sport, international exhibitions, and fairs.²

The 12 September 1980 military coup which, among other things, brutally eradicated existing left-wing currents within Turkish society, effectively ended the domestic politics of the Cold War in Turkey. When full civilian political expression was reintroduced some years later, Turkey emerged into a very different global political climate. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the newly democratized states of the former Eastern Bloc jumped over one another to join a newly constituted and rapidly expanding European Union. Commentators of this period in Turkish history, from the late 1980s through the early twenty-first century, have accordingly shifted paradigms, abandoning the Cold War framework in favour of Europeanization in general and Turkey's membership bid to the European Union in particular as the pivotal metric to assess Turkey's internal and external situation.

This chapter challenges the common periodization of Turkish history since 1960 and, with it, the ways historians and social scientists have made sense of Turkey's recent past. Turkish debates on joining Europe did not begin after the Cold War but took shape during it. In fact, nearly all of the ideological positions and attitudes toward Europeanization that came to dominate Turkish political culture from the late 1980s onward were formulated—and hotly debated and contested—during the Second Turkish Republic. This chapter argues that the existentially charged discussions over Turkey's membership of the European Economic Community, or the 'Great Westernization Debate', cut across existing Cold War frameworks and had a far larger impact on the Turkish social imaginary than the Cold War itself.

This analysis begins with an overview of Turkey's place within the Cold War and the Cold War's place within Turkish political culture. It then details the historical and political reasons for the persistent disconnect between Cold War paradigms and Turkish self-understandings. It concludes with a sketch of the Great Westernization Debate as an alternative lens through which to make sense of Turkish political culture within the

Second Turkish Republic. This chapter is not concerned with the geo-strategic, geopolitical, or economic ramifications of Turkey's participation in either the Cold War or the European project, at least not at the level of international relations. Rather, it works through the ways in which these engagements framed domestic debates and views of Turkish history, Turkey's place in the world, and its future orientation.

TURKEY IN THE COLD WAR, THE COLD WAR IN TURKEY

Despite internal and external pressure, Turkey successfully remained on the sidelines of the Second World War. Before the war's conclusion, however, it became clear that the prospects for Turkish neutrality in the upcoming global struggle between the emerging superpowers were dim and quickly diminishing. Stalin's aggressive attempts to dictate maritime traffic through the Dardanelles set a threatening tone in Turko-Soviet relations, pushing Turkey and the United States (which had recently replaced British interests in the region) into a mutually beneficial strategic partnership.³ The first fruits of this partnership came in the form of the Truman Doctrine, with Turkey receiving \$100 million in economic and military aid and the reassuring presence of the US aircraft carrier *Theodore Roosevelt*.⁴ When it became clear that the Western security framework against the Soviet Union would take the form of a mutual assistance pact headed by the United States, Turkey immediately and actively solicited the alliance, effectively buying membership in NATO by committing its armed forces in Korea.⁵

Despite these dramatic beginnings, Turkey, like the Balkans, soon took a back seat to newer Cold War theatres, a development that put serious strain on the Turko-American alliance. In fact, looking back on the entire post-war period, Turkey's import to the global Cold War follows a sine curve, rising to its height in the first decades after the Second World War, waning from the mid-1960s, reaching its zenith with the 1974 Cyprus crisis, only to rise again with the Iranian revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Geostrategic factors account for the majority of these shifts. In the years following the war, the still uncertain boundaries of the European front, Turkish participation in Korea, and the deployment of medium-range Jupiter missiles on Turkish soil all increased Turkey's worth in the Cold War balance. In contrast, by the mid-1960s, the Cold War shift away from Europe to East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, an increased focus on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),

and the secret deal struck between Kennedy and Khrushchev to remove nuclear weapons from Turkey, drew attention away from Anatolia. It was not until 1979 that, as the Cold War centre of gravity shifted once again closer to Turkey, US interests followed in the same direction. Thus, for the bulk of the Second Turkish Republic (1961–80), Turkey remained on the geostrategic margins of the global Cold War. The Turks themselves at the time were well aware of these shifts. Turkey's leaders and diplomats were constantly struggling to play up the country's strategic import in order to secure US aid, weapons, and security and yet, despite US rhetoric to the contrary, found themselves increasingly isolated and expendable: the US embargo following the Cyprus invasion of 1974 serving as the painful climax of this trend.

Domestically, Turkey's early inclusion into the Western orbit opened the door to US influence, which came to occupy a privileged place in Turkey's post-war project. In the immediate post-war years, the Truman Doctrine, US military power against the perceived Soviet threat, and the simple fascination with a novel and thriving culture, all served to propel the United States as the new symbol of the West. Compared to the Europeans, the US also had a much greater physical presence within Turkey in the first two decades after the war. American bazaars, American cinema, American military bases, American nuclear missiles, American technicians, and American-style highway construction funded by American credit, were turning Turkey into what the then Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes gleefully termed a 'little America'.⁶

Early expressions of Westernization also conditioned its domestic political culture. Within parliamentary politics there was no significant opposition to the Turkish–US relationship throughout the Cold War.⁷ The two main centre parties, the Democrat Party (after 1960, the Justice Party (JP)) and the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) were fully supportive of the alliance, and Islamic and radical-right outrage at Western cultural imperialism took a back seat to fears of communism.

Outside of parliament, significant opposition to the US developed, as it did in much of Western Europe and the non-aligned world, in the mid-1960s. Radical student organizations and trade unions, taking inspiration from anti-imperialist movements in East Asia and Latin America, began to make their presence felt on the streets. The 'Yankee Go Home!' mentality manifested itself in protests against the US Sixth Fleet, the torching of the US ambassador's car, and demands for the closure of US bases or the re-legalization of opium banned as a result of US pressure. Even if carried out

by a small minority, such protests certainly made headlines throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. The birth of anti-American extra-parliamentary politics opened up the domestic front of the Cold War, weaving the latter into much older Turkish concerns over national development and sovereignty.

By the mid-1970s, the presence of radical leftist movements in universities and unions were countered by the formation of radical right wing 'commandos' or Grey Wolves, as the militant youth wing of the ultra-nationalist National Action Party (NAP) was known. This development brought the domestic front of the Cold War to the streets of Turkey. Pitched battles in major cities and assassinations of intellectuals, trade union leaders and university professors signalled that political violence was a regular and escalating part of Turkish life. The figures rose from 34 political killings in 1975, to 262 in 1977, and finally to the shocking and oft quoted number of 20 a day by the summer of 1980. The increasing political violence and instability of the late 1970s has been the single most important factor for reading the Second Turkish Republic through a Cold War lens. Yet, as Feroz Ahmad and others have quite correctly pointed out, though steeped in Cold War rhetoric, the intent of the radical right's political violence was to cause chaos and demoralization in order to create a climate in which a law and order regime sympathetic to their interests and agenda would be welcomed by the populace as the saviour of the nation—and was thus based on domestic rather than Cold War calculations and dynamics.⁸ In fact, outside of these extra-parliamentary confrontations carried out by a small minority, Turkish political culture had moved steadily beyond the Cold War.

The shift in Turkish domestic political culture away from Cold War frameworks took place much earlier than the 1970s, during the first years of the Second Republic. It was born of a sense of abandonment that accompanied the shift in US security interests away from Turkey to other Cold War theatres, a change made explicit with the 1964 Johnson letter refusing US military assistance in the event that a Cyprus invasion should provoke Soviet attack. The incident in particular prompted a reality check in both the corridors of the Turkish state and the press over Turkey's unquestioning allegiance to the United States as well as engendering increasingly vocal support for a more multi-dimensional approach to Turkish foreign policy. By the mid-1960s, and especially after the onset of détente, Turkey began to look beyond the US and rigid Cold War frameworks and back again to a now fully recovered Europe.

THE TURN TO EUROPE

When, after 1964, the Turks finally began to publicly question and debate their position within the wider world, they quickly discovered that twenty years of one-dimensional reliance on the United States had cost them dearly. Turkey had lost many of its former connections and ties to its neighbours including Greece, the Balkans and the Middle East, had no part in the decolonization and Non-Aligned Movements taking place all around it, and found no platform to speak from on the Arab–Israeli conflict. As early as 1963, an astute member of Turkey’s diplomatic corps remarked on Turkey’s peculiar situation: ‘In short Turkey is a lone wolf without instinctive allies or friends.’⁹

Feeling abandoned by the US and globally isolated, from the mid-1960s Turkey turned its attention back to Europe, initiating a long and drawn-out internal debate over Turkey’s membership bid to the nascent European Economic Community (EEC). It was through this issue, and not the Cold War, that the ideological and cultural debates over Turkey’s self-image would take place.

As part of Turkey’s Western alignment, the Democrat Party (DP) had closely followed the project of European unification from its beginnings with the European Coal and Steel Community and welcomed the creation of the EEC. So it was no surprise that, six weeks after Greece’s announcement of its application in 1959, the DP followed suit. Within a few months, negotiations commenced over the details of Turkey’s integration into the EEC, with the resulting Ankara Agreement signed in September 1963.

From Turkey’s initial application, integration into the EEC has occupied the imaginations of a broad range of Turks, made zealots out of technocrats and statesmen, and led to best-sellers, theatre productions, and arson. Alternately embraced as the crowning symbol of Turkey’s accomplishments and disavowed as the re-colonization of the country, rarely has it been grasped as somewhere neutrally in-between. Initially the concern of a few diplomats and economists, by the late 1960s Turkish–EEC relations developed into what Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit termed in 1975 a ‘National Problem’. When the Second Turkish Republic entered its second decade, more and more issues, including the development of the Turkish economy, debates over Turkish culture, international alignments, and even the meaning and continuation of the Atatürkist revolution, were discussed through the prism of Turkey’s integration into the EEC. Thus, the EEC served as a concrete platform anchoring the often

abstract and ideological debates over the past and future of the Turkish nation to Turkey's integration into the Common Market.

The privileged position occupied by the EEC in the Turkish political imaginary begs several questions. How could the prospect of membership in a relatively minor economic organization of Western European states come to have such a defining, if not existential, grip on Turkey's imagination? How could joining a customs union become more pivotal to Turkish cultural and ideological debates than the global Cold War? There are a number of answers to these questions which a brief comparison of Cold War organizations and frameworks with those of the EEC will illuminate.

First was the issue of timing. For the first 15 years of the post-war period there was near total consensus amongst the major parties and the broader Turkish elite on Turkish foreign-policy aims—so much so that foreign-policy alternatives were not even discussed in the Turkish press.¹⁰ It was only after the 1964 Cyprus crisis that criticism of the government's foreign policy became a feature of Turkish political culture. By the time Turkey came to question and thus think about its past, present, and future through its foreign policy alternatives, it had already entered into all of the geostrategic and economic alignments of the Cold War. The Marshall Plan, the Central Treaty Organization, and above all NATO were *faits accomplis* before the advent of ideological party politics raised Turkey's external alignment as a subject of public discussion. This significantly altered the positionality of Turkish supporters and detractors of Cold War organizations, forcing the latter to justify the much more radical move of renouncing the alliance. Given Turkey's geographic vulnerability and strategic importance, France's Gaullist gesture of withdrawing from the military command of NATO was not a viable option. By contrast, Turkish integration into the EEC was an ongoing and incomplete process, the very framework of which was negotiated in the midst of a charged domestic debate over Turkish foreign policy.

Second, the instrumental reality of Turkish membership within the Atlantic Alliance served to dampen its impact on Turkish self-understandings. Historically included into the Western system for strategic reasons since the 1856 Treaty of Paris, Turkey's NATO membership continued this trend. In both instances, it was the threat of Russian influence that confirmed Turkish membership into the Western system of states.¹¹ Ironically, NATO membership actually underscored the distinction between inclusion in the Western strategic orbit and exclusion from the European 'Club' or 'Community'. Integration into the project

of European unification, Turks believed, would mark the end of their historical exclusion.

Third, Turkish political culture during the Second Republic had an uneasy relationship with Cold War paradigms. There was a persistent awkwardness in translating the political language of the Cold War into Turkey's own concerns and attitudes. Its terms and configurations felt forced and imported, having little resonance with how Turks had previously understood themselves and the world around them. Cold War delineations of East and West were based either on economic distinctions between capitalist or communist modes of production, or on the politico-ideological struggle over the meaning and substance of 'democracy'. Neither had much in common with Turkey's historical understanding of East and West, which was ultimately derived from the nineteenth-century European dichotomy between an advanced European civilization and its oriental and backward counterpart. Turkish integration into the EEC resonated much more powerfully with Atatürk's project to transform Turkey from a traditional into a modern society.

Fourth, the scope of Turkey's Cold War commitments was much narrower than Turkish association with the EEC—a difference that was especially significant for Turkish nationalist opposition to both frameworks. Turkey's inclusion in the Western Cold War orbit put relatively few constraints on Turkish sovereignty, forcing the opposition into symbolic gestures such as protests against US bases on Turkish soil or the arrival of the US Sixth Fleet in Turkey. By contrast, the EEC invoked the very real possibility of economic, political, and social union with Europe, resonating with and resurrecting debates over nationalism, modernity, and Westernization that lay at the core of the modern Turkish project.

Fifth, domestic political configurations were a very large factor in debates over the Cold War and the EEC. Throughout the Second Turkish Republic, the sheer numerical strength of the anti-communist alliance, in both the National Assembly and civil society, was an overwhelming force against a vocal but numerically miniscule leftist movement. In each of the five general elections of the Second Turkish Republic, the parties supporting Turkey's inclusion in the Western Cold War orbit gained between 89 per cent and 100 per cent of the total vote, whereas those favouring withdrawal or non-alignment garnered between 0 per cent and 11 per cent.¹² By contrast, Turkish support and opposition to the EEC cut across established Cold War lines. The Islamic and ultra-nationalist right, both fanatically anti-communist, were staunchly opposed to Turkish integration

into the Common Market. When combined with the radical left, and, after 1969, the left wing of the RPP, there was an absolute parliamentary opposition to the EEC throughout the 1970s. This configuration of forces created a level playing field that allowed Turkey's association with the EEC to become a hotly contested debate in a way that the Cold War never could.

Sixth, and perhaps most decisive of all, was the language used to speak about potential Turkish membership of the EEC. This language was altogether incommensurate with the technocratic speak employed in negotiating or publicly presenting other international economic associations, and it disturbed dormant ghosts of Turkey's past relations with Europe and, with it, narratives of the Turkish people, their state, their culture and their place in the world.

Turkish attitudes regarding the EEC can be divided into two dominant discourses that conditioned how Turks spoke about their integration. These discourses, immanent to Turkish history, are here termed the 'Civilizational' and the 'National'.¹³

The following sections in no way purport to offer a complete analysis of the shifting politics and postures with which Turks approached the EEC, nor do they present a chronological history covering major events—both of these tasks are well beyond the scope of this essay. What this article does aim to do is introduce the two dominant ways of speaking about the EEC, trace their historical origins, and detail the final confrontation between these ways of speaking, which took place just seven days before the 1980 coup that ended the Second Turkish Republic. Only by examining the language Turks used—and its historical resonance with past ways of understanding Turkey—does it become possible to explain how and why the prospect of joining the EEC eclipsed the Cold War as the dominant framework through which Turks made sense of themselves during the Second Turkish Republic.

CIVILIZATIONAL DISCOURSE AND THE EEC

At the time of the Turkish application in the summer of 1959, the EEC was in its infancy. Looking back on these beginnings in the early 1990s, İlhan Tekeli, a prominent social scientist and Common Market expert, commented: 'Since any new economic community must renegotiate its relations with its neighbors; Turkish-EEC relations, from the very start, were formed by a reciprocal search for definition'.¹⁴ So what did members of the Turkish elite make of this new organization?

For DP Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the significance of the EEC was unequivocal. At a cabinet meeting in the presidential palace on 30 July 1959 he stressed how, 'Our application to the EEC was a logical outcome of Turkey's desire to be counted as European', adding that 'the formation of the EEC must be seen as another historical opportunity for Ankara to demonstrate Turkey's Europeanness'.¹⁵ Four years later, at a banquet attended by the EEC Commissioner and the foreign ministers of the EEC member states, Zorlu's successor, Feridun Cemal Erkin, spoke in a similar vein: 'The Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC is the consummation of the Turkish Republic's goal to join Europe and the standard of civilization that it represents.'¹⁶

All too often, such statements have been uncritically viewed as articulations of Turkish Westernization or summarily dismissed as ideological window dressing for pragmatic political goals. Scholars have usually looked beyond these statements and focused either on Turkey's geostrategic concerns, such as the Turko-Greek rivalry and the Cold War, or the economic discourse used by the few diplomats throughout the negotiation process.¹⁷

Yet, between Turkey's initial application in 1959 and the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, very few Turks contextualized Turkey's intentions to integrate into the EEC economically or geostrategically. Rather, the above statements by the foreign ministers of Turkey's two rival parties, four years apart, attest to a language of a very different sort, one that spoke of integration in civilizational terms. This civilizational discourse signified Turkish membership in the EEC as the consummation of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision to 'raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization'.¹⁸ For the Turkish elite, joining the European Common Market was seamlessly incorporated into, and quickly became the benchmark and beacon for, this civilizational project.

In September 1959, Cihat İren, a Swiss-educated lawyer, economist and founder of two important business organizations, wrote in near revolutionary terms about Turkey and the Common Market: 'Not just industry, but all of our economic, social, and cultural institutions must be reorganized. Not on the basis of our particular conditions, but rather on the conditions of a community to which we belong and to which our destiny is tied'.¹⁹ In February of the following year, Feridun Ergin, a columnist for the daily paper *Cumhuriyet*, argued that, 'This [integration to the EEC] is a long term project spanning twenty to thirty years. What Turkey will gain by this process is a slow coalescing or coming

together of Turkish economic policies and politics with the mentality of the contemporary civilized world'.²⁰ A few months later, in September 1960, Ergin again characterized Turkey's integration with the EEC as part of much grander project, 'For those that wish to see Turkey reach the level of Western Civilization and the standards of its prosperity, the Common Market must be seen as an opportunity rarely produced by either fortune or history'.²¹

Politician and economics professor Aydın Yalçın wrote on 10 August 1960 in *Öncü*:

Turkey is a new state that has taken Europeanization, its culture, lifestyle, social and political organization, as its own reason for existence. Particularly since the time of Atatürk, the view that Turkey's salvation and development can only be achieved through Europeanization has been firmly adopted by our people. Since we have rejected being an Asian people, or a Middle Eastern state, and understood ourselves as in Europe, the EEC, in this regard, carries a different meaning. The considerations outlined above, which approach the Common Market from a social, political, but above all spiritual dimension, should come first in any decision. Only then should we consider the economic points.²²

This rhetorical framework, readily adopted by almost all members of the Turkish elite, continued unabated through the violent domestic upheavals between 1959 and 1963. Despite an increasingly authoritarian turn by the DP party, a military coup, the subsequent trial and execution of DP leaders, and the creation of the Second Turkish Republic, the tone and posture of Turkish statements toward the EEC remained the same.

The signing of the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963 was the elaborate and ostentatious peroration of the civilizational discourse developed by the Turkish elite over the previous years. The signing ceremony propelled Turkish–EEC relations to the forefront of Turkish political culture, a position they would occupy throughout the Second Republic. The press was quick to mimic the established civilizational framework in introducing the Agreement to the Turkish population. Vecihi Ünal's piece in *Akşam Gazetesi*, exemplifies the columns that filled the pages of Turkish newspapers following the signing ceremony:

Becoming a member of the Common Market means sharing a common economic, political, and cultural philosophy with the free and independent nations of Europe—it means the realization of Atatürk's, and therefore our

ideal. By integrating into the Common Market, no longer will Europe be alien to us, nor will we be Europhiles admiring Europe from afar, but we will now actually partake and be part of that life-style.²³

The signing of the Ankara Agreement had a number of long-term effects on Turkish understandings of the EEC, Europe, and Turkey's place within it. For most Turks, the agreement equated the idea of Europe with the EEC. In 1963, this was far from a self-evident or even logical connection. Alongside its membership in NATO (1952), Turkey was a member of two pan-European institutions that confirmed its European credentials—the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1948) and the Council of Europe (1949), all inclusive of a greater number of 'European' states than the EEC. Yet, when Turks opened their newspapers on 13 September 1963, they were told that they had, seemingly overnight, become Europeans.²⁴ A *Milliyet* headline covered half the front page: 'Turkey's Europeanness Has Been Validated'.²⁵ *Akşam Gazetesi* claimed 'Turkey Is Inescapably Part of Europe!'²⁶ *Hürriyet* headlined with 'Historical Agreement Signed Yesterday. We've Joined the Common Market!' and went on to exclaim how, 'This event is the most productive and concrete step in Turkey's 150-year effort to westernize and be considered an equal member of Western Civilization'.²⁷

The coupling of the EEC with the civilizational discourse within the Turkish social-imaginary catapulted the significance of Turkey's integration in the minds of Turks who came to see this union as the benchmark of the nation's success. Without this initial coupling, the EEC could not have had the effect on Turkish self-understanding it has enjoyed since. In such an atmosphere, criticism of the Ankara Agreement or the merits of Turkey's relations with the EEC became tantamount to treason.

The language Turks initially used to talk about an economic organization of six states was far more monumental and historically laden than the language surrounding Turkish membership in larger and, geostrategically speaking, more significant Cold War organizations. The reason for this is that Turkish integration into the EEC was signified in civilizational terms, as the consummation of Atatürk's vision.

NATIONALIST DISCOURSE AND TURKISH OPPOSITION

For its supporters, the EEC represented the culmination of the processional westward march of Turkish society, which slowly began in the eighteenth century, accelerating dramatically with the accession of Atatürk as its leader.

This reading traced a one-dimensional, linear, and teleological narrative of Turkish history that steamrolled over the numerous turns, tensions, and ambivalences within the near-history of Turkish–European relations.

The nationalist discourse that rose in opposition to the EEC, whether on the left or radical and Islamic right, was essentially directed against this one-dimensional reading of Turkey's past. It was a hermeneutical project that resurrected moments in Turko-European history that had been glossed over by the civilizational discourse, moments which harnessed the darker history of these relations in opposition to the EEC.²⁸ Interwar Kemalism had a very ambivalent stance towards the nation. On the one hand, it was a national project that was created and understood itself in antagonism to European imperialism. On the other, particularly in the 1920s when Atatürk sought rapprochement with the West, Kemalism was a project that saw the nation as little more than a means to join Western civilization and modernity. In this latter sense, the Turkish nation was divested of all previous characteristics (history, culture, etc.) so that it could take on the modern attributes of Europe. This latter strand is what the DP and RPP (until Ecevit) picked up on after the war, opening the way for the radical right and left to adopt the nationalist anti-imperial facets of Kemalism now disavowed by the centre parties.

Nationalist opposition to the EEC, first voiced by the Workers Party of Turkey (WPT), was not long in coming. On 14 September 1963, two days after the signing of the Ankara Agreement, the WPT distributed a note:

NO TO THE COMMON MARKET!

We are opposed with all our might and being to the Common Market agreement and the air of celebration [bayram] forced upon its signing ... The Common Market is incommensurable with our essential national interests and the spirit of national struggle [kuvayı millîye ruhu] these are based on.²⁹

A week later the WPT representative to the Senate, Niyazi Ağırnaslı, delivered a speech to a uniformly hostile Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Quieting the violent boos, shouts, and fist-banging of the other party representatives, the TGNA president introduced Niyazi Bey as follows: 'Despite your unanimous approval and the government's signature [claps, shouts of "Bravo"]', Niyazi Ağırnaslı from Ankara has requested to speak on Turkey's relations with the Common Market. He has, by law, a right to do so.'³⁰ In the fall of 1963, Ağırnaslı and fellow WPT members were the lone oppositional voices amidst a chorus of EEC supporters.

The WPT was not only the first political party to oppose integration, it was also the first party to challenge the hegemony of the Civilizational discourse in structuring the Turkish social imaginary. It introduced an altogether different way of speaking about the EEC, seeing it as antagonistic to Turkey's national interests, in this instance defined as a free but labouring people who had won their independence through a war against the European powers.

By the late 1960s, the newly formed ultra-right wing National Action Party (NAP) and the Islamic National Salvation Party (NSP), cutting across Cold War divisions, had joined ranks with the left through a nationalist discourse of opposition. Interpreting the EEC as an economic and cultural encroachment on Turkey's national interests, the NAP was vehemently opposed to the Common Market. The party programme adopted in June 1973 stated that:

The NAP is not against regional economic organizations. On the other hand, we consider it a national duty to resist all organizations that reach beyond the economic domain toward social, cultural, and political integration. The Common Market, which is nothing more than the belated and indirect application of the Sevres Treaty, will lead to a social and cultural deformation of our nation.³¹

In perhaps the strongest indication of how the EEC debate was redrawing the terrain of Turkish politics, the NAP came close to praising their Cold War arch-enemy in its struggle against the Common Market. The editors of *Devlet* (State), the semi-official mouthpiece of the NAP, prefaced their first special EEC issue by stating that, 'certain other forces [referring to the socialists] are already engaged in criticizing the Common Market on economic grounds'. While they felt this to be an important undertaking (an implicit and rare acknowledgement of socialists as national subjects within the ultra-nationalist imaginary), they nonetheless called on true nationalists to, 'focus their attentions on the cultural aspects of EEC imperialism and its threat to Turkey's national interests'.³²

The Islamic right, for its own part, viewed the EEC as yet another instrument of Christian-Zionist imperial control. Before the Turkish National Assembly the leader of the NSP, Necmettin Erbakan, likened the EEC to a three-storey building. 'On the top floor sit the Jews, below them the Americans, and finally on the bottom, the Europeans. They're inviting us into the basement', Erbakan claimed, 'as the building superin-

tendent [kapıcı]'.³³ Throughout the 1970s, Erbakan advocated immediate withdrawal from the EEC, the severance of all ties and relations with Western European states, and a new orientation toward the Arab countries to the East, 'where Turkey could ascend to its role as the rightful leader of Muslim world'.³⁴

By the early 1970s, Turkish opposition to the Common Market had reached such a state that the Turkish National Assembly was on the verge of not ratifying the Additional Protocol necessary to advance integration with the EEC to its second phase. It took the military intervention of 1971, which rammed through the ratification upon a cowed National Assembly, to set Turkish-EEC relations back on track. EEC supporters, finding themselves in an increasingly hostile environment, sounded the alarm. Professor Aydın Yalçın's 1972 article in *Milliyet* typified the response of those expounding the Civilizational discourse:

The importance of the multi-lateral institutions Turkey joined in the aftermath of WWII, namely NATO and the European Council, especially in terms of their symbolic function of representing us as a part of Europe, are now being eclipsed by the EEC. Yet Turkey today finds herself on the margins of this European development. In these upcoming years we must guard against any actions that could stall or freeze our political, social, economic, and spiritual integration with Europe. Otherwise, just as in the 1920s and 30s we will once again follow on the path of isolation.³⁵

Yet, Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and Europe's unequivocal condemnation of it added further fuel to nationalist opposition. In the aftermath of Cyprus, the Nationalist discourse vaulted from the periphery to the core of Turkish political culture, becoming by decade's end the predominant framework through which Turkish-EEC relations were signified in Turkey. Between 1974 and 1980, Turkish opposition, which had emerged in university dormitories and radical youth groups, spread throughout the mainstream press and bureaucracy, even making its way into segments of the diplomatic corps. Perhaps most significantly, it penetrated the secular nationalist camp, spearheaded by the left-of-center RPP, long-time defenders of Atatürk's Westernization project. The left wing of the party, led by party president and thrice prime-minister Bülent Ecevit, increasingly began to speak of the EEC as antagonistic to Turkey's national interests.

Unlike the more radical opposition groups, however, Ecevit brought a more measured approach to the Common Market, positioning it within the

European tradition as a whole. He believed that Turko-European relations were marked by an internal contradiction rooted in a crisis of European modernity. For Ecevit, the universal ideals of freedom, social justice, and democracy Europe birthed had become endangered by the profit-driven imperatives of its 'liberal capitalist' economic system. Ecevit argued that rather than resolving this contradiction, the West had simply exported the problem through its relations with the developing world.³⁶ The rise of multi-national entities like the Common Market was, for Ecevit, the latest vehicle through which the West's internal crisis was being thrown onto the shoulders of the non-Western world.³⁷ In 1975 he wrote that, 'It is such that the West, which fosters and takes pride in the functioning of democracy and social justice in their own countries, is, from an economic standpoint, forced to deny these privileges to the developing world.'³⁸ For Ecevit, this created an inherent contradiction between the ideological and material relationships the West fostered with the rest of the world. As new multi-national entities like the EEC,

Largely determined the foreign relations of Western states, the 'natural affinity' between the peoples of the developing world and the Western countries, an affinity derived from 'shared aspirations for freedom and social justice', has been trumped by economic forces that demanded a compliant population.³⁹

As these ideas began to resonate among the secular nationalists, a greater number of them more openly came out against Turkish integration into the Common Market. With the RPP rapidly shifting toward the opposition, the JP was left as the sole defender of Turkish integration within the National Assembly. By the late 1970s, the Nationalist discourse began to have a material impact on Turkish–EEC negotiations themselves, culminating in Ecevit's 1978 decision to 'freeze' relations 'until a new formula had been negotiated'.⁴⁰

THE FINAL CONFRONTATION

In this increasingly sour atmosphere, Hyrettin Erkmen, the foreign minister of the newly formed JP government, announced in February 1980 the intention to apply for full EEC membership.⁴¹ The announcement came as a complete shock to Turks and Europeans alike. When it became clear that Erkmen was serious rather than bluffing his way into concessions

from Europe, the opposition sprang into action, providing the final showcase for the hegemonic struggle between the civilizational and nationalist discourses.

On 5 September 1980, seven days before the military takeover, Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic NSP, exercised his third interpellation against the JP government, specifically accusing him of 'betraying the national interest in his beliefs and actions as Foreign Minister'.⁴² The first charge read as follows:

The respected minister has, from his first day, attempted to thrust Turkey into union with the Common Market; a union that would invariably turn us into a satellite of Europe, estrange us from the Muslim world, and force us into political integration with the West.⁴³

In his response, Erkmen addressed what he felt to be the two most vociferous objections to Turkish membership. To the belief that the European Parliament was a supra-national organization exercising sovereignty over individual nations, Erkmen calmly explained the role allotted to it under the institutional structure of the EEC—which, in 1980, amounted to very little. At the same time, Erkmen claimed, the European Parliament was making important decisions about the future state of Europe, and Turkey, as an associate member, was being left out of these decisions.⁴⁴ To the widespread belief that by joining the EEC, Turkey would become a colony of powerful European states, Erkmen had the following rejoinder:

Forget seriousness, there is not even a trace of poetry in this belief. There is apprehension, anxiety, or intentional misdirection but no ounce of truth. If the Common Market is the great colonizing country, then are England, France, its colonies? Each one of the member states has a functioning parliament and unconditionally exercises its right to sovereignty. If they do so, what is to stop us from doing the same?⁴⁵

In answering both of these objections, Erkmen took issue with the 'us' versus 'them' mentality employed by the opposition discourse, which opposed Turkey to a negative image of Europe. His retorts aimed to erase this inclusion/exclusion dichotomy by relocating the Turkish subject from an external position (from which European culture seemed monolithic and homogenizing) to within the inner workings of the EEC (where European civilization was seen as a pluralist conglomeration of many cultures).

This relocation of the imaginary Turkish subject from an antagonistic to an inclusive position was Erkmen's ingenious attempt to revitalize the Civilizational discourse. He did not dispute the particular Nationalist objections of the opposition (on the uniqueness of the Turkish language, its culture, and the importance nationalists of all stripes attached to Turkish sovereignty), but much more fundamentally disputed their expression through the antagonistic ontology of the Nationalist discourse. The Nationalist discourse had structured understandings of the Turkish nation in opposition to the EEC, specifically identifying the Turkish nation as that which was prevented from full realization by the presence of the EEC. What Erkmen was offering in its stead was a vision of Turkish culture incorporated into the tapestry of cultures that comprised Western civilization. In hindsight, hung in the balance of these two scenarios, was the Turkish social imaginary, caught between immersion into a global civilization which increasingly commodified the differentiation of culture (where Turkey would become the land of shish kebabs and carpets) and the preservation of the nation through continued confrontation with the West. While it would be a full 20 years before Erkmen's vision became crystallized into the official motto of the European Union, 'United in Diversity', Turks of the late 1970s were debating its meaning and significance as an existential possibility.

The interpellation served as the final battle between the Nationalist and Civilizational discourses. It was the culmination of nearly two decades of struggle between two ways of talking about Turkish-EEC relations, each with its own way of imagining Turkey. As a testament to how far the tables had turned since the WPT first unveiled the Nationalist discourse in 1963, the boos and fist-banging that had accompanied Ağırnaslı's TGNA speech 17 years prior were now directed toward the last true proponent of the Civilizational discourse. Despite Erkmen's reasoned response to the anti-EEC camp, RPP support for Erbakan's interpellation secured enough votes to remove Erkmen from his post. Seven days later, on 12 September 1980, the Turkish Armed Forces would carry out their third and most violent military intervention—abruptly ending the history of Turkey's initial encounter with the European Economic Community.

This chapter has traced how and why the EEC came to occupy a privileged place in Turkish debates about the past, present, and future of their country. Two discourses, one civilizational, the other national, informed Turkish attitudes concerning the EEC. By resonating and amplifying the long history and ambivalences in Turkish attitudes toward the West, these

discourses cut across existing Cold War divisions and allowed Turks to resurrect a vital debate about who they were and where they were going. It was these connections to past ways of thinking about Turkey and its place in the world that allowed the EEC to eclipse the Cold War as the primary register by which Turks of the Second Republic came to understand themselves.

NOTES

1. See Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey, America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987); George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945–71* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1972); Andrew Mango, *Turkey, A Delicately Poised Ally* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1975); Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); Erik Jan Zürcher *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); Özgür Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1974).
2. See Cangül Örnek and Çağdas Üngör (eds.), *Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2013).
3. Jamil Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011).
4. Barın Kayaoğlu, 'Strategic Imperatives, Democratic Rhetoric: The United States and Turkey, 1945–52', *Cold War History* 9, no. 3 (2009): 321–45.
5. George McGhee, *The U.S.-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Dionysios Chourchoulis, *The Southern Flank of NATO: 1951–1959. Military Strategy or Political Stabilization* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014).
6. Barış Doster, 'Türkiye'de NATO Karşıtlığının Tarihsel ve Siyasal Kökenleri' ['The historical and political roots of Turkish opposition to NATO'], *Ortadoğu Analiz* 4, no. 40 (2012): 31–41.
7. The only exception being the Workers Party of Turkey which gained three per cent of the vote and sent 15 MPs to the National Assembly in 1965.

8. Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye:1945–1980* [*The Turkish road to Democracy*] (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1994).
9. Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 246.
10. See Duygu Sezer, *Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika* [*Public opinion and foreign policy*] (Ankara: A.Ü.S.B.F, 1972). Journals such as *Forum* and later *Yön* were the exceptions that proved the rule.
11. See Meltem Müftüler-Baç, *Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press: 1997), 3.
12. TBMM Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.genel_secimler, accessed 30 January 2015.
13. For a more detailed analysis and theoretical discussion of these discourses, see Mehmet Döşemeci, *Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
14. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu* [*Turkey and the European Union*] (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993), 7.
15. Şaban Çalış, *Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri* [*Turkey–EU Relations*] (Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2001), 41.
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PART VI

Conclusion

The Balkans: A Cold War Mystery

Odd Arne Westad

As an international system, the Cold War was riddled with contradictions. Alliances that seemed to be based on ideological cohesion split apart much more readily than those based on practical interest. Countries that were strongly inimical towards each other joined the same set of alliances, because their fear of the ideological and strategic challenge posed by one of the superpowers was stronger than the fear of their neighbour. And, as with all ideology-based international systems, the role of mavericks and non-conformists was high up on the playbill, simply because they were so visible on stage: in a system based on conformity, it does not take much extra plumage to stand out.¹

The Balkans demonstrated these contradictions better than most places. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia split in 1948, in spite of the two countries' leaders being closer on ideological issues than most other communists in Eastern Europe. Romania stayed within the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, but remained a political fly in the ointment for Moscow from the early 1960s up to the end of the Cold War. Greece and Turkey—long-term adversaries in the Balkans—both joined NATO, in spite of the intensity of

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their conflict (not least over Cyprus). It was Cold War as Process Art, a conflict that was supposed to be as frozen as much in ideals as in division lines aptly dissolved by improvisation.

The chapters in this volume lay out the key stages of the process, and this conclusion will discuss some of the key findings the authors present. But before doing so, it is necessary to outline what should be considered the main mystery of Cold War Balkan politics, diplomacy, and social development. Its core is this: given the degree of dissonance with almost all general Cold War rules that existed within the Balkans from 1945 to 1989, why did the Cold War in Europe not unravel from there, but rather from the north-eastern corner of the continent, namely Poland and the Baltic states? What was it about the Cold War Balkans that seemed to produce heterodoxy and conformity at the same time? We shall return to this mystery at the end of the chapter, but it is useful to bear it in mind as we journey through some of the key issues in the volume.

Like the First World War—the conflict that set in motion most of the twentieth-century’s travails—the Cold War could be said to have started in the Balkans. In his address to a joint session of Congress in March 1947—often dubbed ‘the Truman Doctrine’—US President Harry S. Truman made Greece and Turkey test cases for US efforts to counter the Soviet Union and communism everywhere in the world. ‘Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East’, Truman proclaimed.

But the Truman Doctrine was, as historians have noted, not primarily about the Balkans. Its intention was to signal an American willingness to confront Soviet and communist power everywhere, and to mobilize the American people in support for this campaign. ‘We shall not realize our objectives’, the president said,

unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.²

In this sense, the Truman Doctrine signalled the Cold War’s globalization, not its localization. As with the First World War, the Balkans was an insufficient but non-redundant cause for the Cold War in the form it took after 1947.

In its local incarnation, though, the Cold War could be said to have much deeper roots than the Truman doctrine. Some of these roots came out of the nineteenth century. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a vacuum that local movements and international actors strove to fill, in terms of state formations, political ideologies, and social development. Germany and Italy—in different ways and at different times—confronted British power in the Eastern Mediterranean. After 1918, the conflict between right-wing nationalist projects and the domestic left became more intense. And, from the 1930s through to the end of the Second World War, the issue of collaboration with or resistance against the expansion of German power in the Balkans reigned supreme everywhere. As elsewhere in Europe, the question split local elites apart within each Balkan country. For some, the fear of the Soviet Union and of social revolution combined with revisionist territorial claims to create a near-perfect political climate for collaboration. For others, the fear of German control and emphasis on national independence outweighed the gains collaboration could produce. The result everywhere—except Turkey, which had stayed out of the war—was a fatal weakening of the national elites created in the Balkans in the nineteenth century.

By 1944 Balkan leaders were scrambling to adjust to a new international scene in which German power was evaporating and Soviet power rising. Even without the tremendous and unexpected advance of the Red Army, though, it is pretty clear that all the Balkan countries involved in the Second World War would have faced social and political revolutions in the aftermath of the conflict. These were countries ripe for political revolt—de-legitimized elites, long-term economic failure, and communal dislocation—although the political outcome of these revolutions would have been different without Soviet and US interventions. Soviet power secured local communist control in Bulgaria and Romania. US power secured an anti-communist victory in Greece and protection for the Ankara government against Soviet and separatist claims. By 1947 the Balkans seemed headed for a strict Cold War division of the region, similar to that of Central Europe (or northeast Asia, for that matter).³

But then most things went haywire. Stalin's excommunication of Tito and the Yugoslav Communists—an unanticipated, haphazard, and imprudent act if there ever were one in international politics—broke the pattern of Cold War stability. In 1948 Yugoslavia was the core country in the Balkans. Its military reach was bigger than any of the others, with the possible exception of Turkey. Tito's role in liberating his own country

from German occupation made him a respected figure well outside the communist camp (in spite of the brutality with which he secured his rule). The break with Yugoslavia in effect removed Soviet power from the Mediterranean, doomed the communist rebellion in Greece (in which Stalin had little faith from the beginning), and created an independent centre of communist power in Southern Europe. Thinking from a post-Cold War perspective, the West could not have produced a better result even if they had had their own intelligence services plan for it.⁴

Diversity was therefore almost from the beginning of the Cold War the name of the game in the Balkans. This diversity became more intense as Yugoslavia diverged from the Soviet scheme both domestically and internationally. As Perišić points out in this volume, this was an enforced and almost arbitrary divergence. At the beginning of 1948, the vast majority of Yugoslav communists had no intention of deviating from the Soviet experience in building socialism. Quite on the contrary, both Tito and other leaders spoke about the need to bring Yugoslav practice *closer* to that of the Soviets, so that it could benefit from the social and technological know-how of their comrades from the east. It was only after Stalin chucked them out of the communist community that they realized the need for a distinct Yugoslav road to communism. The more liberal form of communism practised by Belgrade was therefore an afterthought, created in part by the need for national mobilization and cohesion and in part by the need to appeal to the West for support.

By the mid-1950s, however, Yugoslav particularism had become an established trend, both in the country itself and in its international appeal. 'Titoism'—a term Stalin had created as an opprobrium, possibly because it sounded like the hated 'Trotskyism'—began having a more positive value, connected to Yugoslavia's promotion of concepts such as workers' self-management in collectively-owned enterprises and profit-sharing between workers and the government in larger companies. Even after the partial post-Stalin reconciliation with Moscow from 1955, the Yugoslav leaders kept their ideological predilections, which now had come to be a significant part of their identity. Though Yugoslav socialism was less than a success in domestic economic terms, at least over time, its distinctiveness helped Tito build close relations with Third World revolutionaries who also wanted to be socialists without accepting the full Soviet package of centralization and rigorous planning.

Such is the role that chance sometimes plays in history. The outcome can be far removed from the intended result. What is most surprising,

perhaps—especially in light of our mystery outlined above—is that Yugoslav reform communism and Western European radical social democracy (and later euro-communism) did not pull more closely together throughout the Cold War. That such a convergence did not happen vis-à-vis *Eastern* Europe is not difficult to explain. ‘Titoism’ was the main target of Stalin’s Eastern European purges in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Eastern European leaders after Stalin feared the effect the Yugoslav example could have and policed their own parties ruthlessly against any ‘Titoist infections’. But it is also clear that Tito himself did not see any advantages for Yugoslavia in other Eastern European countries turning in his political direction. The challenge to the Soviets would be too great and might endanger Yugoslavia’s own security.

With regard to Western Europe there was also a great deal of Yugoslav reluctance to enter into closer relations with the left. Tito feared that Western European influence, which grew in the 1960s and 1970s through tourism and migrant workers, could endanger his and his party’s grip on power at home. At times, leaders in the Yugoslav party were almost as fearful of Western European inspiration as the Soviets and their allies. Indeed, this fear was a main reason why the Third World alternative came to overshadow Western European links. Like with Eastern Europe, Tito was also worried that too close links with Western European socialists would provoke the Soviets, in return for very limited gains to the Yugoslavs themselves. Throughout its existence, the heads of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were far more interested in Western financial support and security links than with any anti-Cold War ideological alliances inside the West.⁵

The Balkan Pact of 1953/4 is the best example of Yugoslavia’s need for security against the Soviet Union, the very good reasons for which are laid out in Mark Kramer’s chapter. The only example of a formal alliance across ideological boundaries in the Cold War, the Balkan Pact provided for military assistance from the other parties if one of them were attacked. It linked together a conservative monarchy in Greece, a nationalist and centralist republic in Turkey, and a Communist state in Yugoslavia in a defensive alliance. But the incongruousness of Yugoslavia’s presence in such company was soon overshadowed by tensions between the two non-communist NATO member states, which rendered the pact useless only a few years after its signing. If Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviets was the first Balkan Cold War earthquake, then the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus was certainly the second.

How NATO and the West managed to avoid the collapse of their Balkan alliance system is discussed in several chapters in this volume (Ayşegül Sever, Effie Pedaliu, Eirini Karamouzi, and Mehmet Döşemeci). As the authors point out, the main reason was the combination of two deep fears held both in Athens and Ankara: that a war between them would weaken both states internally and that they would find themselves excluded from the anti-communist external security that NATO membership (and eventually the hope of European Community membership) entailed. Given the intensity of conflict between the two over Cyprus—both before and after the Turkish invasion that led to the 1974 partition of the island—that both countries tried to exploit, the advantages of their NATO membership is perhaps not surprising. But, for our purposes here, it is worth noting that it was at least in part bigger Cold War concerns that prevented the centrifugal bilateral relationship from throwing one or both countries out of their US and Western European alliance.

In contrast with the turbulence within the Cold War experienced by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, Bulgaria had a stolid, almost staid experience after the first post-war years of social upheaval. Part of the reason for the relatively uneventful Bulgarian communist experience was that the country was perhaps the only place in Eastern Europe where communism delivered what seemed a viable development strategy. From the early part of the twentieth century, Bulgarian elites had sought ways in which to achieve forms of industrialization and agricultural efficiency that would at least bring them up to the same level as their more advanced Balkan neighbours. The Soviet development model delivered reasonable growth for Bulgaria, obviously in part because of the low starting point. But political stability along with learning from the Soviet economic experience meant that by the end of the Cold War in terms of per capita income Bulgaria was not only ahead of the other Balkan Communist states, but also equalled that of Turkey or of Poland.⁶

By contrast, the 'national communist' experiments in the Balkans did not do well in economic terms, at least not from the 1960s on. Yugoslavia's economic growth stagnated. Albania, with its curious Chinese alliance, was even by communist standards an economic basket case. Romania, whose leaders constantly challenged the Soviets within the COMECON and Warsaw Pact from the mid-1960s, did not fare well either. In fact, the decline in Romania's economic fortunes was especially precipitous, since most of the visible economic progress was based on foreign loans. In

economic terms, at least, Cold War dissent was not a safe way to progress in the Balkans.

Contrast this with the Greek experience. Through its links with Western Europe and the United States, Greece went through an economic revolution. In 1950 its gross domestic product per capita was only slightly ahead of Bulgaria's. Forty years later, it was about three times bigger. This sea change began in the 1960s, but sped up after Greece's democratization and took off after its 1981 European Community membership. Greece, it seems, benefitted both from an open and trade-based economy and from its Cold War alliances. It is worth asking whether the former would have been possible without the latter. Even though it is now abundantly clear that parts of Greece's economic integration with capitalist Europe was premature both for that country and its partners, it is still obvious that Greece's overall development was helped by its ability to join Western alliances.

Put together, these points—culled from the research that is presented in this volume—may help us understand why the Cold War proved more durable as an international system in the Balkans than the high level of internal bloc dissonance may at first seem to allow for. Greece benefitted in many ways from the Cold War (even though its dreadful experience with civil war and dictatorship long seemed to indicate otherwise). So did Bulgaria, though it was even less free than Greece to choose its own partners. As for Romania and the Greco-Turkish conflict, the United States and the Soviet Union were willing to live with Cold War mavericks as long as open rebellions inside the alliances could be avoided.

The Cold War, it seems, played a useful role for many of the regional power-holders. The external superpower threat helped keep alliances and regimes afloat, even when many national purposes might have led in a different direction. In the Balkans, local conflicts kept the Cold War in place, while the Cold War kept local conflicts if not frozen, then contained. This is true both for the Greco-Turkish conflict, which it is hard to think would not have led to war if not for the fact that both countries belonged to the same international alliance, and for the internal conflicts in Yugoslavia, so disastrous after the Cold War was over.

Other explanations could, of course, also be brought to bear. Yugoslavia—the only Balkan state that could have been a serious threat to inner-bloc stability, especially after 1956—deliberately limited any impact its alternative model of communism might have had within the Warsaw Pact countries. In terms of European significance, especially from a strate-

gic point of view, Poland and north-eastern Europe were (and are) much more important to great power relations than any Balkan country, and their potential defection from the Soviet camp a much more existential threat to the Cold War system. But, even so, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that Balkan discord was less of a danger mainly because local self-containment fitted with the ordering and domination that were primary superpower aims during the Cold War.

NOTES

1. The role of the maverick is of course not unknown in earlier bipolar conflicts either. I write this close to Walsingham in Norfolk, a place that saw more than its fair share of idiosyncrasies during the Reformation.
2. President Harry S Truman's Address before a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp.
3. For an overview, see Svetozar Rajak's excellent chapter in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1: 198–220.
4. Mark Kramer's (Chap. 2) superb overview in this volume shows just how precipitous Stalin's actions were, and how disastrous their consequences.
5. See Evanthis Hatzivassiliou's (Chap. 4) in this volume for an overview of Western views.
6. Stephen Broadberry and Alexander Klein, 'Aggregate and per Capita GDP in Europe, 1870–2000: Continental, Regional and National Data with Changing Boundaries', *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 60, no. 1 (2012): 79–107.

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